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Abstract
Water is a primary human need. The supply of water has not increased in the face of 
population growth. At present severe pressure exists on water supplies in California and 
along the river system both in the developed and developing world (especially in the 
case of the Nile in Egypt). Whatever our policy stance towards the economics of water 
supply (the liberal market, social democracy and democratic socialism), cost 
management and processes are central to the water sector.
The control or governing ideas within which cost management takes place are the two 
major concerns of this thesis. These two issues were explored in a case study of the 
General Organisation for the Greater Cairo Water Supply, focusing specifically upon 
government policy, administrative controls, the influence of public sector bodies and 
other customers. Control procedures, the perceptions and experiences of managers 
(regarding policy choice), cost management policies and practices, environmental 
demands (both market and physical), were all sought. Data was collected from multiple 
sources (triangulation) involving interviews, questionnaires, documentation, direct 
observation and participant observation.
The research findings showed that the practice of cost management has developed. 
Reasons were multi-fold: (a) To keep costs well above revenue (b) To engender a 
factor-resources cost and technical approach to cost management (for efficiency and 
optimisation) (c) To deflect any attention away from strategic cost management (d) To 
engender an organisational belief that ambiguity and unpredictability in the 
environmental market is impossible to handle (e) To deny the relevance of customer 
cost/usage efficiency as a matter of systemic significance.
This ‘evolution of control’ is explained through the theoretical context of institutional 
theory; demonstrating how values, beliefs and modes of regulation have produced a 
technical and passive non-reactive control system.
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MPWWR The Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources
MTSS Management and a Training and System Strengthening
OFWAT Office of Water Service
OIE Old Institutional Economic theory
P(CI) Perception of Competitive Intensity
P (Un) Perception of Unpredictability
PA Principal-Agent Theory
SBU Strategic Business Unit
SCM Strategic Cost Management
SMA Strategic Management Accounting
TA Throughput Accounting
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TFA Total Factor Cost
TQM Total Quality Management
UAS The Unified Accounting System
USAID The U.S. Agency for International Development
V C Value Chain
V. E. Value Engineering
ZBB Zero-Based Budgeting
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.0 Introduction
This thesis offers an explanation for the role of cost management in the Egyptian water 
industry. Chapter one outlines the contributory value of this thesis and links it to wider 
research in this area (see sections 1.1 and 1.2). It also explains reasons for the author's 
interest in this topic, and the rationale for choosing it (see section 1.3).
The chapter outlines the theoretical framework (see section 1.4) and the research 
methodology and method (see section 1.5) used in the research. It gives a brief synopsis 
of the contents of chapters in this thesis (see section 1.6).
1.1 Background
This research investigates the role of cost management in the water industry. There are 
several definitions of cost management. Brimson (1996: 104) argues that cost 
management is the “management and control of activities to determine an accurate 
product cost, improve business processes, eliminate waste, identify cost drivers, plan 
operations, and set business strategies”. Homgren, et al., (1999: 875) argue that cost 
management is the “actions of managers undertaken to satisfy customers while 
continuously reducing and controlling costs”. The Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants defines cost management as follows: “Cost management is the application 
of management accounting concepts, methods of data allocation, analysis and 
presentation, in order to provide the information required to enable costs to be planned, 
monitored and controlled” (CIMA, 2000: 27).
Scapens (1991) notes that whilst there is a large and ever-growing ‘tool-chest’ of 
modem management accounting techniques, (including cost-volume-profit analysis, 
activity-based costing etc) "little can be said at the theoretical level about the techniques 
(tools) which should generally be used in practice" (p. 219). He goes on to argue that 
before the gap between theory and practice can be closed, "researchers must examine 
the various roles which management accounting fulfils within the organisation" (p.
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221). He goes on to argue that there is little1 evidence of how different costing methods 
are being used. There is much less research on why only one method is used and why 
one method is preferred over another. Similarly there is a dearth of research on how 
accounting practices have developed over time and on the sources (institutions) that 
have influenced that development. In addition Simons (1992: 44) raised the question 
"What role can accounting play in stimulating emergent strategies?" Scapens (1991: 10) 
contends that "the terms ‘cost accounting’ and ‘management accounting’ now tend to be 
used synonymously in textbook titles".
In cost management literature, evidence of renewed interest was witnessed from the 
reaction to Johnson and Kaplan (1987) who argued that the systematic structures of cost 
accounting did not make much of a connection with the systematic problems of 
managing an enterprise. They also contend that the cost management accounting 
systems (which do support financial reporting requirements) are difficult to justify 
economically. A great deal of recent cost management literature has centred around 
activity-based costing (Banker and Hughes, 1994; Cooper and Kaplan, 1992; and Datar 
and Gupta, 1994). However other modem cost management tools such as 
‘benchmarking’ (Elnathan and Kim, 1995) and just-in-time inventory systems (Alles, et 
al., 1995) have also recently been examined.
Cost management has three dimensions to it: Efficiency, optimisation and strategy (Al- 
Hazami, 1995). Most researchers concentrate on efficiency (Thompson, 1967; Miller, 
1989; Williams and Giardina, 1993; Ezzamel, et al., 1994; Dugdale, et al., 1996; 
Homgren, et al., 1999) . Others focus on optimisation (Tumey, 1991b; Anotos, 1992; 
Cooper, et al., 1992; Harmmer and Champy, 1993; Brimson, 1996; Smith, 1997; 
Trussel and Binter, 1998; 1998; Rouse and Putterill, 2000) and strategy4 (Ansoff, 1965; 
Anthony, 1965; Mintzberg, 1978; Miles and Snow, 1978; Simmonds, 1981; 1982; 1985; 
1986; Simons, 1987; 1990; 1995; Bromwich, 1988; 1990; Dent, 1990 and Johnson and 
Scholes, 1993).
1 With the exception o f  a few studies (Ask and Ax, 1992; Drury and Tayles, 1994; 2000; Innes and 
Mitchell, 1995).
2 See section 4.1.
3 See section 4.4.
4 See section 5.2.
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Strategic management accounting has attracted attention from numerous authors to its 
different aspects. For instance, Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Simmonds, 1981; 1982; 
1985; 1986; Bromwich, 1988; Allen, 1985; and Taylor and Graham, 1992; all 
emphasise the extension beyond management accounting's internal focus to include, for 
example external information about competitors, see section 5.2.1). There has been 
extensive and rapidly growing literature on strategic management accounting 
(Simmonds, 1981; Shank, 1989; Bromwich, 1990; Dent, 1990; Wilson, 1991; Hartman, 
1993).
Some researchers focused on business strategy, - identifying the relationship between 
the strategic position chosen by a firm and the expected emphasis on management 
accounting5 (see section 5.2.2). Others advocate an analysis of ways to decrease costs 
and/or enhance differentiation of firm products, through exploiting linkages in the value 
chain and optimising cost drivers6 (see section 5.2.3).
1.2 Objectives and research questions
The main objectives of this study are to understand, describe and explain the role of cost 
management in the water industry. The focus of this study is the service water industry 
in Egypt. This research will study the problems of cost management which have arisen 
in the Egyptian water system. Cost management will be examined as a whole system, 
from different viewpoints, including accounting (managerial and economic perspective), 
and Government policy (social and political perspective).
Taking the main objective and the meaning of the term ‘cost management’, questions to 
be addressed in this research include:
5 Ansoff, 1965; Anthony, 1965; Miles and Snow, 1978; Andrew, 1971; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 1996; 
Mintzberg, 1973; Dent, 1990; Goold and Quinn, 1990; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Simons, 1987; 
Shank, 1989; Shank and Govindarajan, 1989; Porter, 1980; 1985; 1990; Gray, 1990; and Hartmann, 1999.
6 Hargert and Morris, 1989; Shank and Govindarajan, 1992b; Nanni, et al., 1992; Harland, 1996; Ellram, 
1991; Williamson, 1985; Berry, et al., 1997; Seal, et al., 1999; Slack, et al., 1998; and Rajagopal and 
Bernard, 1993.
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• What is the current cost structure for the provision of Egyptian water services?
n
(descriptive and illustrative)
• What is the rationale of the companies for the cost structure? (explanatory)6
• What methods of cost accounting were/are used in the Egyptian water industry? 
(descriptive and illustrative)6
• What is the role of the accounting (its nature and function) in controlling the water 
industry? (descriptive and explanatory)6
1.3 The motivation of the study
The motivation to research this area of study arose from a desire to understand the 
contribution of cost management to the complex task of decision-making. Many 
researchers draw attention to the importance of cost management. Rajaopal and Bernard 
(1993) claim that cost management draws on a number of functions but concentrates on 
total quality management, negotiating, and supplier alliances. Horngren (1995) argues 
that the focus of cost management should be on decision making, while Cooper (1996) 
argues that the growing importance of cost management is significantly changing the 
practice of management accounting. Seal, et al., (1999) argue that cost information not 
only plays a role in the strategic sourcing decision but will also influence the ongoing 
management of partnerships. In a strategic approach, the ongoing management of a 
strategic partnership should be on cost rather than a price basis. This thesis explains cost 
management in the Egyptian Water industry.
Young and Selto (1991: 288) in their review of research in new manufacturing practices 
and cost management stated that "In order to have a significant impact on either the 
academic or practitioner community, cost management research will have to assess the 
economic, behavioural and social consequences of new manufacturing practices and 
new cost management methods". Durden and Mak (1999) argue that the focus of a 
contemporary costing system should be on cost management, not extended reporting. 
They argue that if cost management is the primary purpose of a costing system, then it 
is appropriate to report overhead variances as a period cost, rather than pro-rating these 
variances to various accounts. The researcher's view is that the future of the water
7 A term identified by Scapens (1990).
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industry in Egypt will potentially change focus from cost management of supply to cost 
management of demand.
A second motivation was that the future looks bleak if Egypt does not succeed in 
formulating and implementing a water management policy which can match limited 
fresh supply with increasing demand. Per capita water resources were expected to drop 
from about 922 m3per year (in 1990) to about 337 m3per year in the year 2025. This 
will help change the focus from cost management of supply to cost management of 
demand. Hvidt (1998) in his research identified eight characteristics from his analysis of 
water resource planning in Egypt. They were: (a) a shift from water abundance to water 
deficit, (b) the importance of international co-operation (c) supply bias (d) 
environmental concern (e) lack of data (f) established priority to non-agricultural uses of 
water (g) delayed implementation and (h) an uncertain administrative framework in 
water resource planning.
1.4 Theoretical framework
Institutional theory is adopted as a framework for explaining the role of cost 
management in the Egyptian Water Industry. There are differing views of institutional 
theory; from the economic, political and sociological perspectives. Each of these 
dimensions has been used by previous studies to examine different management 
accounting issues. The core idea of each view is discussed later in the thesis (see section 
2 .2).
This thesis uses neo-institutional economic theory to explain the operation of cost 
management in the GOGCWS (see section 11.2). The study examines how government 
policy (a coercive institutional pressure) influenced the choice of accounting system in 
the GOGCWS. The justification for the choice of neo-institutional economic theory is 
fully discussed later in the thesis. However, the theory offers a better explanation for 
cost management practices in the GOGCWS, which operated in an unchanging and 
relatively static environment. The thesis also offers alternative governance structures for 
the water industry in different countries from a neo-institutional economic8 theory 
perspective (such as the UK where water is provided by a highly regulated market,
8 According to neo-institutional economic theory (transaction cost), there are three models o f  governance: 
(1) markets (2) hybrids and (3) hierarchies or internalisation (Williamson, 1996).
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France where water services are a hybrid structure and bgypt where water services are a 
hierarchical (see sections 7.2.5 and 10.1.1).
There are significant differences between the neo-classical economic theory9 and the 
neo-institutional economic theory. Perhaps the most significant differences for this 
research is related to the first element of cost management (efficiency). Neo-classical 
economic theory defines cost management in three ways: allocative efficiency or pareto 
efficiency, productive or technical efficiency and dynamic or interemporal efficiency. In 
contrast, neo-institutional economic theorists have expressed strong reservations about 
using the pareto efficiency criterion to justify government intervention. They also argue 
that by comparing real-world arrangements against the ideal of allocative efficiency 
rather than feasible institutional alternatives, policy-makers have become far too 
inclined to prescribe government intervention.
There are two views of management accounting within institutional research. The first 
view sees management accounting as an institution within the organisation (Bums and 
Scapens, 1998; 2000). The second view shows accounting as primarily concerned with 
the effects of the external or macro-institutional, (i.e. effect of the social, economic and 
political on accounting practices of organisations, Covaleski, et al., 1993; 1996; 
Carruthers, 1995).
This research takes into consideration the two views of management accounting within 
institutional research (see sections 11.2.2 and 11.2.3). Thus the accounting system (the 
unified accounting system) is an institution within the GOGCWS (see section 8.5) and 
also institutional pressures exerted by the Egyptian government shapes accounting 
practice (the UAS) in the GOGCWS (see chapters 9, 10 and 11).
The explanations of this research are centred around two propositions: (a) Government 
policy (coercive isomorphism) shapes the limited use of cost management for 
efficiency, optimisation and strategy (b) Organisations are the ‘theatre’ in which 
institutions are visible. In other words, the explanation of this research takes into 
consideration the institutional functionalist view (first proposition) and the institutional 
interpretive view (second proposition)
9 For the criticism o f  neo-classical economic theory (see sections 3.1 and 3.3.1).
25
Institutional theory adds a broader (extra-organisational) institutional dimension to the 
analysis and discussion of this thesis. Bums and Scapens (2000) argue that in order to 
understand micro-processes it is necessary to recognise the institutional context both 
within the organisation itself, (i.e. the organisation's rules, routines and institutions) and 
outside, (i.e. the broader social, economic and political institutions of the organisational 
field and the society in which the organisation operates).
As mentioned in section 1.1, cost management has three elements to it: efficiency, 
optimisation and strategy (Al-Hazami, 1995). Most researchers concentrate on 
efficiency (see sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). Others focus on optimisation (see section 4.4) 
and strategy (see section 5.2). This research incorporates all three elements of cost 
management. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that a good deal of organisational 
behaviour can be understood by knowing something about the organisation's 
environment10 and the problems it faces in obtaining resources. What happens in an 
organisation is not only a function of its internal stmcture, leadership, procedures, or 
goals, it is also a consequence of the environment, and the particular contingencies and 
constraints from that environment. Therefore, this research focuses on institutional 
context within and outside the GOGCWS.
1.5 Research Methodology and Method
Methodology refers to the methods and ways used to conduct research. Blaikie (1995) 
states that methodology is essentially epistemology. He argues that epistemology is a 
theory of knowledge. It presents a view and justification for what should be regarded as 
‘knowledge’ - (i.e. what can be known, and what criteria such knowledge must satisfy 
in order to be termed ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘beliefs’). In short, epistemology is 
concerned with the nature and forms of knowledge; how knowledge is acquired and the 
relationship between ideas about the world and the world itself. Epistemological debates 
are concerned with the appropriateness of procedures and methods in the process of 
knowledge acquisition. A typical epistemological debate would focus on induction and 
deduction11.
10 This research argues that the environment o f  the GOGCWS could explain three main factors: product 
market, factor market and legislation.
11 For definitions o f ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ approach, see section 6.1.1.
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This study adopts a hybrid approach, focusing more on the inductive strand. The 
rationale for choosing a hybrid approach is because the objectives of this research are to 
describe what is going on (i.e. to describe the current cost structure for the provision of 
water in Egypt); and to understand and explain why it has been put into effect, (i.e. the 
companies rationale for choice of cost structure). Explanation therefore involves 
induction and deduction. DeVaus (1996: 11) claims that inductive and deductive 
approaches are not alternative ways of arriving at good theories; rather they represent 
two stages with different starting points. The research also takes a ‘voluntaristic’ view 
of human behaviour rather than one which guides contingency research (Child, 1972; 
Schreyogg, 1980). The voluntaristic view is noticeably absent in early neo-institutional 
research (DiMaggio, 1988 and Oliver, 1991). This approach followed from more recent 
advances in institutional theory which call for more-in-depth, interpretive analyses of 
the dialectic between stability and change (Czarniawska and Servon, 1996).
A case study method is used in this research. Strengths and weaknesses of the case 
study method (see Miles, 1979) have been addressed since the late 1970s. There is an 
increasing body of literature on how to conduct and analyse case-study data (Campbell, 
1975; McClintock, et al., 1979; Yin, 1981; 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989; Scapens, 1990; 
Gummesson, 1991; Rose, 1991; Ryan, et al., 1992; Otley and Berry, 1994; Hartely, 
1995).
This case study research will focus on three objectives: descriptive, illustrative, and 
explanatory (Scapens, 1990). These objectives will assist the researcher in answering 
his research questions (see section 1.2).
This research will be based on a case study of one company in Cairo, - the General 
Organisation for the Greater Cairo Water Supply. Reasons for choosing this company 
were several. Firstly, it was the first company to be established in the water industry in 
Egypt. It therefore helps describe and explain the role of cost management in the 
Egyptian Water Industry (because it represents the past, present and future experience 
of Water Service in Egypt). Secondly it provides water for 25% of the population in
12 ‘Voluntaristic’ view assumes that human beings are free-willed, act independently o f  external stimuli 
and exercise freedom o f  choice (Burrel and Morgan, 1979).
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Egypt. It also has a unique1-3 laboratory for analysing water in the Middle East (The cost 
of this laboratory was 25 million Egyptian pounds14).
Thirdly there are discrepancies between the expenses of the GOGCWS and its income. 
The cost per m3= 0.46 pence (wages 8.03 + Power and electricity 6.99 + raw materials 
4.47 + other current expenses 7.00 + interest “local and international” 11.29 + 
Depreciation 8.19)15. By contrast, average income was per m3= 0.16 pence, so this 
price does not encourage efficiency. Finally it is estimated that the General Organisation 
for the Greater Cairo Water Supply loses 40% of water through leakages each year. This 
results in an estimated wasteful expenditure of 250 million Egyptian pounds every year. 
Efficiency in the company is therefore low.
Data will be collected from multiple sources (triangulation) including interviews 
(qualitative), questionnaires (quantitative) and company documentation. The rationale 
behind this integration is that any limitations of one method will be counter-balanced by 
the strength of another (Hoque and Hopper, 1994).
1.6 Structure of the thesis
This thesis has eleven chapters. The aim of chapter two is to outline neo-institutional 
economic theory as the theoretical basis of the research. The chapter argues that both 
contingency theory and institutional theory are important for explaining the design and 
use of cost accounting systems. It. also argues that while technical (or contingent) 
explanations of cost management are not rejected, they are clearly viewed as.incomplete 
(Scott, 1987). Institutional theory adds the social and political elements, which are 
typically absent or de-emphasised in the rational instrumental approach (which guides 
most of the recent research on cost management). The chapter examines the theories 
used in accounting research, and offers an overview of management accounting. The
13 The GOGCWS, (no date source given, c) - "Greater Cairo Water", The Administration o f  Public 
Relations.
14 N.B: English pound £ = 6.00 Egyptian pounds.
American Dollar $ =  5.00 Egyptian pounds.
15 The GOGCWS (no date source given, c) - "Greater Cairo Water", The Administration o f  Public 
Relations.
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chapter also clarifies the level (organisation level) and approach (a process approach) 
which this study has adopted.
Chapter three aims to explain the role of management accounting by examining the 
theory behind it. It discusses the role accounting has come to occupy in micro-level 
(organisations) and macro-level (societies). This chapter gives an overview of 
management accounting theory. It criticises and shows the limitations of management 
accounting from a neo-classical economic stance. The chapter outlines some alternative 
approaches to management accounting, (namely neo-institutional economic theory, old 
institutional economic theory and neo-institutional sociology theory). Furthermore it has 
argued that the institutional theory approach has the potential to provide a useful 
theoretical framework for understanding management accounting (cost management) 
practices. The chapter argues that institutional theory offers a useful theoretical 
framework for understanding management accounting (and cost management) practice.
Chapters four and five focus on the model of cost management which this research has 
adopted. This research is based on a model of cost management which has three 
elements: efficiency, optimisation and strategy. Chapter four focuses on the first two 
elements of cost management: efficiency and optimisation. It outlines the problem and 
discusses the development of cost management. The chapter then identifies some 
models of cost management which indicate how to increase efficiency (i.e. throughput 
accounting, benchmarking, target costing and ABC) and others to increase optimisation 
(such as, ABM). The chapter identifies links between institutional theory, transaction 
cost and efficiency. It examines how the efficiency framework is favoured by 
transaction cost theories. Chapter five identifies strategic management accounting as 
one of the models of cost management which considers both the internal and external 
environment (the third element of cost management). The chapter focuses on cost 
accounting in service organisations and discusses how it can support corporate strategy.
The aim of chapter six is to outline the research design and methodology. The 
methodological position adopted in this research is a hybrid approach (i.e. between 
inductive and deductive), but mainly an inductive approach (for the rationale for 
choosing a hybrid approach, see section 6.1.1). The research also took a nominalist view 
(ontology - the rationale for which can be found in section 6.1.2). It also takes a
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‘voluntaristic’ view of human behaviour rather than one which guides contingency 
research (Child, 1972; Schreyogg, 1980). The chapter also clarifies the methods of data 
collection and the rationale for choosing them. A case study approach is adopted in this 
research. The case study  ^ is both a process of induction and deduction. The 
methodological position led the researcher to use multiple sources for collecting data 
(including semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and company documents of the 
GOGCWS).
Chapter seven offers alternative governance structures from the neo-institutional 
economic perspective for the water industry in different countries (such as the UK 
where water is provided by a highly regulated market, France where water services are 
hybrid and Egypt where water services are hierarchical structure). The chapter discusses 
the importance of water in order to explore the phenomenon of privatisation in the water 
industry. It looks at its effect on the role of accounting in general, and cost management 
in particular. The chapter considers the pros and cons of public versus private 
ownership of water. Finally, the issue of costs in the water industry is explored (i.e. how 
do people pay for their water requirements, how is the cost of water calculated, is the 
current system fair or is a new system required?).
Chapters eight and nine focus wholly on the case study of the General Organisation for 
the Greater Cairo Water Supply (the GOGCWS). Chapter eight describes the accounting 
system used at the GOGCWS and examines its supervision and control. It explores the 
questions: “Which methods of cost accounting were used in the Egyptian water 
industry?” What model of cost management was followed in the GOGCWS?” “Are 
there any similarities or differences between rules and routines16 of the cost accounting 
system at the GOGCWS?” The chapter also discusses alternatives to cost management 
as suggested by consultants Black and Veatch International. It also discusses 
perceptions of the GOGCWS managers' towards the issue of cost management. Chapter 
nine explores the question: "Was there a relationship between cost management17 and P 
(C.I)18 and P (Un)19 which relates to the three areas of the external environment
16 Rules and Routines used by Bums and Scapens (2000) see rules as comprising o f  accounting systems 
as set out in procedure manuals. ‘Routines’ are the actual accounting practices in use.
17 The objectives o f  cost management are efficiency, optimisation and strategy
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(product market, factor market and legislation) from the neo-institutional economic 
theory perspective?
Chapter ten aims to discuss the external and internal environment of the GOGCWS. It 
also examines the perceptions of the GOGCWS managers of the issue of privatisation in 
the water industry and cost management. The chapter highlights the importance of neo- 
institutional economic theory as theoretical framework for this research because it 
focuses on both the external (Covaleski, et al., 1993; 1996; Mezias, 1990) and internal 
environment (Bums and Scapens, 2000).
Chapter eleven aims to discuss the GOGCWS research findings in the light of the 
theoretical framework which was adopted. It also relates the findings back to the 
literature review. The chapter explains why there was no change in cost management at 
the GOGCWS by adopting two propositions from the neo-institutional perspective. 
Firstly, government policy (coercive isomorphism) shaped the limited use of cost 
management for efficiency, optimisation and strategy. The second proposition assumed 
organisations are the 'theatre' in which institutions are visible. It examines the 
accounting system of the GOGCWS (the UAS) from an institutional perspective (the 
three pillars of institutional theory: cognitive, normative and regulative, Scott, 1995).
The final chapter aims to summarise the results of the research and identify its 
contributions to knowledge. Some contributions relate to cost management and 
management accounting while others relate to institutional theory and the case study 
approach. The chapter discusses the limitations of this study and offers suggestions for 
future research. It concludes with a discussion on the research process and the learning 
experience.
The structure of the thesis is shown in figure 1.1 as below:
18 P (C.I) refers to the perception o f  competitive intensity, (i.e. the general level o f  market conditions 
which make profitability difficult).
19 P (Un) refers to the perception o f  unpredictability, (The overall degree o f  variability from period to 
period, which make forecasting and planning difficult).
20 Although, the term isomorphism is generally associated with the neo-institutional econom ic sociology, 
it is equally applicable to any analysis o f  neo-institutional they in general (such as neo-institutional 
econom ic theory).
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Chapter 2 
Institutional theory
2.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to outline the theoretical basis of the research and the 
rationale for choosing it. For this purpose, the chapter is divided into four sections.
The first section gives the reasoning behind institutional theory as a choice of 
framework. It highlights the differences between contingency theory and institutional 
theory. It shows the different approaches to institutional theory and accounting research.
The second section introduces questions arising out of institutional theory. It outlines 
the core ideas of those schools and models which study institutions. It then gives a brief 
review of early institutionalist and neo-institutional theory in economic, political and 
sociology. It goes on to introduce the theories used in accounting research and offers an 
overview of management accounting within institutional theory.
The third section explains concepts which have been applied to institutions and isolates 
management accounting within these concepts. It highlights the similarity between 
structuration theory and institutional theory. It also illustrates levels of analysis in 
institutional theory (i.e. the two approaches in order to explain institutions). It then 
clarifies the level and approach which this study has adopted.
The final (fourth) section outlines the main conclusions of this chapter.
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2.1 The rationale for choosing institutional theory
Why is a theoretical framework important? Coase21 (1983: 230) argued that "without a 
theory there is nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material, waiting for a 
theory, or a fire". Institutions often play important roles in the diffusion of ideas 
(Bjomenak, 1996). In some cases they act as propagators, in others as moderators of 
change. It is therefore reasonable to expect cost practices to be influenced by those 
institutions involved in setting standards for the profession (e.g. professional bodies, 
academic institutions and major companies).
As part of the growing pluralism in the study of organisations, new sociological 
paradigms have emerged since the 1970s. Like economics, they offer explanations of 
organisational structure, - additional to those available in structural contingency theory - 
(Penning 1992; Davis and Powell 1992). These include the theories of ‘resource 
dependence’ (Pfeffer and Salancik 1977), ‘Institutional’ (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), 
‘population ecology’ (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), ‘agency’ (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and ‘transaction cost economics’ (Williamson, 1985).
Subsequently, many new approaches have arisen including institutional theory in the 
US (Meyer and Scott 1983a) and action theory in the UK (Silverman 1970). Drury and 
Tayles (1995) called for different approaches and perspectives, rather than a wholly 
economic perspective of management accounting. They advocate "explaining observed 
practices by examining their role within the broader organisational, social, political and 
cultural dimensions in which accounting information is used" (p. 278). Brignal (1997) 
argues that service costing systems must be seen in their wider context (as part of 
management information systems which embrace non-financial information).
Geiger and Ittner (1996) claim that contingency and institutional theories can explain 
the design and use of cost accounting systems in government agencies. This research 
has adopted institutional theory as a framework for explaining the role of cost 
management in the Egyptian Water Industry. Despite the many advantages of
21 The ‘godfather’ o f  the new institutional economic theory.
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contingency theoryzz, it was not adopted in this research. Reasons for this are two-fold: 
theoretical and practical. At the theoretical level, Bourgeois (1984) criticises 
contingency research for failing to consider reverse causation (where the presumed 
contingency factor results from the structure). The positive correlation between strategy 
and structure may have arisen through structure causing strategy.
Merchant (1984) contends that contingency theory can be criticised on the grounds that 
organisational context is often a construct of the researcher rather than a description of 
perceived reality as used by the organisations under study. Spekle (2001) claims that a 
contingency theory approach is more a vague idea than an actual theory. He contends 
that contingency theory has no a priori intuition of its own as to what the pertinent 
factors are and to their likely consequences. He goes on to argue that contingency 
modes tend to be partial, - focusing as they do on elements of the control system (e.g. 
budgeting systems), rather than directly addressing the full configuration of control 
devices.
At the practical level, under contingency theory the type of management accounting 
system (MAS) varies according to the specific circumstances or situation in which the 
organisation operates (see section 5.2.2). Hence, choice of MAS design is constrained 
by conditions and depends on the ability of management to find the best “fit”. This is 
not applicable to the General Organisation for the Greater Cairo Water Supply because 
the GOGCWS is an economic organisation within the public utilities sector. The 
GOGCWS must therefore apply the Unified Accounting System which includes a 
management accounting system. In other words, the GOGCWS has no alternative in its 
choice of management accounting system.
22 Otley (1995: 191) claim that "the design o f  any planning and control system is situationally specific. 
When designing a system, a distinction is made between controllable and non-controllable factors. 
Controllable factors o f  the organisation are not considered contingent variables, rather they are part o f  a 
package o f  organisational controls selected for use. The organisation is expected to adapt to the 
contingency it faces, by arranging these suitable factors. It controls appropriate configuration that it hopes 
w ill lead to an effective control system. Interdependence between accounting information system s and 
components o f  contingency elements are still possible".
Berry et al., (1995: 22) argue that "contingency theory provides a picture for the organisation through its 
environment. The environment is crucial in shaping the organisation, and the survival o f  an organisation 
depends on its ‘fitness’ for the changing environment". Donaldson (1995) argues that while organisational 
theories can supplement contingency theory, the latter nevertheless remains the core explanatory theory 
o f  organisational structure.
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While technical (or contingent) explanations of cost management are not rejected, they 
are clearly viewed as incomplete (Scott, 1987). Institutional theory adds the social and 
political elements which are typically absent or de-emphasised in the rational 
instrumental approach (which guides most of the recent research on cost management). 
Bjomenak (1997) argues that there are several explanations underlying characteristics of 
cost practice, and that an institutional frame of reference may be important for 
understanding how and why changes in cost practice occur. Contribution to knowledge 
in the field of cost management (building on contingency theory) remains fragmented. 
However more inclusive approaches are required before we can fully understand cost 
management (Spekle, 2001).
In recent years there has been increasing interest in institutional theories within the 
social sciences (Scott, 1995). Three such theories have been used in accounting 
literature namely neo-institutional/transaction cost economics23 (derived largely from 
the work Williamson, 1975), old institutional economics24 (Scapens, 1994), and neo- 
institutional sociology (Miller, 1994). These will be discussed in detail in section 3.3).
Previous governmental accounting research (based on economic theory) generally 
ignores how institutional and organisational pressures constrain accounting choice (i.e. 
the method of cost management in the water industry, Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). This 
research argues that institutional theory offers the best explanation for the role of cost 
management in the Egyptian Water industry.
2.2 History of institutional theory
Institutional theory has been used here as the framework for explaining the role of cost 
management. The theory has raised some contentious questions about organisational 
‘worlds’ (Scott, 1995). These include:
23 N ew  institutional economics focuses primarily on micro-analytic questions (e.g. the comparative 
efficacy with which alternative generic forms o f  govemance-market, hybrids and hierarchies econom ise 
on transaction costs). It avoids the broader questions o f  origins and change in the “institutional rules o f  
the game: customers, laws, politics” (Williamson, 1991: 269).
24 There is similarity between Giddens' theory and old institutional economic theory (see figure 2.1). 
Bums and Scapens (2000) argue that structuration theory is not particularly helpful for exploring 
processes o f  change. Archer (1995) supports this view arguing that structuration theory does not 
incorporate historical time. She contends that "structure and agency can only be linked by explaining the 
interplay between them over time. Without the attention paid to the time factor, the problem o f  structure 
and agency can never be satisfactory resolved" (p. 65).
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(a) Why organisations of the same type, (located in scattered localities) closely resemble 
one another (e.g. schools and hospitals).
(b) How should we regard behaviour in an organisational setting? Does it reflect the 
pursuit of rational interests and the exercising of conscious choice; or is behaviour 
primarily shaped by conventions, routines, and habits?
(c) Why does observed behaviour of organisational participants often depart from the 
formal rules and stated goals of the organisation?
(d) Why and how do laws, rules, and other types of regulative and normative systems 
arise? Do individuals voluntarily construct rule systems which then influences their own 
behaviour?
(e) Where do interests come from? Do they stem from human nature, or are they 
culturally constructed?
(f) Why do specific structures and practices diffuse through organisations in ways not 
predicted by the adopting organisations?
(g) How do differences in cultural belief shape the nature and operation of 
organisations?
(h) Why do organisations and individuals conform to institutions? Is it because they are 
rewarded for doing so, because they are morally obliged to obey, or because they can 
conceive of no other way of behaving?
There are several models which attempt to study institutional theory. These include The 
Columbia school, Parson's approach, The Carnegie school and The Cognitive school. It 
is useful here to highlight the key points of each model in turn.
In the Columbia school Merton (1936, 1957) and Selznick (1948) laid the groundwork 
for a process model of institutions. Merton described 'process-operating' in bureaucratic 
organisations as encouraging officials toward over-conformity. Selznick focused on 
processes within particular organisations as giving rise to a distinctive set of valued 
commitments. Stinchcombe (1968) claims the mechanisms used by powerful actors 
perpetuate their own interests and commitments. Stinchcombe25 (1968: 107) adds that 
an institution can be defined as “a structure in which powerful people are committed to 
certain values or interest”.
25 Stinchcombe is a scholar o f  the Columbia school and a student o f  Selznick's.
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Parsons (1960a: 20) develops his “cultural-institutional” argument by examining the 
relationship between an organisation and its environment. He looks at the ways in 
which the value system of the organisation is legitimated by its links to “main 
institutional patterns” in “different functional contexts”. Parsons (1960b) offers a 
different definition of the term 'institution'. He argues that organisations become 
vertically differentiated into three distinct levels or 'layers': (1) Technical (production 
activities) (2) the Managerial (concerned with control and co-ordination activities, the 
procurement of resources and the disposal of products) and (3) Institutional (relating the 
organisation to the norms and conventions of the wider community and society). 
Parsons concludes that every organisation is a subsystem of “a wider social system 
which is the source of meaning, legitimation, or higher-level support which makes 
implementation of the organisation’s goals possible” (pp. 63-64).
As a member of the Carnegie school Simon (1957) was one of the first theorists to link 
individual cognitive capacity with organisational structure. He notes how organisational 
structures work to simplify and support decision-making in organisations, - allowing 
them to achieve higher levels of consistent “boundedly rational” behaviour.
March and Simon (1958: 141-142) argued that in many circumstances, “search and 
choice processes are very much abridged. Much of the behaviour in organisations is 
governed by performance programs”. Hence value assumptions, cognitive frames, rules 
and routines are all ingredients conducive to individuals behaving 'rationally'. The 
"rational individual is organised and institutionalised” (Simon, 1957: 102).
In the Cognitive school early research concentrated on "human organisms". Markus and 
Zajonc (1985: 141) found that “the idea of the human organism as an information- 
processor became popular". The mind came to be viewed by many as a computer-like 
apparatus that registered incoming information and then subjected it to a variety of 
transformations before ordering a response”. Recent cognitive theory and research has 
emphasised individual shortcomings as information processors and decision-makers 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Nisbett and Ross 1980).
There are differing views of institutional theory from an economic, political and 
sociological perspective. There are salient differences between institutional theory and
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neo-institutional theory from an economic perspective. Similarly, between institutional 
theory and neo-institutional theory in political science. Likewise, between old 
institutional theory and neo-institutional theory in sociology. The core ideas of each 
perspective will be examined in turn.
Institutional economists emphasised the importance of change. Veblen (1898; 1919) 
embraced an evolutionary perspective and claimed that valid economics could highlight 
the role of technological change and trace the changing phases of the economy. 
Commons (1924) stressed the centrality of change, - viewing the economy as “a moving 
changing process” (p. 376).
Neo-institutional economic theories are concerned with rule and governance systems 
which develop to regulate or manage economic exchanges. The first theorist to advocate 
this new approach was Coase26 (1937). His article “The Nature of the Firm” asks why 
some economic exchanges are carried out within firms under a governance structure 
(involving rules and hierarchical enforcement mechanisms), rather than being directly 
subject to price mechanisms in markets. Coase (1937: 389) concludes the reason must 
be that “there is a cost of using the price mechanism”, (i.e. the cost of negotiating and 
concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place in a
97market). It is because of these “transaction costs" that companies emerge.
Jaccoby (1990) argues that the approaches offered by early institutionalists depart from 
those of their neo-classical colleagues in four important aspects.
26 Coase in his article 1937, posed an important question. He asks
"What is a firm and what determines its boundaries"?
The importance o f  Coase's contribution was the recognition that conventional neo-classical econom ics 
cannot explain why firms exist. Coase hypothesised that firms exist because they are able to operate under 
certain aspects o f  economic activity more cheaply than the market. This valuable insight has been further 
developed by economists under the general heading o f  “transaction costs economics”. Two particularly 
influential contributions were from Williamson (1975) and Klein et al., (1978). More recently Hart (1995) 
has introduced "A Property Right Approach" to the theory o f  the firm (offering a significant extension o f  
the transactions costs approach).
27 The basis o f  transaction costs is to explain the existence o f  different organisational forms as choices 
from a limited menu o f  "workable" contracting structures (Walker, 1998).
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(a) Indeterminancy versus determinancy: where the orthodox model assumes “perfect 
competition and unique equilibria, the institutionalists point to pervasive market power 
and to indeterminancy even under competition” (Jaccoby, 1990: 318).
(b) Endogenous versus exogenous determination of preferences: Neo-classicalists stress 
the importance of individual wants or preferences, whereas institutionalists argue that 
such preferences are shaped by social institutions, whose operation should be the actual 
subject of economic analysis.
(c) Behavioural realism versus simplifying assumptions: Institutional theorists argue 
that economists should use pragmatic and ‘psychologically-realistic’ models of 
economic motivation, rather than subscribe to naive utilitarian assumptions.
(d) Diachronic versus synchronic analysis: Rather than accepting the “timeless and 
placeless” assumptions of neo-classical theorists, institutionalists recommend that 
economists should ascertain “how the economy acquired its features and conditions and 
what causes these features to vary over time and place” (Jaccoby, 1990: 320).
Institutional approaches dominate political science in both Europe and America. 
Eckstein (1963) claims the early institutionalists ushered in the first crude form of 
positivism in political science. Beginning during the mid-193 Os and continuing through 
the 1960s, the institutionalist perspective was challenged and largely supplanted by the 
behavioralist approach (not to be confused with “behaviourism” in psychology). This 
was an attempt to sever the tie to moral philosophy and rebuild political science as a 
theoretically-guided empirical science (Easton, 1965). The behavioralist persuasion 
diverts attention away from institutional structure to political behaviour.
Neo-institutionalists within political behaviour have grouped themselves into two 
camps. Historical theorists and rational choice theorists. Historical institutionalists 
devote themselves to the detailed analysis of regimes and governance mechanisms (e.g. 
March and Olsen, 1984; 1989; Hall, 1986; and Skocpol, 1985; 1992). Institutions are 
viewed as including “both formal structures and informal rules and procedures that 
structure conduct” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2). Historical theorists take a social- 
constructionist position which assumes that "capabilities and preferences (i.e. the vary
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nature of the actors) cannot be understood except as part of some larger institutional 
framework" (Krasner, 1988: 72).
The social-political constitution of accounting practice and regulation has gained 
increasing attention in research literature (e.g. Hopwood, 1984; Hopper et al., 1987; 
Miller et al., 1991). Theorists recommend that within the governmental sector, 
researchers should direct their efforts towards understanding the emergence of political 
institutions; particularly administrative institutions which have been influential in 
providing order and change in American politics, (in terms of the regulations they issue) 
(e.g. March and Olsen, 1989: 17).
Rational choice theorists see institutions as governance or rule systems. This approach 
represents an extension of neo-institutional work in economics, to the study of political 
systems. Moe (1984: 750) dissects the major elements making up this paradigm as 
including: “the contractual nature of organisations, markets vs. hierarchies, transaction 
costs, the rationality of structure, individualistic explanation, and economic methods of 
analysis. Standard neo-classical notions, optimisation, marginality, equilibrium are 
often central to this new tradition”.
Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 9) see no conflict between historical institutionalists and 
rational choice theorists. They examine the historical stance: “Historical institutionalists 
would not have trouble with the rational choice idea that political actors are acting 
strategically to achieve their ends. But clearly it is not very useful simply to leave it at 
that. We need a historically-based analysis to tell us what they are trying to maximise 
and why they emphasis certain goals over others".
The importance of politics, (specifically in relation to the issue of ‘change’) is well- 
documented in management literature (Buchanan and Badham, 1999; Dawson, 1994; 
1996; Pettigrew, 1973). This research highlights the key role politics can play in driving 
and shaping change processes; (though politics is not the only factor). Although it is not 
intended here to get drawn into a debate of what politics represents, most writers see 
politics as "attaining interest-based demands" (Pettigrew, 1973) and "getting things 
done your way" (Buchanan and Badham, 1999). Pfeffer's (1981: 7) definition of politics 
aptly captures the generally-accepted view amongst most academics that:
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"Organisational politics involves those activities taken within organisations to acquire, 
develop and use power. It uses other resources to obtain one's preferred outcome in a 
situation in which there is uncertainty or discussion about choice"
Sociologists gives more attention to the institution itself than economists and political 
scientists. Cooley (1956) for example, emphasised the interdependence of individuals 
and institutions, of self and social structure. Hughes (1936; 1939) shares and elaborates 
upon this interdependent view. Weber however is caught between the three major 
debates; between those who view social science as a ‘natural’ science, and those who 
argue that it is a cultural science.
Weber argued that the social sciences differ fundamentally from the ‘natural’ sciences 
in that in the former both researcher and object of study attach meaning to events. For 
Weber (1968), action is social, and individuals do not automatically respond to stimuli. 
Researchers cannot expect to understand social behaviour without taking into account 
the meanings that mediate social action.
Between the idealist arguments of Durkheim and the materialist emphasis of Marx, 
Weber employed an interpretative approach to attempt a synthesis between the two. 
Although the material conditions and interests stressed by Marx constrain choice and 
action, the idealist interpretations of normative values, motivate and ‘activate’ action 
(Alexander, 1983).
Between the institutionalist-historical model of economics and classical interest in 
developing general theoretical principles, Weber embraced institutionalist arguments. 
He argued that economics should be historically informed and comparative in its 
approach. At the same time he agreed with Manger and classicists in supporting the 
value of theoretical models, (which allow us to derive information from ‘historically- 
embedded’ systems in order to formulate and evaluate general arguments. Weber claims 
by abstracting from the specificity and complexity of concrete events, researchers can
. 9 o
create “ideal types” to guide and inform comparative studies .
28 Researchers should not insist that individuals under all conditions behave as economists). Such models 
could then prove useful as guides for analysis, and increase understanding o f  the real world.
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Neo-institutional theory in sociology focuses on legitimisation of organisational forms 
and processes. Silverman (1971) proposes an ‘action’ theory of organisations. 
Silverman attacks prevailing models of organisations (including contingency arguments 
and Parsons-Selznick’s structural-functional view), as being overly concerned with 
stability, order, and technical efficiency. Silverman proposes a phenomenological view 
of organisations which focuses attention on meaning systems, (and the ways in which 
they are constructed and reconstructed in social action).
Meyer and Rowan (1977) embrace the view of institutions as “complexes of cultural 
rules”. These rules are increasingly being rationalised through the actions of academic 
professions, nation-states, and the mass media. This has therefore engendered the 
development of more types of organisations. Meyer and Rowan draw attention to the 
impact of organisational forms of change on the wider institutional environment.
2.3 Institutional theory and Accounting
There is no universal definition of an 'institution'. Scott (1995: 533) defines an 
institution as consisting of "cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
which provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are driven by 
various carriers (cultures, structures, and routines) and they operate at multiple levels 
jurisdiction. In this conceptualisation, institutions are multifaceted systems 
incorporating symbolic systems, (cognitive constructions and normative rules) - i.e. the 
regulative processes carried out which shape social behaviour. As such meaning 
systems, monitoring processes, and actions are all interwoven".
Cognitive pillar
Cognitive elements of institutions are rules that constitute the nature of reality and a 
frame through which meaning is made. Symbols - words, signs, and gestures - have 
their effect by shaping the meaning we attribute to objects and activities. Meanings arise 
in interaction and are employed to make sense of the ongoing stream of events.
29 In terms o f  the organisation's wider institutional context, its members conceptualise and give meanings 
to terms like "budget", "profit", and "costs" (Preston, 1995). The meanings o f  such terms are reproduced 
over time, and become embedded in the rules and routines which define their calculation. A s such, 
accounting practices (e.g., budgeting) and accounting information (e.g., the return on capital employed) 
represents more than is commonly perceived. They include action and thought, and are more than simple 
decision-making aids (Swieringa and Weick, 1987). Perceptions and meanings are both cognitively and 
theoretically bound (Hodgson, 1988). Hence, the term "profit", for example would differ in interpretation 
for different professions.
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Accounting routines facilitate interpretation of the work place, and can help individuals 
understand how their organisation is performing (March, 1988).
Social scientists have long recognised the importance of symbolic systems and shared 
meanings. However their early work treats these systems and meanings as internalised 
and subjective. Beyond the traditional view of institutional theory, formal control 
systems serve as symbolic displays, leaving actual work activities to be promoted by 
social means (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Neo-institutional theory in sociology treats 
symbolic systems and cultural rules as objective, and external to individual actors. A 
cognitive perspective directs us to pay attention to the symbolic aspects of social life, 
however it would be a mistake not to attend to the activities also associated with these 
belief systems.
Previous research has found accounting to be a symbol of legitimacy (Carpenter and 
Feroz, 1992; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). Meyer and Rowan argue that certain elements of the formal structure in 
bureaucracies, function as myths. They cite accounting as an example. They argue that 
"Institutional techniques are not based on efficiency but are used to establish an 
organisation as appropriate, rational, and modern. The use of these techniques "display 
responsibility and avoid claims of negligence" (p. 344). They show that 
bureaucratisation is caused, in part, by the ubiquity of these rationalised myths in 
society. By designing a formal structure which adheres to the prescription of myths in 
the institutional environment, an organisation demonstrates that it is acting in a ‘proper’ 
and adequate manner.
There are a variety of cognitive elements (D'Andrade, 1984). Of these, ‘constitutive 
rules’ are the most important (Searle, 1969). These rules or "processes" involve the 
creation of categories and the construction of typifications (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967: 39). Such processes are variously applied to things, ideas, events, and actors. 
Constitutive processes offer an explanation for much social behaviour and differ from 
lay interpretations, and from those found in social science. As Meyer, et al., (1987: 13) 
argue: "Most social theory takes actors (from individuals to states) and their actions, as 
real a priori, elements. Conversely we see the "existence" and characteristics of actors 
as socially constructed and highly problematic. The action is the enactment of broad
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institutional scripts rather than a matter of internally-generated and autonomous choice, 
motivation and purpose".
Normative pillar
The normative pillar focuses on normative rules which introduce a perspective, - an 
evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life. Normative systems include both 
values and norms. Values are conceptions of the desirable, (which along with 
construction of standards, existing structures or behaviour), can be compared and 
assessed. Norms specify how things should be done. They define legitimate means to 
pursue valued ends. Normative systems define goals or objectives (e.g. making a profit), 
but they also designate appropriate ways to pursue them (e.g. conceptions of fair 
business practices). The normative conception of institutions is embraced by 
sociologists, because it focuses attention on institutions where common beliefs and 
values are more likely to exist.
The accounting norm system consists of the institutional environment of the accounting 
action system30. It is characterised by "rules and requirements to which individual 
organisations must conform if they are to receive legitimacy from the environment" 
(Scott and Meyer, 1983: 140). The accounting norm system should not however be 
perceived as a system acting in ‘perfect harmony’.
Different interests are represented within the norm system. These often consist of many 
individuals and organisational actors (Mezias, 1990). The norm system comprises 'the 
multiple institutional environment' of the accounting action system. The accounting 
norm system is involved in many activities (most of which can be designated as "talk",- 
both process and output). The rhetoric of accounting is one of its main activities.
The rhetoric of accounting plays a role in reducing uncertainty in decision-making and 
accountability (Mellemvik, et al., 1988; Miller and O'Leary, 1990). It is also the basis 
for most normative and positive accounting theory (American Accounting Association, 
1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Rhetoric is fundamental to accounting as an 
organisational and societal activity (Birnberg, 1980; Jonsson, 1988).
30 The accounting action system comprises instrumental accounting activities. It operates within single 
organisations and can be divided into separate but interrelated procedures (e.g. the daily registration o f  
transactions and annual reporting, Bergevam, et al., 1995).
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Rhetoric is important to the accounting norm system in the process of regulating norms 
(Puxty, et al., 1987; Johnson, 1988). It also generates and legitimises norms. Auditing is 
also involved in the accounting norm system (i.e. the evaluation of accounting 
procedures in relation to existing norms). From this perspective of the organisation, 
there are two types of norm systems - external and internal. Whereas an external norm 
system acts in order to co-ordinate the accounting action of organisations within its 
domain, an internal norm system acts mainly in order to adapt accounting action to its 
local context.
In theory, accounting norms should control accounting action. Although a strong link 
exists between norms and action, the latter may generate more organisational and 
societal qualities than are included at present in accounting rhetoric (Bergevam, et al., 
1995). This is because an implemented accounting procedure always confronts its 
context (Bimberg, et al., 1983; Boland and Pondy, 1983; Hopwood, 1983; 1987; 
Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Swieringa and Wieck, 1987; Nahapiet, 1988). The use of 
accounting in any environment can only be regulated by norms to a certain extent. The 
consequences of norms will therefore be different to those from intentions, (even though 
accounting action may be wholly controlled by norms).
As mentioned, a normative pillar includes values and beliefs. Definitions of value and 
belief differ in accounting. ‘Values’ are concerned with the legitimacy of the ends to 
which accounting is directed, while ‘beliefs’ are the confidence in the means of 
pursuing them.
In much of conventional accounting value is attached to capital (the maximising of 
shareholders wealth). This has a legitimate claim of being a universal value (Stewartt 
III, 1994). Also important are the values of those who propose "social responsibility" or 
"green accounting" (Jones and Dugdale, 2001). An accountant’s overriding duty is to be 
"a friend of the Earth" (Gray, 1990). Disagreement over the term ‘value’ can also be 
detected in management accounting's treatment of costs. Whether labour should be 
treated as a "variable" or "fixed" cost may be merely a technical issue. Advocates of the 
latter view suggest there are important humanitarian values at stake (Jones and Dugdale, 
1998). These concern whether employees are to be treated as costs (that must be
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reduced or eliminated), or whether organisations should (on moral grounds) provide 
secure employment for their members (Goldratt, 1994).
Disagreement over which path to pursue is accompanied by differing beliefs as to which 
means should be adopted. The last few decades have seen successive views of 
"management philosophy" with its familiar acronyms (JIT, TQM). They all propose 
differing suggestions. Often "new" philosophy runs counter to 'conventional' wisdom 
(Jones and Dugdale, 2001). To move from one perspective to another requires a 
fundamental shift in viewpoint. Hence, belief has to be established and should not be 
taken for granted). Since the 1980s, fundamental changes in views ("paradigm shifts") 
have been associated with the activities of "management gurus". Observers of this 
phenomenon have noted that 'beliefs' and 'faith' are important and in this respect not 
dissimilar to spiritual beliefs (Clark and Salaman, 1995; Wilson, 1996; Oliver, 1997).
Marsh and Olsen (1989: 21) developed a primarily normative conception of institutions: 
"The proposition that organisations follow rules (where much of the behaviour is 
specified by standard operating procedures), is a common one in bureaucratic and 
organisational literature. It can be extended to ‘political institutions’. Much of the 
behaviour we observe in political institutions reflects a routine way in which people do 
what they are supposed to do".
Very little institutional accounting research examines the internal processes of an 
organisation. However, Bums and Scapens (1998; 2000) focus on the internal processes 
of routinisation and institutionalisation. They look at how accounting routines provide 
the normative basis (i.e. legitimation) for organisational action. Accounting routines 
have ‘productive potential’ (i.e. instrumental value). They can also embody norms, 
values, etc., which favour particular vested interests (ceremonial value).
For cognitive theorists, compliance occurs in many circumstances, because other types 
of behaviour are inconceivable. Routines are followed because they are taken for 
granted as "the way to do things". Whereas normative theorists emphasise the power of 
roles (normative expectation guiding behaviour), the cognitive framework stresses the 
importance of social identities, (i.e. our conceptions of who we are and what action 
make sense for us in a given situation).
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Regulative pillar
Regulative processes involve establishing rules. They help in the review of others' 
conformity and can manipulate sanctions (i.e. rewards or punishments) in an attempt to 
influence future behaviour. These processes may operate through diffuse, informal 
mechanisms, involving shaming or shunning activities (Scott, 1995: 35).
Economists view institutions as resting primarily on the regulative pillar. North (1990: 
4) argues that "[institutions] are perfectly analogous to the rules of a game in a 
competitive team sport. That is, they consist of formal written rules as well as unwritten 
codes of conduct which underlie and complement formal rules. Rules and informal 
codes are sometimes violated and punishment enacted. Hence, an essential part of 
institutional functioning is the cost of ascertaining ‘violations’. Economists focus their 
attention on the behaviour of individuals, firms in markets and other competitive 
situations".
Force, fear and expedience are central ingredients of the regulative pillar. They are 
tempered by the existence of rules, whether in the guise of informal mores or formal 
rules and laws. Weber (1968) notes that few (if any) rulers are content to base their 
regime on force alone. All attempt to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy. Economics 
emphasises the cost(s) of regulation. Economic historians view this as an important 
function of the state. North (1990: 64) argues: "Because ultimately a third party must 
always involve the state (as a source of coercion), a theory of institutions also inevitably 
involves an analysis of the political structure of a society, (and the degree to which that 
political structure provides a framework of effective enforcement)".
Some institutional accounting research (e.g., Covaleski et al., 1993; 1996; Mezias, 
1990) focuses on the impact of external legitimation in shaping accounting practice. For 
example, Covaleski, et ah, (1993) suggest that pressures exerted by the US Federal 
Government were crucial in the development of a case-mix accounting system in the 
health industry. Mezias (1990) describes how various institutional factors (e.g. laws, 
expectations, professionalism) influenced the formulation of US accounting policies.
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Cultures rely primarily on interpretative structures - (codified patterns of meanings and 
rule systems). The emphasised aspects of culture will vary according to which 
institutional elements are given prominence. Cognitive theorists stress the importance of 
categories, distinctions, and typifications. Normative theorists point to shared values 
and normative expectations; while regulative theorists look to conventions, rules and 
laws.
Simons (1995) introduces the idea of belief systems (i.e. organisation culture) into his 
‘levers of control’. He links belief systems to boundary systems, interactive control 
systems, diagnostic control systems and business strategy. The levers of control can be 
described as follows:
(a) Belief systems - to inspire, and direct the search for new opportunities.
(b) Boundary systems - to set limits on opportunity-seeking behaviour.
(c) Diagnostic control systems - to motivate, monitor and reward achievement of 
specified goals.
(d) Interactive control systems - to stimulate organisational learning and the emergence 
of new ideas and strategies.
Social structures rely on expectations associated with networks of social positions (role 
systems). These structures constrain and empower the behaviour of actors, while at the 
same time they are reproduced and transformed by the same. This aspect of structure, 
depends on which elements are put into effect. Cognitive theorists stress structural 
isomorphism. Cognitive typifications are often coded into organisational structures as 
differentiated departments and roles. Normative and regulative theorists are apt to view 
structures as governance systems, emphasising either the normative (authority) or the 
coercive (power) aspects of these structures.
Routines rely on actions which reflect the tacit knowledge of actors - (deeply ingrained 
habits and procedures based on prior knowledge and beliefs). Early institutionalists 
viewed habitualised actions, routines, standard operating procedures, and patterned 
activities as central features of institutions. More recently, evolutionary theorists such as 
Nelson and Winter (1982), point to the stabilising role played by participants’ skills and 
organisational routines. These are activities involving little or no conscious choice, and
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behaviour is governed by tacit knowledge and constrained by rules of which the actor 
may be unaware.
Nelson and Winter, (1982: 410-411) describe accounting as "a highly structured set of 
routines". Their work on evolutionary economics is useful in developing an institutional 
approach to management accounting research. An institutional approach recognises that 
accounting can both shape and be shaped by institutions which govern organisational 
activity. Managers now appear to be using their accounting systems and routine 
financial reports more flexibly, in conjunction with a range of other performance 
measures, (both financial and non-financial) (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 1996; Miller 
and O'Leary, 1993; Ezzamel, et al., 1994; Burns and Scapens, 2000).
During the 1990s, a growing number of scholars characterised their contributions (in the 
interpretation of accounting systems) as ‘organisational routines’ (Roperts and Scapens, 
1990; Dent, 1991; Scapens, 1994; Bums and Scapens, 2000, Burns 2000). In his 
institutional perspective on accounting, Bums (2000a) classifies these contributions into 
three different groupings: Neo institutional economics (or transaction cost economics), 
Neo institutional sociology and finally Old institutional economics.
There is a two-way relationship in both directions between rules and routines (Bums 
and Scapens, 1998; 2000). In effect, rules are formalised statements of procedures, 
whereas routines are the actual procedures used. Rules are normally only modified at 
intervals, whereas routines are in a cumulative process of change. Rules may be 
imposed and become implemented through routines, or they can emerge out of 
established routines.
In the context of management accounting, mles are made up of accounting systems (as 
set out in procedure manuals), whereas routines are accounting practices in use (Bums 
and Scapens, 2000). Clearly, there is a relationship between mles and routines, however 
it is important not to confuse the two. Any given management accounting system in use, 
may not accurately mirror the procedures set out in the procedure manuals (Robert and 
Scapens, 1985).
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Structuration theory-51 is the relationship between activities of knowledgeable human 
actors and the structuring of social systems. Giddens distinguishes between systems, 
(comprising discernibly similar social practices), which are reproduced across time and 
space through human actions, and structures, which transform those social practices into 
systems. For Giddens, systems are not structures, but are structures drawn upon in 
action (Bums and Scapens, 1998; 2000; Jones and Dugdale, 2001).
Giddens set out to develop a theory of the production, transformation, reproduction and 
dissolution of social institutions by incorporating both structure and agency. These are 
the stmctural properties of social institutions (codes, rules and blueprints that influence 
and are influenced by social actions in day-to-day activities across time and space 
(Giddens 1984: 17). Agency is strategic actions of knowledgeable, reflexive social 
actors which illustrate their working lives.
Old institutional economics has defined ‘institutions’ as "a way of thought or action of 
some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group, or the 
customs of a people" (Hamilton, 1932: 84; Scapens, 1994). This definition embodies 
both systems (thoughts and actions of prevalence and permanence) and stmcture 
(embedded habits and customs). Macintosh and Scapens (1990) argue that management 
accounting can be understood by drawing upon Giddens' three dimensions of 
stmcturation: signification32, domination33 and legitimation34.
31 Macintosh (1994) summarises: "Structuration theory is the interplay between agent action and social 
structure, in the production, reproduction, and regulation o f  social order. Structures existing in virtual 
time and space, are drawn upon by agents as they act and interact in specific time-space. Agents are 
setting themselves the outcomes o f  these actions and interactions" (Macintosh, 1994: 172).
Giddens (1992) does not accord priority to either structure or action. Rather he advocates a study o f  social 
practices which both socialises (constitute) individuals as actors, and realise (embody) structures. Thus 
structure and action are "different ways o f  looking at the same thing" (Craib, 1992: 34). The production 
and reproduction o f  society is seen as a skilled performance for its members who draw upon both 
practical and discursive consciousness. ‘Practical consciousness’ is knowledgability about the world, 
while ‘discursive consciousness’ is our reflexive monitoring o f action (Jones and Dugdale, 2001). The 
challenge in empirical work (based on structuration theory) is to keep in mind concepts o f  structure and 
agency and relate this duality to the inter-relationship o f  dis-embedded and embedded levels over time 
and space.
32 Signification creates meaning in social interaction.
33 Domination produces power.
34 Legitimation provides a system's morality.
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These three dimensions35 also appear within institutional literature. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the link between them.
Figure 2.1: Institutional and Giddens' theory
Institutional theory Giddens' theory
Old institutional 
economics
focus on 
------------------------ ►
Signification (meaning)
Neo institutional 
economics
focus on 
------------------------ ►
Domination (governance 
structures) reflects a 
concern for control
Neo institutional 
sociology
concerned with 
------------------------ ►
Legitimation of organisational 
forms and process
Source: Adapted from Scott, W. (1995); and Burns and Scapens (1998)
For institutions, levels may be operationalised as a range of jurisdictions taken from the 
institutional form. Scott (1995) identifies six categories: (a) levels of world system (b) 
societal (c) organisational field (d) organisational population (e) organisation and (f) 
organisational subsystem
This research has focused on the ‘organisation level’. This means it focuses on the 
micro-processes, but does not ignore the broader (macro-institutional) dimension. To 
understand these micro-processes it is necessary to understand the wider institutional 
context. This involves both within the organisation (i.e. the organisation's specific 
milieu of rules, routines and institutions), and outside (i.e. the broader social, economic 
and political institutions of the organisational field, and the society in which the 
organisation is situated). Table 2.1 refers to those theorists whose work has pursued on 
institutional element at each of the specified levels.
35 Macintosh (1994: 172) argues that the three layers (outlined in the abstract for analytical purposes) are 
closely entwined in reality. Accounting systems consist o f  signification codes and the interpretative 
schemes for applying them. They also include domination codes and resources (rights) used to draw upon 
them, and also legitimation codes and also norms for using them (Jones and Dugdale, 2001).
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Table 2.1: Institutional Pillars and varying levels: Illustrative theorists
Levels
Pillars
Regulative Normative Cognitive
World system North and Thomas 
1973
Krasner 1983 Meyer 1994
Societal Skocpol 1979 Parsons 1953, 1960a Dobbin 1994
Organisational field Campbell and 
Lindberg 1990, 
Schmitter 1990, 
Ezzamel 1993, 1996
Mezias 1990 DiMaggio 1991
Organisational
population
Barnett and .Carroll 
1993a
Singh, Tucker, and 
House 1986
Carrol and Harman 
1989
Organisation Williamson 1975, 
1985, 1991, Bums 
1997, Robert and 
Westin, 1999
Selznick 1949 Clark 1970, Bums 
and Scapens 1998, 
2000.
Organisational
subsystem
Shepsle and 
Weingast 1987
Roy 1952, Buroway 
1979
Zimmerman 1969.
Source: Adapted from Scott, W. (1995)
It is possible to associate various ‘schools’ or ‘types’ of work with different locations in 
the property space, (created by the cross-classification of emphasis and level, see figure 
2 .2).
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Figure 2.2: Institutional Pillars and varying levels: Illustrative schools
Levels
Pillars
Regulative. Normative. Cognitive.
World-system f  Economic \  ( history J
7 N eo- \
I institutional \
Societal
v sociology J
Organisational field
/  Historical \
/  institutionalism \  
I in political 
\  science J
7  Traditional Y  
/  institutional \  
sociology
Organisational
population
{  Population \  
( ecology )
Organisation
VSS'N^ \  
institutionalism 
\ in economics /
/  Evolutionary \
/  theory in \  
/ economics 1
Organisational
subsystem
{  Ethno- >v 
I m ethodology J
Source: Scott, W. (1995)- "Institutions and Organisation", p. 59
Scott (1995) discovered salient differences among schools aligned with neo­
institutionalism. Sociologists emphasise a cognitive conception, cultural carriers, and 
macro level forces. By contrast, neo-institutional economists stress a regulative 
conception, structural carriers, and a micro focus. Different ideological perspectives 
share the same view.
Zucker (1977: 728) observed that “institutionalisation is both a process and a property 
variable”. Mohr (1982) differentiates between variance and process theories. Variance 
theories (associated with viewing institutions as entities), focus on abstract variables, 
(both independent and dependent), and attempt to establish their causal relations.
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Variance approaches identify the factors causally associated with the phenomena of 
interest. Variance theories address the question: why did the observed effect happen?
A process approach addresses the question: how did the observed effect happen? This 
approach assumes that “history matters”. It believes how things occur, influences things 
that subsequently happen (Scott and Meyer, 1983). Burns and Scapens (2000) have used 
a process approach to explore the complex and ongoing relationship between actions 
and institutions. They demonstrate the importance of organisational routines and 
institutions in shaping the processes of change in management accounting.
This research adopts a process approach. The rationale for choosing this approach is 
because it allowed the researcher to observe the state of management accounting and 
control in the Egyptian water industry. Questions to be addressed include: How has the 
water industry changed? What needs, changing? There have long been recommendations 
for a ‘process’ approach to be adopted in accounting research; - an approach which 
highlights the characteristics of accounting as a process, rather than as an outcome 
(Hopwood, 1987; Laughlin, 1991; Covaleski, et al., 1993; Scapens, 1994; Bums, 2000).
Management accounting systems and practices constitute organisational mles and 
routines. In order to understand the complex processes of the Egyptian Water Industry, 
it is necessary to examine both the internal and external institutional context of the 
organisation. An understanding of management accounting as organisational mles and 
routines, should enable the researcher to focus his energies on developing management 
accounting concepts, techniques, systems, etc. These are likely to be more useful in 
practice than the so-called ‘optimal techniques’- designed for abstract rational decision­
makers (Bums and Scapens, 2000).
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown the importance of both contingency theory and institutional 
theory for explaining the design and use of a cost accounting system. The chapter has 
argued that while technical (or contingent) explanations of cost management were not 
rejected, they were clearly viewed as incomplete (Scott, 1987). Institutional theory adds 
the social and political elements, which were typically absent or de-emphasised in the
55
rational instrumental approach (which guides most of the recent research on cost 
management).
This chapter works with a definition of ‘institutional theory’ and its core elements: 
cognitive, normative and regulative. It states the researcher view of management 
accounting. This research contends that accounting in organisation is primarily 
concerned with external or macro institutional effects (social, economic and political) 
and management accounting as an institution within the organisation.
The chapter looks at previous accounting research and notes that very little institutional 
accounting research focuses on the internal processes of an organisation. Hitherto, most 
institutional accounting research has focused on the impact of external legitimisation in 
shaping accounting practice. This led the researcher to look at the institutional context 
within the GOGCWS (for example, which models of cost management were followed in 
the GOGCWS, and what methods of cost accounting were used in the GOGCWS, see 
sections 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7). It also led the researcher to look at the institutional context 
outside (i.e. the GOGCWS the legal framework for water industry in Egypt, the external 
supervision and control body of the GOGCWS and the suggestions by the consultants 
Black and Veatch International which related to cost management, see sections 8.1, 8.3 
and 8.7).
The chapter links the three pillars of institutional theory (cognitive, normative and 
regulative) with accounting research. It also examines the differences among schools 
aligned with neo-institutionalism. For example, sociologists emphasise a cognitive 
conception, cultural carriers, and macro level forces. By contrast neo-institutional 
economists stress a regulative conception, structural carriers and a micro focus. As 
mentioned in section 1.4, this research adopts neo-institutional economic theory, this led 
the researcher to focus on regulative pillar of institutional theory.
The chapter points out the similarity between Giddens' three dimensions (signification, 
domination and legitimation) - and institutional theory. It focuses on the ‘organisational 
level’ of analysis. It gives the chosen approach of analysis, a process approach and 
offers a rationale for choosing it (see section 2.3). Furthermore, there have long been 
recommendations for a ‘process’ approach to be adopted in accounting research. Having
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determined the theoretical framework of this research, the next chapter will discuss the 
role of management accounting from the institutional theory perspective.
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Chapter 3 
Institutional theory and the role of management accounting
3.0 Introduction
Management accounting (cost management) research is explained largely by rational 
economic theory, and neo-classical theory (the normative view). A major criticism of 
rational economic theory is that it fails to consider the behaviour of the firm. It also 
neglects the social and political context. Rational economic theory assumes the 
imperfect market does not exist and therefore neglects the monopoly market, 
uncertainty, and unpredictability.
In order to address these issues, this chapter examines alternative institutional 
approaches, - namely old institutional economic theory, neo-institutional economic 
theory and neo-institutional sociological theory. The chapter begins with a rejection of 
the core assumptions of neo-classical economics theory. It is argued that institutional 
theory offers a more useful theoretical framework for understanding management 
accounting (cost management) practices.
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the role of management accounting, by examining 
the theory behind it. For this purpose this chapter is divided into four sections.
The aim of the first section is to illustrate the role accounting has come to serve in both 
micro-level (organisations) and macro-level (societies). There then follow three sub­
sections: the first part explores several views on accounting, explains its role and 
examines the relationship between the state and accounting. The second sub-section is 
devoted to the role of accounting in micro-level organisations. It reviews the 
relationship between accounting and decision-making and its problems as outlined by 
Thompson and Tuden (1959). The third sub-section looks at the role of accounting in 
macro-level societies. It focuses on rational decision-making, economic rationality, 
differences between formal and substantive rationality, while also examining the 
process of accounting regulation.
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The second section reviews the role of management accounting within organisations, 
from an economic perspective. Problems of management accounting within the 
organisational setting are discussed.
The third section reviews the different perceptive on management accounting. It begins 
with criticism of management accounting from a neo-classical economic perspective. 
There then follows a review of management accounting from an institutional 
perspective, - (incorporating old institutional economic theory, neo-institutional 
economic theory and neo-institutional sociology theory).
The final section sums up the main conclusions of the chapter.
3.1 The role of accounting in organisation
3.1.1 Different views of accounting and its roles
Previously accounting has suffered from the misconceptions of being too "narrow" or 
"technical". Accounting is portrayed as a simple technique, - merely a set of instructions 
for generating, processing and evaluating information (Carruthers, 1995).
Social science has demonstrated the richness and significance of accounting. 
Establishing links between accounting research and other paradigms has been an 
important part of this project. For example, theories of class conflict inform Bougen's 
(1989) investigation of accounting and industrial relations. Similarly, Miller and 
O'Leary's (1987) historical analysis of standard costing and budgeting employs Michel 
Foucault's conception of power. Likewise Baecker's (1992) discussion of accounting 
draws upon mathematical logic and literary criticism. Such examples serve to reinforce 
the relevance of accounting for a variety of issues (power, conflict, rationality, 
governance, and organisational behaviour).
Accounting has functional claims and pretentions36 at its core. We are led to believe it is 
essentially concerned with the provision of “relevant information for decision-making”. 
It has a “rational allocation of resources” and maintains institutional “accountability”
36 Littleton (1953: 18) in his search for a rationale, argues that: “There must be some basic concept which  
makes accounting different from all other methods o f  quantitative analysis. There must be a central idea 
which expresses better than any other the objectives, effects and results characteristic o f  accounting. A  
‘centre o f  gravity’ if  you w ill”.
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and “stewardship”. Accounting systems are seen as mirrors of both societies and the 
organisations in which they are utilised. At a societal level, accounting reflects on 
organisation’s ‘social’ relationships. The organisational level has recently been 
influenced by the emergence of contingency schools of thought in the study of 
organisational behaviour (Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Hopwood, 1974; Sathe, 1975; 
Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978; Watson, 1975).
Accounting systems may be viewed as a product of the complexity, uncertainty of the 
organisational environment (Galbraith, 1973; Khandwalla, 1972). Accounting may also 
be seen as ‘technology of the enterprise’ (Daft and Macintosh, 1978) or a strategy of 
corporate management (Chandler, 1962). Accounting is a discipline which can 
encompass a body of ideas, conventions, variable tools/techniques and a variety of 
actual practices (Boyns and Edwards, 1997). Hoskin and Macve (1992) note that "the 
power of accounting" is associated with the need to co-ordinate activities of 
departmentalised large-scale business organisations (Williamson, 1980; Johnson and 
Kaplan, 1987).
The varied role of accounting can tell us how it influences accounting discourse and the 
way people have sought to influence accounting. The various roles of accounting have 
changed its practice. Argyris and Schon (1974) point out a mere theory on paper is very 
different from theory in practice. The roles of accounting and its actual practice appear 
to have a rather equivocal relationship.
Functional claims for accounting stem mainly from professional institutes, accounting 
regulation bodies, state agencies and the academy itself. They very often reflect the 
pressures on those bodies and a need for a public legitimacy and rationale for action. 
Formulated in the context of particular institutional needs and actions, functional claims 
attempt to provide novel interpretations of the accounting mission (Burchell, et al., 
1980).
The roles of accounting provide a normative structure for accounting thought. The roles 
define what accounting is, and ought to be about. These roles therefore facilitate the 
appraisal of accounting practice. Accounting has changed in terms of the roles it serves. 
Those who have sought to ‘extend’ accounting promote “corporate accountability” and
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further “rational decision making”. Others point to the challenges which social change 
necessarily creates for accounting practice (Gilling, 1976).
The State exerts influence on accounting in terms of accountability and the furtherance 
of organisational and societal efficiency (Searle, 1971). Professional institutes and 
agencies concerned with accounting regulation adopt a similar stance. They emphasise 
the role accounting could play in improving the flow of information (useful for 
investment decisions of shareholders). Those practising accounting within 
organisations, point to its relevance in improving organisational efficiency and the 
maintenance of organisational control.
Shaoul (1997) claims that since the 1960s, mainstream financial accounting research 
analyses problems and issues in positivist or technical ways (in which the basic values 
of the model are not questioned). Issues are therefore conceived as purely technical 
problems. In financial accounting research, the issue was largely how to make public 
sector accounting more like that of the private sector. The debate therefore revolved 
around the value of accrual accounting.
Throughout the 1970s, emerging accounting research opposed the technical approach. 
This research re-examines the theoretical underpinnings of the discipline, - critically 
analysing the basic concepts of profit, value, efficiency, etc. Other research traces the 
history of accounting discourses and its pliability according to the social context in 
question. Other research has looked at accounting’s role as ideological in the 
distribution conflict over wealth. Some researchers have analysed accounting as 
rhetoric, examining its epistemological basis.
Critical accounting research has turned away from analysing contemporary events or 
outcomes of public policy decisions in ways that are useful or helpful to the broader 
public. This has happened at the very time when the public sector has faced 
interventions (in which accounting was to play a crucial role). A recent study by 
Edwards and Shaoul (1996) found that relatively few academic researchers have 
examined contemporary corporate events. There are also few accounting studies of 
corporate performance using primary sources (see Adcroft, et al., 1991; Berry, et al., 
1985; Cooper and Hopper, 1988). Briloff and Chatov were the foremost accounting
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critics of corporate behaviour in the USA. In the UK there was Stamp (see Stamp and 
Marley, 1970; Stamp, et al., 1980) and more recently, Sikka (see Mitchell, et al., 1992; 
Mitchell and Sikka, 1993; Russell, 1991).
The different views and roles of accounting are summarised in table 3.1 below: 
Table 3.1: Different views of Accounting and impact on its role
Views of accounting Role of accounting
Accounting is seen to have a core of 
functional claims
Provision of relevant information for 
decision-making, with the achievement of 
rational allocation resources.
Accounting is seen as a mirror of society, 
or a mirror of organisations
Reflects the organisation of social 
relationships (contingency theory).
Accounting is a discipline which 
encompasses a body of ideas, a set of 
variable techniques and a variety of 
practices.
Changes the practice of accounting.
Source: Adapted from Burchell, et al., (1980)
3.1.2 Accounting systems and organisational practice
The relationship between accounting and organisational decision-making has been an 
influential basis for the analysis, development and articulation of normative accounting 
roles and "solutions". Many writers have noted the multiple roles which accounting 
systems can and do play in providing relevant information for decision-making. They 
help improve the rationality of the decision-making process and maintain the 
organisation in ‘a state of control’. A problem however is that the relationship between 
accounting information and decision-making has not been critically examined. Burchell, 
et al. (1980) refer to the work of Thompson and Tuden (1959). Their study distinguishes 
between uncertainty over the objectives for organisational action, and uncertainty over 
the patterns of causation that determine the consequences of action (see figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Decision-making and location of organisational uncertainty.
Uncertainty of objectives
Low High
Uncertainty of 
cause and effect
Low Decision by computation Decision by compromise
High Decision by judgement Decision by inspiration
Source: Burchell, et al., (1980)- "The Roles o f Accounting in Organisations and Society", p. 13
When objectives are clear and undisputed, the consequences of action are presumed to 
be known. Thompson and Tuden highlight the potential for decision-making by 
computation. This situation might represent what Simon (1960) called ‘structured 
decision-making’, where the intelligence, design and choice phases are all 
programmable. Accounting systems serve as "answer machines", providing the simple 
investment appraisal methods, stock control systems and credit control routines which 
feature in management accounting texts.
With clear objectives but uncertain causation, the situation becomes more complex and 
the potential for computation diminishes. Thompson and Tuden see decisions being 
made in a judgmental manner. Accounting systems might be expected to provide 
assistance through what Gorry and Scott-Morton (1971) refer to as ‘decision support 
systems’ and Churchman (1971) calls ‘inquiry systems’.
There are two reasons behind the extending of computational practice into the realms of 
the judgmental. The first reason stems from the increasing formalisation and 
objectification of management knowledge. The second from the extent to which 
accounting practices have become implicated in the development of neo-management 
and other more complex forms of organisational segmentation and management.
Accounting involves the implementation of changes in management practice. The
i
increasing formalisation of investment appraisals and planning processes has extended 
the sphere of financial calculation. Developments in accounting practice have enabled 
‘operationalisation’ of organisational efficiency and performance, - allowing objectives 
for action to be stated in less ambiguous terms.
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Given the uncertainty over objectives and relative certainty over causation, values, 
principles, perspectives and interests will conflict. Standards for appraisal and the 
criteria for guiding the organisational task are problematic. Here political processes are 
important in the decision-making process. Modes of accounting can act as "ammunition 
machines" through which different parties seek to promote their own vested interests. In 
order to selectively channel distribution of information, certain parties implicated in 
organised action, can introduce neo-mechanisms for organisational control, and 
management of information-flow (Pettigew, 1973).
Where objectives are uncertain, accounting systems are often used to promote particular 
values. Mechanisms for organisational control are now arising out of the political and 
conflictive nature of organisational life. As Pfeffer (1978) states: "Structure, it would 
appear, is not just the outcome of a managerial process in which (organisational) 
designs are selected to ensure higher profit. Structure, rather, is itself the outcome of a 
process in which conflicting interests are mediated so that decisions emerge as to what 
criteria the organisation will seek to satisfy. Organisational structures can be viewed as 
the outcome of contests-for-control and influence occurring within the organisation. 
Organisational structural arrangements are as likely to be the outcomes of political 
processes as are organisational resource allocation decisions".
The design of information systems and accounting systems are often implicated in the 
management of political processes. For organisational actions and their consequences, 
accounting systems can influence those which become relatively more visible (Becker 
and Neuheuser, 1975) (particularly to senior management groups). The ‘visibility’ that 
is established is very often an asymmetric one. The powerful observe the less powerful, 
but not vice versa. It is a unique mode of surveillance that is established. The centralised 
co-ordination of activities maybe established. Budgeting, planning and reporting can 
together provide a framework within which a measured and observed delegation of 
authority can take place.
With uncertain objectives and causation, Thompson and Tuden point out that decision­
making tends to be ‘inspirational’ in its nature. As such, the accounting system can be 
created to serve as an organisational "rationalisation machine". The accounting mission 
focuses exclusively on those accounting roles which precede decision-making.
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Accounting systems are often implicated in organisational processes. As Bower (1970) 
discovered, the widespread use of capital budgeting procedures has resulted in the 
availability of justification devices for proposals of organisational action. Accounting 
has gained widespread support, and has a simple provision of information for decision­
making (for proposals which remain problematic). Similarly budgets can be built 
around what is likely to happen. Burchell, et al., (1980: 28) refer to the work of Meyer 
and Rowan (1978) who claim that: "Much of the irrationality of life in modem 
organisations arises because the organisation itself must maintain a ‘rational corporate 
persona’. We find planners and economists who will waste their time legitimising plans 
already made, accounts to justify our prices, and human relations professionals to defect 
blame from our conflicts. Life in modem organisations is a constant interplay between 
the activities that we need to carry on and the organisational accounts we need to give".
Some authors have looked at how accounting is ‘implicated’ in organisational practices 
(Burchell, et al., 1980; Hopwood, 1983; Neimark and Tinker, 1986; Hopwood, 1987; 
Knights and Collinson, 1987; Lehman and Tinker, 1987; Miller and O’Leary, 1987; 
1990; Hines, 1988; Loft, 1986; Nahapiet, 1989). This ‘constitutive’ role of accounting 
to create particular conceptions of organisational reality, is especially potent in 
processes of organisational change. The role of accounting in actively constructing 
organisational purposes and rendering visible the issues, projects, and criteria which 
accrue significance in the pursuit of those purposes, has been considered by a number of 
authors (Hines, 1988; Nahapiet, 1989; Loft, 1986; Hopwood, 1983; 1987; Miller and 
O’Leary, 1987; Neimark and Tinker, 1986; Burchell, et al., 1980).
Accounting researchers agree that accounting techniques are an effective means of 
facilitating the process of allocating and utilising resources in pursuit of desired 
objectives. These techniques also produce a variety of other effects within 
organisations. Covaleski and Dirsmith (1986) suggest that budgetary systems can be 
used for representing vested interests in political bargaining processes, and in 
maintaining power-relationships within organisations. Likewise Bariff and Galbraith 
(1978) concluded that by manipulating the method by which information is processed, 
control systems can sustain or alter power-relationships within organisations. Nahapiet 
(1989) found in particular circumstances, accounting can be seen as a set of mles for
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negotiating an understanding of organisational reality. This is contrary to being viewed 
simply as a mechanism for establishing an objective economic reality. Markus and 
Pfeffer (1983) have illustrated cases of accounting system failures in organisations 
(following the implementation of modified accounting and control mechanisms to 
achieve desired ends).
It is increasingly being acknowledged that accounting systems do not simply allow their 
intended objectives to be realised. The ‘effects’ of accounting are not necessarily 
confined to their designated use. As such, "the consequences of accounting do not 
necessarily have a close and automatic relationship with the aims in the name of which 
it was introduced" (Hopwood, 1984: 185).
Espeland and Hirsch (1990) in their case study of a conglomerate merger, illustrate the 
rhetorical power of accounting as a symbolic system for legitimating new corporate 
forms and practices. Similarly Jones (1992) charted the changing perceptions and use of 
accounting control systems to improve efficiency following a management buy-out. 
These studies have been central to the work which has explored the role of accounting 
in recent public sector organisational reform, (particularly the impact of new forms of 
financial control), (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Dent, 1991; Humphrey and Scapens, 
1990; Humphrey, 1991; Boum and Ezzamel, 1986). The role of accounting changed 
from its previous concerns with probity, compliance and control, to one which focused 
on efficiency, effectiveness and cost saving (Richardson and Cullen, 2000).
Recent studies of organisational change in the private sector have shown pro-active 
accounting to be an important feature (Espeland and Hirsch, 1990; Jones, 1992) and in 
the public sector (Bourn and Ezzamel, 1986; Espeland and Boum, 1990; Broadbent, et 
al., 1991; Hood, 1991; Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Humphrey and Scapens, 1992). It 
has been especially evident in studies of organisations earmarked for privatisation, 
(such as the Regional Water Authorities of England and Wales which supply water and 
sewerage services, Ogden, 1995a).
In the case of water, the constitutive role of accounting (in actively constructing 
organisational purposes and shaping new images of the organisation and its relationship 
with its environment), is especially evident. In response to new imperatives to cut costs
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and improve financial performance, senior managers sought to re-focus and improve the 
ways in which the organisation was governed and controlled. As such, more attention 
was given to economic implications, particularly in term of costs and management 
decision-making. Subsequently considerable organisational resources have been given 
over to the development of more elaborate management information systems. These 
include: (a) developing, planning and control mechanisms (b) Ensuring detailed 
specification of objectives (c) Generating more accurate assessment and allocation of 
costs to each unit of operational activity and (d) Introducing performance indicators and 
output measures (to evaluate and compare achievements). Managers were given new 
training in management skills and were subject to a much more numerate and 
performance-based type of reporting and accountability (Ogden, 1995a: 198).
3.1.3 Accounting and Social Practice
Accounting cannot, however, be conceived as purely an organisational phenomenon. 
Whilst arising out of organisational and institutional pressures, it is also a prevalent 
feature of the societies in which we live. Certainly the development of accounting itself 
has paralleled the emergence of numerous other specialised mechanisms for 
information-processing and social and economic calculation. These include statistics, 
the compilation of information for social and economic administration, instruments for 
social and economic categorisation in medicine, psychiatry, education, law and business 
and economic life (Baritz, 1960; Cullen, 1975; Kamin, 1974; Kendrick, 1970; 
Sutherland, 1977).
Marx saw accounting as an important tool in decision-making for capitalists. His ideas 
were taken up by Most (1963) and Bailey (1978). Most (1963) was critical of Marx for 
not discarding his ideological “baggage”, and rather concentrating wholly on 
management accounting. However it is important to note that Marx stressed the ‘social 
rationality’ of accounting. Social rationality encompasses ‘mystification’ of social 
relationships. Burchell, et. al., (1980: 19) refers to a Marxist text; “The way in which 
surplus value is transformed into profit by the rate of profit is a further development of 
the inversion of a subject which takes place in the process of production. In the latter we 
have seen the subjective productive forces of labour appear as productive forces of 
capital. The value (or past labour), which dominates living labour, is incarnated in the 
capitalist. The labourer appears as mere labour-power -  (a commodity). Even in the
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simple relations of production, this inverted relationship produces correspondingly 
inverted conceptions...”
Weber (1969: 86) stressed economic rationality: "From a purely technical point of view, 
money is the most "perfect" means of economic calculation. That is, it is the most 
rational means of orienting economic activity". Weber saw rationality in terms of the 
calculative means which might bring it about. He defined the ‘formal rationality of 
economic action’ as "the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting, technically 
possible, which is actually applied" (1969: 85). Weber (1969) distinguished between 
‘formal rationality’ and ‘substantive rationality’. He thought formal rationality provided 
an adequate means to achieve substantive rationality.
Hirst (1976) takes this argument further. He states: "Only formal rationality can adjust a 
means to an ends in terms of efficiency, (since it provides a quantitative measure of 
efficiency). A qualitative measure of the efficient use of resources is logically 
impossible. All economic action therefore requires formal rationality, and indeed, is 
modelled on formal rationality. Resources cannot be "rationally oriented" to economic 
ends without quantitative calculation. The definition of ‘economic action’ is viewed in 
terms of formal rationality. Formal and substantive rationality are not alternative and 
equally "rational" calculations. End-rational action (in the economic sphere) requires 
formal calculation.
Some commentators have stressed the role which accounting plays in allowing the 
devolution and decentralisation of economic decision-making. Others have pointed to 
the different internal pressures which should be taken into account when decision­
making is centralised, (either in the hands of the monolithic enterprise, Chandler, 1962) 
or the state (Bettleheim, 1976). Accounting is seen as both reflecting and enabling the 
construction of society. Institutional forms and modes of social action are intertwined in 
its emergence and development.
In terms of technical elucidation and standardisation, attention has been given to the 
institutional and political components of the regulatory endeavour. In the case of 
inflation-accounting in the United Kingdom, it has been seen that the institutional 
mechanisms for accounting regulation arose at the interface between a critical media,
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concerned agencies of the state and a profession concerned with preserving its powers 
of self-regulation and control (Zeff, 1972).
The interests of the state are changing. Initially inflation-accounting was concerned with 
the taxation of corporate income and the formulation of policies for macro-economic 
management. However other agencies of the state began to devote attention to the role 
which inflation-accounting might play in the implementation and furtherance of micro- 
economic policies for industrial recovery and growth. Others have looked at the role 
accounting plays in coping with both an economic crisis and threat of a changing social 
power structure.
In a regulatory environment, the conditions for accounting change are complex. Both 
technical and conceptual developments are required. However to be influential they 
have to root themselves in a dynamic constellation of issues which constitutes the 
accounting context. Privatisation led to many changes in different areas. Central to these 
changes was an all-pervasive managerial concern with introducing and operating more 
stringent forms of accounting controls over organisational activities. Initiatives in cost- 
conscious resource management, cost improvement programmes, performance 
indicators, delegated budgets, cost centres and new management information system 
have all been variously deployed. Managers have tried to give effect to politically - 
determined notions of efficiency, cost effectiveness, value for money, and greater 
financial accountability (Gray and Jenkins, 1986; Fry, 1988; Clarke and Cochrane, 
1989; Dent, 1991; Humphrey and Scapens, 1990; Humphrey, 1991; Broadbent, et al., 
1991).
Accounting is central to the processes of organisational change. Privatisation has 
changed accounting information systems and the uses made of accounting information. 
In the case of the ten Regional Water Authorities of England and Wales, Ogden (1995a) 
argued that there should be an increased emphasis attached to costs and cost-reduction 
to meet Government - determined performance aims prior to privatisation. He also 
stressed the need to enhance their efficiency profiles in the run-up to privatisation. This 
resulted in a management initiative that not only served to achieve the targeted 
improvements in organisational efficiency, but also to communicate new organisational
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realities and promote cost consciousness as a mobilising rationale for organisational 
action.
Accounting has come to be seen as a social and institutional practice that acts upon 
individuals, entities and processes, and transforms them in an attempt to achieve a 
specific end (Miller, 1994). Accounting is widely seen as a powerful force, influencing 
both individuals and society (Jones and Dugdale, 2001: 35-36). Miller (1994:1) argues 
that development of interests in the social and institutional practice of accounting 
"entailed a move by researchers beyond those organisations at the executive level of 
research".
Accounting operates more broadly and deeply than appears apparent on the surface of 
specific practices (Jones and Dugdale, 2001). Accounting is embedded in (and 
constitutes) social relations, and the strong occupational organisation of accounting 
(Armstrong, 1987a: Anderson et al., 1997).
Accounting as a process constitutes, and is embedded in social and system relations . 
The re-embedding of accounting is shaped by social relations of local contexts, (whilst 
simultaneously shaping those contexts, Jones and Dugdale, 2001). Time is organised 
around accounting periods - for example, it becomes structured around annual, 
quarterly, and monthly reporting. Accounting generates chronological cycles of 
planning and budgeting. Accounting thus regulates relations between individuals, the 
wider organisation, and parts of the actual organisation.
The claims of accounting to represent corporate activities faithfully, are in part, 
supported and reinforced by the institutional commitments of regulators, academics and 
politicians. They are all keen on the idea of "free markets". They characterise markets as 
"fair" distributive mechanisms. In other words, unimpeded markets (i.e. unregulated), 
are seen to reward the ‘productive’ with pecuniary compensation, and punish the "non­
productive" with failure. Markets reward productivity and punish non-productivity in an 
even-handed manner. Hence, intervention into the operation of markets is considered
37 ‘Social’ integration refers to the ways in which actors relate to each other. ‘System ’ integration is how  
institutionalised parts o f  systems relate to each other (Lockwood, 1964).
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inappropriate. A reluctance exists among certain economists, regulators, and politicians 
to intervene directly into the operation of markets.
Despite the belief in the fairness of markets, there remains a need to monitor market 
operations at a macro level, (as well as to monitor the success or failure of individual 
entities as they function in a market economy). Regulators often call upon accounting 
(with its representational claims) to make the effects of the economic, "visible" and 
measurable. Accounting is thus seen to act as a scorecard by which we identify 
productive and non-productive entities. The representational claims of accounting are 
reinforced when its practices are called upon to provide a window through which to 
view specific entities operating in the market. This in turn allows us to view operations 
of the market.
The representational claims of accounting are reinforced by a commitment to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of markets. They also help maintain a commitment to the 
non-intervention in the functioning of such markets. As accounting is seen to provide a 
window into markets, questions about the "fair", "effective" or "efficient" functioning of 
markets may be re-framed as questions about existing accounting practices.
3.2 The role of Management Accounting
3.2.1 Economic perspective
Ward (1992) discussed the role of management accounting and claimed that in most 
businesses it is normal to separate the financial function into three main roles. These 
are:
(a) Recording the financial transactions of the business and externally reporting to 
shareholders the historic financial results of these transactions (i.e. financial 
accounting).
(b) Raising the funds required by the business in the most appropriate manner (i.e. 
financial management or corporate finance).
(c) Supporting the managers of the business in the financial decision-making process 
(and being part of that management team, i.e. management accounting).
38 See the role o f  OFWAT in the UK water industry (section 7.3.3).
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The separation of management accounting from financial accounting is fundamental in 
highlighting the fact that management accounting does not concentrate wholly on 
recording past events or on presenting externally published financial statements.
Bromwich and Bhimani (1989) in their study of the development of management 
accounting in Britain highlighted some key issues. These include: (a) the role of the 
management accounting system for purposes of strategic decision-making (compared to 
those of everyday control) (b) The extent to which the system influenced, or was 
influenced by, organisational structure (c) The extent to which non-routine accounting 
information was used. Table 3.2 shows the development in management accounting.
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Table 3.2: The historical development of management accounting
Development Date
Cost and management control information 1890
Scientific management 1902
Break-even charts 1903
Standard costing and variance analysis 1908
Centralised accounting systems with decentralised functional organisation 1900
Capital and operating budgets 1910
Centralised control and decentralised responsibility 1920
Separation of financial and cost accounting 1923
Residual income method 1940
Simplex method for linear programming 1944
Discounted cash flow 1950
Total quality management 1950s
Cusum charts 1954
Optimum transfer pricing 1957
Computer technology 1960
Opportunity cost budgeting 1966
Zero-base budgeting 1969
Information economics and agency theory 1970s
Just-in-time scheduling 1970s
Activity-based costing 1980s
Target costing 1980s
Value-added management 1980s
Activity-based management 1990s
Benchmarking 1990s
Strategic management accounting 1990s
Supply chain management 1990s
Source: Adapted from Smith, M. (1995)- " New Tools For M anagem ent A ccounting” , pp. 6-8
The investigation into the role of management-accounting information (in complex 
operations) has focused on the interaction of disciplines in actual practice and the
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formalisation and correction of deficiencies. The pioneering work of Robin Cooper, 
Tom Johnson and Robert Kaplan has been central to such developments since the mid- 
1980s.
Scapens (1991) found that while there is a large and growing tool-chest of modem 
management accounting techniques, (including cost-volume-profit analysis, activity- 
based costing etc.), "little can be said at the theoretical level about the techniques (tools) 
which should be used in practice" (p. 219). He goes on to argue that before the gap 
between theory and practice can be closed, "researchers must examine the various roles 
which management accounting fulfils within the organisation" (p. 221). Scapens (1991: 
10) notes that "the terms cost accounting and management accounting are now used 
synonymously in textbook titles".
Dietrich (2001) outlines different economic perspectives on the firm and examines 
implications for the role and functioning of management accounting systems. He 
summarises the different approaches to management accounting in a simple 2 * 2  matrix 
set out in figure 3.2
Figure 3.2: The different roles of Management Accounting
Constraining 
Authority
Co-ordinating
Source: Dietrich, M. (2001)- "Accounting for the Econom ic firm", p. 17
Before the role of management accounting can be discussed, certain terminology needs 
to be clarified (e.g. ‘knowledge that’, ‘knowledge how’, ‘authority constraining’ and 
‘authority co-ordination’). Loasby (1998) distinguishes between "knowledge that" and 
"knowledge how". "Knowing that" is knowledge of facts and relationships and is the 
result of formal education and the news. According to Loasby, traditional production 
functions are based on "knowledge that". Dietrich (2001) argues that if the use of 
institutions is based on "knowledge that", the necessary predictability will be generated 
by rules that operate as general constraints. This occurs in an optimising world where
Knowledge
That How
(a) Passive optimiser (d) Active regulator
(b) Passive co-ordinator (c) Active co-ordinator
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rules act as parameters to decisions (i.e. institutions are part of a non-economic 
background to economic activity).
"Knowing how" is the ability to carry out appropriate actions to achieve desired results. 
This includes knowledge of a particular skill and of when and where skills should be 
applied. Dietrich (2001) claims that we can view "knowledge that" and "knowledge 
how" as respectively ‘passive’ and ‘active’, use of information. If institutions are 
underpinned by "knowledge how", spatial and temporal specific learning is necessary. 
This learning is a basic requirement for institutions to involve active participation in a 
social context, (rather than just operate rule-defined behaviour).
Dietrich (2001) argues that different perspectives on the firm, view authority as either 
being necessary for co-ordination purposes, or see it as a constraint on economic 
activity. If authority exists for co-ordination purposes, it is viewed as having a positive 
role in the perspective concerned. For instance, clearly defined authority (and the co­
ordination it provides), might be argued to have efficiency advantages. Authority as a 
constraint, is viewed (in general terms) as influencing relationships to promote the 
interests of particular economic agents. This constraining effect might involve ex-ante 
intentions (as with monopoly control over resource allocation).
There are four different roles of management accounting, (a) Management accounting is 
a passive optimisation tool, where authority is viewed as a constraint, and information- 
use described in a "knowledge that" manner. This is the world of textbook accounting. 
Hence the requirement for efficient and effective monitoring fails to recognise the 
importance of ‘bounded rationality’ (Dietrich, 1993). The (implicit) complete 
contracting is based on a universal "knowledge that" rather than learning-based 
"knowledge how".
(b) Much of the recent literature in accounting appears to have adopted a transaction- 
cost logic (neo-institutional economic theory). This is accounting as ‘passive co­
ordinator’. Accounting systems are viewed here as efficient responses to particular 
environmental conditions. Authority is one means of co-ordinating resource allocation 
and is necessary to economise on market-based transaction costs. The "knowledge that" 
basis of an accounting system is more problematic. We can refer to site and human asset
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specificities here (see section 3.3.2.2). Any management accounting system involves 
set-up costs and Teaming-by-doing’, (i.e. the system itself will have firm specific 
characteristics).
-3Q
(c) The ‘competence’ theory of the firm has been shown to involve a more active role 
in management accounting (but this is still one of co-ordination). This active role 
involves recognising accounting as informal and routinised, as well as a formal activity. 
Authority is seen as co-ordinating, and decision-making is based on "knowledge how" 
rather than "knowledge that". The competence approach emphasises the rationale of the 
firm, and its long-running competitive advantage. This theory sees institutional 
characteristics as derived from individual decisions and activities, (i.e. it is based on 
methodological individualism).
(d) Management accounting prevents what might be called an ‘active regulator’ (when 
accountants use constraining authority and "knowledge how" information). "Knowledge 
how" and learning are linked to co-ordination (described in terms of direction and 
routines, and hence institutional development). A constraining authority - ("knowledge 
how") has, what might be called a ‘reserve logic’. Institutions are given an existence 
that logically precedes individual activity, (i.e. it is methodologically holist). Dietrich 
(2001) argues that the limitations in a constraining authority - ("knowledge how"), 
should be viewed as leading to more than just exchange-based economy. Dietrich 
(2001) claims that implications of this general framework affect accounting in two 
ways: (a) By viewing accounting as a professionalised activity (B) by incorporating a 
symbolic as well as instrumental significance.
Dietrich and Roberts (1997, 1999) suggest that traditional economic approaches to 
professionalisation are incomplete as they adopt either efficiency or power. Dietrich 
(1997), (using institutional analyses of the role of accounting - e.g. Armstrong, 1985; 
1987; Fligstein, 1987), shows professional accounting control within an organisational
39 The basic difference between the contracting and competence perspective can be understood (in game 
theoretic terms) as the difference between the prisoner's dilemma and co-ordination problems (Foss, 
1993; Longlois and Robertson, 1995). Contracting (prisoner's dilemma) analysis is oriented towards 
issues o f  motivation and control, (given the divergent incentives o f  the factors involved). The emphasis is 
on issues o f  organisation and co-ordinating behaviour rather than production. Conversely the competence 
perspective o f  the firm sees its basic nature in terms o f  the co-ordination o f  divergent capabilities. The 
way in which this co-ordination problem is solved, influences a firm's productive capabilities.
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context, can become "locked-in". As Perkin (1989) found, this organisational 
dominance of professionals reflects a wider social dominance. It follows that accounting 
can channel organisational activity partly by formal rule-setting, but also by 
management of organisational context. This perspective is consistent with that 
suggested by Roberts and Scapens (1990) in which accounting is viewed as enhancing 
the position of particular organisational actors relative to others.
The second context is that organisational activity (specifically accounting activity), can 
be viewed as having a symbolic, as well as instrumental significance. For instance, 
Carruthers (1995) suggests that management accounting is a legitimation tool for a 
firm's ‘outside’ world. If accounting practices are viewed as having purely instrumental 
significance, (whether this is contracting or competence-based), such legitimation is 
irrelevant. It only becomes significant if institutionalisation processes are based on 
"participation in a social context".
3.2.2 The problem of management accounting in organisation services
During the 1980s, criticism of management accounting practices began to appear in 
professional and academic accounting literature. The most prominent critic was Robert 
Kaplan, who, in a series of articles in the mid-1980s, questioned the relevance of current 
practices (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). The principal criticisms of current management 
accounting practices can be summarised as follows: (a) Conventional management 
accounting does not meet the needs of today’s manufacturing and competitive 
environment (b) Traditional product costing systems provide misleading information for 
decision-making purposes (c) Management focuses almost entirely on internal activities 
and relatively little attention is given to the external environment in which the business 
operates
Bromwich and Bhimani (1989) identify five persistent weaknesses in management 
accounting: (1) The subservience of management accounting to external financial 
accounting requirements (2) The lack of strategic considerations in management 
accounting and project appraisal (3) The reliance of management accounting on 
redundant assumptions concerning manufacturing processes (4) The maintenance of 
traditional assumptions in performance evaluation (5) The continued short-term 
orientation of performance measurement
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Their findings are useful in providing indications of the likely direction.of future 
research. In particular they identify: (a) the need to identify cost drivers which link 
processes to cost of output (b) the need to measure activity-based costs where these are 
meaningful and can lead to significant benefits (c) the benefits of non-financial 
accounting information in different manufacturing environments (d) the opportunity to 
incorporate both qualitative and non-financial, quantitative information into 
management accounting information systems (e) the increasing relevance of a strategic 
approach to management accounting.
Bjomenak and Olson (1999: 237) argue that conventional management accounting has 
focused primarily on the scope dimension40 (i.e. what is accounted for, and for what 
period of time). The scope dimension includes sub-dimensions such as cost items, cost 
objects and allocation bases. Bjomenak and Olson (1999) argue that the system 
dimension41 is almost non-existent in conventional management accounting (p. 328) and 
that the choice of time perspective plays no important role in management accounting.
Bjomenak and Olson (1999: 333) argue that the conventional view of a management 
accounting system includes a continuous view of the system itself. This means that the 
system is assumed to have longevity. This idea of the ‘continuous system’ was 
undermined when Madsen (1963) introduced the variability-based accounting system42. 
Bjomenak and Olson (1999) argue that the conventional management view of a 
management accounting system (one which uses different costs for different purposes), 
is challenged by the "different system for different purposes perspective". The "different 
systems perspective" operates at different levels in the organisation. They argue that the 
conventional wisdom of management accounting shows information symmetry as a way
40 The scope system includes three elements: (a) descriptive variability factors or descriptive objects 
(DO), (its purpose is to describe the variations in costs related to the object) (b) Causal variability factors 
(CVF) (describes the cause o f  variation) (c) Time. (The period o f  time accounted for, p. 328).
41 The dimension system is the link between the users o f  the system and how the system is designed. 
There are two aspects in the system dimension: (a) the lifetime o f the system (b) the integration o f  user 
aspects in management accounting (Bjomenak and Olson, 1999: 328).
42 In this system, data collection was considered a continuous task, while reporting was made on both a 
continuous and ad hoc basis (Bjomenak and Olson, 1999: 333).
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of achieving goal congruence through aggregation of cost data. Systems are designed in 
a top-down fashion because the centre is assumed to know which information has no 
value.
Management accounting faced a "crisis of confidence" (Dent, 1990) following "an acute 
failure of managerial expertise, and of calculative expertise in particular" (Miller and 
O'leary, 1993: 188). Following the "lost relevance" of management accounting (Johnson 
and Kaplan, 1987) there was development of a new market for new accounting - (e.g. 
activity-based costing, throughput accounting, target costing, economic value added). 
Traditional systems were condemned as producing irrelevant (mis)information (Jones 
and Dugdale, 2001).
Fitzgerald, et ah, (1991) have argued that conventional standard costing and variance 
analysis do not provide useful information for cost control. The majority of costs are 
fixed with respect to changes in unit production volume, (which is often the case in 
service industries). Management accountants (Johnson, 1992) and operations managers 
(Nanni, et ah, 1992) both agree that such techniques are irrelevant, untimely and cause 
manipulation of operations to meet the standard/budget.
Some authors have suggested ways of making management accounting more relevant 
via either activity-based costing (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988) or throughput costing 
(Galloway and Waldron, 1988). However, these initiatives would only address part of 
the problem. Service organisations43 today compete on a range of dimensions, (not just 
cost and price), so a good planning and control system cannot focus on the financial 
dimension alone. Service costing systems must be seen in their wider context, (i.e. as 
part of management information systems44 which embrace non-financial information).
43 Service organisations have five characteristics (Fitzgerald, et al., 1991). (1) The customer is present 
during the service delivery process, (which poses threats and offers opportunities to serve managers). (2) 
Many aspects o f  services are intangible, making it difficult to know what the customer values. (3) 
Services are heterogeneous in two ways: (a) The frequently high labour content means that service 
standards vary from person to person or from day-to-day. (b) Customer expectations may also vary. (4) 
Production and consumption o f  most services is simultaneous, so they cannot be counted or tested prior to 
delivery. Finally, most services cannot be stored because they are perishable.
44 Management information systems are defined as "a system that enables both internal and external 
information to be reported at operational, tactical and strategic levels". Management information systems 
cover such dimensions as quality, flexibility and innovation, as well as finance, within an appropriate 
control model (Brignal, 1997).
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It is commonly agreed that businesses today are competing across a range of variables, 
(not just cost and price), therefore their management information systems should reflect 
this (Kaplan, 1983; 1984; Sink, 1985). Fitzgerald et ah, (1991) have argued that the 
measurement of service business performance across six dimensions, is a vital part of 
feed forward, (feedback control at the strategic business unit level). These six 
dimensions have been divided into categories. They measure the results of competitive 
success. "Competitiveness" includes market share, and financial measures include unit 
cost, profit and value added. The other four dimensions measure aspects of the 
determinants of that success (quality, flexibility, resource utilisation and innovation). 
Cost leaders will tend to focus on measures of resource utilisation and cost. Those 
following some form of "differentiation" strategy will slant the mix and weighting of 
measures of determinants towards their differentiating aspect, (such as quality). 
Measures of competitiveness will be necessary under either strategy. There will be 
interactions and ‘trade-offs’ made between the six dimensions as priorities change 
through the life cycle. These trade-offs may be of such importance to competitive 
success that they must be included in an organisation's reward system.
3.3 Theory of management accounting
The academic production of accounting theory is closely related to economics (Jones 
and Dugdale, 2001) - (in terms of the theoretical approaches adopted, the disciplinary 
background of the individuals involved, and the organisational setting of university 
accounting departments). The issues addressed by those who construct and promote 
accounting theory may be very different from the concerns of practitioners - (shown by 
the long-running discussion of "the gap between theory and practice" - Edwards and 
Emmanuel, 1990). Similarly, Johnson and Kaplan (1987) cite the use of simple 
(abstracted) economic models by accounting academics in US business schools, as one 
of the key factors for management accounting losing its relevance for management at 
local level.
3.3.1 Management Accounting from a neo-classical economic perspective
The neo-classical theory of the firm seeks to represent the choice behaviour of the firm 
as a rational solution to the single-person-decision problem (Walker, 1998). Neo­
classical theory has been criticised for its inability to address fundamental economic 
realities. Nelson and Winter (1982: 5) criticised “the inability of the prevailing theory to
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come to grips with uncertainty, bounded rationality, the presence of large corporations, 
institutional complexity, or the dynamics of actual adjustment processes”. In recent 
years various heterodox schools have emerged within economics. These include radial 
economics, institutional economics, post Keynesian economics, neo-Marxist economics. 
At the heart of many of these alternative approaches is a concern about the fundamental 
assumptions of (neo-classical) economic theory (Scapens, 1994). In particular, the 
assumptions of economic rationality and market equilibrium.
The two core assumptions of the neo-classical economic45 stance are: (a) the rational 
maximising economic agent (b) the general equilibrium achieved by market forces 
(these have been increasingly challenged by institutional and other heterodox 
economists, Scapens, 1994). Institutional economists argue that these core assumptions 
are inadequate for such theoretical purposes as understanding economic change and 
analysing the process of transformation in a modern economy. They see both individual 
behaviour and the working of the market as influenced by institutions (which are social 
phenomena in need of theoretical explanation). Machlup (1967) claim that neo-classical 
theory of the firm was developed for market and industry analyses, not as description of 
what managers actually do. Scapens and Arnold (1986) argued that neo-classical theory 
was not intended as an explanation for the behaviour of managers within firms. The 
neo-classical theory of the firm does not analyse institutional arrangements which 
govern economic activity within the firm (Scapens, 1994). Walker (1998) argues that 
the neo-classical model was not designed for understanding the complex issues that 
arise in choosing an optimal organisational form.
Simon's concept of "bounded rationality" (in relation to Rational maximising economic 
agents), has had a significant impact on institutional economics (Scapens, 1994). Even 
the new institutional economists, (e.g. Williamson) claim to be influenced by Simon. 
They link Simon's concept of bounded rationality with economising on transaction 
costs. They thereby retain the concept of optimising economic rationality, (although 
rational choices are bounded by available information and information-processing 
ability). Simon argues that individuals must "satisfy, because they cannot maximise".
45 Scapens (1994) argues that old institutional economic theory has developed in response to neo-classical 
analysis. Old institutional economic theory makes the "institution" the unit o f analysis, rather than the 
rational maximising behaviour o f  individual decision-makers. Neo-institutional economic theory has 
developed as extension to neo-classical analysis.
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He links bounded rationality with ‘satisfying’, rather than optimising behaviour. In line 
with this view, old institutional economists argue that satisfying can be seen in rule- 
based behaviour.
Economic-based approaches to theory of organisations assumes self-seeking rational 
optimisation on behalf of all economic agents. In the specific context of management 
accounting, there are two potential problems with this approach (Walker, 1998). The 
first is that by ruling out bounded rationality on the part of decision-makers, one 
automatically rules out any explanation of a demand for accounting reports (which help 
decision-makers to understand their decisions). If all individuals are super-rational then 
they have no need for decision aids of any kind.
The second problem with super-rationality is that it implicitly carries the assumption 
that all individuals share a common understanding of the world in which they operate. 
This is an understanding which they all appear to share. The core problem of this 
approach is that it fails to consider a socially constructed reality. The influence of social 
and cultural factors on organisational structures cannot be easily captured by models 
which assume economic agents are adept at calculation.
The economics-based approach sees management accounting as "the provision of 
information which is designed to enable decision-makers to make optimal decisions" 
(Scapens and Arnold, 1986). Accounting research which adopts agency theory or 
transaction cost economics, focuses on equilibrium and optimal solutions. This form of 
research may introduce new techniques, but it does not assist our understanding of how 
such techniques become an established part of accounting practice in organisations. For 
example, it may be possible to demonstrate that the use of activity-based costing (ABC) 
is more ‘rational’, than cost allocations based on labour hours. However such ‘rational’ 
analysis cannot explain why ABC techniques come to be used in some organisations, 
but not in others. It also fails to anticipate potential problems or difficulties faced in the 
implementation process, (Bums and Scapens, 2000).
When viewed from a perspective of management accounting, (neo-classical economic 
theory can be seen to adopt a conventional wisdom's view of management accounting) 
for the provision of information in decision-making. This is associated with the design
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of optimal organisational structures. Neo-classical theory of the firm provides an 
inadequate theoretical framework. The standard theory of the firm is based on the 
assumption of absolute certainty. This assumption is problematic. It cannot explain 
organisational structures, because there is no rationale for the existence of firms in a 
world of ‘perfect’ certainty. In other words, the conventional theory of the firm is 
inconsistent. Economic uncertainty must form an essential part of any attempt to explain 
why organisational structures are what they are. Conventional wisdom sees accounting 
as an outcome of "rational" behaviour, - aiming to maximise company profits through 
the provision of new "optimal" information (Hopwood, 1987; Burns, 2000). This 
"technical" view is grounded in neo-classical economic theory of the firm (Scapens and 
Arnold, 1986).
3.3.2 Management Accounting from an Institutional perspective
As mentioned in section 2.1, there are three theories used in accounting literature 
namely: neo-institutional economics (transaction cost), old institutional economics and 
neo-institutional sociology.
3.3.2.1 Old institutional economic theory and Management accounting
Accounting from an Old institutional economic perspective can be understood in terms 
of the change in accounting routines that may be part of the assumptions and beliefs of 
an organisation (Scapens, 1994; Burns, 1997; Burns and Scapens, 2000). These 
assumptions and beliefs, (common to organisational members) are called "institutions".
Old institutional economics was introduced by Yeblen (1898; 1919: 239) who defined 
an institution as the "settled habits of thought common to the generality of man". OIE is 
undergoing somewhat of a revival in research (Hodgson, 1988; 1993; Tool, 1993). It 
emerged in opposition to ‘static’ rational-actor economic theorising, and should not to 
be confused with neo-institutional economics.
Old institutional economic theory is "a thought or action of some prevalence and 
permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of people" 
(Hamilton, 1932: 84). Burns and Scapens (2000) apply old institutional economic 
theory concepts to show how accounting practices can become routinised. They explain
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the nature of organisational rules and routines in the relationship between action and 
institution, (from old institutional economic theory).
Bums and Scapens (2000) argue that habits are personal. Routines may involve groups 
rather than individuals. Therefore, routines represent patterns of thought and action 
which are habitually adopted by groups. Organisational routines play an important role 
in the relationship between actions and institutions.
Habits and routines are be particularly useful in dealing with the uncertainty and 
complexity of everyday life. In a complex and uncertain organisational world (i.e. the 
GOGCWS), it is impossible for an individual to make choices which are ‘assumed’ in 
rational economic models (Simon, 1957). Given that routines may involve groups, they 
become the components of institutions. Institutions may enforce formal and social 
coherence upon human activity, (partly through continuing production and reproduction 
of habits of thought and action, Scapens, 1994). Parsons (1940: 190) argued that 
“institutions are 'normative patterns' which define what it is to be part of a given group 
or society. Institutions are proper, legitimate, and expected modes of action or social 
relationship”.
Scapens (1994) highlighted the importance of mles when he argued that "rules are 
necessary to co-ordinate and give coherence to the actions of groups of individuals". He 
argued that individuals are able to give reasons for following mles, and the mles 
themselves may be the result of earlier action. In this way, although mles and routines 
may give stmcture and coherence to individual action, the rules themselves will have 
emerged through actions (Scapens, 1994: 309). Institutional economists see the 
relationship between past actions and current rule-based behaviour, as complex and 
socially-constructed.
Bums and Scapens (2000) found a two-way relationship between mles and routines as 
illustrated in figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: The relationship between rules and routines
A ......... ^
Rules
<
B
w
Routines
Source: Adapted from Burns and Scapens (2000), "Conceptualising Management Accounting 
Change: An Institutional Framework"
Arrow A refers to the first direction between rules46 and routines. It is here that rules are 
established (e.g. budgeting procedures), and through their implementation, routine will 
emerge. Arrow B refers to routines. These routines either deviate from original rules, or 
were never originally set out in the form of rules. In such cases, it may be decided to 
formalise established routines in a set of rules. Hence the process moves from routines 
to rules.
In order to explore the role of rules and routines in the relationship between actions and 
institutions47, it is useful to begin with Giddens theory. Giddens (1984) looked at the 
relationship between actions of ‘knowledgeable’ actors and the structuring of social 
systems. He distinguished between systems (which comprise discemibly similar social 
practices, - reproduced across time through individual action), and structures which bind 
those social practices into systems. His theory assumes systems are not structures, but 
contain structures which are drawn upon in action.
Bums and Scapens (2000) argue that both Old institutional economic theory and 
Giddens theory contain systems. These are thoughts and actions of some prevalence, 
permanence and stmcture, (i.e. embeddedness in habits and customs). According to Old 
institutional economic theory, it is important to view rules and routines as interacting 
between the realm of action and realm of the institutional (Bums and Scapens, 2000). 
Figure 3.4. illustrates this.
46 Formulated rules may become modified when a group finds mutually acceptable ways o f  implementing 
them (Burns and Scapens, 2000).
47 Scapens (1994: 309) found there is no simple, one-way direction o f  causality between institutions and 
actions. There is a duality in the relationship between them. Institutions which influence actions, are 
themselves often the outcome o f  those actions. Hence, institutions do not determine actions, nor do 
actions create institutions. There is a duality between institutions and actions (Scapens, 1994).
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Figure 3.4: The process of Institutionalisation
Institutional Realm
Routines Routines,
Rules Rules
Time
Realm of Action
Key : a = encoding b = enacting c = reproduction d = institutionalisation
Source: Burns and Scapens (2000), p. 9.
The framework combines both synchronic48 (arrows a and b) and diachronic (arrows c 
and d) elements. Bums and Scapens (2000) found that there are four processes.
The first process (arrow a) indicates the encoding of institutional principles into mles 
and routines. Existing routines will encode prevailing institutional principles, (which in 
turn will lead to the formulation of routines). This encoding process draws on 
assumptions which comprise institutional principles and follows the process of change 
into existing meanings, values and power.
The second process (arrow b) involves actors enacting the routines (and mles) which 
encode institutional principles. The third process (arrow c) occurs when repeated 
behaviour leads to a reproduction of routines.
The fourth process (arrow d) is the institutionalisation of rules and routines which have 
been reproduced through the behaviour of individual actors. This involves a 
disassociation of patterns of behaviour from particular historical circumstances. Rules 
and routines therefore take on a normative and factual quality, which obscures their
48 ‘Institutions’ constrain and shape action at specific points in time. Actions produce and reproduce 
institutions diachronically, (i.e. through their cumulative influence over time).
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relationship with the interests of different actors. In this way, rules and routines become 
‘the way things are done’. In this way, routines themselves can be institutionalised. In 
other words, it becomes an established way of behaving. Routines become an 
unquestioned way of doing things. The institution assumes that these routines represent 
appropriate behaviour for a particular social group. The routines themselves are the 
local environment of the institution. If the institution is accepted in its external 
environment, the more likely it is to influence action and to resist change.
Management accounting in institutional theory (from an old institutional perspective) 
provides the basis for decision-making. It also assists in the formation of expectations 
and beliefs. The extent to which accounting practices give social coherence and 
meaning to organisational behaviour, and allows individuals, and groups within firms to 
give meaning to their day-to-day activities.
Burns and Scapens (2000) argue that. Old institutional economic theory provides a focus 
for organisational routines and institutionalisation. In management accounting, OIE 
focuses on change in organisational routines. Burns and Scapens (2000) see 
management accounting as a routine, and therefore potentially institutionalised. They 
believe that management accounting can come to underpin the ‘ways of thinking and 
doing' in organisations (Mouritsen, 1994). This means they view management 
accounting as an institution within an organisation.
3.3.2.2 Neo-institutional economic theory and Management accounting
Neo-institutional economic theory has been studied by many researchers (e.g. 
Williamson, 1975; 1985; 1996; and North, 1990). Neo-institutional economic theory has 
been employed in accounting research (Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Johnson, 1983; Spicer, 
1988; Colbert and Spicer, 1995). Scapens (1994) argues that neo-institutional economic 
theory remains firmly rooted in "static" neo-classical economic theory. On the other 
hand, Old institutional economic theory attempts to explain phenomena in "processual" 
terms, (examining why and how things become what they are (or are not), over time.
As Bums (1998) points out, the "markets and hierarchies" theory has probably exerted 
more influence on management accounting research, than any other branch of new-
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institutional economics . The discussion of this sub-section will restrict itself to the link 
between management accounting and transaction cost theory. The basic components of 
the transaction analysis framework are illustrated in table 3.3.
Table 3.3: The Basic Components of the Transaction Analysis Framework
Transaction The cost of running the system, and include ex-ante 
costs (e.g. drafting and negotiating contracts), and ex­
post costs (e.g. monitoring and enforcing agreements)
Governance Structures
Markets versus Hierarchy - Markets - where transactions are conducted between 
firms, (e.g. manufacturer and wholesaler)
- Hierarchies - (where transactions are conducted within 
a firm, (e.g. vertically-integrated supply chains) are 
compared for their relative efficiency in sustaining 
recurrent trading relationships
Assumptions regarding human nature
Bounded rationality Decision-makers intend to be rational, but are 
constrained by their limited information-processing and 
communication abilities
Opportunism Decision-makers may unscrupulously seek to serve their 
own self-interests, and it is difficult to determine who is 
trustworthy and who is not
Degree of asset specificity Problematic, when an inter-firm relationship is 
supported by specific assets. (Degree of asset 
specificity, whose values are limited to outside the focal 
relationship)
Source: Standifird, S. and Marshall, R. (2000)- "The Transaction Cost Advantage o f Guanxi-Based 
Business Practices", p. 17:18
Three factors determine the extent of transaction costs: bounded rationality, 
opportunism and asset specificity (Dietrich, 2001). In the absence of any of these
49 The application o f  neo-institutional theory in accounting is not restricted to perspectives derived from 
economics. It is also evident that neo-institutional sociology plays an important role, (for example: 
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1998; Covaleski et al., 1993).
factors, transaction costs will be zero, and asset specificity is given a pivotal role. Two 
types of specificity are particularly relevant for the current discussion. "Site" and 
"human"50 specificity arise from ‘learning by doing’. These asset specificities lead to ex 
post lock in between contracting partners. Hence, they aggravate bargaining and 
policing problems if ‘arms-length’ contracting is adopted. Such problems can be readily 
managed by using an authority relationship which is accepted by all contracting parties.
An existing management accounting system is consistent with a transaction cost logic. 
The development and use of accounting systems involve resource expenditures which 
transactions cost theorists deem as important. Systems provide an important means of 
codifying rights and responsibilities. Without this codification, the policing and 
economising of behaviour would be difficult (if not impossible). Changes in accounting 
system can be explained as response to change in the factors which determine 
transaction costs (e.g. bounded rationality and asset specificity). The historical 
development of management accounting has been analysed (Johnson, 1983; Johnson 
and Kaplan, 1987), likewise the internal organisation (Spicer and Ballew, 1983), 
transfer pricing (Spicer, 1988; Colbert and Spicer, 1995), and financial control 
(Ezzamel, 1992).
Zimmerman (1997) approaches management accounting from a neo-institutional 
economic perspective. He argues that management accounting cannot be properly 
understood without a theory of the nature of an organisation. Zimmerman's (1997) 
contribution shows how the transaction costs approach can provide a general framework 
to which all standard management accounting techniques can be applied. Zimmerman 
sees management accounting as a general organisational design problem. The design of 
an organisation involves three key issues: (1) the optimum division of decision rights
(2) the establishment of systems for measuring and evaluating the performance of 
decision centres (3) the choice of system for linking rewards and promotions to 
measured performance.
50 In addition to site and human asset specificity, Williamson (1985) speaks o f  "physical" and "dedicated" 
asset specificity. The former involves specialised equipment, the latter, - generalised investments which  
produce outputs for specific customers. From a transaction cost perspective, human and site specificity 
lead to vertical integration, (i.e. firm-based organisation), whereas physical and dedicated specificity lead 
to quasi integration (Dietrich, 1994).
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Transaction cost economics has been criticised for failing to recognise the importance of 
the institutional environment (Robins, 1987). Williamson's (1991) discussion of the 
hybrid form is a direct response to this criticism. Predictions concerning the hybrid form 
revolve around the existence of contract law (Williamson, 1991). The hybrid structure is 
one exception (Granovetter, 1985). Contract law characterises institutional structures. 
Lack of contract law is assumed to represent a lack of institutional structure (Nee, 1992; 
Xin and Pearce, 1994).
The main weaknesses of Zimmerman’s (1997) theory is that he fails to discuss any 
alternative approaches, (and their respective strengths and weaknesses). He also chooses 
to ignore all sociology-based literature on management accounting.
Hopper and Armstong (1991) identify fundamental problems in the theoretical 
framework of neo-institutional economic theory (transaction costs economics). These 
are (1) the term "transaction costs" has never been precisely defined (2) There is a 
failure to consider links between product markets, power and organisational forms (3) 
There is a failure to take into account the influence of social and political processes on 
the development of firms (4) A failure to consider the potentially exploitative nature 
between capitalist firms and their employees. In relation to point one, Walker (1998) 
argues that ‘labour process theory’ is also guilty of using terms which are difficult to 
precisely define, (e.g. "class", "power"). “It is difficult to see why product market 
conditions should influence organisational form (at least as a first order effect”), (his 
response to the second point). The problem with considering political and social forces 
is the implication that one cannot study any economic phenomena in isolation from 
everything else”, (his response to the third criticism).
3.3.2.3 Neo-institutional sociology theory and Management accounting
Scott (1987) distinguishes four sociological research directions and offers a definition of 
institutional theory which has been utilised in organisational analysis. The first 
approach sees the structure of the organisation as adaptive, and the result of individual 
and environmental influences/constraints (Selznick, 1957). ‘Institutionalisation’ refers 
to this adaptive process, (Scott, 1987: 493).
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The second approach sees institutionalisation as a process of ‘creating reality’, and is 
based on the idea of a ‘shared reality’, (i.e. a construction created in interaction between 
people), (Berger and Luckman, 1967). ‘Institutionalisation’ is viewed here as the 
process whereby actions are repeated over time, and are assigned similar meanings by 
the subject and by others. In this process, individuals come to accept and share a 
definition of reality (Scott, 1987: 495).
The third approach has its roots in the work of Berger and Luckman (1967). 
Institutionalisation is seen not as a process here, but as a set of elements (Scott, 1987: 
497). Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest that organisations adapt to the wider 
environment in order to gain legitimacy, resources, stability and survival. An 
organisation can gain legitimacy by turning to experts in a specialist field, (e.g. 
accounting). The external symbolic, rhetorical or political order is a major influence on 
the internal structural order. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose three ways in which 
an organisation conforms to symbolic order: (1) coercive (2) mimetic and (3) normative 
processes.
The fourth approach sees institutions as distinct societal ‘spheres’. There are ‘symbolic’ 
and ‘behavioural’ systems, but these differ from institutional ‘spheres’ (Scott, 1987: 
499).
Sociological theory shares a concern with the normative institutionalist approach. 
Sociology theory looks at the role values play in shaping behaviour within a structure. 
Selznick (1957) distinguished between organisations as ‘structural expressions of 
rational action’ and organisations as ‘normative and adaptive’. The latter view is similar 
to the March and Olsen perspective (1989, 1995).
What appears to differentiate the sociological perspective from the normative 
institutionalist perspective is the relationship with the environment. This view, is 
common with one major strand of organisational theory. It looks at organisations as 
both dependent upon the resources of their environment, in turn, shaped by that 
environment. March and Oslen (1989, 1995) see institutions as largely autonomous 
‘actors’, (at least after their initial formation). The sociological perspective places an 
institution on the periphery.
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Neo-institutional sociology (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995) has previously 
been employed in accounting research (Covaleski et al., 1993; 1996; Carruthers, 1995). 
Although there is a significant overlap between Old institutional economic theory and 
neo-institutional sociology, the former deals directly with the emergence, continuity and 
change of institutions through time (Scapens, 1994). Neo-institutional sociology focuses 
more on "macro-institutions"51 while old institutional economic theory examines micro­
institutions within organisations (Scapens, 1994: Burns, 1996; 1997). Neo-institutional 
sociology research in accounting, focuses predominately on extra-organisational 
institutions (their social, economic and political effect) (Covaleski et al., 1993; 1996; 
Carruthers, 1995; Fligstein, 1998).
Miller (1994: 2) argues that "Whilst accounting shares with statistics the ability to 
translate qualities into quantities, it does so largely by translating these qualitative 
differences into financial values which need no further referent".
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that there are different views of accounting. It has highlighted 
the relationship between accounting' and organisational decision-making. This led the 
researcher to address the question "What role has accounting played in the GOGCWS?" 
(see chapter 11.2.1). This chapter has stressed the importance of the social aspect of 
management accounting. It concludes that accounting cannot be conceived as purely an 
organisational phenomenon. This led the researcher to examine the external 
environment of the GOGCWS (see chapter 9). It also led him to explore the social 
aspect of privatisation in the Egyptian water industry (see section 10.1).
The chapter has reviewed different views of management accounting and its different 
roles (passive optimiser, passive co-ordinator, active regulator and active co-ordinator). 
It highlights the problem of management accounting generally and in organisation 
services particularly.
This chapter has argued that the institutional theory approach has the potential to 
provide a useful theoretical framework for understanding management accounting (cost
51 For example a generally-accepted accounting principle at society level (Mezias, 1990).
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management) practices. This led the researcher to adopt two propositions from 
institutional theory in order to explain the findings of this research. These two 
propositions are: firstly, government policy (coercive isomorphism) shaped the limited 
use of cost management for efficiency, optimisation and strategy; secondly 
organisations are the 'theatre' in which institutions are visible.
This chapter has given an overview of management accounting theory. It has criticised 
and shown the limitations of management accounting from a neo-classical economic 
stance. The chapter has outlined some alternative approaches to management 
accounting, (namely neo-institutional economic theory, old institutional economic 
theory and neo-institutional sociology theory). The next two chapters are going to 
discuss the elements of cost management (chapter four focuses on the first two 
elements: efficiency and optimisation and chapter five indicates the third element which 
is strategy).
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Chapter 4
Models of cost management
4.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate literature relating to a model of cost management. 
For this purpose, the chapter is divided into six sections.
The aim of the first section is to examine the concept of efficiency (i.e., Pareto 
efficiency, technical efficiency, and economic efficiency) and the ways of using cost 
management to increase efficiency.
The second section illustrates the link between institutional theory, transaction cost and 
efficiency. It argues that efficiency framework is favoured by transaction cost theories.
The third section reviews literature relating to activity based cost (ABC), emerging 
ideas and its core idea, the difference between ABC and traditional accounting systems, 
the adoption of ABC and its criticisms, the limitations of ABC and alternative 
approaches. It also highlights the relation between ABC and institutional theory.
The fourth section discusses activity-based management (ABM) as ABC cannot totally 
eliminate arbitrary allocation of overheads. The key extension of ABC is into ABM. 
This section discusses emerging literature on ABM and the similarity and differences 
between AMB and ABC, the difference between the views of traditional cost and ABM, 
and its cost and importance.
The final (fifth) section outlines the main conclusion of this chapter.
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4.1 Efficiency
The aim of this section is to review literature relating to the struggle for efficiency. 
Control has two problems:
(a) The regulation of the processes of the formulation of purpose
(b) The regulation of the processes of purpose achievement
Thompson (1967) suggested these problems could be further understood through three 
major themes; firstly, the establishment of purpose; secondly, the pursuit of 
effectiveness; and finally, the struggle for efficiency.
The control of efficiency via the loop of the budgeting and reporting process, in 
connection with standard costing as a part of design and planning process, leads to the 
emphasis given to calculation and analysis of variances. For example Ezzamel, et al.,
(1994) stated that companies are focusing on improving the technical capabilities of 
their management accounting system in order to improve their costing calculations and 
therefore enhance their efficiency. But control of efficiency and standard costing might 
have become obscured by the attention paid to the observation and analysis of 
variances.
Pareto improvements have come to be labelled improvements in efficiency, and, 
Pareto optimal situations have come to be labelled efficient situations, and in the 
process the special assumptions that “lie behind this persuasive shorthand have tended 
to become obscured” (Williams and.Giardina, 1993: 66). It is quite difficult to resist a 
proposal which has apparently been demonstrated to improve efficiency, yet there may 
be very good reasons for doing so in certain circumstances.
Efficiency is the relative amount of inputs used to achieve a given level of output 
(Homgren, et al., 1999: 539). Efficiency is the relationship of outputs to given sets of 
inputs (Berry, et al., 1995). This relationship can be expressed in many ways. 
Accountants find themselves relating the value of outputs in the market-place to the 
value of inputs in the factor market place: raw material and supply, labour, 
management, capital and financing, and technology, concluding that efficiency gains
52 The general rule is that, if  such a change means at least one person is better off, and leaves nobody 
worse off, that change is “Pareto improvement”, and if  the system reaches a situation in which it is 
impossible to make someone else worse off, that situation is “Pareto optimal” (Williams and Giardina, 
1993: 66).
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might occur if either the value of the outputs rises per unit of input, or the cost of inputs 
fall per unit of output. It is helpful to notice that even technical efficiency gains 
measured in this way might be confusing in relative price changes and gains in technical 
efficiency during the transformation process.
Thompson (1967) argued that technical efficiency can only be discussed in a bounded 
system where the boundaries are closed for analysis, and that effectiveness can only be 
discussed in an equally, but different, bounded system. Purpose will tend to be 
unbounded and to be the product of social interaction.
Figure 4.1: Bounding domains for purpose, effectiveness and efficiency
Purposes
^  Output
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Source: Berry, et al., (1995)- “Management control”, p. 6.
Does efficiency variance occur in fixed manufacturing overheads? Homgren, et al., 
(1999) argue that the efficiency variance pertains only to variable manufacturing 
overhead. There can be no notion of efficiency for fixed manufacturing overhead 
because this does not alter with changes in output level. With fixed capital equipment, 
the most important issue is not “what you have but how you use it”. Against this, 
management accounting texts assume that capacity and efficiency are fixed at the level 
set by “currently variable standards based on efficient operating conditions” (Ricketts 
and Grays, 1988).
Miller (1989) argues that the vocabulary of cost provides the basis for an economic 
language of organisational motive, which subsequently informs the construction of new 
operational concepts of accountability and performance measurement. Priority 
objectives were seen in terms of “reviews of operating costs”, “cost saving investment 
programmes” and “close examination of the potential for further cost saving”. Better
53 Efficiency variance: the difference between the actual quantity o f  input used and the budgeted quantity 
o f  input that should have been used multiplied by the budgeted price. A lso called input efficiency  
variance or usage variance (Horgnern, et al., 1999: 523).
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management information systems, new performance measures, cost base reviews, new 
methods of budgeting, more rigorous business planning, the introduction of new 
technology and reductions in manpower were all extolled as a means of securing 
reductions in costs. Achievements and measures of performance were reported in terms 
of “cost saving”.
Al-Hazami (1995) in his literature review on management accounting and the 
accounting and control paradigm concludes that three ways of using cost management 
to increase efficiency are discussed: throughput costing (Waldron and Galloway, 1988; 
1989a, b; Darlington, et al., 1992; Dugdale and Jones, 1994; Tayles and Walley, 1994), 
benchmarking and target costing54 (Monden and Hamada, 1991; Tani, et al., 1994), and 
cost leadership55 (Porter, 1985; Simons, 1990). These ideas on cost management are 
driven by the economics of internal organisation and transaction cost analysis (Coase, 
1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A 
brief discussion on each of them - three ways of using cost management to increase 
efficiency - is given below:
The first method of using cost management to increase efficiency is throughput 
accounting (TA). Galloway and Waldron, published a series of articles in Management 
Accounting in late 1988 and early 1989 explaining the ideas of throughput accounting. 
They identify three concepts which should be taken into consideration:
(1) Manufacturing units are an integrated whole whose operating costs in the short term 
are largely predetermined. It is more useful and infinitely simpler to consider the entire 
cost, excluding material, as fixed and to call the cost the "Total Factor Cost" (TFC). 
Dugdale, et al., (1996) illustrate the core idea of this concept and say Galloway and 
Waldron point out that any approach to allocation of overhead, particularly 
depreciation, is likely to generate misleading information (for example, cost per hour 
rate) and so lead to poor decisions.
54 For target costing (see section 5.5).
55 See section 5.2.2.
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(2) For all business, profit is a function of the time taken for manufacturing to respond 
to the needs of the market. This in turn means that profitability is inversely proportional 
to the level of inventory in the system, since the response time is itself a function of all 
inventory.
(3) It is the rate at which a product contributes money that determines relative product 
profitability. And it is the rate at which a product contributes money compared to the 
rate at which the factory spends it that determines absolute contribution as sales revenue 
less material costs. If the total of this contribution from all products per unit time 
exceeds total expenditure per unit time then an overall profit will be generated 
(Dugdale, et al., 1996).
Galloway and Waldron's first concept indicates that throughput accounting presumes 
that all factory costs (except materials) are fixed in the short/medium term - the opposite 
of activity based costing, which presumes all costs to be variable! Throughput 
accounting is therefore closely allied with traditional contribution analysis which 
emphasises the importance of maximising contribution in order to maximise short-term 
profits.
The second concept is rather contentious. It is hardly self-evident that profitability is 
inversely related to manufacturing response time and Galloway and Waldron's 
corollary, in order to maximise, is hardly easier to accept.
The third concept is very similar to the traditional idea of "contribution per unit of 
limiting factor". Galloway and Waldron argue that profitability will be maximised by 
maximising the rate at which cash is generated (cash being the difference between 
selling price and material cost for each product), and they propose that products be 
ranked according to the throughput accounting (TA) ratio which is defined as:
j, _ Return per factory hour 
Cost per factory hour
Where: -
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_ . Sales price-Material costReturn per factory hour ----------------------------------
Time on key resources
_ . , Total factory cost
Cost per factory hour= --------------------------------------------
Total time avaliable on key resource
Dugdale, et al., (1996) argue that aspects of throughput accounting can be integrated 
into conventional theory. The particular usefulness of the TA ratio appears to be that it 
indicates whether, if one product only were manufactured, the result would be a profit 
or a loss (a TA ratio of more than 1.0 indicates profit, less than 1.0 indicates a loss).
In conclusion, cost derived by activity costing and by throughput accounting serve very 
different purposes. Activity costing aims to identify all overhead costs with a product as 
accurately as possible. A medium to long term time-scale is envisaged so that product 
strategy decisions can be reflected in changed levels of overhead costs. Throughput 
accounting costs focus on short term with overhead attributed to product accounting and 
usage of existing manufacturing bottlenecks. In short, the view of Dugdale, et al.,
(1996) is that the idea of building up product cost on a "throughput accounting" 
principle is probably impracticable.
The second way for using cost management to increase efficiency is benchmarking and 
target costing. The following section will discuss benchmarking and the fifth chapter 
will discuss target costing.
American Productivity and Quality Centre defines benchmarking as "a systematic and 
continuous measurement process, a process of continuously measuring and comparing 
an organisation's business processes against business process leaders anywhere in the 
world to gain information which helps the organisation to improve its performance" 
(Beretta, et al., 1998: 11).
Benchmarking was seen as a management technique to be used only by specialists and
to be applied only when large breakthrough improvements were needed, often in a crisis
situation. Benchmarking has since become an important tool in the management
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process. It represents ongoing, structured comparisons with the goal of promoting 
continuous improvement from organisational solutions adopted by each company in 
managing its business processes. Clarke and Marton (1997) argue that benchmarking is 
a tool for change management.
There is no doubt that organisational aspects of the benchmarking process are crucial to 
the success of the project. Benchmarking attempts to help companies by providing 
reliable answers to two basic questions: how much can the performance of process be 
improved and which practices lead to best performance. Beretta, et al., (1998) argue that 
there are at least four methodological issues that are extremely critical to the success of 
benchmarking projects. These four methodological issues are: (a) how to define the 
performance measures (b) how to achieve comparability of performances (c) how to 
identify best practices (d) how to evaluate the transferability of best practices. The core 
idea of each element is discussed in turn
The first methodological issue is how to define performance measurement. 
Benchmarking is aimed at answering two basic questions connected to breakthrough 
performance improvement: (1) how much can a company improve its performance? (2) 
how to dramatically improve performance? Connecting performance measurement of 
accounting activities to value generation implies two logical shifts in performance 
measurement methodology: (1) changing the point of view: from organisational units 
(the accounting department) to organisational processes (the accounting processes). (2) 
expanding the traditional cost based perspective: from a uni-dimensional perspective 
(typically cost-based), to a multi-dimensional perspective (considering the process 
cycle, time and quality of services as well as cost).
The problem in defining performance measures is how to compose a well-balanced 
multi-dimensional vector (integrating cost, time and quality) for target setting and 
evaluation of an accounting process. The performance should include three performance 
measures: cost minimisation, cycle time minimisation and improvement of quality.
The second issue is to achieve comparability of performance. This issue relates to 
comparing company performances for benchmarking purposes. The boundaries or 
parameters of the process context need to be established for comparability of
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performance targets derived from external benchmarks. The performance of an 
accounting process is dependent on the way resources (mainly human resources) are 
organised, the way technology (mainly information technology) is applied to the 
process, and the peculiarities of the process environment (or context).
In short, comparability of performance data has to be assured through the identification 
of the structural performance drivers that mostly influence the context in which the 
process is managed. For accounting processes, structural performance drivers are 
process specific more than industry specific.
The third methodological issue is to identify best practice. Benchmarking should not be 
limited to gap measurement. It should help management identify the drivers or practices 
underlying the best performance (Beretta et al., 1998). The starting point is the task of 
defining what is best practice. Although the idea of best practice implies universality, 
universality has two invincible enemies in benchmarking. The first is the fact that there 
is no practical possibility to include in a benchmarking study all the best practitioners. 
So, best practices are those that, having applied certain criteria of performance 
evaluation, have proved to work better than others among all that we benchmarked. The 
second enemy is the fact that in operations it is very difficult to prove that there is one 
best way of doing something.
In summary, for identifying best practices in accounting processes, an effective 
benchmarking methodology should clearly show the different ways accounting 
activities can be carried out and how they are connected with each other (practices). 
Also, it should highlight the functionality induced on accounting processes by non­
accounting processes and practices (enablers).
The final issue is how to evaluate the transferability of best practice. Benchmarking is a 
methodology intended to facilitate learning from outside. However, sound practices 
developed by one company often cannot simply be adopted by another company. 
Identification of best practices should be followed by the test of transferability in 
different contexts. What is needed is a methodology for the specific to a well defined 
context.
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4.2 Institutional theory and efficiency
Granovetter (1985) claims that transaction cost theory provides an under-socialised 
account whereas institutional theory offers an over-socialised perspective. More 
specifically, "economic approaches to the study of organisation, transaction cost 
analysis included, generally focus on efficiency" (Williamson, 1981a: 549). Whereas 
"institutional theorists place particular emphasis on legitimation processes and the 
tendency for institutionalised organisational structures and procedures to be taken for 
granted" (Oliver, 1992: 563), regardless of their efficiency.
Peter and Royston (1997) argue that transaction cost and institutional perspectives are 
not necessarily in conflict, but are complementary elements of a constrained-efficiency 
framework. The constrained-efficiency framework illuminates the adoption of 
organisational designs by viewing organisations as efficiency seeking (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) under cognitive and institutional constraints, as opposed to efficiency 
optimising.
Transaction cost theory has evolved from the initial question, why do organisations 
exist?, to address questions of more immediate concern to organisation theory. In 
particular, what designs will organisations adopt under various circumstances 
(Williamson, 1992)? Thus, Williamson (1981a: 568) suggested that the reason "there 
are so many kinds of organisation [is] because transactions differ so greatly and 
efficiency is realised only if governance structures are tailored to the specific needs of 
each type of transaction". Transaction cost explanations have been employed to 
examine hierarchies, franchises, multidivisional, conglomerates, holding companies 
(Williamson, 1975), clans (Ouchi, 1980), networks (Jarillo, 1988), and market-hierarchy 
hybrids (Williamson, 1991b). In each of these explanations, the rationale for existence 
of any given organisational design is its efficiency compared to the set of available 
alternatives, including markets (Winter, 1991). In this sense, the transaction cost 
explanation rests on a comparative-efflciency account of design selection (Klein and 
Shelanski, 1994).
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Peter and Royston (1997) argue that the conceptual foundation for the constrained- 
efficiency framework is cognitive constraints, competitive pressures and institutional 
influences. For the purpose of this research the concentration will be on institutional 
pressures. Williamson (1992: 41) is explicit about the role of institutional environment 
suggesting that "the institutions of governance (firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus) are 
embedded in the institutional environment". However, the institutional environment 
envisioned by transaction cost economists consists only of the "set of fundamental 
political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, 
exchange and distribution" (Williamson, 1993: 111). The institutional environment 
envisioned by institutional theorists includes its more cognitive and sociological 
elements, such as patterns of social relations (Bums and Wholey, 1993) and 
embeddedness interpretations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
Scott (1987: 493) pointed out, "the beginning of wisdom in approaching institutional 
theory is to recognise at the outset that there is not one but several variants". The critical 
consideration is the contrast between transaction cost theory, which addresses an 
organisation's concerns with efficiency, and institutional theory, which "demonstrates 
how non-choice behaviours can occur through the exercise of habit, convenience, or 
social obligation" (Oliver, 1991: 151). In its strongest form, the institutional approach 
rejects the premise that organisational phenomena are the products of rational choice 
based on technical considerations (Westney, 1993). Rather, emphasis is placed either on 
the decisions made, or on the pressures to secure legitimacy that operate on 
organisations, or both.
In general, institutional theorists have been more interested in explaining uniformity 
than diversity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism, a central concept within 
institutional theory (Westney, 1993), captures the extent to which the organisational 
designs adopted within organisational fields tend toward increasing homogeneity over
56 March and Simon (1958) recognised that decision-makers operate under cognitive constraints that 
make strict optimising theories untenable. In their framework, and that o f  Cyert and March (1963), 
decision-makers tend to conduct more-or-less limited searches among available alternatives to obtain 
satisfying, rather than optimising solutions.
57 Although individuals are cognitively constrained in their pursuit o f  efficient organisation designs, one 
mught still argue that efficency-based competitive pressures should ensure that observed designs w ill be 
those in which organisational efficiency is optimised. However, Robins (1987) stressed that in the 
absence o f  perfect competition, optimal exchange efficiency need not always result.
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time. This emphasis on uniformity naturally leads institutional theorists to focus on the 
organisational field, or even society at large, as the primary unit of analysis (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991).
Echoing Granovetter's (1985) concerns about over-socialised theory, Powell (1991: 
194) suggested that "much of the imagery of institutional theory portrays organisations 
too passively and depicts environments as overly constraining." Finally, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) and Tolbert and Zucker (1984) recognised that institutional forces are not 
always primary, noting the tendency for early adoption to be driven by technical, as 
opposed to legitimacy considerations. These shortcomings are addressed by integrating 
elements of institutional theory into the comparative-efficiency approach offered by 
transaction cost theorists. The various institutionalisms (Scott, 1987, 1995) may be 
grouped into two broad categories of institutional effects: pre-conscious and post­
conscious.
According to preconscious institutionalisation, organisations operate and make choices 
in environments where much is taken for granted. These elements, which are either 
infused with excess value (Selznick, 1957) or constructed in the process of social 
interaction (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), serve as powerful ‘frames’, shaping the 
decision-making process by influencing what is or is not perceived by decision-makers. 
Preconscious institutionalisation, in other words, corresponds to DiMaggio's (1988: 4-5) 
factors "that make actors unlikely to recognise or act on their interests". According to 
post-conscious institutionalisation, tangible forces in an organisation's environment 
directly or indirectly divert design adoption away from the proposed dynamic in 
transaction cost economics (i.e., comparative efficiency) and toward the dynamic of 
legitimacy.
Although the terminology may be new, these two constructs find support elsewhere 
within the institutional theory literature. Jepperson (1991: 147), for example, stresses 
that "one may take for granted some pattern because one does not perceive it, or think 
about it [preconscious]; alternatively, one may subject the pattern to substantial 
scrutiny, but still take it for granted . . .  as an external objective constraint [post­
conscious]".
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Pre-conscious and post-conscious institutionalisation may be discussed in relation to 
Scott's (1995) normative and cognitive pillars of institutional theory. According to Scott 
(1995: 38-39), the normative pillar refers to sets of expectations within particular 
organisational contexts of what constitutes appropriate, and thus legitimate behaviour. 
Rational action is always grounded in social context that specifies appropriate means to 
particular ends; action acquires its very reasonableness in terms of these social rules and 
guidelines for behaviour. Here, choices are structured by socially mediated values and 
normative frameworks.
In other words, Scott's (1995) normative pillar is grounded in the "logic of 
appropriateness" (March, 1981); that is, what is expected of organisations. Scott's 
(1995) normative pillar may be viewed as either pre- or post-conscious institutionalism. 
Much of the writing on normative constraints emphasises how the normative 
expectations assume a taken-for-granted form; the ways of organising become 
unquestioned, and alternatives become unthinkable (Zucker, 1983). In this sense, 
normative expectations correspond to the current use of the term preconscious; 
organisational actors may simply be unaware of possible alternatives. However, as soon 
as actors deliberately consider alternatives, the normative expectation is no longer 
preconscious. Post-conscious institutionalism is evident when organisational actors are 
aware of the need to change, but actively consider only a limited range of alternatives, 
each of which is acceptable within the prevailing institutional context.
Scott's (1995) cognitive pillar of institutional theory was focused on the frameworks of 
meaning by which actors interpret and make sense of their world. Unlike bounded 
rationality within transaction cost theory, the cognitive influences emphasised by 
institutional theorists (e.g., Fligstein, 1991: 315; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) relate 
to "the internalised symbolic representations of the world" (Scott, 1995: 40). The role of 
these symbolic representations has been examined through various terms (see Walsh, 
1995) and there have been calls for a more careful synthesis of the cognitive and 
normative perspectives (see Scott, 1994). It is important to note that the cognitive pillar 
(as with the normative pillar) may be unwitting and therefore preconscious or it may be 
post-conscious.
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4.3 Activity Based Costing (ABC)
This section aims to review literature relating to the cost of product generally and 
activity-based cost especially.
Cost accounting research has been concentrated on two broad areas (Vollmers, 1994):
(1) The study of modem cost methods and techniques58, (e.g.; ABC59)
(2) The study of the origin and development of cost accounting (Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; Ahmed, 1992), for example how budgeting and standard costing resulted in 
increased control over labour.
Homgren (1995) says in the U.S. during the past 30 years there were three noteworthy 
developments in management accounting:
(a) In the early 1960s, emphasis on variable costing and contribution reporting; these 
ideas influenced designing and changing of the basic management accounting system
(b) In the late 1970s, emphasis on Zero-based budgeting (ZBB), these ideas gave 
welcome attention to how to improve the budgeting process; but ZBB has practically 
vanished from actual practice60
(c) In the late 1980s, activity based costing (ABC) dominated U.S. literature on 
management accounting. Furthermore, Johnson (1990) describes ABC, variance 
analysis, and return on investment as three of the most important management 
accounting theories in the twentieth century.
Activity-based costing (ABC) has been established for the best part of thirty years (e.g. 
Staubus, 1971) and its current popularity and form can be traced to the development and 
implementation in the U.S. (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988; Cooper, 1988). Use of ABC has 
spread quickly, to varying degrees, in the US, Canada, and the UK. One might expect 
the use of ABC to spread to other countries, particularly countries that share a common 
language and have similar capitalistic business cultures.
58 This involves theoretical development, e.g.; new cost drivers, or implementation o f  these techniques, 
e.g.; implementation o f  ABC.
59 Johnson, 1988; Cooper and Kaplan, 1988; Jeans and Morrow, 1989; Noreen, 1990; Johnson, 1990; 
Innes and Mitchell, 1990; Bjomenak and Mitchell, 2000; Daniels, 1999; Malmi, 1999; Innes, et al., 2000
60 ZBB has vanished because it has no history.
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Some factors have contributed to the dissatisfaction with conventional costing systems. 
The problem was caused by three compounding factors (Innes and Mitchell, 1995):
(a) The structure of product cost61 in many contemporary businesses had changed 
substantially, with production and non-production overhead costs growing in relative 
size and importance while direct labour had shrunk dramatically.
(b) Direct labour and machine hours have persisted as major bases of production 
overhead absorption products. Both of these bases relate fairly closely to production 
volume and their use therefore rests on the assumption that overhead incurrence is 
output driven.
(c) There is a shift in emphasis from production overhead costs driven mainly by output 
to production overhead costs driven by the diversity and complexity of production. 
Production overheads of this type have been concisely summarised by Miller and 
Volluman (1985) as falling within four transaction type categories: (a) Logistical 
transactions (b) Balancing transactions (c) Quality transactions (d) Change transactions.
Kaplan, (1994) argues that traditional cost allocation systems allocated overhead costs 
on simplistic measures such as direct labour, or sales dollars or direct costing systems 
that ignored overhead costs entirely for calculating the costs of products. Johnson and 
Kaplan (1987); Cooper and Kaplan (1988); Miller and Volluman (1985); all suggested 
Activity based costing -  a two stage cost allocation model - to trace overhead costs to 
specific activities (cost pools) and then from these activities to individual products or 
groups of products using cost drivers. If we assume the previous argument regarding the 
traditional cost is right, it is less clear what new approaches could overcome these 
limitations.
ABC goes for greater complexity by expanding the notion of cost variability implicit in 
the second half of the procedure. ABC uses multiple "cost drivers" linked to functional 
activities in all parts of the organisation's value chain, assuming that only activities 
cause costs. These factors, together with the lagged relationship between resource 
consumption and cash spending, mean that ABC is not a perfect cost control or 
prediction model (Piper and Walley, 1990).
61 Product cost: The cost o f  a finished product built up from its cost element (CIMA, 2000).
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ABC tries to solve the "allocation problem" identified by Thomas (1974), but Bngnall
(1997) argues that it is focusing on the wrong area: accurate product cost rather than 
cost engineering to gain a target market share at a predetermined price with acceptable 
profit, with planned cost reductions through the life cycle as in target costing 
(Hiromoto, 1988; Kato, 1993).
ABC may have some merits as a product costing system for those mass services (for 
example, Water services) which compete via a "cost leadership" strategy. As they have 
significant amounts of short-term fixed, indirect costs, it appears to be a cumbersome 
and ineffective method of cost management.
ABC systems could be valuable not only for analysing manufacturing overhead costs 
and influencing product design decisions, but also for assigning marketing, selling and 
distribution costs to customers, business segments and distribution channels. The 
costing field shifted from arguments on how to allocate costs (the traditional domain of 
cost accounting) to identifying the cost flows from organisational spending to supply 
resources that create the capability to perform organisational activities.
ABC systems came from two theoretical developments (Kaplan, 1994) that elevated the 
approach from deductive assertions to scientifically testable hypotheses:
(1) Discovery of the cost hierarchy of indirect and support expenses
(2) The distinction between costs of resources supplied and the costs of resources used 
i.e. the role for unused capacity costs.
In comparison with the conventional costing model, (full absorption costing ‘FAC’), 
two major points are made by Kaplan and his colleagues:
(1) They move away from the notions of short-term fixed and variable costs which are 
an important feature of management accounting’s conventional wisdom, and focus on 
the variability of cost in the longer term
(2) They propose a hierarchical resource consumption costing model which assumes 
that the costs which are shared at one level will be variable at a higher level (Scapens, 
1991; Brignall, et. al., 1991).
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ABC will generate product (or service) line costing which will differ tfom those 
produced by a traditional system primarily in respect of their indirect cost content. This 
is because costs will be attached to products in a way which reflects how these products 
have created a demand for, and effected the consumption of, the resources which 
comprise the organisation’s overheads. Where this element of cost is material and where 
traditional methods of overhead costing (e.g. labour hour/cost rates) do not adequately 
capture resource consumption, then the use of ABC will improve the product cost 
information which is produced (Innes and Mitchell, 1995).
Turney, 1991a; Kaplan, 1995; and Cooper, et al., 1992 argue that ABC is important 
because it allows management accountants to become part of the organisation’s value- 
added team by working in conjunction with other organisational and administrative 
functions. The Accounting function in firms which choose to adopt ABC moves from a 
narrow recording role to a broader management decision-support role. For example, it is 
argued that ABC provides more precise costing which leads to more informed pricing 
and more informal cost control. Furthermore, the information provided by an ABC 
system can also lead to changes in the operational design of the firm. Firms which 
choose not to consider ABC may risk having cost systems that possess computational 
accuracy but lack conceptual integrity (Emore and Ness, 1991) . This is because the 
traditional accounting system merely collects and aggregates data but does not reflect or 
encourage the changes necessary in today’s manufacturing climate (e.g. computer- 
aided-manufacturing, just-in-time production processes, or inventory management 
techniques such as material requirement planning). In addition, decision-makers tend to 
exclude accountants from the management team when they could benefit from their 
insight and expertise.
Bjomenak and Olson (1999: 326) argue that most studies examining the new models 
(techniques or ideas) focus on a limited set of characteristics, for example the cost 
function assumptions in the ABC model (Noreen, 1991; Christensen and Demski,
62 This does not suggest that ABC is appropriate for all firms. Contingency theory research in accounting 
argues that factors such as the environment, technology, and organisational size and structure influence 
the choice o f  accounting and information systems (Hayes, 1977; Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; 
Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978; Otley, 1980) and therefore, there is no “universally appropriate 
accounting system which applies equally to all organisations in all circumstances”. In practice, Cobb, et 
al., (1993) also note that implementation issues (particularly lack o f  resources) continue to hinder the use 
o f  ABC in UK firms.
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1995). Furthermore, they argue that the ABC literature identifies the need for different 
objects63.
Activity-based costing can be considered an administrative innovation. Evan (1996) 
distinguishes between technical and administrative innovations. For example, technical 
innovations include new products or processes while administrative innovations include 
such changes as new organisational structures and internal reporting systems. Hopwood 
(1974) and Merchant (1981) classify accounting systems as administrative innovation.
Damanpour and Evan (1984) suggest that administrative innovations more often lead 
technical innovations than the reverse. This implies that firms with innovative 
accounting (administrative) systems will be more likely to adopt technical innovations. 
Further, Dunk (1989) suggests that non-innovative accounting control systems can act 
as barriers to technical innovation.
Dunk (1989) also discusses the difference between technical and administrative 
innovations and focuses on the lag between administrative (accounting) innovations and 
technical innovations. Dunk suggests that one reason that organisations are loath to 
adopt accounting innovations (e.g. ABC) is because the perceived economic benefits of 
a change in accounting system are difficult to quantify. Kaplan (1984) and Johnson and 
Kaplan (1987) also contend that the cost of management accounting systems (which do 
not support financial reporting requirements) are difficult to justify economically.
Several surveys have examined the adoption of ABC in companies in the US and report 
a range of results. For example, Green and Amenkhienan (1992) state that 45% of 
responding manufacturing firms using advanced technologies have implemented ABC 
to some degree in their firms. Shim and Sudit (1995) state that 27% of the 
manufacturing firms surveyed had fully or partially implemented ABC. A 1993 study 
conducted by the Cost Management Group of the Institute of Management Accountants 
(1993) found that 36% of responding US firms had implemented ABC and a 1995
63 Bjomenak and Olson (1999: 330) identify three major developments regarding descriptive objects in 
the new techniques: (a) the traditional focus o f  responsibility centres and products extended to a larger 
number o f  factors (b) financial data is combined with non-financial data to extend the description o f  
variability (c) external descriptive objects (e.g. competitors) and external descriptions o f  variability (e.g. 
customer satisfaction) are introduced in the techniques
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survey by the same group (Cost Management Group of the Institute of Management 
Accountants, 1996) showed that the percentage of ABC adopters had increased to 41%.
In the UK, Innes and Mitchell’s (1991) research on the implementation and use of ABC 
systems reveals that only 6% of surveyed U.K. firms had begun to implement ABC by 
1990. Drury and Tayles (1994, 2000) who report that 13% of UK manufacturing firms 
had adopted ABC by 1991 found somewhat higher rates of adoption. Recent research 
indicates that the upward trend in adoption of ABC continues as Innes and Mitchell
(1995) report that 20% of the top 1,000 firms in the UK have adopted ABC. Innes, et. 
al., (2000) review the changes that have occurred in the ABC adoption status of 
companies over a recent 5-year period and their result reveals that the use and interest in 
ABC has not increased in this time.
Although the result of Innes, et al., (2000) highlighted that the use of ABC has not 
increased over the past 5 years. Some changes have been observed in the purposes64 of 
ABC. For example, there is an increase in the use of ABC for cost reduction, 
product/service pricing, cost modelling, customer profitability analysis, output 
decisions, new product/service design and decreased use of ABC for performance 
measurement/improvement, budgeting and stock valuation. Comparatively less research 
on adoption of ABC in Canada exists. However, a survey sponsored by the Society of 
Management Accountants of Canada found that 23% of responding manufacturing 
firms have adopted ABC (Armitage and Nicholson, 1993).
Shields and Young (1989) developed a theoretical model about the implementation of 
cost management systems (CMS) that is applicable to ABC. They identified seven 
behavioural and organisational factors as being critical to the implementation of CMS:
(a) Top management support
(b) Linkage of CMS to competitive strategies
(c) Linkage to performance and evaluation systems
(d) Adequate internal resources
(e) Training
(f) Non accounting ownership
64 The researcher acquired this knowledge from the comparison between the survey in 1994 and 1999 
which was highlighted by Innes, et al., (2000).
I l l
(g) General consensus about objectives of CMS
This approach is in line with the tool approach where researchers survey managers to 
determine factors that appear to be important, and correlate these factors with success 
and failure (Shields, 1995; Gosselin, 1997). The table 4.1 summarises prior studies 
relating to ABC implementation.
Table 4.1: Prior studies to ABC implementation
Study Method Implementation Model
Cooper et al. (1990) Field study of eight 
companies
Analysis and action
Anderson (1995) Field study of one company Initiation, Adoption, 
Adaptation, and Acceptance
Coderre (1995) Theoretical model No stages
Anderson and Young 
(1997)
Surveys and multiple case 
studies of 21 ABC projects
No stages
Mackley and Thomas 
(1993)
Field study of one company Goal attainment, Adaptation, 
Integration and Long term 
development
Norkiewicz (1994) Field study of one company No stages
Shields (1995) Survey of 143 firms that had 
implementation of ABC
No stages
McGowan and 
Klammer (1997)
Survey of 53 employees 
from 4 target sites
No stages
Gosselin (1997) Mail survey of 161 
Canadian manufacturing 
SBUs
Adoption and Implementation.
Lemond (1992) predicted that ABC would become a major force in Australia. Yet, Joye 
and Blaney, 1990; Dean, et al., 1991, Corrigan, 1996 and Booth and Giacobbe (1995) 
report little use of ABC in Australia. In fact Dean, et al., (1991) reported that only 8% 
of Australian firms had adopted ABC by 1990 and Booth and Giacobbe found a 
similarly low adoption rate of 12% in 1995.
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Surveys of ABC systems in non-English speaking countries, for example, Sweden (Ask 
and Ax, 1992), Finland (Lukka and Granlund, 1994). France (Bescos and Mendoza, 
1995), Spain (Sales, et al., 1995) and Denmark (Sorensen and Israelsen, 1996) 
suggested adoption rates below those recently found in the Anglo-American countries. 
Malmi (1997) reported low but increasing emphasis on ABC in Finland.
Kaplan, 1988; and Hartnett, et al., 1994 argue that firms are less likely to change 
management practices (e.g. ABC) when costs, especially those relating to inventory 
valuation, may have to be restated under financial accounting reporting requirements. In 
addition, successful adoption of management accounting practices will not occur 
without support from top level management (Shields, 1995).
In theory, it is possible to trace all overheads, but, in practice, it is quite difficult to trace 
some overhead costs such as head office administrative costs or joint cost to individual 
products, and hence there is still some room for arbitrary cost allocation. For example, 
Scapens (1991) described an allocation problem where there might be a temptation to 
terminate production of individual products when their joint production is still 
worthwhile. In addition, the ABC model has been criticised for being based on the 
simple economic analysis which underlies management accounting’s conventional 
wisdom, and on the assumption that there is a sense of harmony and co-operation 
among operating units, and between operating units and service functions; it does not 
acknowledge the possibility of conflict over the allocation process (Ahmed and 
Scapens, 1991; Gietzmann, 1991; Bhimani and Pigott, 1992).
Most of the few studies which have addressed ABC success and/or failure have been the 
so-called factors studies65 (Cobb, et al., 1992; Shields, 1995; Anderson, 1995). The 
focus has been on identifying factors which ABC success or failure. Shields (1995), for 
example, found top management support, linkage to competitive strategies, linkage to 
performance evaluation and compensation, training in implementing ABC, non­
accounting ownership and adequate resources all positively correlated with ABC
65 The term “factors study” is borrowed from information technology (IT) implementation literature 
(Kwon and Zmud, 1987; Lucas, 1990; Cooper and Zmud, 1990), where it refers to studies which “try to 
identify those “factors” most related to IS implementation success and failure (Kwon and Zumd, 1987: 
228). Most o f  these studies are typically cross-sectional seeking statistical correlation between factors 
hypothesised to influence implementation outcome and some measure o f  that outcome.
113
success. Cobb, et al., (1992), in turn, suggested that the major problems experienced 
with ABC related to the lack of adequate internal resources, particularly staff time and 
computer resources. Anderson (1995) identified 21 factors, related to the individuals 
involved, the organisation structure, the task, the technology employed and the external 
environment, which influenced ABC implementation at General Motors. One problem 
with the factor approach is that there is hardly any limit to the number of possible 
factors affecting the relative implementation outcome.
Argyris and Kaplan (1994) seek an alternative way of explaining ABC failure by 
presenting a behaviour model of why and how employees resist ABC. They build on 
Argyris (1985, 1990: 38), noting that “ ...barriers to change arise from the defensive 
routines that participants trigger to protect themselves from experiencing 
embarrassment and threat from the new idea’ (see also Cooper, et al., 1992). Apart from 
the ABC context Markus (1983) argued that resistance to new information systems can 
be understood in terms of organisational power and politics. In a similar vein, Scapens 
and Roberts (1993) illustrated how division’s attempts to increase unit accountability 
led unit management to resist a new accounting system. Malmi (1997) proposed that 
claims on ABC failure result, in part, from assessing the use and value of ABC’s from 
the decision-making perspective.
Innes and Mitchell (1995) said ABC will not solve all of the complexities of product 
costing. Some arbitrariness will certainly remain. For example, some overheads are 
incurred at a level divorced from that of any individual product. Cost drivers may suffer 
from the problem of “jointness”. If the number of orders is being used as a driver for 
procurement overhead and the direct material for a number of products is made on each 
individual order then the association of the cost driver with the individual products 
becomes problematic. Indeed the identification of sets of cost drivers, which explain 
100 percent of the relationship between products and activity costs, is unlikely. ABC 
product costing has some technical difficulties.
Homgren (1995) said the ABC movement, in the late 1980s has been stimulating and 
beneficial. Nevertheless, the following aspects are troublesome:
(1) Excessive of the past developments and excessive claims regarding what is new
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(2) The lack of respect for history. For example, although ABC had another name, its 
basic ideas were exposited in Longman and Schiff (1955: 70) as practical distribution 
cost analysis. Many scholars and consultants have neither time nor the inclination to 
explore the history of thought
(3) Outrageous claims. These exaggerations included such statements as all costs are 
variable or all costs are fixed
(4) Proneness toward regarding product costs as the major influence on decisions 
regarding pricing, product mix, and make or buy decisions
(5) The proclivity to not practice what is preached
(6) The lack of ABC in Japan. American literature abounds with descriptions of changes 
in management theory and practice inspired by developments in Japan
(7) The frequent failure of ABC systems to distinguish between resources provided and 
resources consumed
ABC has maintained a high profile status as an important management accounting 
innovation for well over a decade (Bjomenak and Mitchell, 1999). However, despite a 
strong and durable advocacy (Cooper, 1988; Cooper and Kaplan, 1991; 1992; 1998; 
Kaplan, 1992), several reservations have been expressed concerning
(a) The substance of its practical attraction (Bjornenak, 1997; Gosselin, 1997; Malmi, 
1999), i.e. that it may be a fad or fashion, engendering a bandwagon effect rather than a 
genuine and useful technical enhancement
(b) Its decision-making relevance (Noreen, 1991; Bromwich and Hong, 1999), i.e. that 
several restrictive (and practically unlikely) conditions must apply before the ABC 
information can legitimately be used to generate relevant costs for decisions
(c) The problematic and costly design, implementation and operation of the systems 
required for ABC in an organisation context (Cobb, et al., 1992; Malmi, 1997).
Homgren, 1995; and Innes and Mitchell, 1995 summarised the advantages from ABC as 
follows: ABC has generated enormous enthusiasm about its basic ideas. It links causes 
(cost drivers) with effects (changes in costs). ABC entreats us to choose cost allocation 
bases with great care. In particular, we should be aware of the fact that costs are driven 
by many factors other than the volume of units produced or sold. ABC has correctly 
advocated the use of multiple cost allocation bases that are appropriate cost drivers. It 
criticised the overuse of direct labour as a cost allocation base, particularly when it is
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used as the lone base for applying indirect costs to products. ABC has stressed that 
executives manage costs by overseeing activities instead of products. The accounting 
for costs by activities highlights the interdependencies among activities in many 
departments or functional areas. ABC has emphasised that product costs are affected by 
all functions in the value-chain, not just by manufacturing alone. It has alerted managers 
to the existence of cross-subsidisation among the product cost where there is a wide 
range of operating and a wide range of products.
ABC advocates have started to admit that the complexities of a detailed ABC system 
may inhibit its use as an ongoing cost accounting system. ABC information may give a 
good indication of how a product has consumed resources in the recent past; this may 
bear little relationship to future incremental cost (from expansion) or future avoidable 
cost (from dropping the product).' The use of ABC will generate information of 
relevance to cost control. Overheads are made more visible through pooling by activity 
and their underlying cause, to the extent it is reflected in their cost driver, is also 
indicated. ABC has given a greater understanding of cost behaviour, improved 
communication of cost information due to the logic of ABC. It is also directly related to 
how costs are incurred, particularly indirect labour costs, and the gathering of 
information to run the system can be a matter of some sensitivity. ABC will result in a 
new set of information, which can be used to measure aspects of operational 
performance within the organisation, i.e. cost drivers and cost driver rates. These may 
provide useful and quick regular feedback to line management and may help to foster 
cost consciousness and efficiency (Johnson, 1988).
ABC possesses several compelling positive attributes. It has the potential to contribute 
to strategic decision-making, cost control and management and performance 
measurement. But both system designers and users, in order to realise the benefits of 
ABC and minimise the costs, must exercise some care. Implementation success will 
depend particularly on attention being given to the following three factors:
(a) A recognition of the nature and variation in ABC
(b) A recognition that ABC is not a complete general purpose system which will meet 
all cost information needs
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(c) A recognition that any ABC system will have some limitations and if not caretully 
designed and monitored will have the potential for dysfunctional consequences for the 
adopting organisations
Activity based costing has been seen to offer important advantages over traditional 
costing techniques including: enhanced product cost accuracy (Brimson 1991; Cooper 
and Kaplan, 1987; Roth and Borthick, 1989), more comprehensive cost data for 
performance evaluation (Berliner and Brimson, 1988), more relevant information for 
managerial decision making (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988), greater potential for sensitivity 
analysis (Shank and Govindaragin, 1989), and generally, in providing a novel outlook 
on value-adding organisational transactions and activities (Johnson, 1988).
Bhimani and Pigott (1992) argue that although research concerns over such 
consequences in relation to organisations implementing ABC have remained largely un­
addressed. It has been acknowledged that behavioural, organisational and social factors 
are likely to be implicated in replacing conventional costing systems with more 
complex and innovative accounting techniques (Bromwich and Bhimani, 1989).
ABC is the basis of the cost assignment view in which resources are assigned to 
activities and then to cost objects (products). While this process can provide more 
accurate costing of products or services, it does not in itself manage costs (Rouse and 
Putterill, 2000: 368).
Regarding to the relationship between ABC and institutional theory, Soin et al., (2002) 
used old institutional economic theory to interpret the role of management accounting in 
organisational change. They present an interpretative study of the introduction and 
implementation of an Activity Based Costing (ABC) system in the clearing department 
of a UK-based multinational bank. Soin et al., (2002) was concerned with the interplay 
between management accounting and other agents of organisational change that drew 
on rationalities and legitimating for spheres such as scientific management and human 
resource management. Their paper drew on institutional theory in order to understand 
the extent of change, as a way of evaluating the relative roles of other institutionalised 
practices apart from management accounting and to assess the relative impact of the 
new management systems.
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Although it is easy to find technical justifications for ABC in literature, sociological 
institutional theory does not automatically assume that particular techniques are chosen 
purely for their instrumental efficiency (Sion, et al., 2002). Actors often have a hazy 
view on the nature of the problem and have a socially constructed view of reality 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966).
4.4 Activity Based Management
This section reviews literature relating to the cost of product in general and activity 
based management in particular.
Williams and Ashford (1994) highlighted four of the changes in control systems and 
product costing systems that may be necessitated by new manufacturing technologies:
(1) Competitive pressures necessitating shorter product life cycles and faster 
introduction of new products and services. Management Accounting Control System 
(MACS) must respond with flexible management structures, project teams and new 
performance measures (NFIS)
(2) Emphasis on activity analysis and the supply chain. MACS must respond with much 
closer attention to long-term supplier alliances and investigate activity-based 
management systems (ABM) and customers' profitability analysis
(3) Adoption of Total Quality Management (TQM). MACS must respond with an 
increased emphasis on NFIS, to observe internal and external failure costs, to monitor 
prevention costs and to measure the costs of quality
(4) Adoption of Just in Time management (JIT). MACS must respond by making 
wholesale modifications to traditional systems based on labour productivity machine 
efficiencies, rejection and wastage rates, and inventory holdings. These will no longer 
be appropriate and new NFIs must place the emphasis on service to customers and 
speed of delivery
The evidence suggests that it will be impossible to eliminate arbitrary allocations of 
overheads totally, even under an ABC system, so we must look beyond product costing 
to a more appropriate emphasis on process management. ABC may be a useful starting 
point.
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The key to the extension of ABC into Activity Based Management (ABM) is a wider 
appreciation of the concept of “drivers”. We can no longer focus on cost drivers alone 
but must investigate the manner in which resources are consumed in non-dollar areas 
(Smith, 1997). Customers have perceived need in at least four areas, all of which require 
simultaneous satisfaction: lower costs, higher quality, faster response times, and greater 
innovation.
Activity Based Management (ABM) reshapes how companies manage costs. By 
understanding its activities, a company can expose opportunities for performance 
improvement that conventional cost accounting systems seldom detect. Cost 
management is improved by identifying what the organisation does and providing a 
benchmark to judge how much better a company’s performance might be (Brimson, 
1996). Activity based management is a system of management which uses activity- 
based cost information for a variety of purposes including cost reduction, cost 
modelling and customer profitability analysis (CIMA, 2000). Activity-based 
management (ABM) is a system that incorporates many of the concepts of strategic 
management re-engineering and applies them to cost management (Trussel and Bitner, 
1998). Activity based management is a modem cost accounting and management model 
that is consistent with the concepts of strategic management and re-engineering. ABM 
is both an accurate cost accounting system and a performance improvement tool 
(Tumey, 1991b).
Business process re-engineering (BPR) is a management tool for redesigning business 
processes in order to obtain dramatic improvements in performance measures, such as 
cost and quality. The idea behind BPR is to fundamentally revise all aspects of 
performing activities, from a revision of strategic goals and operating objectives to an 
alternation of work methods. Under BPR, work should be focused on processes and not 
functional tasks (Harmmer and Champy, 1993). Activity-based management (ABM) is 
similar in nature to BPR but adds the analysis of the cost management.
ABM consists of two viewpoints: a cost view and a process view. Under the cost view, 
ABM is a cost accounting system (called activity-based costing). The value of the cost 
view is to determine the cost of a product in service. Under the process view, ABM is 
used to develop financial and non-financial performance indicators for the output of
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each activity centre. The goal of the process is to measure performance (Trussel and 
Binter, 1998). The two viewpoints of ABM are summarised in figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Activity-Based Management
Outputs
Resources (Cost view)
Processes/Activities
Cost objects
Inputs (Process view)
Source: Trussel and Bitner, (1998)- “Strategic Cost Management: An ABM approach”, p. 442
Rouse and Putterill (2000: 368) argue that cost management is pursued via ABM, which 
is portrayed in a process revealing the causes (cost drivers) of work or activities, and 
focusing attention through performance measurement on how activities are conducted. 
The process by which activities are triggered by cost drivers is shown separately to 
recognise that the mere occurrence of a cost driver may not in itself initiate an activity 
and that management authorisation may be required. Trussel and Binter (1998) 
determined ten steps for designing and implementing the process view of activity-based 
management. The steps are based upon procedures espoused by Harmmer and Champy, 
1993 and Cooper, et al., 1992. The steps of ABM are summarised in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Implementation steps of the process view of AMB
2- Determine the cost processes and the major cost objects
9- Define the cost drivers for each activity
3- Determine the supporting processes
6- Set the major operating objectives of each process
4- Form the process teams
10- Take steps to ensure the acceptance of the new system
1- Develop a clear and succinct mission statement
5- Define the strategic objectives of each process
7- Identify the main activities in each process
8- Develop key performance indicators for each process and activity
Source: Adapted from Harmmer and Champy, 1993; Copper, et al., 1992; and Trussel and Bitner, 
1998.
Cooper, et al., (1992) discuss the implementation strategies of ABM systems for eight 
companies: five manufacturing entities, one distribution company, one financial 
services provider, and one energy company. Anotos (1992) discusses ABM for a not- 
for-profit organisation. Harmmer and Champy (1993) discuss the implementation of 
business process re-engineering for several companies.
The steps necessary for designing and implementing the cost view of ABM follow 
(Cooper et al., 1992) the cost view of ABM called activity-based costing (ABC):
(a) Determine the activity centre
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(b) Assign costs to the activity centres
(c) Define the cost objects
(d) Link activity costs to the cost objects
The traditional view is that costs are best controlled by department managers who are 
responsible for minimising the variance between budgeted and actual costs by cost 
element. The emphasis is on efficient use of resources. The ABM view is that costs are 
best controlled by managing the workload, eliminating non-value added activities, 
managing the factors that drive costs, continuously improving value added activities, 
and streamlining management. The emphasis is on effective use of resources. (Brimson, 
1996). In addition to that the initial literature on ABC essentially viewed it as a product 
costing system (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988). Whereas ABM was viewed as a broader 
management system incorporating activity-analysis, analysis of business processes and 
analysis of value and non-value activities.
The output from the ABM system can be utilised for many purposes. The costs of all 
activities and all programs are more accurately determined. The information from ABM 
enables better decisions to be made relating to resource allocation, programme 
retention, marketing strategies, programme returns and like (Trussel and Binter, 1998). 
Activity information allows managers to identify and eliminate waste. It also confirms 
progress in removing waste from operating activities (Brimson, 1996).
Managers need activity information to help them achieve enterprise excellence. Activity 
accounting identifies what the organisation does. In order to improve profitability and 
performance, it is critical to understand where the enterprise’s precious time goes and, 
in detail, what the enterprise does and how it does it. Activity-based management is a 
powerful tool for managing the complex operations of a business through a detailed 
assessment of its activities. Activity accounting attributes cost and performance data to 
activities. Activity cost and performance data provide management with information 
needed to determine an accurate product cost, improve the business process, eliminate 
waste (non-value added activities) identify cost drivers, plan operations, and set 
business strategies. Activity-based management generates cost and production 
information in a manner that drives continuous improvement and total quality. 
Continuous improvement and total quality control are facilitated by treating each
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activity as a process and identifying the source of cost rather than focusing on the 
symptoms. In focusing attention on the source of problems, management must assign 
responsibility to those departmental activities that drive costs and monitor their 
execution to see if the planned results are achieved.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the concept of efficiency66 and the way67 of using cost 
management to increase this. It has been argued that some techniques/tools of cost 
management relate to traditional management accounting such as throughput accounting 
and others relate to contemporary management accounting (i.e. ABC). The chapter has 
argued that institutional theory (sociology institutional theory) does not automatically 
assume that particular techniques of cost management are chosen purely for their 
instrumental efficiency.
The chapter has highlighted the focus of transaction cost theory (under-socialised) and 
institutional theory (over-socialised). It has been argued that transaction costs and 
institutional perspectives are not necessarily in conflict. It shows the transaction cost 
explanations rests on a comparative-efficiency account. The chapter has also 
highlighted the importance of institutional environment and shown that isomorphism is 
a central concept within institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Scott (1987; 
1995) grouped institutional effects into two board categories: pre-conscious and post­
conscious.
Figure 4.4 will help to demonstrate that some of the new tools of cost management - 
ABC/ ABM - contain aspects of the same idea used in past tools of cost management.
Figure 4.4: Models (tools) of cost management
FAC ZBB b ABC ABM...p. W W
66 Efficiency is the relationship o f  outputs to given sets o f  inputs. It can only be discussed in a bounded 
system where the boundaries are closed for analysis.
67 There are three ways o f  using cost management to increase efficiency; throughput costing, benchmark 
and target costing, and cost leadership.
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Berry, et al., (1995: 55) say that Johnson and Kaplan (1987), in their critique of 
management accounting and control, argued that the systematic structures of cost 
accounting did not make much of a connection with the systematic problems of 
managing an enterprise. To recapitulate a little, the structures of traditional cost 
accounting, especially methods such as full absorption costing, fit beautifully with the 
notion of functional bureaucracy, in that they are a classic case of decomposition and 
disagregation of hierarchic elements to lower-order activities.
Managers need an analysis to enable them to see the relationship between the way in 
which they were using resources and the way in which they were allocating costs. Even 
if we accept the economic managerial resource vs. managerial cost analysis, it should be 
noted that the use of full absorption costing to reflect opportunity cost was unhelpful 
and inadequate. What Kaplan argued was that it was important to break this systematic 
notion of full absorption costing, and to actually create the idea of activity pools to 
which overheads could be allocated. Then these activity pools would be rigorously 
criticised (in other words, there would be the emergence of the ideas of Zero-based 
budgeting, i.e. a new form) to decide upon appropriate cost structures, then the costs in 
the activity pools would be allocated to products on some reasoned basis.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s ABC has become widespread. It is claimed that ABC 
can be used as part of the strategic management process through understanding cost 
behaviour and analysing the profitability of customers and the newly created products 
(Brignall, 1997). In ABC and the traditional literature, cost causality is related to 
internal factors like number of set-ups, number of machine hours or number of products 
(Bjomenak and Olson, 1999: 331). The ABM literature expands the view on cost 
causality in activities by identifying a set of different drivers, e.g. initial drivers, 
resources drivers and cost drivers (AX and Ask, 1995).
In conclusion, it was observed that most models of cost management previously 
mentioned such as; FAC, ZBB, ABC, and ABM focus on internal factors and neglects 
the external factors. This leads to choose institutional theory as the framework because 
it helps to recognise the institutional context, both inside and outside of the 
organisation. Furthermore, this leads the researcher to look for another model of cost
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management that considers internal and external environment (see strategic 
management accounting).
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Chapter 5 
Strategic management accounting and cost management
5.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to focus on cost accounting in service organisations and 
illustrate strategic management accounting as one of the models of cost management 
which considers the internal and external environment. Furthermore, it focuses on how 
cost accounting can support corporate strategy. For these purposes, this chapter is 
divided into four sections.
The first section illustrates the gap between changes in cost accounting practices and 
changes in textbooks and it links the idea of cost accounting in the past and the present. 
It also highlights the cost accounting in a service organisation.
The second section examines strategic management accounting (SMA) from four 
viewpoints (Lord, 1996). The first viewpoint emphasises the extension of traditional 
management accounting’s internal focus to include external information about 
competitors. The second viewpoint has been developed in business strategy literature 
and has examined the relationship between the strategic position chosen by a firm and 
the expected emphasis on management accounting. The third viewpoint advocates the 
analysis of ways to decrease costs and/or enhance differentiation of a firm's products 
through exploiting linkages in the value chain and optimising cost drivers. The fourth 
viewpoint challenges the basis of the other viewpoints. It points out that they assume 
that managers are able to deliberately plan what strategy the firm will follow.
The third section aims to explain how costing techniques can support strategy. It gives a 
brief discussion on six cost management techniques that support strategy and illustrates 
how these six models can help to manage the cost of existing products and future 
products.
The final (fourth) section outlines the main conclusion of this chapter.
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5.1 Cost accounting
5.1.1 Changes in cost accounting practices textbook
There is a gap between the content in changes costing in textbooks and the methods 
used (Scapens, 1991). The conventional wisdom of management accounting textbooks 
suggests that in many situations absorption costing cannot provide relevant costs. In 
practice, however, absorption costing seems to be the dominating technique in most 
Western countries (e.g. U.S.: Howell, et al., 1987; U.K.: Drury and Tayles, 1994; 2000; 
Sweden: Ask and Ax, 1992).
The gap between costing practice and textbooks and the current criticisms of both 
costing practices and conventional wisdom (e.g. Johnson and Kaplan, 1987) are based 
on a limited number of studies of costing practices. Scapens (1994) argues that more 
attention should be given to management accounting practices, and less to the 
comparisons of management accounting practices against theoretical "ideas". There is 
little68 evidence of how different costing methods are being used. There is less research 
on why one method is being used, and even less research on why one method is 
preferred to another, and on how accounting practices have developed over time or on 
the sources (institutions) that have influenced the development.
This research does not aim to highlight the gap but rather the clear link between changes 
in practices and textbooks. Table 5.1 shows this link.
68 With the exception o f  few studies (e.g. Ask and Ax, 1992; Drury and Tayles, 1994; 2000; Innes and 
Mitchell, 1995).
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Table 5.1: Major characteristics in three phases
Source of 
inspiration
Textbooks major (new) 
topics
Costing practice major 
characteristics
1936-55 German tradition Advanced allocation 
How to implement 
Absorption costing
Advanced allocation 
absorption costing
1955-70 U.S./ Danish 
inspiration
Contribution margin 
Standard costing 
Variability accounting
Contribution costing
1970-95 U.S. inspiration Decision orientation 
Optimal production 
Inventory valuation
Different methods for 
different situations
Source: Bjornenak, T. (1997)-M Conventional Wisdom and Costing Practice", p. 378.
The link between changes in costing practices and changes in textbooks seems to 
continue. The major new. topic today is Activity Based Costing. Most textbooks adopted 
the conceptual framework related to ABC around 1990. A gap between costing 
practices and conventional wisdom in textbooks is found in all periods.
Bjornenak (1997) concluded that no one can assume that textbooks have a major 
influence on costing practices. More likely, both costing practices and textbooks are the 
results of the same institutional influences, for example academic institutions or 
consultants introducing the contribution margin approach in the 1960s or ABC in more 
recent years.
5.1.2 Cost accounting in the past and now
Clark (1923) coined the phrase "different costs for different purposes: stock valuation, 
planning control and decision-making (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Drury and Dugdale, 
1992). Chandler (1977: 109) argued that the key to subsequent developments is found in 
change. "Did cost accounting become a basic tool of railroad managers" (Chandler, 
1977:116).
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Cost accounting is not embedded in accounting theory. German literature has 
emphasised that accounting systems transform cash flow into flows of periodic surplus. 
German literature identifies four basic systems for measuring monetary flows and hence 
income, namely:
(1) Net cash flows, which are defined as changes in liquid funds. They are used as the 
underlying income concept to perform capital budgeting
(2) Changes in the sum of liquid funds plus accounts receivable minus liabilities. 
Kloock and Schiller (1997) define flows as being the basis to Riebel's "costing" system 
(Riebel, 1974)
(3) Earning, defined as revenues minus expenses
(4) Operating revenues69 minus costs70
In Anglo-American literature the term "cost" does not often seem to be well defined 
and is frequently confused with other concepts of surplus determination. Costs always 
include a quantity components (consumption of input factors) and a value component. 
The associated value component can be measured in two ways. The first involves only 
the assignment of payments in the form of actual, past or future market prices to the 
consumed input factors. This is the concept of "pagatory" costs71. The second approach 
adds opportunity costs to pagatory costs, and from optimisation theory, opportunity 
costs can only be computed after optimal decisions have determined (Hax, 1965: 145). 
Nevertheless, the system of marginal costing allows for the inclusion of opportunity 
costs. Lucker's Theorem is important for costing purposes. It demonstrates how to 
compute the capital given the decision-maker has decided to measure income by 
(revenues - costs). Lucker's Theorem bridges the gap between long-term and short-term 
decision-making.
Cost accounting has not been central to WCM ideas, though activity-based costing 
(ABC) is sometimes incorporated within it. However, WCM with its emphasis on non- 
financial measures, continuous improvement, computerised information systems, and
69 Operating revenues are defined as the periodic creation o f  goods (or services) in the pursuit o f  the 
substantive goal o f  the corporation.
70 Costs are defined as the value o f  the periodic consumption o f  goods (or services) in pursuing the 
substantive goal o f  the corporation.
71 This expression is German which means "consisting o f  (cash) payments".
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changed management structures and roles is likely to impact upon the role of 
management accounting.
In the pre-WCM era it was thought that production could be managed "by numbers". 
The numbers would show what to make, what to buy, who to blame. If, for example, the 
latest cost report shows a negative cost variance in welding, the onus is on the welding 
supervisor to cut costs. But how? There is no data on the causes of the cost average - 
WCM mandates simplification and direct action: Do it, measure it, diagnose it, fix it, 
manage it on the factory floor. Don't wait to find out about it by reading a report later 
(Schonberger, 1986).
Schonberger's position is not dissimilar to Johnson's thesis in Relevance Regained 
(1992). Johnson argues that accounting relevance was not lost but rather it was never 
relevant to the efficient running of businesses: "Certainly I do not believe the answer is 
to reform how we do management accounting. In that regard I refute the advice. You 
hear from people who advocate activity based costing, or ABC, as the panacea to what 
ails American business... Improving how companies trace overhead costs may be 
important for some things, but in the guise of cost drivers, ABC does not necessarily 
stimulate continuous improvement nor does it mark a pathway to competitive 
excellence" (Johnson, 1992: 8).
Schonberger (1991) passed similar comments indicating that whilst ABC may be 
relevant to product line decisions it was unsuitable for performance assessment, adding 
that the cost reporting role would diminish as managers spend more time on physical 
customer-centred measures of continuous improvement. Clark is often given the credit 
for introducing the concept of "different costs for different purposes" (Frank, 1990). 
Schmalenbach introduced the importance of dividing fixed and variable costs for 
decision purposes as early as 1899 (Solomons, 1952).
Coward (1944: 287) argues that "the costing schemes should be designed in a way that 
enables one to separate direct costs, variable overhead and fixed overhead". Shark 
(1943) and Coward (1944) presented alternative classifications of cost pools, called 
"kostnadssted". The normal choice of "kostnadssted" would be department, but Coward 
argued for other alternatives: "if a manufacturing company follows the conversion of
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materials in different steps through the factory, then it is natural to divide the production 
process into sub-processes" (Coward, 1944: 49). The meaning of the concept "sub­
process" is the same as what we today might call an activity. Whether using activities, 
functions or departments, the importance of using many cost pools is pointed out, and 
little attention is given to the use of only one plant wide overhead cost pool.
Henzel (1931) argued that the overhead costs should be allocated on a casual basis. 
Coward (1944) discussed how to allocate under-absorbed cost due to sub-normal 
activity. Coward calls these costs "cost of unused capacity" and discusses eight different 
approaches to this problem. The same concept is used in the contemporary debate about 
spending versus consumption (Cooper and Kaplan, 1991; 1992).
5.1.3 Cost accounting in service organisations
77Silversto, et al., (1992) identified three different service delivery process types, 
professional, shop and mass, whose costing systems also varied systematically 
(Fitzgerald, et al., 1991). Brignall, et al., (1991) discovered that cost traceability varied 
systematically, being greatest in professional services and least in mass services. Mass 
services (for example Water services) use a complicated mix of equipment, facilities 
and mainly back-office staff at each strategic business unit to deliver a standardised 
service. Professional services are labour intensive, with their cost structure dominated 
by front-office staff delivering a customised service.
Traditional full product costing systems trace input costs into the conversion process, 
separating them between those which can then be traced directly to outputs (products) 
and those which cannot (indirect costs): these indirect costs are then allocated to 
products through a two-stage procedure. The indirect costs are first collected into cost 
pools within the conversion process, and then attached to products by some method 
based on unit volume of production such as direct labour hours.
Johnson and Kaplan (1987) argue that this second step may cause product costs to fail 
to reflect the resources they consume. ABC73 and Throughput Accounting74 aim to 
improve product costing system by attacking different parts of the two stage allocation.
72 From a study o f  operations management literature and their research in 11 service organisations.
73 See section 4.3.
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The life cycle model (Koutsoyiannis, 1982) argued that a business unit's/product's life 
has four basic stages (launch, growth, maturity, decline) with attendant changes to 
various contingent variables such as its external environment, mission and chosen 
generic strategy (Porter, 1980). Business risk is high in the first phase (where the future 
is uncertain and the mission is to build) and low in the final phase, but financial risk is 
low in the first phase yet high by the final one. As businesses in the launch phase are 
cash-negative, and businesses in the mature phase cash positive, appropriate capital 
structure moves from equity (perhaps venture capital) at the start to a mix of debt and 
equity by maturity and debt in the final phase (Ward, 1993). Cost structure and cost 
behaviour will therefore vary systematically across the business life cycle. Cost 
tracebility may also vary if fixed, indirect costs are kept to a minimum unit at the 
mature stage.
In consequence, management information systems (and the costing and performance 
management systems within them) may also need to change through time so as to 
maintain the visibility of the changing factors critical to competitive success at each 
stage of the life cycle. Ideas drawn from Target costing and life cycle management may 
be more helpful for cost management here than conventional ABC or Throughput 
Accounting. For example, "Target costing is not actually a form of costing. Target 
costing is an activity which is aimed at reducing the life-cycle costs of new products, 
while ensuring quality, reliability and other consumer requirements, by examining all 
possible ideas for cost reduction at the product planning, research and development, and 
the prototyping phases of production. But it is not just a cost reduction technique, it is 
part of a comprehensive strategic profit management system" (Kato, 1993: 36).
Some authors (Govindarajan and Shank, 1992; Adamany and Gonsalves, 1994) argue 
that the type of cost and other performance management information to be monitored 
should vary at different organisational levels and stages of the business/product life 
cycle.
74 Throughput Accounting attacks the first half o f  the two-stage costing model by eliminating the 
distinction between direct and indirect, treating all costs as facility factory costs (Goldratt and Fox, 1989). 
Throughput Accounting is similar to the contribution per unit o f scarce resource approach and assumes 
that all non-material costs are fixed in the short-run (for Throughput Accounting, see section 4.1).
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5.2 Strategic Management Accounting (SMA)
The aim of this section is to review literature relating to strategy and management 
accounting. Strategy is hotly debated and elusive (Dent, 1990). The term is employed in 
literature of many disciplines. Penning (1985) notes that economists, social 
psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists use it, and in 
addition, literature abounds with definitions ranging from the general to the specific 
(Dent, 1990). The term “strategy” has been borrowed from the military. It is defined as 
the “art of so moving or disposing troops or ship or aircraft as to impose upon the 
enemy the place and time and conditions for fighting preferred by oneself’ (The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1983).
The theorists have attempted to provide taxonomies of “generic strategy” that are 
generalisable across firms and industries. There was considerable agreement in the 
literature that the scope of strategic choice includes: (1) Corporate strategy that deals 
with the allocation of resources among various business or division of an enterprise (2) 
Business strategy that concerns primarily the question of the competitive position of a 
particular business or division of an enterprise (3) functional (operational) strategy that 
is limited to specific functional areas (e.g., marketing and distribution) within particular 
businesses. Each of these strategies is concerned with specific sets of strategic 
characteristics and choices, which are related to different levels of an enterprise (Dent, 
1990; Johnson and Scholes, 1993).
Literature on strategic management accounting has several views. These views could be 
divided into four viewpoints (Lord, 1996). The first viewpoint emphasises the extension 
of traditional management accounting’s internal focus to include external information 
about competitors. The second viewpoint has been developed in the business strategy 
literature, identifying the relationship between the strategic position chosen by a firm 
and the expected emphasis on management accounting. The third viewpoint advocates 
analysis of ways to decrease costs and/or enhance differentiation of firm products, 
through exploiting linkages in the value chain and optimising cost drivers. The fourth 
viewpoint challenges the basis of the other viewpoints. It points out that they assume 
managers are able to deliberately plan what strategy the firm will follow.
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5.2.1 The first viewpoint of SMA.
Johnson and Kaplan (1987: 33-34) wrote that, “Carnegie relied on financial information 
which concerned his competitors’ direct production costs. Carnegie’s operating strategy 
[of pushing] his own direct costs below his competitors’... promoted him to require 
frequent information showing his direct costs in relation to those of his competitors”.
Simmonds’ (1981; 1982) definition and description of strategic management accounting 
focused on comparison of the firm with its competitors. The contribution of Simmonds 
(1981; 1982; 1985; 1986) was most significant from the viewpoint of showing how 
strategic management accounting might be undertaken (Wilson 1991: 100-104). He 
suggested adding more relevant market data to management records and a regular 
reporting system. Simmonds advised accountants to collect market share details, costs, 
sales and volume data against those of competitors (market leader, close competitors 
and laggards). He emphasised in particular the need for the relative competitive data on 
levels and trends of prices, costs, profit and volume changes for the firm and its 
competitors. For example, Simmonds (1981) pointed out that management can gain 
strategic advantage via its pricing policy and low cost strategy (e.g. the market leader 
can control the competitive situation with the highest volume and profits, plus the 
lowest unit cost and price).
In addition Simmonds drew some attention to time and long run strategic 
reconfiguration in relation to cost structure “profit is stemming from the pattern of 
competition over time in the competition configuration 'rather than from’ internal 
efficiency. For example, increased profit can be reflection of decay in competitive 
position as a result of higher prices, decreased quality, reduction in advertising or any 
other reduction in spending that reduces market share” (Simmonds, 1981: 26).
Bromwich (1988: 26) intends that the focus of the firm should be on external matters, as 
“it is in the firm’s markets that profits are made and where competitors challenge the 
enterprise”. He said that it is necessary to go even further than Simmonds’ suggestions, 
not only comparing the firm with its competitors, but also evaluating “the benefits of the 
enterprise’s products both from the customer’s point of view and the firm’s perspective” 
(p. 27).
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Allen (1985) stated that information for strategic decision-making must be forward 
looking not based on past costs and the concept of capital maintenance, but being 
concerned with values, investments and cash flows over the long-term continuum. 
Taylor and Graham (1992) promoted the inclusion of non-financial information crucial 
to strategic planning and control.
5.2.2 The second viewpoint of SMA
Before the relationship between strategic management and management accounting is 
examined, one question should be addressed: Why do we need to be concerned with the 
relationship between strategic management and management accounting at all?
One reason is that it seems as if every organisation is supposed to have both a goal and 
an idea of how to reach this goal. In addition, it must be efficient in its actions towards 
achieving the goal before we will consider calling it an organisation. A more practical 
reason for looking at the relationship between the two kinds of management is the fact 
that many organisations over the years use a considerable amount of resources, 
measured in employees' time and company money, on making budgets, accounts and 
strategies. Furthermore, when both managers and researchers are asked what the 
difference is between strategic management and management accounting, they cannot 
give a clear answer, although none of them would reduce one discipline or practice at 
the expense of the other.
The relationship between strategic management and management accounting has been 
described from several perspectives such as a hierarchical, contingency theory, Miles and 
Snow (1978) or new economic view. The relationship between strategic management and 
management accounting has been described as a hierarchical relation within much of the 
literature that takes a rational and objectivistic perspective on organisations and their 
environment.
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Ansoff (1965) and Anthony (1965) saw Strategic Management as a holistic 
interdisciplinary device that was engaged in determining the relationship between the 
organisation and its environment. In comparison, Management Accounting was seen as an 
instrument for calculation, implementation, and control that belonged to the tactical and 
administrative level as only one out of several functional disciplines within the 
organisation. Strategic Management is supposed to deal with the future of the whole 
organisation in a creative and innovative form, whereas Management Accounting is 
expected to handle the history of the company and all its every day details and routines.
Andrew (1971) took this view even further in a formal planning perspective. He saw 
strategic management as the first part of the rational decision-making process concerned 
with goal setting and development of strategic alternatives. Management accounting, on 
the contrary, was concerned with evaluating alternative strategies and translating these 
into operational and measurable budgets for securing and controlling the 
implementation of the strategy.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the planning and control tradition extended the use of 
financial measures to include non-financial representations as strategic indicators, 
organised in strategic control concepts like Critical Success Factors (Bruno and Leidecker 
1984), Benchmarking (Spendolini 1992) and the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 
1992; 1996).
75 Anthony (1965) prescribed three normative and universalistic control activities to be the core functions 
o f  managing: strategic planning, management control and operation (task) control. Strategic planning was 
viewed as being concerned with setting and changing o f  overall corporate strategies and objectives and 
the establishment o f  policies to govern the acquisitions and uses o f  resources. Management control is 
involved with the manner in which managers monitor activities and take action to ensure that resources 
are being achieved as stipulated in strategic planning. Task control (physical production) was concerned 
with the monitoring o f  specific day-to-day activities that call for little judgmental activity (due to 
differences in tasks and the nature o f  the activity itself, Anthony, et al., 1989).
Anthony had no doubts, “structure is given- systems are therefore designed to meet the needs o f  a given  
structure” (Anthony, 1965). The strategies were taken as given and control systems were used to 
implement these strategies two levels: management level and task level. It should be noted that Anthony’s 
model assumed a hierarchical relationship (institutional hierarchy) between three separated layers o f  
management in a formal stable world: strategic planning, management control and operational control. 
This categorisation explicitly avoided addressing the issues o f  organisational goals and objectives 
formulating process (Berry, 1983; Berry, et al., 1991; Otley and Berry, 1980) and adoption to 
environmental contingencies (Otley, 1980). However, this perspective o f  strategy and control procedures 
o f  cost practices may have been suited to organisations that have a wide geographical dispersion o f  sub­
units where reliance on control procedures as designed is greater (Emmanuel, et al., 1992).
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What are the problems with applying this hierarchical perspective on the relationship 
between strategic management and management accounting?
First of all, when we take a rationalistic view, it is not clear whether strategy or 
economics are the goal or the means of the organisation. This depends on the situation 
and the actors speaking about strategy and economics. Secondly, these perspectives 
look at the organisation from an objectivistic and rationalistic point of view, which 
presumes that a manager's task is limited to increase efficiency in the organisation and 
to secure optimisation and control. In real life, top managers often need to take care of 
many other tasks besides efficiency, such as securing the legitimisation of the 
organisation (Meyer and Rowan, 1991), reinforcing the order within and around 
organisations (Mintzberg, 1983) and participating in many symbolic activities as well as 
non-formal actions (Mintzberg, 1973). Third, the efficiency perspective on planning and 
control is not adequate to explain the processes that take place in organisations between 
strategic planning, budgeting and the follow-up on budgets by utilisation of accounting 
and strategic control devices.
Goold and Quinn (1990) point to four problems of strategic control, namely: to 
overcome uncertainty and flexibility at the same time, to motivate rather than control 
managers, to assist rather than replace management judgement and to secure rather than 
destroy mutual confidence between management levels. From a management 
accounting view, Dent (1990) suggested that we should at least look at the relationship 
between strategic management and management accounting from three different 
perspectives, namely, as already suggested above, from a control system perspective, 
from a decision-making perspective and from a perspective legitimising strategic 
change. By looking at the role of accounting in decision-making and how accounting 
provides a language for justification of strategic changes, Dent argued that it was 
possible to get much closer to what is going on in organisations’ everyday life. Finally, 
it can be argued that leaders do not only conceive and justify their visions of the future 
organisation by creating images of the development of the surrounding environments, 
they also mobilise the past as an argument for present and future actions. Therefore, 
leaders also need to look at the capabilities of management accounting to legitimise the 
present and future by reconstructing the past.
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Based on the above arguments, it seems as if the relationship between strategic 
management and management accounting is much more complex than just a typical 
hierarchical relationship. It appears that the concepts of both strategy and accounting play 
many roles within organisational life other than generating efficiency and profit.
The contingency approach is based on the premise that there is no universally acceptable 
model of organisation that explains the diversity of organisational design. It simply states 
that the most efficient form of organisation is contingency theory and the type of 
conditions relevant to the situation. In particular, under contingency theory, the type of 
management accounting system (MAS) varies according to specific circumstances or the 
situation in which the organisation operates. Hence, the choice of MAS design is 
constrained by these conditions and depends on the ability of management to find the best 
solution.
Within the contingency perspective, strategic management is more comprehensive than 
management accounting. Both Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) and Simons (1987) 
suggested how control systems could be best suited to a strategic business that follows a 
specific strategy. The major focus of Simons was on the link between business strategy 
and management control systems. He explicitly used the contingency framework as a 
dominant logic for research on control systems design (Simons, 1987: 358). His first 
attempt (1987) was to extend Miles and Snow’s (1978) analysis to the financial control 
attributes system. It was based on the premise that control systems should be modified 
in accordance with the business strategy of a firm. However, his result was inconsistent 
with Miles and Snow’s (and also Ouchi 1979; Hirst, 1983; Govindarajan, 1984) 
evidence that defenders tend to use more detailed cost analysis techniques and cost 
control oriented towards efficiency in task performance (Dent 1990). Simons (1987) 
found that prospectors tend to use their financial control system more intensively than 
defender with tighter budget goals and more frequent reporting on forecast and outputs 
than cost control.
Porter (1980; 1985) detailed two specific ways in which managers can position their firms 
so they have a strategic advantage over their competitors: firms need to either differentiate 
their product(s) or achieve a position of cost leadership. To differentiate its product, 
competitive advantage is attained by being able to charge high prices, by being able to sell
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more at the given price, or by achieving increased customer loyalty. For cost leaders, 
having lower costs than all competitors attains competitive advantage.
Shank (1989) and Shank and Govindarajan (1989) analysed the relative importance of 
several management accounting methods depending on whether the firm was pursuing cost 
leadership or differentiation. They suggested that companies choosing cost leadership 
would put the most emphasis on traditional cost accounting applications. They would use 
standard costs to assess performance, product costs as an input to pricing decisions, and 
flexible budgeting for manufacturing cost control. They would perceive meeting budgets 
and analysis of competitors’ costs to be of great importance. On the other hand, companies 
differentiating their products as a way of achieving competitive advantage would consider 
marketing cost analysis to be critical to their success. They would consider flexible 
budgeting and meeting budgets to be of only moderate importance, and rank standard 
costing for performance assessment, product costing for pricing decisions and competitor 
cost analysis of little importance.
Shank (1989), Shank and Goverdarajan (1989) focused on the question of how cost 
information could be used to assist managers in formulating and implementing strategy. 
They developed a conceptual framework based on a four stage process of the strategic 
management cycle; formulation, communication, implementation and action. They defined 
strategic cost management (SCM) as “the managerial use of accounting information 
explicitly directed at one of the four stages of the strategic management cycle” (Shank, 
1989: 50). The proposed framework of SCM simply was strategic control model 
concerned with the financial analysis of the value chain and cost driver in different 
strategic positions (Porter, 1985; Shank, 1989). To some extent, they addressed the 
literature debate on how the use of cost information is based on different costing models. 
For example, full absorption costing, activity based costing and contribution costing led to 
different scenarios on comparisons of competitors’ cost structure and how competitors 
could attack firms who use each of these models. Their suggested solution to the problem 
of variance analysis was that companies should develop a strategic management 
accounting system rooted in Simmonds’ approach.
Bromwich (1990) used two economic theories in an effort to provide theoretical support 
for strategic management accounting, linking the theories with Porter’s taxonomy. Their
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theory attributed analysis supports accountants “costing attributes and monitoring the 
performance of these attributes over time” (p. 28), which in turn contributes to Porter’s 
differentiation strategy. The theory of contestable markets “requires that the accountant 
extends cost analysis beyond the firm and reports on the cost structure of rival enterprises” 
(p. 29), which contributes to Porter’s cost leadership strategy.
Bromwich (1990) extended this perspective to include the differentiation strategies on 
management accounting reports. He tried to differentiate between two types of cost 
information in relation to strategic position. The first was related to differentiation strategy 
and was concerned with “costing the characteristics provided by goods and in monitoring 
and reporting on these costs regularly” (Bromwich, 1990: 44). The second was related to 
low cost strategy and was concerned with the analysis of “competitors” costs and cost 
structures and the monitoring of the enterprise’s strategy and those of its competitors in 
these markets over a number of periods” (Bromwich, 1990: 28).
Bromwich’s work was based on economic theory on the value of product attributes in 
differentiation (Lancaster, 1966; 1979) and more recent work on the theory of contestable 
market (Baumol, 1982; Baumol, et al., 1988). He drew on these two economic theories to 
provide a theoretical basis for the involvement of accountants in strategic cost 
management. Bromwich used these two theories to establish the need for accountants to 
compare the cost structures of their own firms with those of actual and potential 
competitors in relation to demand factors. In particular, Bromwich drew attention to both 
(1) the role of sunk cost as an important feature of cost structures in creating barriers to 
entry and then to determining the sustainability of enterprise strategies (2) The cost of joint 
products to be of critical nature when compared to the cost of producing these products 
individually (economic of scope).
Govindarajan and Shank (1992) added dimension to the expected management accounting 
emphasis, by linking the firm’s “mission” (i.e. build, hold or harvest) to its strategic 
position. They concluded that accounting implications for strategic planning, budgeting 
and incentive compensation would be similar under both 'harvest' mission and cost 
leadership strategic position. Similarly, the accounting emphasis suggested for the 
differentiation strategy would also fit a 'build' mission.
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Simons (1990: 141) added the suggestion that defenders “need only focus on strategic 
uncertainties often related to product or technological changes that could undermine 
current low cost positions”. Simons focused on the management process as it related to 
management control and strategy. Basically he considered the management control system 
as tools used for both strategy implementation and strategy formulation. He provided a 
“dynamic process model of strategy and control in which top management regulates 
strategic (environmental) uncertainties through its choice of strategy and the 
institutionalisation of management control system” (Gray, 1990: 145).
Simons (1990) provided empirical evidence of the way in which management control 
systems were not only important for strategy implementation, but also for strategic 
formulation. His research was based on a two-year field study and it provided an 
illustration of how top managers used formal systems to guide the emergence of new 
strategies and ensure competitive advantage.
Simons introduced the idea of interactive management control as opposed to programmed 
control: "Management controls become interactive when business managers use planning 
and control procedures to actively monitor and intervene in on-going decision activities of 
subordinates. Since this intervention provides an opportunity for top management to debate 
and challenge underlying data, assumptions and action plans, interactive management 
controls demand regular attention from operating subordinates at all levels of the company. 
Programmed controls, by contrast, rely heavily on staff specialists in preparing and 
interpreting information. Data is transmitted through formal reporting procedures and 
operating managers are involved infrequently and on an exception basis" (Simons, 1990: 
136).
The focus of attention in Simon's work was business strategy and the way in which top 
managers use interactive control systems to monitor the progress of the business unit 
towards its business goals. He argued that the top managers make selected control systems 
interactive in order to monitor the strategic uncertainties that they believe are critical to 
achieving the organisational goals. It is also suggested that these control systems can be 
linked to the use of subjective reward systems which are not formula based. Company B, 
for instance, in Simons (1990) had a reward system based on effort. As a result of debate
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and dialogue that surrounds the interactive management control process, new strategic and 
tactics emerge over time.
Although the view of management control presented in his paper (1990) differed from the 
traditional approach (management control is an important tool for strategy 
implementation). His methodological approach was linear, based upon a functionalist 
approach “the control system refers to formalised producers and systems that use 
information to maintain or alter patterns in organisational activity” (Simons, 1990: 623). 
His model essentially was normative and was based on the premise that top managers are 
always able to alleviate the effects of environmental uncertainties by designing an 
appropriate control system (contingency view). Simons (1991) gave some attention to the 
complex nature of strategy formulation and implementation. Presumably, Simons viewed 
strategies as organisational learning and as an emergent process (Hartman, 1993).
The analysis thus far has been based on contingency theory approach, which has been 
criticised on the grounds that it suffers from two fundamental problems related to 
conceptual deficiencies and methodological assumptions. Firstly, the contingency 
approach is epistemologically rooted in functionalism (Otley, 1980; Berry, 1983). These 
critics argue that contingency theory is based on linear deductive model of causality and 
relationship, and assumes a highly technical view of organisational choice. Hence, studies 
based on this theory tend to ignore the wider context of organisation as well as the critical 
and dynamic issues such as organisational goals and effectiveness (Otley, 1980; Otley and 
Berry, 1980; Lowe and Puxty, 1989) and authority and accountability (Berry, et al., 1985). 
Secondly, the conceptualisation, definition and measurement of key variables within a 
contingency theory have not been adequately elucidated which has led to an emphasis on 
statistical analysis at the expense of theoretical and empirical attention (Otley, 1989; Dunk, 
1989). Despite the difficulty in employing a contingency theory, it was commonly agreed 
that this approach provided useful insight for understanding how environmental factors 
were related to management accounting systems (Berry et al, 1991; Hoque, 1993).
Miles and Snow (1978: 29) classified organisations by their way of responding to the 
environment, and according to their “particular configuration of technology structure, and 
process”. Miles and Snow’s typology (1978) attempted to study strategy at business level 
in four industries. They identified four major viable strategies: Defenders, Prospectors,
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Analysers and Reactors. The dimension underlying the typology is the rate at which an 
organisation changes its products or markets. Defenders are organisations (strategic 
business unit, SBU) that engage in little or no new product development or new market 
development. Often they control relatively secure niches within their industries, competing 
primarily by price, quality, delivery or service. Prospectors attempt to pioneer in 
product/market development. They tend to offer a frequently changing product line and 
compete primarily by stimulating and meeting new market opportunities. Analysers are an 
intermediate type. They make fewer and slower product/market changes than prospectors, 
and are less committed to stability and efficiency than defenders. Reactors behave with a 
passive strategic adaptation.
Miles and Snow’s view formed the basis for a range of research concerning the best fit of 
strategy and MAS design (e.g. Simons, 1987; 1990). This body of research emphasised the 
relationship between the firm and changing market and focuses on how an optimal 
accounting system can be designed in accordance with a specific strategy the firm had 
decided to follow.
Within the "new economic view" (Hartmann, 1999) we found, among other 
perspectives, transaction cost theory, evolution theory and resource based perspective. 
The transaction cost perspective explained the existence of market and companies, 
vertical integration, product diversification, and divisionalisation of companies, etc. by 
referring to the cost of co-ordination in each transaction. The evolutionary theory 
explained the company as a transmission and variation mechanism, whereas the market 
function was called a selecting mechanism selecting, choosing the most economic 
efficient companies. The resource-based perspective saw the company as a bundle of 
resources and competencies that competitors could not easily imitate due to the 
complexity of the competencies, their historical nature, and because the competencies 
sometimes existed as tacit knowledge. Even though these perspectives differed 
extensively in their perception of rationality and in their explanation of the firm and 
competition, they used economic efficiency as an explanatory factor, thus reproducing a 
hierarchical view of management.
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5.2.3 The third viewpoint of SMA
Cost can be reduced by reducing activities that incur costs without increasing value. 
They can also be reduced by exploiting linkages in the value chain. The value chain is 
“the linked set of value-creating activities all the way from basic raw material sources... 
through to the ultimate end-use product” (Shank, 1989: 50).
Porter's model (1985) provided a potential alternative to ABC. He proposed a value- 
chain (VC) model which breaks down the firm’s activities into nine strategic units of 
interrelated activities and collects cost information about a set of value-creating 
activities all the way from basic raw material suppliers to the ultimate end-users (see 
Wilson, 1991 for summary). Porter (1985) listed twelve factors, including learning, 
economies of scale, interrelationships with suppliers, and discretionary policies, that 
should be examined with a view to reducing costs. He identified three strategic postures 
to manage pricing in relationship to the VC cost . So while some companies tended to 
construct efficient scale facilities and reduce cost through accumulated experience, 
others gained strategic advantage via the cost of differentiation (e.g.; services and 
image) in the market place (Brignall, et al., 1991). Porter’s value-chain approach 
becomes difficult to use in practice (Hargert and Morris, 1989; Hartman, 1993), because 
firms define their business activities around responsibility centres rather than strategic 
business units and value chain activities as defined by Porter.
Porter (1985) presented value chain analysis to gaining competitive advantage. The aim 
of value chain analysis is to find linkages between value creating activities, which result 
in lower costs and/or enhanced differentiation. This linkage may be within the firm or 
between the firm and its suppliers, channels and customers.
Shank and Govindarajan, (1988; 1992a; b; c) have promoted accounting inputs to chain 
analysis under the name “strategic cost management”. They gave several examples of 
how value chain analysis using accounting figures would result in different decisions 
than using traditional management techniques.
76 These strategic postures are: (1) cost leadership (competition on price) (2) product/service 
differentiation (3) focus strategy (a closely defined target segment o f  the market [niches])
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Hargert and Morris (1989) asserted that much accounting is not in a suitable form to be 
used in analysing the value chain. They pointed out that a traditional management 
accounting system does not adequately quantify the costs and benefits of joint 
optimisation and co-ordination between parts of the firm, and between the firm and 
suppliers and buyers. Hargert and Monies, (1989) considered that the process itself 
provided a useful insight, even if it was impossible to estimate precise numerical output. 
“One of the strengths of value chain analysis is that it forces managers to think about 
which activities created profits, to choose a generic strategy for each product and to ask 
of each item of expenditure “how does this add value to buyers”? (p. 187).
Shank and Govindarajan (1992b) recognised that there were problems involved in 
calculating the value chain, but reiterated that “Even the process of performing the value 
chain analysis, can be quite instructive” (p. 184).
Shank (1989) grouped cost drivers into two types: structural and executional. Structural 
cost drivers are scale, scope, experience, technology and complexity. Increasing these 
structural drivers does not necessarily decrease costs. Executional drivers include work 
force involvement, total quality management, capacity utilisation, plant layout 
efficiency, product configuration effectiveness and exploitation of linkages. Shank 
(1989) pointed out that the cost drivers analysis suggested by Porter (1985) was a much 
broader concept than “activity based costing”, which focuses primarily on complexity.
Nanni, et al., (1992) recognised the need for performance measurement both as a guide 
to putting strategy into action and evaluation of actions taken. However, they suggested 
that both financial and non-financial measures be used.
As mentioned in the introduction, this viewpoint advocates analysis of ways to decrease 
cost and/or enhance differentiation of firm products, through exploiting linkages in the 
value chain and optimising cost drivers. This view leads to the issue of supply chain 
management. According to Harland (1996), the term “Supply Chain Management” 
(SCM) seems to have originated in the early 1980s in discussion on the integration of 
the internal business functions of purchasing, manufacturing, sales and distribution. 
Slack, et al., (1998) defined SCM as a holistic approach to managing across company 
boundaries.
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Ellram (1991) saw SCM as a competitive tool that share similar advantages and
77 78disadvantages with vertical integration and obligation contracting form of 
governance. The advantages of vertical integration as opposed to obligation contracting 
were that integration increased control, reduced the probability of opportunism, 
improved communication and avoided the replication of activities. The disadvantages of 
integration included problems in achieving economies of scale, problems of span 
control, the loss of high powered market incentives and the possible perpetuation of 
obsolete processes (Williamson, 1985).
The DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (1997) argued that supply chain 
management is "the strategic management process, unifying the systematic planning and 
control of all technologies, materials and services, from identification of need by the 
ultimate customer. It encompasses planning, designing, purchasing, production, 
inventory control, storage handling, distribution, logistics and quality. The objectives 
are to optimise performance in meeting agreed customer service requirements, 
minimising cost, whilst optimising the use of all resources throughout the entire supply 
chain".
Berry, et al., (1997) argue that the above definition outlines four main uses of the term 
"supply chain management". The internal supply chain which integrates business 
functions had new materials and derived information in a "inbound" "outbound" way. 
Secondly, the management of dyadic or two party relationships with immediate 
suppliers. Thirdly, the management of a chain of businesses including a supplier, a 
supplier's suppliers, a customer and a customer's customer. Fourthly, the management of 
a network of interconnected businesses involved in the ultimate provision of product 
and service packages required by end customers.
Berry, et al., (1997) argue that total cost control is the idea of open book costing. Open 
book costing means the supplier opens his books to the customer and this supports the 
idea of active collaboration and partnership. Lamming (1993) talked about cost
77 Vertical integration internalises the whole activity (Williamson, 1985).
78 Obligation contracting whereby firms recognise their interdependence and ongoing nature o f  
relationships (Williamson, 1985).
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transparency and the sharing of cost information between customer and supplier in a 
way which allowed customer and supplier to work together to reduce costs. This was 
analysed into constituent parts and could support an exercise based on target costing or 
continuous improvement (Kaizen costing).
Seal, et al., (1999) argue that open book accounting could enable both greater trust as 
well as self-enforcing agreements. From an economics perspective, the relation between 
information and trust ran in two (opposite) directions. First, trust between partners could 
reduce costs of negotiating and monitoring agreements by avoiding the need for 
complex contingency agreements. Second, if the costs and rewards of agreements could 
be verified at low cost, then the need for trust was reduced.
Seal, et al., (1999) argue that there were a number of areas where accounting and, in 
particular, management accounting was involved in supply chain management. These 
areas included the make-or-buy decision leading to the choice of the partnership mode, 
the role of accounting in managing a partnership and the accountability of the partners 
to their internal constituencies. The researcher's view was that the supply chain had four 
important dimensions (reliability, availability, efficiency/effectiveness, and flexibility) 
and it has three major criteria. These were as follows:
(a) Cost
(b) Response of the market
(c) Strategic management of the competition
The researcher saw cost as the main element and the core idea of supply chain 
management was to eliminate non-value activity (cost effectiveness). For the purpose of 
this research it would be useful to focus on cost related supply chain management.
Slack, et al., (1998) demonstrated the gearing effect on profits of reducing material 
costs. Seal, et al., (1999) argue that traditional manufacturing was characterised by poor 
quality cost accounting information which could not identify drivers in the assemblers' 
own operations. The prescribed roles of management accounting emphasised reporting 
and controlling functions within a bureaucratic hierarchy. Management accounting 
might also be used in simple "make-or-buy" decisions with the danger here (as in other 
areas of decision-making) being that cost data from the reporting function may 
influence costs for decision-making (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987).
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Lere and Saraph, (1995) highlighted the problem of supply chain management caused 
by cost and suggested a solution for it. They argued that most suppliers would tend only 
to provide information based on traditional costing. Lere and Saraph, (1995) suggested 
that one way round this problem was to deduce a supplier's cost by asking for a process 
flow chart that may indicate any wasteful, non-value adding activities and a breakdown 
of overheads to indicate activities that were performed specifically on his or her 
product.
7 0Rajagopal and Bernard, (1993) emphasised the importance of focusing on "all-in-cost" 
rather than purchase price. They argued that cost management drew on a number of 
functions but focused on total quality management, negotiating, and supplier alliances.
Seal, et al., (1999) argue that cost information not only played a role in the strategic 
sourcing decision but would also influence the ongoing management of partnerships. In 
a strategic approach, the ongoing management of a strategic partnership should be on a 
cost rather than a price basis.
5.2.4 The fourth viewpoint of SMA
The concept of strategic planning and positioning only covers part of business strategy. 
Strategies emerge from interaction between management, employees and the 
environment.
Mintzberg (1978) was one of the first to point out that strategic planning literature 
ignored other types of strategy formation. He made a distinction between strategy 
formulation and formation. He defined strategy formulation as long-range planning by 
leaders of organisations. Strategy formation, on the other hand, he defined as the result 
of interplay between the environment, the organisational operating system and the 
organisation’s leadership. Mintzberg (1978: 935) defined the strategies that formed, 
“the realised strategies”, as “a pattern in a stream of decisions”. He considered a 
strategy to have formed “when a sequence of decisions in some area exhibits a 
consistency over time.
79 The term o f  "all-in-cost" refers to the sum o f  the purchase price plus all in-house costs involved in 
receiving and converting the purchased materials into finished products.
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Strategy is not formulated and implemented solely by top management. There are likely 
to be several interest groups within an organisation; each having “its own set of 
stakeholders with whom it knowledge’s relationships and whose exceptions it 
considers” (Dermer and Lucas, 1986: 473).
Simons (1992: 44) raised the question, “what role can accounting ... play in... 
stimulating emergent strategies?” He suggested that accounting plays a role in 
interactive control systems. In a more recent piece of work, Simons (1995) talked about 
levers of control. In his 1995 work, Simons referred to interactive control systems and 
diagnostic control systems. Diagnostic control systems are in fact just another name for 
programmed control systems. What was interesting about Simons (1995) was the way in 
which he introduced the idea of belief systems (organisation culture) into his levers of 
control80 and linked belief systems to boundary systems, interactive control systems, 
diagnostic control systems and business strategy.
Simons (1995) suggested that these four levers of control work in opposite ways to 
ensure effective strategy implementation and development. Two of the control levers 
(belief systems and interactive control systems) created positive and inspirational 
forces. The two other levers (boundary systems and diagnostic control systems) created 
constraints and ensured compliance with orders. Simons suggested that effective top 
managers used the levers of control to inspire commitment to the organisation; to stake 
out the territory for experimentation and competition; to co-ordinate and monitor the 
execution of today's strategies; and to stimulate and guide the search for strategies of the 
future.
Dermer (1990: 74) proposed that accounting has three roles in shaping strategy: it may 
be used as “a language of discourse”, as an authority establishing and maintaining 
credibility, and as a provider of an historical context for strategy. Dermer also argued
80 The levers o f  control can be described as follows:
* B elief systems - used to inspire and direct the search for new opportunities.
* Boundary systems - used to set limits on opportunity seeking behaviour.
* Diagnostic control systems - used to motivate, monitor and reward achievement o f  specified goals.
* Interactive control systems - used to stimulate organisational learning and the emergence o f  new ideas 
and strategies.
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that research on the relationship between accounting and strategy has been biased 
towards attempting to make accounting more useful to managers. He pointed out that 
stakeholders will access and use “the strengths and weakness of conventional 
accounting ... in ways not anticipated by accountants” (p. 75).
5.3 Cost accounting and corporate strategy
The main aim of this section is to explain how costing techniques can support corporate 
strategy. In order to explain this, the section will firstly highlight how companies have 
to compete and what elements are successful. Secondly, it will give a brief discussion of 
six cost management techniques and how they support strategy. Finally, this section will 
explain how firms manage costs.
Sustainable competitive advantages play a critical role in determining the way firms 
compete. They do so by enabling firms to avoid competition by adopting the generic 
strategies of either cost leadership or differentiation (Porter, 1990). When firms cannot 
create sustainable competitive advantages, they are forced to compete by repeatedly 
creating temporary ones.
Three elements81 play a critical role in determining the success of firms. These three 
elements comprise the product price, quality82, and functionality83. Competition is based 
upon firms performing better than rivals in one or more characteristics. In markets with 
perfect information and only strictly economic rational customers, the specific customer 
trade-offs between price, quality and functionality would be clearly visible. Therefore, 
well specified functional relationships between values for the three elements could be 
set down as the basis for determining a starting point.
When firms adopt a confrontation strategy, a highly effective cost management 
programme is a necessity not a luxury. Cooper (1996) argued that these programmes 
consisted of six products and production process related techniques. Three of them were
81 These three elements - price, quality, and functionality - are called survival triplet by Cooper, in (1995).
82 Quality is defined as conformance with product specification.
83 Functionality refers to the degree o f  success in designing the product to meet specifications that 
customer require.
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forward oriented and designed to help manage the costs of future products. These 
techniques were:
(a) Target costing
(b) Value engineering
(c) Inter-organisational cost management systems
The other three techniques were feedback oriented and designed to help manage the cost 
of existing products. These techniques were:
0 4
(a) Product costing
(b) Operational control
(c) Kaizen costing
The core idea of each technique will be explained in turn.
Target costing.
Kato (1993: 33) defined target costing as "an activity which is aimed at reducing the life 
cycle costs of new products, while, ensuring quality, reliability, and other consumer 
requirements, by examining all possible ideas for cost reduction at the product planning, 
research and development, and the prototyping phases of production. Kato emphasised 
that it was not just a cost reduction technique, rather it was part of a comprehensive 
strategic profit management system. Target costing was the discipline which ensured 
that new products were profitable when they were launched. There were two major 
steps in target costing. The first was to determine a product's target price and target 
margin so that its target cost could be determined. The second was to break down that 
target cost down to the component and raw material level so that the purchase prices of 
those items could be determined. A product's target cost was determined by subtracting 
its target profit margin from its target selling price. That is:
Target cost = Target price - Target margin
The target price of a new product is determined primarily from market analysis. The 
target margin is set based upon corporate profit expectations, historical results, 
competitive analysis, and sometimes, computer simulations. The new product's target
84 See full absorption costing, activity based costing.
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price can be used as the basis for determining the purchase price of components, and 
raw materials acquired externally (Cooper, 1996: 237).
The critical factor that identifies target costing (as opposed to other approaches to 
managing the costs of new products) is the intensity with which the rule, "The target 
cost can never be exceeded" is applied. Without the application of such a rule, target 
costing systems typically lose their effectiveness. Target cost challenges the calendar­
time perspective of costs (Monden and Hamada, 1991). Bjornenak and Olson, (1999) 
argued that target costing took a normative perspective. It said something about how it 
should be, and not how it has been.
Value engineering.
Value engineering (VE) is a systematic inter-disciplinary examination of factors 
affecting the cost of a product in order to devise means of achieving the specified 
purpose at the required standard of quality and reliability at the target cost. VE, like 
target costing, is applied during the design phase of product development. VE is a 
multi-disciplinary team based approach. Teams are typically drawn from multiple 
function areas, including design engineering, applications engineering, manufacturing, 
purchasing, and, sometimes, even the firm's suppliers and subcontractors. VE plays a 
critical role in the management of product costs by helping the firm manage the trade­
off between functionality and cost.
VE requires that each product's basic and secondary functions be identified and their 
values analysed. A basic function is the principle reason for the existence of the product. 
The secondary functions are outcomes of the way the designers chose to achieve the 
basic functions.
Inter-organisational cost management systems.
For many firms, the pressure to become more efficient has caused them to try to 
increase the efficiency of the firms that supply them with raw materials and components 
by developing inter-organisational cost management systems. For this it is necessary to
Of
be part of the most efficient supply chain . There are many ways to achieve this
85 Seal, et al., (1999a) argue that inter-firm supply chains were embedded in institutional environments 
offering resources that may be drawn on by firms that face difficulties in regulation cost and quality 
issues.
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objective such as: the company can opt to blur their organisational boundaries in 
numerous ways (organisational blurring typically occurs when information that is 
critical to one firm is possessed by another firm either further up or down the supplier 
chain); create relationships that share organisational resources, including information 
that helps improve efficiency of the inter-firm activities.
Operational control.
Operational control requires holding individuals responsible for the costs they control 
and for determining how well they control them. The two primary techniques of 
operational control are the establishment of responsibility centres and variance analysis.
As regards to responsibility centres, for an individual to be held responsible for a cost, 
that cost must be assigned directly to the centre over which the individual has control. If 
indirect cost assignments are used, then it is impossible to hold the individual 
responsible for any apparent changes in the level of resource consumption. They cannot 
be held responsible because there is no way of knowing if apparent changes in resource 
consumption are due to distortions in the indirect assignment process or to an actual 
change in the level of consumption. In other words, the first technique aims to change 
the nature of cost management to focus on different objects and process objects.
As regards variance analysis, the traditional use of variance analysis is to monitor how 
well the responsible individual is keeping control over costs. The aim is to ensure that 
the budget is achieved.
Kaizen costing.
Kaizen stands for continuous improvement. Kaizen costing is the application of kaizen 
techniques to reduce the costs of components and products by a pre-specified amount. 
Kaizen, unlike Kaizen costing, typically does not focus on individual products, instead 
it focuses on making the production processes themselves more efficient. As a kaizen 
programme achieves its objectives, the overall cost of production and hence reported
86 Inter-firm relations were partly the outcome o f  technology, transaction characteristics and industry 
structure (Ellram, 1991; Slack, et al., 1998). Seal, et al., (1999a) added to that, inter-firm relations were 
also influenced by interaction between the firms' strategies and institutional environment o f  the industry.
product cost falls. Kaizen does not concern itself with product design, which is 
considered as given.
The difference between target and kaizen costing focuses on the point in the life cycle 
when the techniques are applied, (and what their cost reduction objective is). Target 
costing is applied during the design stage of the product life cycle. It achieves its cost 
reduction objective primarily through improvements in product design. In contrast, 
kaizen costing is applied during the manufacturing stage of the product life cycle. It 
achieves its cost reduction objectives primarily through increased efficiency of the 
production process.
Firms can manage costs in three ways. Firstly, they determine the mix (both present and 
future) of products that the firm sells. Secondly, they manage the costs of future 
products, and thirdly, they manage the costs of existing products.
The effectiveness of the various techniques for a given firm appears to be dependent 
upon several factors including the competitive environment, the maturity of the 
technologies used in the products, and the length of the product life cycle. The role of 
these three factors in determining the effectiveness of the six cost management 
techniques is primarily shaped by how the firm is competing using the following three 
elements: price, quality, and functionality. Under confrontation, firms compete on all 
three dimensions, but one of the three characteristics typically dominates the way the 
firm competes. The feed-forward techniques are particularly effective when firms are 
competing on functionality. The feedback techniques are particularly effective when 
firms are competing on price.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on cost accounting in service organisations. It has identified 
three different service delivery types, professional, shop and mass and related water 
industry as a mass service. The study sees strategic management accounting as the sole 
model of cost management which considers both the internal and external environment. 
Furthermore, it has centred attention on how cost accounting - six models - can support 
corporate strategy.
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In ABC and traditional literature, cost causality is related to internal factors like number 
of set-ups, number of machine hours or number of products (Bjomenak and Olson, 
1999: 331). ABM literature expands the view on cost causality in activities by 
identifying a set of different drivers, e.g. initial drivers, resources drivers and cost 
drivers (AX and Ask, 1995). In SMA literature the cost variability factor is inspired by 
the broader set of causal variability factors inspired by strategy literature (Bjomenak 
and Olson, 1999: 331). Porter (1985) included external factors (institutional factors) in 
his set of stmctural cost drivers. Thus, the cost driver concept in SMA is much broader 
than in ABC, which primarily focuses on complexity (Shank, 1989).
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 have helped to build the framework for this research. Chapter two 
has shown the importance of both contingency and institutional theories for explaining 
the design and use of a cost accounting system. The chapter has argued that while 
technical (or contingent) explanations of cost management were not rejected, they were 
viewed as incomplete (Scott, 1987). This led the researcher to look at the institutional 
context within (e.g. which models of cost management were followed in the GOGCWS, 
and what methods of cost accounting were used in the GOGCWS, see sections 8.5, 8.6 
and 8.7) and outside (i.e. the legal framework for water industry in Egypt, the external 
supervision and control body of the GOGCWS and the suggestions by the consultants 
Black and Veatch International which related to cost management, see sections 8.1, 8.3 
and 8.7) the GOGCWS. The discussion of both the external and internal environments 
of the GOGCWS will be discuss according to neo-institutional economic theory in 
chapters ten and eleven (see figure 5.1).
Chapter three highlighted the different roles which accounting can play in 
organisational practice and social practice. It also illustrated that three institutional 
theories have been used in the accounting literature: old institutional economic theory 
which focus on micro-institutions within organisations; neo-institutional sociology 
which focuses predominately on extra-organisational institutions and neo-institutional 
economic theory which focuses on both micro and macro institutional contexts. As 
mentioned in section 1.4, this research adopts neo-institutional economic theory, this led 
the researcher to look at different kinds of environment in the water industry such as: 
(privatised water services in the UK, hybrid water services in France and hierarchical 
water services in Egypt, see section 7.2).
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Chapters four and five focus on the model of cost management which this research has 
adopted. This research is based on a model of cost management which has three 
elements: efficiency, optimisation and strategy (see figure 5.1). Chapter four focuses on 
the first two elements of cost management: efficiency and optimisation. It identifies 
some models of cost management which indicate how to increase efficiency (i.e. 
throughput accounting, benchmarking, target costing and ABC) and others to increase
0*7
optimisation (such as, ABM) . The chapter identifies links between institutional theory, 
transaction cost and efficiency. It examines how the efficiency framework is favoured 
by transaction cost theories. Chapter five identifies strategic management accounting as 
one of the models of cost management which considers both the internal and external 
environment (the third element of cost management). This led the researcher to explore 
the question "is there any relationship between cost management (efficiency, 
optimisation and strategy) and the perception of competitive intensity and the 
perception of unpredictability related to three areas of the external environment (product 
market, factor market and legislation? See figure 5.1 and chapter 9.
Figure 5.1: The relationship between cost management and the external
environment
External environment
Product
market
Factor
m arket
Legislati
on
Perception o f  
Com petitive 
intensity and 
unpredictability
Cost management 
Policy and practice
Efficiency
Optimisa  
tion
Strategy
87 For the discussion o f  these models within the GOGCWS see section 8.7.
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In order to understand and explain the dynamic relationship between cost management 
and external environment, a case study method has been adopted (see chapter 6). The 
data is collected from multiple sources (triangulation) including company documents 
and questionnaires as a basis of the semi-structured interviews.
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Chapter 6 
Methodology and method
6.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to outline the research design and methodology, and methods 
of data collection. For this purpose, this chapter is divided into three main sections, - 
each further divided into three sub-sections.
Section one outlines the methodology that the research intends to utilise and the 
rationale for choosing it. Section two clarifies the method followed in this research and 
the rationale for using it. Section two is divided into three sub-sections. The first 
explains case study research, case study theory, case study (qualitative). It gives the 
rationale for using case studies in management accounting research and examines some 
accounting case studies. Sub-section two looks at the strengths, weaknesses, and 
problems of the case study method. It suggests ways to understand case study research 
(in the preparation, collection and assessment of evidence, the analysis of data, theory 
development, and report writing).
Sub-section three opens the debate between qualitative and quantitative research, and 
examines three methods of qualitative data collection. It explains why the researcher 
combined qualitative research interviews and questionnaires. It discusses the different 
types of research interview and the strengths and limitations of each. It then explores the 
advantages and disadvantages of qualitative research interviews. Next it explains the 
different forms of company documentation, its advantages, and why it is not commonly 
used organisational research. Finally it describes the method which will be used in the 
analysis of organisational documents (the hermeneutic method) and the rationale for 
choosing this method.
The final section outlines the main conclusions of the previous sections (and sub­
sections) of this chapter.
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6.1 Research design and methodology
Methodology refers to the methods and ways used to conduct research. A 
methodological position consists of three elements (epistemology, ontology and human 
nature, Burrel and Morgan, 1979: 1).
6.1.1 Epistemology
Epistemology is the nature and forms of knowledge. It defines what ‘knowledge’ is, and 
the relationship between our ideas about what is going on in the world and the nature of 
the world itself. Epistemology explains the assumptions about knowledge -  (i.e. about 
how we might begin to understand the world and communicate this knowledge) (Burrel 
and Morgan, 1979). It is the study of criteria, by which we determine what constitutes 
‘valid’ knowledge.
Epistemological debates are concerned with the appropriateness of procedures and 
methods in the process of knowledge acquisition. A central debate focuses on induction 
and deduction. The inductive/deductive debate arises from whether knowledge is 
acquired by observation, or through theory.
n  o
The inductive approach assumes that true knowledge begins with observations, from 
which theory can then be inferred. It is a process which begins with a set of 
observations (i.e. descriptions), and moves on to develop theories of these observations 
(see figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: Inductive approach
Empirical level Begins here obs. 1 obs. 2 obs. 3 obs. 4
Conceptual-abstract level
Theory
Source: DeVaus, D. (1996) - "Survey in Social Research", p. 12.
88 Theory construction / Grounded theory / Post Factum Theory / Ex post facto theory.
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The deductive approach (theory testing), begins by formulating tentative theories 
(hypothesis), and goes on to develop procedures in order to test these theories. The 
deductive approach is sometimes referred to as ‘hypothetico- deductive’ or the 
‘falsificationist’ approach, or “the method of conjecture and refutation” (Blaikie, 1995: 
143-144). The deductive approach begins with a question or a problem that needs to be 
understood or explained89. The first stage involves producing a possible answer to a 
question, or an explanation of the problem itself. The deductive approach begins with a 
theory. This theory then allows us to predict how things will be in the “real” world (see 
figure 6.2).
The literature review gave the researcher certain expectations, as to how institutional 
pressures work to influence the role of cost management in the Egyptian Water 
industry.
Figure 6.2: Deductive approach
Conceptual-abstract level Begins here
Empirical level obs. 2 obs. 3 obs. 4obs. 1
Theory
Source: DeVaus, D. (1996)- ’’Survey in Social Research", p. 12.
This study adopts a hybrid approach (focusing on the inductive method). The rationale 
for choosing a hybrid approach is because objectives of this research are to describe 
what is going on (i.e. what is the current cost structure for the provision of water in the 
Egyptian water industry), and to understand and explain why it is going on (i.e. what is 
the rationale of the water companies for their cost structure?). This therefore involves 
induction and deduction. DeVaus (1996: 11) argues that inductive and deductive 
approaches are not alternative ways of arriving at theories, rather they represent two 
stages with different starting points.
89 The main objectives o f  this research are to understand, describe and explain the role o f  cost 
management in the Egyptian Water Industry.
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6.1.2 Ontology
Ontology is the nature of reality and “being”. Ontology refers to the claims or 
assumptions which social enquiry makes about the nature of social reality. This involves 
claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up, and how these units 
interact with each other (Blaikie, 1995). Ontological assumptions are at the core of the 
phenomena (cost management) (Burrel and Morgan, 1979: 1).
The core debates in ontology relate to “nominalism” and “realism”. Nominalism refers 
to assumptions that the social world (external to individual cognition) and made up of 
names, concepts and labels which are used to structure reality. The nominalist does not 
admit to there being any "real" structure to the world (Burrel and Morgan, 1979: 4). 
Nominalism assumes that situations and objects are not independent of prior knowledge 
and the perceiving mind. Researchers’ from differ ideological backgrounds can arrive at 
different conclusions about the same thing.
Realism90 claims that the social world, (external to individual cognition) is a ‘real’ 
world made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures. Whether or not we 
label and perceive these structures. They still exist as empirical entities (Burrel and 
Morgan, 1979: 4). Realism assumes that situations and objects exist in their own right, 
(external and independent of the observer's mind). It assumes that the researcher's view 
of the world is unaffected by his/her beliefs and prior knowledge. Researcher therefore 
arrive at the same conclusions about a given problem in a similar situation.
This research has adopted a nomalist view. The rationale for choosing a nominal 
approach was largely due to the debate between Macintosh and Scapens91(1990) and 
Boland92 (1993). Boland (1993: 126) claims that Macintosh and Scapens exaggerate the 
operation of management accounting systems when they describe it "as a monolithic set
90 Realism encompasses “metaphysical realism” and “epistemological realism”. “Metaphysical realism” 
perceives reality existing independently o f the cognitive structure o f  observers. Epistemological realism  
perceives reality as cognitively accessible to the observer. Much o f  realism encompasses both views, 
although some realists would claim that while reality does exist independently o f  our efforts to understand 
it, it is not cognitively accessible (Gill and Johnson, 1991: 166).
91 Macintosh and Scapens (1990) employ structuration theory to frame their analysis o f  the budget at the 
University o f  Wisconsin (as reported by Covaleski and Dirsmith , 1988).
92 Boland (1993) draws upon existing empirical work. He re-interprets Milne's (1980) study o f  M BA  
students, through the use o f  accounting reports and utilising structure theory.
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of structuring priorities". Boland stress "the actor's creative open possibilities for 
making meaning (p. 140). Macintosh and Scapens discovered that the ‘power of 
accounting’ “signifies, dominates and legitimises action”. While Boland, however, 
stresses the ‘power’ of the actor in interpreting accounting as an open text.
Jones and Dugdale (2001) claim that these differences in opinion relate to 
methodological differences . Boland (1993) characterises Macintosh and Scapens's 
approach as "a view from a distance", in contrast to his own which is, “up close”. 
Scapens and Macintosh (1996: 681) define their own approach as “institutional 
analysis”, and Boland's as "analysis of strategic conduct". This study has adopted 
institutional analysis. Scapens and Macintosh (1996: 683) argue that "in institutional 
analysis, the knowledge, skill and awareness of actors are kept in suspension, while 
institutions are treated as chronologically reproduced rules and resources. In the analysis 
of strategic conduct, the institutional properties of interaction are assumed to be given 
methodologically. Attention is focused on the processes through which social activities 
are produced and reproduced.
6.1.3 Human nature
Human nature concerns assumptions about the relationship between human beings and 
their environment, (i.e., human life as the subject enquiry, Burrel and Morgan, 1979: 2). 
The issue of human nature is that of what model of man is reflected in any given social- 
scientific theory (Burrel and Morgan, 1979: 6). In other words, they select a position 
which sees human beings as either ‘deterministic’ or ‘voluntaristic’, when they act.
The deterministic view regards human beings and their activities as being “completely 
determined by the "environment" in which they are situated” (Burrel and Morgan, 1979: 
6). The deterministic position assumes that human action can be understood as a direct 
response to external stimuli. It seeks to establish a “cause and effect” relationship 
between stimulus and action. The voluntaristic view assumes that human beings are 
free-willed, they act independently of external stimuli, and exercise choice (Burrel and 
Morgan, 1979: 6).
93 Researchers with different viewpoints and differing ideological backgrounds can com e to different 
conclusions about the same subject.
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Although accounting offers rules and guidelines which companies should follow, 
(especially public sector companies or public utilities which have specific laws -  e.g. 
the GOGCWS, deterministic view). This study adopted a voluntaristic view.
Jones and Dugdale (2001) stress the importance of the empirical content of a study by 
comparing Macintosh and Scapens’ (1990) study with that of Boland (1993). Macintosh 
and Scapens (1990) studied the University Wisconsin’s relationship with the state of 
Wisconsin. Boland (1993) studied managers in organisations confronting a fictional 
case study. (Where no indication was given of organisational value, or meaning systems 
that might be the basis for sharing). Jones and Dugdale (2001) argue that if we are 
concerned with shared values and meanings constructed at the concrete, embedded level 
of the organisation, then it is studies such as that by Macintosh and Scapens that might 
reveal them. Conversely, if we are concerned with values and meanings constructed at 
the abstract dis-embedded level, we might then expect them to be discovered in studies 
such as that by Boland.
This study focused on shared values and meanings constructed at the concrete 
embedded level of the GOGCWS. Therefore, this study adopts a more ‘voluntaristic’ 
view of human behaviour than that which guides contingency94 and neo-institutional95 
research. This approach can be compared with more recent advances in institutional 
theory, which calls for more in-depth, interpretative analyses of dialectic between 
stability and change (Czarniawska and Sevon, 1996).
6.2 Research method
6.2.1 Case study
6.2.1.1 Case study and the rationale for using it
The argument about methods depends on two factors. (1) The relationship between 
theory and method (2) how the researcher attends to the potential weaknesses of the 
method (Hartley, 1995).
The first of these factors (the relationship between theory and method) is discussed 
initially. In the 1990s there was significant interest in both the practice and theory of
94 See Child, 1972; Schreyogg, 1980.
95 See DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991.
163
cost management and management accounting. Many researchers were interested in 
studying practice to document and understand the many roles (economic, political and 
social) that management accounting systems can play in the functioning of 
organisations (Lowe and Machin, 1983; Berry et al., 1985; Chua et al., 1988). A major 
objective of these studies was to examine organisational practice for the development of 
a sociology of accounting practice (Scapens, 1988). Many of these case studies (of 
activity-based accounting systems) explored the issue of how systems could be used to 
assist managers in formulating and implementing strategy (Spicer, 1992).
One reason for studying accounting practice (the case study approach) is to develop a 
better understanding of the role a company's management accounting, control system 
and cost management can play in the formulation and implementation of strategy. 
Several factors distinguish case study research from other empirical research methods. 
These are:
(a) A case study is one of a number of different research methods that can be applied to 
cost management and management accounting research
(b) Case studies involve an empirical inquiry where multiple sources of evidence may 
be used (e.g. questionnaires, interviews, document analysis and observation)
(c) Case study research design can focus on a single organisation, (i.e. the GOGCWS, 
Yin, 1989)
(d) Case study research is likely to be valuable where existing theories are inadequate or 
incomplete
Case studies can give an analysis of the context and processes, of the phenomena under 
study - (usually involving inductive analysis, data collected over a period of time, and 
of one or one or more organisations or groups (Hartley, 1995). Case study is a research 
design which focuses on understanding the dynamic relationships present within a 
single setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). Case studies must be constructed to be sensitive to the 
context in which management behaviour takes place. A case study approach is not a 
method, but rather a research strategy. As Yin (1981) notes, "because the context is 
deliberately part of the design, there will always be many ‘variables’ for observation 
made”. A case study (defined in terms of its theoretical orientation) gives an 
understanding of processes alongside their contexts (Hartley, 1995).
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Scapens, 1990 and Ryan, et. al., 1992 note that the term "fieldwork" and "case study" 
have been used to refer to studies of accounting in its actual setting. Fieldwork means 
studies of social practice in the ‘field of activity’ in which they take place. This can be a 
study of a single company, or a number of companies. A case study implies a single unit 
of analysis. This might be a company or a more aggregated unit of analysis.
Case studies need to develop theoretical frameworks in order to inform the data, provide 
a sense of general relevance and interest, and offer wider meaning than mere 
description. Case studies have been widely used to study culture and change in 
organisations. Case studies are distinguished by their approach to theory-building, 
which is usually (but not exclusively) inductive. The opportunity to explore issues in 
depth, (and in their actual context), means that theory development can occur through 
the systematic piecing together of detailed evidence to generate (or replicate) theories of 
general interest. Yin (1981) suggests that the case study researcher is someone akin to 
that of a detective who must sift evidence in order to "build a picture of motive, 
opportunity and method". In case study research, this ‘detective’ work is undertaken, 
not only to understand the unique features of the case, but also to draw out an analysis 
which is widely applicable.
Within a broader strategy, several methods may be used. These may be either 
quantitative, qualitative or both. The emphasis is generally more on qualitative methods, 
(because of the kinds of questions which are best addressed through the case study 
method). Participant observation is an alternative research method (Burawoy, 1979). 
Interviews are another research technique. These may range from semi-structured to 
unstructured (King, 1995). A case study may involve the use of questionnaires (with 
members of management or the workforce), in addition to observations and interviews.
The distinction between interviews (carried out as part of a case study) and interviews 
(carried out as part of a survey), is a matter of degree. As part of a case study, 
interviews are used to explore and probe in-depth, the particular circumstances of the 
organisation. They can also examine the relation between organisational behaviour and 
its specific context. In surveys, the emphasis is likely to be on comparisons of the 
organisation.
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6.2.1.2 Case study and accounting
Case studies have become increasingly popular in management accounting research. 
Little has been written on the methods of case study research in accounting, (although 
there is a growing literature on case study methods in other areas of social sciences).
What constitutes case study research? How do we evaluate a management accounting 
case study? When are case study methods more appropriate than other research 
methods? Otley and Berry, (1994; 1998) argue that one reason for adopting a case-based 
approach (in the study of accounting control), is because the accounting role and other 
controls cannot be fully understood in isolation. A more contextual approach is 
required. Case studies can be used in a variety of ways in accounting research (Scapens, 
1990; Ryan, et. al., 1992; and Otley and Berry, 1994; 1998) as follows:
(a) Descriptive case studies. These are case studies which describe accounting systems 
techniques and procedures currently used in practice. The research objective is to 
describe methods of accounting practice. Descriptive case studies may be useful in 
determining the extent of the ‘gap’ between accounting theory and practice (i.e. what 
constitutes ‘best’ practice and “successful” companies)?
(b) Illustrative case studies. These are case studies which utilise the innovative practices 
developed by different companies and organisations (Ryan et al., 1992). Kaplan (1984) 
claims that accounting researchers have much to learn from studying innovative 
companies. These case studies are an illustration of what has been achieved in practice. 
Illustrative case study research begins with a clear theoretical standpoint. It then takes a 
‘real-world’ situation and interprets it (in light of the theoretical standpoint adopted). 
Theories are used to explain observations (Otley and Berry, 1994).
(c) Experimental case studies. These are case studies, which examine the difficulties 
involved in implementing new proposals. Accounting researchers have developed new 
accounting procedures and techniques, - which intended to be helpful to accounting 
practitioners. These procedures and techniques have developed from existing theoretical 
perspectives.
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(d) Exploratory case studies. These are case studies which explore the reasons for 
certain accounting practices. They enable the researcher to generate hypotheses about 
the reasons for particular practices (Ryan, et al., 1992). The research objective is to 
produce generalisations about accounting practices (Scapens, 1990). An exploratory 
case goes beyond mere description96 towards ‘explanation’. Research is a process 
between theory (explanation) and data (description) (Otley and Berry, 1994; 1998).
(e) Explanatory case studies. These are case studies which explain the reasons for 
observed accounting practices. The focus of the research is on a specific case. Theory is 
used in order to understand and explain specifics, rather than offer generalisations. The 
research objective is to generate theories which offer valid explanations.
(f) Critical case. A critical case can be used to disprove a theory by generating a set of 
phenomena which is inconsistent with established theories.
(g) Accidental case. An accidental case arises by accident, because “access” to the 
company is not pre-planned. It also restricts a number of aspects of organisational life.
Scapens (1990) and Ryan, et. al., (1992) found that these case studies have many areas 
of overlap. For example, the distinction between exploration and explanation, is rather 
ambiguous. An exploratory study can generate initial ideas, which will then form the 
basis of a theory of accounting practice. The use of case study research methods will 
depend on the nature of the research and the methodology of the researcher.
The researcher pursued three objectives in carrying out this case study research 
(descriptive, illustrative and explanatory). The rationale for choosing three objectives 
was to assist the researcher in his attempt to answer the research questions include:
• What is the current cost structure for the provision of Egyptian water services?
• What methods of cost accounting were and are used in the Egyptian water industry? 
(descriptive and illustrative)
• What is company rationale for choice of cost structure? (explanatory)
• What is the role and function of accounting in controlling the water industry? 
(descriptive and explanatory).
96 It is difficult to distinguish ‘descriptive’ case studies from ‘exploratory’ case studies.
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It was Spicer (1992) who classified case studies into (a) Descriptive/explanatory and (b) 
Informing/explanatory. Group (a) descriptive and/or explanatory, case studies seek to 
describe/explore reasons for particular accounting practice(s). Group (b) informing 
and/or explanatory are case studies used indirectly to help inform non-case empirical 
research, or used directly to explain observed practice.
The primary objective of this research was to "understand, describe and explain the role 
of cost management in the Egyptian water industry". A group (a) case study was 
therefore considered most useful for this research. Scapens (1990) argues that the 
distinction between exploration and explanation is ambiguous. The rationale for 
choosing a descriptive/explanatory (exploratory) case study was because knowledge of 
cost management is insufficient to allow the development of good theoretical 
statements. In other words, the aim of this research was to develop theories for practice, 
which may then assist managers with the design of cost management systems in future.
Several authors have discussed the criteria with which to judge case-study, (e.g. Yin97, 
1981; 1989; Kazdin, 1982; Bruns and Kaplan98, 1987; Eisbenhardt, 1989; Young and 
Selto, 1990; Atkinson, 1990; Scapens, 1990; Spicer, 1992). Perhaps the most significant 
contribution was that made by Scapens (1990). The case methods, (when used for 
explanatory purposes), relied on analytical not statistical generalisations. Therefore this 
research does not draw on a larger population (based on sample evidence), but rather 
generalises back to theory.
Case study research which describes, explains and explores cost management, can be 
grouped into three categories, according to the objectives of cost management 
(efficiency, optimisation and strategy99):
97 Yin explored case studies general.
98 Bruns and Kaplan examined case studies in accounting.
99 The three objectives o f  cost management (efficiency, optimisation and strategy) was adopted from Al- 
Hazami (1995). The models o f  cost management relating to each objective, generates originally from this 
thesis.
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(1) Research which studies throughput costing, benchmarking, target costing, cost 
leadership, full absorption cost and activity based costing, all aim to achieve efficiency
(2) Research which studies activity-based management, re-engineering and economic 
costs focus on optimisation
(3) Related research which studies Strategic management accounting, focuses on 
strategy. This research study incorporated all three objectives of cost management.
6.2.1.3 Understanding case study research
Researchers have identified the strengths and weaknesses of the case study method (see 
Miles, 1979). Since the 1970s, an increasingly sizeable literature has emerged on how to 
conduct case-study research and analyse its data (Campbell, 1975; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Gummesson, 1991; McClintock, et al., 1979; Rose, 1991; Yin, 1981; 1989; Scapens, 
1990).
A strength of the case study method lies in its capacity to explore social processes as 
they unfold in organisations. By using multiple (often qualitative methods, e.g. 
observation), a researcher can learn much more about processes than is possible with 
other techniques (e.g. surveys). Social studies are also useful in understanding social 
processes in their organisational and environmental context. Behaviour is only 
understandable in the context of wider forces operating within the organisation, 
(whether these are contemporary or historical, Hartley, 1995).
Case studies have an important function in generating hypotheses and theory-building. 
They can generate new theory and the emergent theory can be tested with constructs 
that can be measured, and hypotheses that can be disproved (Eisenhardt, 1989). Case 
study research provides a ‘vehicle’ by which theories can be modified from newly 
generated. Case study research is valuable when existing theories are inadequate or 
incomplete. Case studies can explain a sub-set of the topic under investigation. Case 
studies provide a more holistic approach.
Case studies can be useful in ‘capturing’ the intrinsic properties of organisational life. A 
case study is a useful technique where an insight into organisational life is required 
(especially if this is informal, unusual or even clandestine). In detailed case studies,
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what is required is an understanding of what certain (organisational) concepts and 
behaviours mean.
It is useful at this point to give an overview of the problems of the case study approach. 
Several researchers have highlighted problems with the case study approach, and what 
future researchers should do to avoid potential problems (Goode and Hatt, 1952; Yin 
1989; Scapens, 1990; Ryan et al., 1992; and Otley and Berry, 1994). These problems 
are summarised into five areas:
(a) Wholeness. Ryan et al. (1992) argue there is a difficulty of drawing boundaries 
around the subject matter (the role of cost management in the water industry) of the 
case. Case-study researchers must place certain limits on the on the area of study, (and 
make those limits quite explicit). Another possibility is to try to study every thing in 
‘superficial’ way. Goode and Hatt (1952) posed the question "how can the wholeness of 
cases be preserved?" They identify four points: (a) the breadth of data100 (b) levels of 
data101 (c) formation of indexes and types102 and (d) interaction in a time dimension103
(b) ‘Certainty of the researcher’ and the failure to test reliability. A weakness in the 
case study method is the response o f the researcher104. The researcher may feel a false 
sense of certainty about his/her conclusions.
100 The collection o f  a large amount o f data allows a unit to be studied as a ‘totality’.
101 The case-study method is distinguished by its use o f  data from abstract levels (other than purely 
sociological). Sociologists incorporate economic, political and psychodynamic data into their analyses, 
yet social research has (in the main), been moving towards a clearer definition o f  ‘the sociological’, It 
advocates better researchers techniques in order to abstract it from the complexity o f  other relationships.
102 An important technique in preserving the ‘wholeness’ o f  the unit is the development o f  typologies and 
indexes. This technique is not confined to the case-study method and is used in other qualitative analysis.
103 The case-study method also relies heavily on process and time.
104 The ‘problem’ is created by the observer himself. Consequences o f  ‘this feeling o f  certainty’ are many, 
but most o f  them can be grouped under the heading ‘a temptation to ignore basic principles o f  research 
design’. The researcher feels confident in his own specialist subject area and therefore feels no need to 
check the overall design o f  proof. The researcher has a strong conviction that his selection is 
"representative". He did not follow an established mode o f  sampling and therefore is certain there was no 
bias present in the study. Researchers are not categorised into different "types". An investigator who 
absorbs facts from a large number o f cases will believe he has a statistical ‘factory’ sample, (no matter 
how knowledgeable he is about sampling design).
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When an investigator feels "at home" with a given case, s/he may be tempted to "feel" 
the right explanation even though other researchers may arrive at an entirely different 
conclusion. This is what is known as ad hoc theorising. ‘The feeling of certainty’ a 
researcher has, might lead him/her to fail to test reliability of the data, the classifications 
used, or the analysis of the data.
(c) Costs (time and money). It is clear that the case-study approach is a costly one in 
terms of both time and money. Goode and Hatt (1952) argue that each case becomes a 
research project in itself. Therefore, even several adequately-documented cases may 
easily consume two years of a researcher's time. Therefore, for certain types of analysis, 
the use of case study research, can prove fruitful. Other types of analysis may involve a 
simple polling study, or mailed questionnaires. However, the analysis of detailed 
processes of social interaction requires some preliminary resource to case study (even 
where there is not complete reliance upon the case-study method).
A case-study investigator may inadvertently allow evidence or biased views to influence 
the direction of his findings and conclusions. As a result, each case-study investigator 
must work hard to avoid such a situation. Yin (1989) supports this view and claims that 
researcher-bias may influence the findings (Rosenthal, 1966). This problem may also 
emerge with other research strategies, (such as designing questionnaires for surveys, 
Sudman and Bradburn, 1982), or conducing historical research (Gottschalk, 1968). Yin 
(1989) claims that case studies are too lengthy and result in overly-complex documents. 
This is a valid criticism but a well-planned case study need not prove problematic.
(d) Generalisation. Case studies provide very little basis for scientific generalisations. 
A frequently-heard question is "How can you generalise from a single case"? Yin 
(1989) claims that theoretical generalisations are possible from case studies but cannot 
be applied to wider populations.
(e) Skills involved in effective case study research. These skills have not yet been 
defined. Case studies are difficult to carry out effectively. We have little in the way of 
screening or testing for an investigator's ability to carry out effective case study 
research. Rules for carrying out effective case studies have not been established. As a 
result, "most people feel they can carry out case-study research, and nearly all of us
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believe we can understand them. Neither view is well-founded, and the case studies 
generally receive a great deal of credit they do not necessarily deserve" (Hoaglin et al., 
1982: 134). Otley and Berry (1994) argue that case studies (in the accounting and 
control tradition), have been "varied" in their focus. Otley and Berry (1994) claim there 
is currently not much theory-building or cumulation of knowledge. A major criticism of 
accounting and control research case studies is that researchers adopt invariably one 
epistemological stance, and ignore the nostrums of another.
There are certain steps a researcher should follow in order to understand case study 
research. These were suggested by Scapens, 1990; Ryan , et al., 1992 and Hartley, 1995. 
(For an explanation of these steps, see figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3: Understanding case study research
Collecting data Managing data
Analysing and explaining data
Collecting evidence
Preparation
Theory development
Report writing
Assessing evidence
C h oosin g  case  study  
com pany (s)
Gain ng and m aintaining  
access
C h oosin g  in itial fram ew ork
Source: adapted from Hartley (1995); Scapens (1990); and Ryan. et. al. (1992).
172
Preparation
At the preparation stage, a researcher should review a number of available theories. This 
will determine the way in which the researcher examines a case. Preparation can involve 
new theories. It is useful to divide the preparation stage into three sub-stages as follows:
Choosing a case study company (s). Single case studies can yield valuable information 
about the topic under investigation. A research study may become more valid by 
company two or more cases, or indeed even carrying out a comparative study within the 
case organisation itself (e.g. perceptions of employees in different departments).
This research was based on one case study on the General Organisation for Greater 
Cairo Water Supply (the GOGCWS). Reasons for choosing this company were several:
(1) It was the first company established in the Egyptian water industry. It could 
therefore help the researcher achieve his aim of describing and explaining the role of 
cost management in the Egyptian Water industry. The GOGCWS represents "the total 
experience of Egyptian Water"
(2) The GOGCWS provides water for 25% of the population in Egypt. It has a unique105 
laboratory - ideal for analysing water in the Middle East (The cost of this laboratory was 
25 million Egyptian pounds106)
(3) There are discrepancies between the expenses of the GOGCWS and its income. The 
cost per m3= 0.46 pence (wages 8.03 + Power and electricity 6.99 + raw materials 4.47 
+ other current expenses 7.00 + interest “local and international” 11.29 + Depreciation 
8.19)107. By contrast, average income was per m3= 0.16 pence, so this price does not 
encourage efficiency
105 The GOGCWS, (no date source given, c) - "Greater Cairo Water", The Administration o f  Public 
Relations.
106 N.B: English pound £ = 6.00 Egyptian pounds.
American Dollar $ = 5.00 Egyptian pounds.
107 The GOGCWS (no date source given, c) - "Greater Cairo Water", The Administration o f  Public 
Relations.
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(4) It is estimated that the General Organisation for the Greater Cairo Water Supply 
loses 40% of water through leakages each year. This results in an estimated wasteful 
expenditure of 250 million Egyptian pounds every year. Efficiency in the company is 
therefore low
Gaining and maintaining access. Gaining access to an organisation is complex. 
Maintaining this access requires continual attention. Access is affected by changes in 
personnel or the fortunes of the company. It is also influenced by how much 
organisational time the researcher is taking and the perceived contribution of the 
research. "Reporting back" discussions with the principal sponsor in the organisation 
can be useful (Buchanan, et al., 1988).
This research aimed to explain the role of cost management in the Egyptian Water 
Industry. The General Organisation for the Greater Cairo Water Supply (GOGCWS) 
was chosen as a case study. Egypt has a bureaucratic state. Government bureaucrats 
often create unnecessary red-tape. As Cook (1998) found his research in Egypt, some 
topics have ‘universal’ sensitivity in developing countries. These include military 
matters, political power structures, government decision-making processes and religious 
and social problems which reflect the national image. The water industry is a good 
example of the latter. In March 2000 the researcher prepared his preliminary research 
for access into the GOGCWS and in June 2000 was granted access into the company. 
The Fieldwork place as outlined below:
On 13 March 2000, my research supervisor wrote to the Chairman of the Educational 
and Cultural Bureau of Egypt (my sponsor) to ask his assistance in gaining access to the 
GOGCWS (for no later than May 2000, see section A l.l). On 20 April 2000, my 
supervisor sent my fieldwork plan to the Chairman of the Educational and Cultural 
Bureau of Egypt (see section A l.l). The Chairman granted permission for my 
fieldwork. On 9 June 2000,1 arrived in Cairo and the following day I made my way to 
the central government building in downtown Cairo the "Mugamma". I was advised 
there to go to the Central Institution for General Statistical (the CIGS). On 12 June, I 
went to the CIGS and filled in a form requesting permission to carry out interviews and 
questionnaires. They asked me to return in seven days. The following week, I returned 
to the CIGS, only to be told to return a week later. I made it clear then that I only had a
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short time in Egypt and asked them to make sure my papers were ready the following 
week. The next week I return to the CIGS. They informed that a decision had been 
made and would be sent to the Mission department in Mugamma. I requested 
permission to take the documents myself to the Mission department.
On 21 June 2000,1 took the decision papers and a covering letter and the following day 
I took these documents (see section A l.l)  to the Mission department. They asked me to 
return in 48 hours. On 24 June I received a letter from the Mission department 
addressed to the Chairman of the General Organisation for the Greater Cairo Water 
Supply (the GOGCWS). On the same day I went to see the Chairman of the GOGCWS 
who asked me to return the next day. On 25 June, I returned to the GOGCWS who 
passed the letter to the Vice Chairman of Technical Affairs, who in turn transferred it to 
the Vice Chairman of Financial and Administrative Affairs. From that day I had access 
to the GOGCWS.
Choosing initial framework. Literature is used to focus the study to avoid producing a 
narrative, rather than theory-based study. In order to avoid being overwhelmed by data, 
theory is used to examine, support or contest.
Collecting evidence
The researcher should allow issues and theories to emerge out of the case, rather than 
imposing their own view(s) on it. Typical sources of evidence include interviews, 
documentation, direct observation and participant observation. In most cases it is 
important to use multiple sources of evidence. This might include two elements: 
collecting data and managing data.
Collecting data. The data should give the researcher an overview of structure and the 
functioning of the organisation. It should give information as to which people to talk to, 
what to observe, research methods, and systematic questioning (not ad hoc data 
collection). The GOGCWS research utilised company documents, questionnaires and 
interviews. The questionnaire108 was used as the basis for interviews109. The researcher
108 For employee position (name and job o f people who filled in the questionnaire, see table A2.1).
109 The people who were interviewed were the same people who filled in the questionnaire (see table 
A2.1) except Nos. 20, 38, 3 9 ,4 1 - 46, 48-50.
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spent time with each respondent, clarifying the questionnaire in order to make it easier 
and understandable. If a respondent became tired, they were asked to complete it 
another time. Most questionnaires were completed by the third interview. The 
interviews were semi-structured because I was ‘open’ to any new issues (such as 
privatisation in the Egyptian water industry). In addition, if any new issues were raised, 
I would ask all respondents about it.
Managing data. The researcher should observe and record data about the organisation 
and its people. Glaser and Strauss (1967) make a distinction between observation notes, 
method notes and theoretical notes.
Assessing evidence
The validity of each piece of evidence should be assessed by comparing it with other 
evidence on the same issue (triangulation). In assessing evidence there are two crucial 
issues for the case researcher to resolve: (1) The “rules of evidence" which should be 
applied to the case concerned and (2) The “standard of proof’ which is sought at each 
stage of the analysis. In order to assess validity, this research used questionnaires, 
interviews and documentation analysis. The questionnaire had different types of 
questions to measure a single idea. These questions checked the validity and reliability 
of respondents. The researcher compared the information obtained from questionnaires, 
with the information from interviews and documentation.
Analysing data
Data collection and analysis is an iterative process which allows theory to develop, 
grounded in empirical evidence. Yin, (1989) argued that to avoid the danger of 
'premature closure' - what is required is careful description of data and the development 
of categories (i.e. key themes, topics and questions). It is sometimes helpful to prepare 
models (diagrams, flow charts, etc.) which attempt to link the various themes and 
issues. In the light of these suggestions, the researcher began his own analysis of data by 
devoting a chapter to the current accounting system of the GOGCWS. The subsequent 
chapters dealt with the analysis of data.
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Theory development
The researcher should compare existing literature with expert opinion. The researcher 
should ascertain that the case is an accurate rendition of facts, producing plausible 
explanations and conclusions based on best explanation.
Report writing
The report should draw out theoretical implications, which will carry over other case 
studies. Many researchers experience a common problem. How should a researcher 
select a suitable case study for his/her research? Ryan, et al., (1992) illustrate five 
different uses of case study research, namely experiment case110, critical case111, 
extreme case112, exploratory case113, and multiple cases114. There are no universal rules 
for selecting a suitable case study but the selection depends on the research question (s). 
How does the case study help the researcher answer his/her research question (s)?
6.2.2 Qualitative approach
6.2.2.1 The Debate between qualitative and quantitative research
Bryman (1988) draws out some differences between quantitative and qualitative 
research. These differences can be summarised as follows:
(a) The role o f  qualitative research
Quantitative researchers rarely deny the usefulness of qualitative research, but have 
tended to view it as an essentially exploratory way of conducting social investigations. 
Consequently, they have typically seen it as useful at the preparatory stage of a research
110 The ‘experiment case’ relies on theoretical generalisations. Hence, the issues involved in selecting 
cases, should be similar to those considered in selecting topics for experiment, (rather than those used for 
selecting a statistical sample).
111 A ‘Critical case’ is used where there is a well formulated theory and the major research issues are 
clearly defined. The objective o f  such a study would be to determine that the theory provides good  
explanations, otherwise alternative theories need to be developed.
112 An ‘Extreme case’ is used where the researcher wants to extend a theory to cover a wide(r) range o f  
circumstances.
113 An ‘Exploratory case’ could be used to begin the process o f  theory development. The selection o f  a 
particular case for study, is relatively unimportant. What is needed is a case within the relevant area, 
which will then enable the researcher to begin the process o f  theory development.
114 ‘Multiple cases’ can be used for two purposes. The objective o f  multiple cases is to develop a rich 
theoretical framework, capable o f  explaining a wide range o f  circumstances.
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project. Qualitative research is often depicted as useful as a means of hunches and 
hypotheses which can be tested more rigorously by quantitative research (Bryman, 
1988). This research study has combined115 methods of quantitative research 
(questionnaires), and qualitative research (interviews).
(b) Relationship between researcher and subject
In quantitative research, the researcher’s contact with the people under study is fairly 
fleeting, or even non-existent. This was not the case with the GOGCWS research study 
because an example amount of time was spent with each respondent who completed the 
questionnaire. By contrast, qualitative research requires much more sustained contact, 
especially when participant observation is the central method.
(c) The researcher’s stance in relation to the subject
Quantitative researchers adopt the role of an outsider looking in on the social world. 
He/she applies a pre-ordinate framework on the subjects being investigated and are 
involved as little as possible in that world. This was not the case with the GOGCWS 
research study. Among qualitative researchers there is strong urge to “get close” to the 
subject being investigated. For qualitative researchers, it is only by getting close to their 
subjects and becoming an "insider", that they can view the world as a participant in that 
setting. Adler (1985: 11) in his research, found that “the only way I could get close 
enough to [upper-level drug dealers and smugglers] to discover what they were doing 
and understand the world from their perspectives was to take a membership role in the 
setting”.
(d) Relationship between theory/concepts and research
The model of quantitative research, is that theories and concepts are the starting point 
for investigations carried out within its framework. However the extent to which 
quantitative research is explicitly guided by theory has been questioned by many 
commentators. Some argue that theoretical reasoning often occurs towards the end of 
the research process (Cicourel, 1982). Qualitative researchers often reject the idea of 
using theory as a pre-cursor to investigation (except perhaps as a means of providing an 
initial orientation to the situation as in “ground theory”), since it may not reflect 
subjects’ views about what is going on and what is important. Consequently, as one
115 Questionnaires are used as a basis for interviews.
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advocate of qualitative research has put it: “It is marked by a concern with the discovery 
of theory rather than the verification of theory” (Filstead, 1979, p. 38). The GOGCWS 
research had an uncompleted theoretical framework before the fieldwork began. The 
framework was completed after the fieldwork. Hence, the researcher deemed a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research as most appropriate.
(e) Research strategy.
Quantitative research tends to adopt a structured approach to the study of society. To a 
large extent, this tendency is a product of the methods with which it is associated-both 
surveys and experiments. By contrast, qualitative research tends to be more open. Many 
ethnographers advocate the delineation of a research focus be deferred as long as 
possible (Cohen, 1978). Consequently, many qualitative researchers feel overwhelmed 
during their early days in the field, since everything they observe is potentially “data”. 
Whyte (1984) for example, sees ethnographic research as deriving much of its strength 
from its flexibility, which allows new leads to be followed up or additional data to be 
gathered in response to changes in ideas. But he also notes a limitation of such 
flexibility since “you may find so many interesting things to study that you are at a loss 
to delimit the scope of your project'and focus on specific problems’ (p. 225). For the 
purpose of the research and the method used in this study (a combination between 
quantitative and qualitative), the questionnaire had several open-ended questions and 
was used as a basis for the semi-structured interviews.
(j) Scope o f findings.
It is common to conceive of the quantitative/qualitative dichotomy in terms of 
respective commitments to nomothetic and ideographic modes of reasoning (Halfpenny, 
1979). This distinction effectively refers to the scope of the findings, which derive from 
a piece of research. A nomothetic approach seeks to establish general law-like findings, 
which are deemed to hold irrespective of time and place. An ideographic approach 
locates its findings in specific time-periods and locations. The findings of this research 
were done in a specific time-period, and in one location (the GOGCWS) because the 
researcher focused on only one case' study of an Egyptian water company. This means 
the research followed mainly a nomothetic view. However, the findings can
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generalise across the Egyptian water industry, because there is only one law and one 
accounting system applied in all water companies in Egypt.
Quantitative research exhibits a nomothetic approach because of the investigator’s 
ability to extrapolate findings to larger populations. By contrast, the qualitative 
researcher frequently conducts research in a specific milieu (a case study), whose 
representatives are unknown, so the potential for generalisation is also unknown.
(g) Image o f social reality.
Quantitative research conveys a view of social reality which is static, (in that it does not 
consider the impact and role of change in social life). Qualitative research examines 
connections between variables. The proponents of qualitative research argue that 
quantitative research rarely examines the processes which link to qualitative research 
(Blumer, 1956; 1969). They also claim that the independent and dependent variables 
fail to take into account the flow of events in which these variables are located. The 
qualitative researcher is in a better position to view the connections between events and 
activities, and to explore people’s interpretations of the factors which produce such 
connections. This stance affords qualitative researchers a much greater opportunity to 
study processes in social life.
(h) Nature o f  data.
The data arising from quantitative studies is often depicted as hard, rigorous, and 
reliable. This suggests that such data exhibits considerable precision, is collected 
systematically and may be checked by another investigator. These factors mean that 
quantitative data is more persuasive, and hence more likely to gain the support of policy 
makers.
Qualitative researchers routinely describe the data derived from ethnographic work as 
“rich” and “deep”, thereby drawing a contrast with quantitative data (which tends to be 
depicted as superficial). The adjective “rich” suggests an attention to (intricate) detail 
which many qualitative researchers often provide. For many qualitative researchers, 
quantitative research produces superficial data. For example, qualitative researches see
1,6 The objective o f  the study is not to provide generalisations or explanations at abstract levels. Rather it 
is to provide theoretical explanations o f observations in a particular rather than a general setting.
180
survey research as merely a source of ‘surface’ information, which relates to abstract 
categories. By contrast, the quantitative researcher may consider a limited ample 
research studied in one location as somewhat lacking (Liebow, 1967). The data 
collected may be heavily influenced by the particular emphases and predisposition of 
the researcher.
For a summary of the above arguments see table 6.1
Table 6.1: Differences between quantitative and qualitative research
Quantitative. Qualitative.
1- Role of qualitative research Preparatory Means to exploration of
actors’ interpretation
2- Relationship between Distant Close
researcher and subject
3- Researcher’s stance in Outsider Insider
relation to subject
4- Relationship between Confirmation Emergent
theory/concepts and research
5- Research strategy Structured. Unstructured
6- Scope of findings Nomothetic Ideographic
7- Image of social reality Static and external to actor Processual and socially
constructed by actor
8- Nature of data Hard, reliable Rich, deep
Source: Brym an, (1988)- “Quantity and Q uality in Social Research”, p. 94.
Both qualitative and quantitative research involves the development of methodological 
skills, e.g. (gaining access, conducting different types of interview, different approaches 
to participant observation, work histories, case studies, and ethnographic research). 
However qualitative research is more than a series of methodological skills. It involves 
reflection on such skills, understanding different approaches to analysis, dealing with 
issues of generalisation and specificity, and an engagement with theory and method.
Confusion only arises with qualitative research over the way such data must be handled, 
and the use to which such data can be put. This confusion is caused by a failure to 
differentiate between several orientations in qualitative data. The difficulty of
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qualitative research methods is how to treat the data in an appropriate way, and how to 
choose methodological issues.
Within the positivistic paradigm, qualitative researchers tend to look for cause and 
effect on the assumption there is a ‘real’ world which has determinate characteristics. 
These theories will show how certain variables interrelate - especially how they relate to 
each other in a cause and effect fashion. Some writers disagree with this view of 
positivism. The idea is that of an underlying unequivocal reality, consisting of a web of 
relationships between specifiable variables, and scientific theories are testable models of 
that reality. It is true that positivism favours quantitative methods, but it is incorrectly 
thought that qualitative research data cannot fall within a positivist philosophy of 
science. Ashworth (1997) considers “the ground theory” of Glaser Strauss and 
colleagues (Strauss and Corbin 1990), as having many of the hallmarks of positivism, 
despite the fact that qualitative techniques are seen as appropriate to the whole research 
process, not merely to the early “discovery” phase.
It is clear from the above argument that although qualitative research has several 
advantages, it also has disadvantages. In order to limit the effect of these disadvantages, 
the researcher combined both qualitative research (interviews) and quantitative research 
(questionnaire).
6.2.2.2 Qualitative research interview
The most widely used qualitative method in organisational research is the interview 
method. It is easy to see why. It is a highly flexible method, it can be used almost 
anywhere and is capable of producing data of great depth (King, 1995). Above all, it is a 
method with which most research participants feel comfortable. When a researcher tells 
interviewees “I would like to interview you about...” most people have a reasonable 
idea of what to expect. This is not necessarily the case with other qualitative methods, 
such as participant observation or the Twenty Statement test.
King (1995) argues that qualitative research interviews have “depth”, are “exploratory”, 
semi-structured, or unstructured. Kvale (1983: 174) defines the qualitative research 
interview as “an interview, whose purpose is to gather descriptions of the meaning of 
the described phenomena”. The goal of any qualitative research interview is therefore to
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see the research topic from the perspective of the interviewee, and to understand how 
and why he or she comes to have this particular perspective. Hence, what is required for 
any interview is a low degree of structure imposed by the interviewer; open questions, 
and a focus on “specific situations and action sequences in the world of the 
interviewee”, rather than abstractions and general opinions (Kvale, 1983: 1976).
There are three kinds of interview: qualitative research interview, quantitative research 
interview117, and structured open-response interviews118 (King, 1995).
Qualitative research interviews vary in their focus - focusing on an individual’s whole 
life-world. Fetterman (1989) looks at particular topics and how they are perceived and 
understood by interviewees. Though never highly structured, qualitative research 
interviews also vary in the degree of structured imposed.
The research used semi-structured interviews (structured open-response interviews). 
The rationale for choosing this type of interview is that it lies somewhere between the 
qualitative research interview and the structured interview, (in terms of its degree of 
imposed structure and the balance of open and closed questions). King (1995) refers to 
them as "structured open-response interviews". They tend to focus on factual 
information and general evaluative comments, without exploring deeper layers of 
meaning. King (1995) argues that the structured open-response interview is most
117 The antithesis to the qualitative research interview is the structured interview. In this, the interviewer 
uses detailed a schedule with questions asked in specific order. Questions are mostly closed, and w ill use 
numerical rating scales, and/or tick- boxes. A small number o f  open-ended questions may be used to 
allow the interviewee to expand upon particular points or make general comments about the research 
topic. The interview will not normally taped; instead the interviewer will record responses by hand. The 
qualitative research interview is most appropriate when: (a) a study focuses on the meaning o f  a particular 
phenomena to participants (b) to study individual perceptions o f  processes (within a social unit are to be 
studied prospectively, using a series o f  interviews) (c) where individual historical accounts are required o f  
how a particular phenomena developed - (for instance, a new shift system) (d) where exploratory work is 
required before a quantitative study can be carried out (e) where a quantitative study has been carried out 
and qualitative data is required to validate particular measures or to clarify and illustrate the meaning o f  
the findings.
118 This type o f  research interview lies somewhere between the qualitative research interview and the 
structured interview in terms o f  its degree o f  imposed structure and balance o f  open and closed questions. 
King (1995) refers to them as "structured open-response interviews". They tend to focus on factual 
information, and general evaluative comments without exploring deeper layers o f  meaning. The 
structured open-response interview is most appropriate: (a) where a quick, descriptive account o f  a topic 
is required, without formal hypothesis-testing (b) where factual information is to be collected, but there is 
uncertainty about what, and how much information participants will be able to provide (c) where the 
nature and range o f  participants’ likely opinions about the research topic are not well known in advance, 
and cannot easily be quantified.
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appropriate (a) where a quick, descriptive account of a topic is required, without formal 
hypothesis- testing (b) where factual information is to be collected, but there is 
uncertainty about what and how much information participants will be able to provide
(c) where the nature and range of participant opinion about the research topic is not well 
known in advance and cannot easily be quantified
Qualitative research interviews have many advantages. For example, different type of 
qualitative research interview can be-used to tackle different types of research questions 
in organisations, making them one of the most flexible methods available. They can 
address quite focused questions about aspects of organisational life, (for instance, 
specific decision processes such as selection decisions, or decisions about innovation 
adoption). Similarly, they can focus on experiences of a particular training or 
development programme, perhaps as part of a wider assessment process. At the other 
end of the scale, qualitative research interviews can be used to examine much broader 
issues, in such areas as gender, organisational culture and the effects of unemployment.
The key feature between the quantitative and qualitative research interview is the nature 
of the relationship between interviewer and interviewee. In a quantitative study using 
structured interviews, the interviewee is seen as a research “subject”, in much the same 
way as he or she would if completing a questionnaire or taking part in an experiment. 
The researcher’s concern is to obtain accurate information from the interviewee, 
untainted by relationship factors. The interviewer therefore tries to minimise the impact 
of interpersonal processes on the course of the interview. By contrast, qualitative 
researchers believe there can be no such thing as a “relationship-free” interview. Indeed, 
the relationship is part of the research process, not external to it. The interviewee is seen 
as a “participant” in the research, actively shaping the course of the interview rather 
than passively responding to the interviewer’s pre-set questions.
The qualitative research interview is ideally suited to examining topics in which 
different levels of meaning need to be explored. This is something that is very difficult 
to do with quantitative methods, and problematic for many other qualitative techniques. 
Finally, the qualitative research interview is a method which most research participants 
accept readily. Some researchers have suggested that people like talking about their
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work, whether to share enthusiasm or to air complaints, but rarely have the opportunity 
to do so with interested outsiders (King, 1995).
Without doubt, there is no one-research method which has advantages without having 
its disadvantages. Qualitative research interviews have several disadvantages. The 
process is very time consuming, (in developing an interview guide, carrying out 
interviews, and analysing transcripts). It is essential that the researcher does not attempt 
to take on more interviews than he or she has time for in a study. Qualitative research 
interviews are also demanding to conduct, as they involve considerable concentration 
from the interviewer. Interviews are also time-consuming for interviewees, and this may 
cause problems in recruiting participants in some organisations and occupations. The 
best recruitment strategy is probably to send a letter with basic details of the study’s 
aims and what will be required of the interviewee, with a follow-up phone call in which 
the researcher can explain his or her aims in more depth and answer any queries.
Occasionally, the researcher will experience “difficult” interviewees, defensive, hostile 
or unable/unwilling to focus on the research topic(s). To be told directly “that was a 
ridiculous question!” or I can’t see why you are asking me these things’ is much more 
uncomfortable than receiving a questionnaire back from a survey participant with 
“stupid question!” scrawled across it. The researcher may be able to use interpersonal 
skills (above all, patience) to defuse awkward situations, and must ensure that his or her 
research questions are likely to be relevant to the people being interviewed.
A difficulty faced by many researchers using qualitative research interviews is the 
feeling of data overload as a result of the huge volume of rich data produced by even a 
moderate-sized study. It is easy for the researcher, particularly if inexperienced in the 
method, to feel that he or she is lost and sinking in a quagmire. This is most likely to 
happen when the researcher is utilising solely qualitative methods in an institution 
dominated by traditional quantitative techniques. In these circumstances, King (1995) 
suggests three directions where the researcher can turn for a ‘rope’ to pull him or herself 
out of the swamp. First, there are the original aims of the study. If beginning to feel lost 
in a particular line of exploration, the researcher should ask: ‘Is this adding to my 
understanding of the topic(s) I set out to study? If not, is it raising new and related 
topics which are of interest?’ If the answer to both questions is “no”, then the researcher
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should change the direction of the analysis. Second, the inexperienced researcher can 
turn to literature describing other studies using qualitative research interviews, to 
provide examples of how problems in data analysis were tackled, including material 
outside his or her own area. Third, personal networking is of great importance. If there 
is no one even sympathetic to qualitative methods in the researcher’s own department, 
he can try other departments.
6.2.2.3 Company documents
Organisational documentation comes in many forms: company annual reports; public 
relations material and press releases; accounts statements; corporate mission statements; 
policies on marketing strategy; formal charters and legal documents; policies on rules 
and procedures; human resources management strategies; policies directive on training, 
career management; job mobility and relocation management; formal memos between 
different groups and departments; and informal and private correspondence between 
staff and correspondence between respondent and researchers (Forster, 1995).
There are many advantages to using organisational documents such as:
(a) Organisational documentation and the history o f the company. Documentary 
records data is often more comprehensive than the kind of material which the researcher 
who is new to an organisation could obtain from either interviews or questionnaires. 
They are often contemporary records of events in organisations. This can help the 
researcher to look more closely at historical processes and developments in 
organisations, and can help in interpreting informants' "rewriting" of history. Most of it 
is within company boundaries and even those documents which are explicitly public 
relations in tone, can tell the researcher a great deal about the kind of "image" and the 
culture of a company.
(b) Organisational documentation and understanding. Company documents are (co n ­
textual paradigms which are an integral part of other systems and structures in 
organisations. They can highlight different understandings and interpretations of life 
amongst different groups within companies.
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(c) Organisational documentation and time and validity. Company documents save time 
in research. They enable the researcher to access detailed information on, for example, 
organisational structure, succession planning systems, career development policies, and 
so forth. Organisational documentation provides another means of triangulating data.
If company documents have all these advantages why are they not used more in 
organisational research? Forster (1995) argues that company documentation may not be 
an accurate record of actual events and processes. So they should never be taken at 
"face-value". Company documents need to be carefully checked, interpreted and 
triangulated with other data sources. There is no universal method of analysis of 
organisational documents. This research will use the hermeneutic method to analyse 
company documents. The hermeneutic method is concerned with the study of historical 
texts, with understanding rather than hypothesis-testing, and analysing the meaning of 
individual texts. The rationale for choosing the hermeneutic approach is that it describes 
the process of developing an inductive understanding of clusters of company 
documents, through to a deductive understanding of the whole.
Forster (1995) identifies seven stages in the hermeneutic process and the researcher has 
broken them down into six stages119 (see figure 6.4).
119 The researcher sees the third stage o f  Forster's ‘seven stages’ as identifying thematic clusters, which  
developed from the second stage which identified (sub-) themes. The researcher combined the two stages 
in the GOGCWS.
Figure 6.4: The hermeneutic process 
Research design.
Using representative case material
Understanding the meanings of individual texts.
Triangulating documentary data.
(Re) contextualising documentary data
Identifying (sub-) themes and thematic clusters.
Employing reliability and validity checks.
Source: Forster, N. (1995)- " The analysis o f com pany docum entation", p. 151
Understanding the meanings o f individual texts. This stage involves a continuous back 
and forth process between the parts and the whole. The initial task of the researcher is to 
search for themes within each document and then within clusters of the documents. At 
this stage the focus of attention is on meaning rather than on analysis. From this, 
"ground knowledge", themes and sub-themes will emerge, and the researcher can then 
determine what is important to extend our understanding of textual themes and sub­
themes.
Identifying (sub-) themes and thematic clusters. At this stage the researcher tries to 
understand contradictory sub-themes, so it then becomes possible to cluster documents.
Triangulating documentary data. At this stage, the analysis of company documents is 
critical. A serious problem arises here, because whilst a segment of text may be 
analysed in the researcher's own right, the true meaning of these can only be evaluated 
with reference to other texts and other forms of data. There are two solutions for these 
problems. The first solution is to recognise that it impossible to do full justice to the 
range and quantity of documents in any organisation. The best that we can hope to
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achieve is to provide slices of organisational life in academic journals. The second 
solution is to check reliability and validity. The GOGCWS research study opted for the 
second solution (see section 9.3).
Employing reliability and validity checks. The aim of this stage is to enable the 
researcher to verify the findings.
(Re)contextualising documentary data. Company documents can only be fully 
understood within broader organisational contexts and processes, and with reference to 
other forms of data. The GOGCWS research study used company documents, 
questionnaires and interviews.
Using representative case material. At this stage, a researcher selects which documents 
are to be sampled and used as the case materials in company reports, conference 
presentations and research publications.
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the methodology and method used in the GOGCWS 
research. The research combined inductive and deductive approaches, focusing more on 
the inductive strand. It adopts both nominal and voluntraistic views. This research is 
characterised as "institutional analysis", similar to that of Scapens and Macintosh 
(1996). Theory is used in order to understand and explain the role of cost management 
in the Egyptian water industry. The research objective is to generate theories which 
provide good explanations (explanatory case study, Scapens, 1990).
The case study method was adopted in this research. The argument about methods 
depends on two factors; firstly, the relationship between theory and method, and 
secondly, how the researcher attends to the potential weaknesses of the methods (see 
sections 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.1.3).
This research is based on one case study - The General Organisation for the Greater 
Cairo Water Supply (GOGCWS) (the rationale for choice of company, can be found in 
section 6.2.1.3). The case study method was used for analysis of processes of cost 
management at the GOGCWS (inductive approach). The case study focused on
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understanding the dynamic relationship between cost management and the external 
environment (see chapters 9 and 10).
This chapter has illustrated different types of accounting case studies (descriptive, 
illustrative, explanatory, exploratory, etc). It also explained how a case study is 
conducted, - beginning with its preparation and ending with report writing. The case 
study in this research had a descriptive and explanatory purpose.
The research combined quantitative research (i.e. questionnaires) and qualitative 
research (interview methods). The questionnaire was used as a basis for the semi­
structured interviews. The data was collected from multiple sources (triangulation), 
including company documents and questionnaires.
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Chapter 7
The Water industry, Cost management and Institutional theory
7.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the importance of water, to explore the 
phenomenon of privatisation in the water industry and the effect it has on the role of 
accounting, considering cost management in particular. The chapter will also consider 
the pros and cons of public versus private-owned water systems. Finally the issue of 
costs in the water industry will be explored (i.e. how do people pay for their water 
requirements, how to calculate the cost of water, and is this system fair or is a new 
system required).
The research focuses on England, France and Egypt. The rationale for choosing these 
three countries is England has experience of privatisation and problems in the water 
industry. Before privatisation, England experienced similar problems to those currently 
experienced in Egypt. France was selected because in the researcher's view, it has one 
of the ‘best’120 water industries in the world (in terms of the management of water). The 
French system is a state-regulated system. Egypt is currently experiencing many 
problems with its public utilities (especially the water industry).
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section one offers a definition of a public 
utility and indicates that the water industry is one of these. The chapter also highlights 
the importance of water, the responsibility of government (in relation to) water, and 
how to meet the growing demand for water.
Section two examines the aim of privatisation and why the UK government chose to 
change from a regulated water industry to a privatised one. It also examines the effect of 
privatisation on the customer, on efficiency, on costs, on competition, and on
120 The researcher has built his view from many examples such as; in the global water industry, the two 
largest companies are both French; Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux and Vivendi. These two giants dwarf the 
UK water companies- Suez Lyonnaise has a market capitalisation o f  £15.6 billion and Vivendi £22.9  
billion. Their mission is also clear. When the chairman o f  Suez Lyonnaise was asked about this strategy, 
he replied: "In water and waste water services, we want to be world leaders". These companies are 
competing aggressively in the global market and are respectively four and six times larger than the largest 
UK water company, Thames Water, which has a market capitalisation o f  £3.9 billion.
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performance. Finally, a brief assessment of the system of water in France and Egypt is 
conducted from an institutional perspective.
The third section illustrates cost systems and problems in the water industry; i.e. how 
people pay for their water requirements, how the cost of water is calculated and whether 
this system is fair or a new system is needed.
The final (fourth) section outlines the main conclusion of this chapter.
7.1 Public utility
7.1.1 Characteristics
No single characteristic distinguishes a public utility from other firms. However, 
several conditions that follow Howe and Rasmussen (1986) when considered in 
combination do serve to identify a company.
(1) A public utility frequently has natural monopolies, in a similar way to electric, gas, 
water and telephone companies
(2) The prices these industries charge for services are determined by government 
regulation
(3) The utility must supply all who require the service, when they want it and at the 
regulated price. The utility cannot turn away customers who are willing to pay the 
prescribed price
(4) Utilities are given franchises as exclusive suppliers within the franchise area
(5) The utility is subject to additional regulations not required of other firms, including 
regulation of accounting practices, procedures of security issuance, plus extensive 
reporting of business activities
(6) A utility must provide a service that is essential in some sense to modem living but 
this condition is difficult to define in practice
7.1.2 Types of services
Another way of identifying a public utility is by specifying the services it provides. As 
the well-known public utility economist (Bonbright, 1961) put it, there are basically two 
categories of public utilities:
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(a) Those enterprises which supply, directly, continuous or repeated services through 
more or less permanent physical connection between the plant of the suppliers and the 
premises of the consumer
(b) The public transportation industries. Important among this first group are utilities 
supplying electricity, gas, telephone, telegraph and water. The second group includes 
airlines, motor freight carriers, railway, water carriers, petroleum pipelines, and local 
transit systems.
An interesting alternative viewpoint is expressed by the economist Primeaux, (1979) 
who argues that the electric utility currently does not possess the prerequisite conditions 
for a natural monopoly and therefore its monopoly status, as a public utility, ought to be 
re-examined.
7.1.3 A schematic Diagram of the public utilities
The political and economic institutions that are important in public utility economics are 
shown in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: The public utility and its related constituencies
creditors owners
regulatory
commissions
Public utility firm
managers,
employees
legislatures
potential
competition
courts
Industrial and residential
commercial users
issues.
j----------------------------------  ►
Source: H owe and Rasm ussen, (1986)- “Public Utility Econom ics and Finance”, p. 9
A brief explanation of the relationships among the various participants is given as 
follows:
A- Creditors and owners provide capital to finance the rate of base-working capital, 
land, and plant and equipment; and in turn, receive interest payments and dividends.
B- Regulatory commissions regulate and control; they set rates so as to provide a 
reasonable return to the capital suppliers of the utility and ensure adequate service. 
Public utility managers provide information and request permission for changes in 
service, corporate policy, and rates.
C- Legislatures give the mandate to monitor and set the general provisions of the 
regulation.
D- The acts of state and federal legislatures and administration are subject to review by 
the court.
E- Public utility firms provide a service to various classes of customers and receive 
payment.
F- Industrial and commercial consumers and residential users render service complaints 
and suggestions for rate level and structure change.
G- Potential competition is largely limited, although specific types of competition are 
allowed in some areas by the regulators.
These institutional relationships may be compared and contrasted with the economic 
circular flow diagram presented in figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: Economic Circular Flow
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Source: H ow e and Rasm ussen, (1986)- “Public Utility Econom ics and Finance”, p. 10
As with economic circular flow, firms provide services in exchange for revenues and 
incur costs by purchasing resources, thereby providing income to resource suppliers. 
Since competition does not work well in many utility markets, the balance between 
revenues, costs, utility services and resources is distorted.
The public therefore regulates the rates and services of public utilities and attempts to 
restore the imbalance by eliminating monopoly profits and the underproduction of 
services. (Tax revenues, raised from general revenues or from excise taxes on utility 
services finance regulatory commissions and other governmental bodies). The 
administration of the regulatory commission will also affect each regulatory jurisdiction 
via public employment and governmental budget policies.
Public utilities are ultimately public only by law. For example, oil refineries, though in 
many ways a public utility, cannot said to be so without legislation establishing 
regulation. Fundamentally, a public utility is a creature of law, a creation of property 
rights more limited than those permitted by businesses and consumers in general.
To summarise, the water system is increasingly being distanced from other utilities. The 
boundary between the competitive market and regulated activities has been drawn in the
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water industry so, that competition is almost excluded. With the implication that the 
industry as a whole is a natural monopoly, their activities will be subject indefinitely to 
prospective regulation.
7.1.4 Importance, demand for water and the responsibility of government
Byatt - The Director of Office of Water Services in England - (1997) set some 
objectives which he wanted to achieve generally in public utilities but especially in the
water industry. These aims are as follows:
* * 121(a) Price review
(b) Customer service standards122
(c) Competition123
(d) Charging policy124
19S(e) Open and transparent regulatory regime
Water is the most important natural resource in the world, as without it life cannot exist 
and most industries could not operate. Although human life can exist for many days 
without food, the absence of water for only a few days has fatal consequences. The 
presence of a safe and reliable source of water is thus an essential prerequisite for the 
establishment of a stable community.
In the absence of such a source, a nomadic life-style becomes necessary and 
communities must move from one area to another as demands for water exceed its
121 A price review aims to reset water and sewerage price limits and to reduce prices in real terms for 
customers through significant reductions in bills. It also aims to maintain incentives for companies to 
increase their efficiency and reduce costs, while also ensuring an adequate level on investment in capital 
assets in order to arrive at the price limits via an open, transparent, fair and responsible process. This 
includes a high level o f  consultation with the industry and its customers.
122 Customer service standards protect the interests o f  customers by ensuring a good quality service. The 
comparative competition between water companies to increase standards and reduce costs, protects the 
interests o f  customers by maintaining and improving the efficiency and effectiveness o f  the system o f  
customer representation.
123 Competition develops an effective policy to maintain the role o f  comparative competition as this is 
important where direct competition is not possible.
124 A  charging policy is necessary to secure a cost reflective tariff structure that encourages efficient use 
o f  water and takes into account the needs o f  customers.
125 An open and transparent regulatory regime provides information about the industry and its regulation.
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availability. Therefore it is not surprising that sources of water are often jealously 
guarded and over the centuries many skirmishes have taken place over water rights.
History shows many occasions where agricultural development has been hindered by 
interference with water supplies as part of the conflict between landowners and settlers. 
This has occurred in numerous parts of the world. Other conflicts in relation to water 
supplies can arise because of the effects which human and industrial waste can have on 
the environment. This means that the importance of water as a natural resource, which 
requires careful management and conservation, must be universally recognised. 
Although nature often has great ability to recover from environmental damage, the 
growing demands on water resources necessitate the professional application of 
fundamental knowledge about the water cycle to ensure the maintenance of quality and 
quantity.
Demand for water is growing into the 21st century, particularly demand for public water 
supplies. The most important factor affecting the demand of water is the rise in 
population, for example; Egypt's population increased from 55 million in 1994 to 63 
million by the year 2000 and is expected to increase to 86 million by 2025. The demand 
for water is also expected to increase.
There are some approaches to meet the growing demand for water such as
(1) Raising awareness of the importance of water through public education campaigns
(2) Encouraging people/ business/ industry not to waste water
(3) Installing water meters on all domestic properties, which could reduce demand by 
about 10% (as water becomes scarce should we pay more for it?)126
(4) Increasing the price of water on a graded scale of charges
(5) Restricting water use during periods of drought
(6) Managing water pressure to reduce leaks (the General Organisation for Greater 
Cairo Water supply, which provides water to 25% of population’s Egypt, loses 40% of
197water through leakage each year)
126 Information source: http://www.Oxfordshire.gov.uk- “Water- where are we going? Agenda 21”.
127 The GOGCWS, (no date source given, c)- "Greater Cairo Water", The Administration o f  Public 
Relations.
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Recent approaches to meet the growing demand for water have focused on voluntary 
mechanisms to conserve water and reallocate it among competing users rather than on 
developing new supply resources. At the same time, governments are seeking 
alternative ways to finance the operation and management of existing infrastructure and 
the construction of new infrastructure. These alternative approaches may be divided into 
three categories (Thobani, 1997):
(a) Pricing policies
(b) Informal water market
(c) Formal water market
In many developing countries, governments consider water to be too precious a resource 
or too difficult a commodity to be left to the market. Decisions about who gets water, at 
what price and for what use have thus been entrusted to public officials. Although the 
state retains ownership of this asset, it typically endows private and public entities, such 
as farmers, industrial users, and power and water companies with the right to use 
surface water or groundwater for a particular purpose.
The allocation of water rights is typically the responsibility of the government, as is the 
construction, ownership and operation of the infrastructure such as dams, reservoirs, 
and canals. In some countries the government even installs and operates wells. Recently 
many countries have transferred operations and management responsibility to user 
association; enforcement is the responsibility of public authorities or water user 
associations, or both (Thobani, 1997).
User associations are typically informal entities that play a role in distributing the water 
from a canal or river. In some countries, however, such as Chile, Mexico, and Peru, user 
associations are legally recognised bodies which set and collect fees and who operate 
and maintain the hydraulic infrastructure. Publicly administered systems of water rights 
have all too often resulted in inefficient use and supply of water.
Government control has not been effective at ensuring that the poor have access to 
water. In many cities in developing countries, the poorest are not served by piped 
municipal water and must resort to buying water from private vendors at prices that are 
several times higher of those paid by more wealthy residents. Also, farmers who are
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politically influential manage to get easier access to water rights, which are obtained 
without charge and for whose use farmers typically pay only a nominal fee.
7.2 Privatisation
7.2.1 The aim of privatisation in UK
In 1967, a White Paper (Cmnd 3437, 1967) introduced more formal criteria for pricing 
and investment decisions, and public sector industries in the United Kingdom had been 
“steadily pushed towards behaving according to commercial rather than social criteria” 
(Whitehead, 1988: 6).
In the early 1980s, the Conservative Government sought radical changes in the 
management of public enterprises, inspired by its belief in the innate inefficiency of 
traditional public sector provision of goods and services. Alarmed at increasing 
demands on the Exchequer to make good operation losses and finance capital 
programmes, the government determined to remedy the lack of any efficiency checks on 
industries’ performance.
More generally, difficulties in measuring efficiency and productivity and the 
problematic nature of making comparisons between public and private sector 
enterprises, have led to debate about the government’s claim that private sector 
provision of goods and services is necessarily better (Kay, et al., 1986; Utton, 1986; 
Vickers and Wright, 1989). Some academic commentators have been especially critical 
over the limited extent to which privatisation has actually promoted more competition 
(Heald and Steel, 1986; Bishop and Kay, 1988; Kay and Thompson, 1988; Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988). Opportunities to break up the old public sector monopolies and create 
greater competition have been largely ignored, not least because of the influence of the 
treasury and senior management within the industries concerned. The treasury has been 
primarily concerned with raising revenue from the sales of public assets and was very 
aware that “monopolies are worth more than competitive industry” (Kay and 
Thompson, 1986). Senior management had also opposed any re-structing of their 
industries. In the early phases of privatisation policy, some chairmen of nationalised 
industries were openly critical of the government’s policy (Thomas, 1986), they were 
generally more supportive of the policy, however, when concessions from government
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were forthcoming in terms of competition, debt write-off, and regulation (Hills, 1986; 
Utton, 1986; Heald, 1989; Vickers and Wright, 1989; Mitchell, 1990).
Ogden and Anderson (1999) say the aim of a move from public sector to private sector 
for a public service is to achieve “profit and creating shareholder value”. Ogden (1995) 
says the main public justification for pursuing privatisation had been the government’s 
claim that it would bring greater efficiency and improvements in the production of 
goods and services through more competition and easier access to capital markets. This 
basis for policy has been informed by the government’s belief that private sector 
provision of goods and services is intrinsically more efficient than public sector 
provision. Management in the public sector, with little market incentive to improve 
performance, is viewed as “operating bureaucracies and not businesses” which leads to 
rigidity and inefficiency, and an inability to respond effectively to technological change 
or changes in consumer demand (Moore, 1985). For example, the white paper on Water 
privatisation (Cmnd 9734, 1986) argued that removal of government intervention and 
political interference in the day-to-day management of enterprises would improve 
management performance and access to private capital markets would make it easier for 
enterprises. It concluded:
"Freeing the authorities from the constraints imposed by state ownership will help them 
to carry out their tasks with vigour and imagination”(para. 38). The Government’s claim 
as for example, argued in the 1986 White Paper on water privatisation (HMSO, 1986), 
that private sector provision of goods and services, subject to the disciplines of market 
forces, is more efficient than public sector provision.
The aim of Privatisation (Ogden and Anderson, 1999: 96) is that “private enterprise is 
both more flexible and readier to pursue energetic and innovative approaches than the 
public sector. The demands of the market will give management and staff the impetus 
they need to secure greater efficiency”. This aim can be achieved if the privatised 
enterprise is more competitive. In the case of privatised public utilities, this has not 
happened, attracting critical attention (Heald and Steel, 1986; Kay and Thomposon, 
1986; Bishop and Kay, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Consequently the monopoly 
character of the industry has remained unchanged with privatisation.
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Moore (1985) says that privatisation can achieve great efficiency and many of benefits. 
The privatisation of the utilities has resulted in generous dividends to the shareholders 
and remuneration to top management, an unsuccessful spending spree in search of 
future earning growth, and a 25 percent fall in employment for the workforce (Froud, et 
al., 1996). In the UK, Water Authorities were privatised in 1989 and other major state 
industries which have been sold off include British Telecom in 1984, British Gas in 
1986, and Electricity distribution and generation in 1990 and 1991.
In 1989, the ten Regional Water Authorities of England and Wales wereqmvatised. The 
Regional Water Authorities were a product of a major re-organisation of the Water 
industry in 1973. Ten Regional water authorities consists of nine in England (Anglia, 
Northumbria, NorthWest, Severn Trent, Southern, South West, Thames, Wessex and 
Yorkshire) and one in Wales (Welsh Water). They vary in size from Thames, the largest 
with a turnover in 2000 of £1,367,8 million and workforce of 9,9995 to SouthWest, the 
smallest with a turnover in 2000 of £467 million and a workforce of 3,500 (Annual and 
Summery Reports, 2000).
From an institutional perspective, the researcher can argue that the policy of the UK's 
water industry has been informed by the government's belief that one extemal-factor is 
expected to motivate government managers to acquire and use cost accounting systems 
if the presence of competition and funding is uncertain (Scott, 1987). Government 
reform literature argues that agencies that are required to be self-supporting and 
compete for funds face many of the same competitive pressures encountered in the 
private sector, and are similar to private sector firms with zero profit targets (Brown and 
Sproghe, 1987; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).
As a result, reform advocates claim that agencies faced with market pressures and 
requirements to recover all expenditures with revenues will become more businesslike 
and cost conscious, and will make greater use of cost accounting data in order to control 
costs and prevent funding shortfalls and associated sanctions (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992; Gore, 1993).
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7.2.2 The effect of privatisation
The aim of any market, private or public, is to satisfy the customer. The customer is 
satisfied if he/she receives a good product, properly delivered, at a fair price. These 
elements lead us to look at efficiency, competition, and performance.
7.2.2.1 The effect of privatisation on efficiency
Efficiency is the main aim of privatisation through competition. In other words, 
competition is seen as the tool to achieve efficiency. Why do we need efficiency in the 
water industry? The Confederation of British Industry (1991) answers this question and 
sets some comments for this point such as; "the cost of water depends not just on the 
unit price but also on the volumes used and wasted". Minimising water wastage on site 
can mean reduced capital input and operating costs for on site water treatment and help 
to reduce the pressures and demands on the service network. Efficient water use can 
mean energy savings and improved water management can increase operational 
efficiency. The financial advantages of water saving and reduced wastewater discharge 
can offset the cost of re-circulating, recycling and re-using water. This is due to water 
being the main constituent of many effluents. Through the minimisation of water use 
and the reduction of losses, the effluent volume may be reduced and on-going effluent 
treatment costs cut, thereby reducing the demand on water supply and helping to 
safeguard supplies for the future.
The main issues of how to procure investment and how to drive efficiency improvement 
exist under both public and private regimes. The problem economists have called it
n o
“principal/agent ”, refer to differences in information and incentives between players. 
Companies know best about their own business but do not have the same motivation as
128 The basic insight o f principal-agent theory (PA) is, well known. One party (the principle, P) hires 
another (the agent, A) to undertake a particular task, but the former party suffers from an information 
asymmetry that introduces a problem in terms o f motivating the agent.
In both economics literature (Arrow, 1985; Rees, 1985; Laffont, 1989; and essays in Diamond and 
Rothschild, 1985) and the accounting extensions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986) the solution to a PA problem involves the development o f  an optimal incentive package that 
furthers the objectives o f  the principal and constrains the actions o f  agents. To investigate the difficulties 
we can identify two types o f  information asymmetry: hidden information (or adverse selection) and 
hidden action (or moral hazard). The former asymmetry exists ex ante but the information becomes 
available after completing the transaction. Hidden action asymmetries exist ex post in that an agent's 
actions can affect the outcomes that occur but these are not observed by the principal.
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politicians. Therefore regulators are needed to protect consumers from excessive prices 
and to ensure quality standards, investment and efficiency.
Does the efficiency saving benefit customers? (OFWAT, 1996). If yes, how? The role 
of Office of Water Services (OFWAT) in England is to ensure that the prices paid by 
customers are fair and justified. The regime must also ensure that companies are 
efficient. A price control system ensures that the benefits of efficiency improvements 
are shared between customers and shareholders. The best way for the companies to do 
this is to reduce or defer the take up of their price limits. If profits are to be directly 
controlled, the regulator must stipulate the maximum acceptable return on assets that 
can be made in any period. This “rate of return” regulation can involve the regulator 
adjusting prices every year on the basis of the profit made by the company. The excess 
return could be clawed back by the regulator which could lead to companies boosting 
their asset base and providing “gold plated” solutions.
The Director of Office of Water Services must encourage companies to operate 
efficiently. He monitors standards, comparing performance between companies, against 
each company’s targets and with other sectors. The Director must give companies 
incentives to reduce operating costs and the cost of sustaining their assets, raise money 
cheaply and complete environmental projects at low cost.
The regulator in the U.K. is forced to employ very unsatisfactory methods, such as 
'comparative' (yardstick) competition which has come to occupy a central place in 
efficiency comparisons in the water industry. Comparing different companies and trying 
to bring the less efficient up to the level of the more efficient might appear to be a 
superficial way of simulating real competition. But, in practice, this does not happen.
Bryan, (1998) identifies three issues related to competition in water. Firstly, there is a 
big difference in principle between dynamic competition in a real market and static 
comparisons between companies in a non-competitive market. Where there is no 
competition, the incentive for improvement which exists in competitive markets is 
absent. In tightly regulated markets, companies are not so much trying to better their 
rivals by innovating and reducing costs, they are just trying to impress their regulator. 
Secondly, making meaningful comparisons in a comparative competition regime is
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extremely difficult. In principle, the problem is that there are many variables which 
affect the costs of any given company. Some means of standardisation for these has to 
be found if useful efficiency comparisons are to be made. Thirdly, concentration on 
comparative competition distracts attention from introducing the real thing. It has also 
produced side effects in water which verge on the ridiculous. There is much concern to 
avoid "losing" comparators.
Privatisation is best regarded as part of a continuing process of change that has affected 
the industry over the decade of the 1980s, rather than a singular event. In the early 
1980s the water authorities were subject to increasing pressure from new government 
financial controls and performance aims to become “more efficient”. Once the 
Government publicly announced its interest in privatising them in 1985, and published 
its intention to do so in its White Paper in 1986, these pressures intensified. Like other 
privatised enterprises, the water authorities were strongly encouraged to improve their 
profitability and efficiency profiles to make their successful flotation more viable 
(Aylen, 1988; Chambers, 1988; Rickard, 1988). They had an extended opportunity to do 
so, as they experienced an untypical prolonged period of run-up to privatisation, owing 
to a number of technical and political difficulties the Government encountered with its 
privatisation proposal (Ogden, 1991).
The water authorities had to transform themselves from public sector bodies concerned 
with containing costs to private sector PLCS pursuing profitability. The vocabulary of 
profit replaced the previous one of costs as senior managers deployed a new economic 
language for describing organisational motives. Managers in the new water PLCS have 
had to respond to new expectations and assessments of corporate performance that will 
be measured by shareholders, investors and financial analysts in term of profitability. 
Although many have been persuaded, by the government’s rationale for privatisation by 
1989, there remained some managers and employees who retained doubts about the 
legitimacy of profit as the primary objective for the new Water PLCS. Southern Water’s 
group finance director said in a speech to the Institution of Water Officers in 1992, 
found that it was still necessary, three years after privatisation, to argue that: “We have 
to make everybody think profit. Profit is not inconsistent with this industry. It’s not a 
dirty word” (Water Bulletin, 1992).
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1.2.2.2 The effect of privatisation on competition
This section considers competition in the UK water industry in a global context. The 
importance of competition is examined and its implications for efficiency are 
investigated.
A competitive force in the utilities generally has brought benefits to customers by 
reducing costs and improving the quality of the service. In the water industry, the 
chances of market competition were extremely limited, a view shared unequivocally 
both within and outside the industry (Littlechild, 1986; Harper, 1988). Nevertheless, 
although it did not entail any significant developments in competitive market forces, 
privatisation has brought into operation a new economic regulatory frame-work for the 
provision of water services which provides considerable stimulus to achieve better 
performance through the operation of a pricing formulae and “yardstick” competition.
During the 1980s the water authorities were subjected by the Government to increased 
scrutiny and rigorous demands in order to improve their financial performance, improve 
their efficiency and profitability in preparation for successful flotation as privatised 
Water PLCS and to submit themselves to yardstick competition and comparative 
judgements by the financial markets. The ways in which the water authorities adopted 
new strategic postures as they responded to these successive changes, provided a fertile 
research site for exploring the roles accounting may play in processes of organisational 
change.
The international market for water and waste water services is estimated to grow to 
between $370 billion and $380billion per annum by 2010 (West, 1999). Clearly, this 
represents a substantial opportunity for UK water companies. Indeed, UK companies 
are already establishing a presence on the global water stage. Thames Water, the UK’s 
largest water company, has responsibility for supplying water of the city of Lzmir in 
Turkey. Anglia Water has recently won a contract to supply one and a half million 
people in Valporaiso in Chile. Yorkshire Water has announced its intention to buy 
Aquarion, a US water company. The UK, the US and France currently have water 
companies of sufficient experience and critical mass to take advantage of this 
opportunity.
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In France, there are two large companies: Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux and Vivendi. Suez 
Lyonnaise has a market capitalisation of £15.6 billion and Vivendi has a market 
capitalisation of £22.9 billion. Their mission is clear. When the Chairman of Suez 
Lyonnaise was asked about his strategy, he replied: “In water and waste services, we 
want to be world leaders” (Rider, 1999).
Competition in the water sector is very valuable; the UK water regulator (OFWAT’s) 
prospects for price reductions between (10% to 20%) could extract in excess of £2 
billion out of the industry over the five-year period of the review129. This will be a blow 
to the water companies and leave them with fewer funds for international expansion. 
Even with substantial investment to date, it is estimated that meeting the quality of 
standards will still cost in excess of £8 billion.
The Department of the Environment produced a consultation paper considering ways of 
extending opportunities for competition in the water industry which was published on 1 
April 1996, with a consultation period open until 1 July 1996. The consultation paper 
proposed seeking legislative changes for inset appointments, cross-boundary supplies, 
common carriage and liberalising connections between companies. The Director of 
Water Services has been involved in the preparation of this paper and supports these 
proposals.
Summerton (1999) says no degree of regulation can match genuine competition and in 
the next few years we should expect to see far greater effort and imagination going into 
how to introduce real competition in certain aspects of the water industry.
Before we leave the subject of competition in the water industry we should look at the 
view of the UK water regulator on mergers (who has prevented mergers between UK 
water companies). Byatt (1997) has argued that mergers, which reduce the number of 
comparators, are against the public interest and should only be allowed to proceed if 
they result in the emergence of a new better comparator who is able to deliver a better 
service at a lower price to customers. The regulator believes that consolidation would
129 The estimated £2 bn revenue shortfall is derived from the estimated Po and K factor projection for the 
Water Services Companies delivered in the prospects for prices consultation paper (October 1998).
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reduce the number of companies and therefore it will be harder to compare their 
performance to determine which companies are efficient (and should be rewarded) and 
which are inefficient (and need to improve).
Indeed, the regulatory regime in water seems inconsistent with the present U.K 
government's commitment to protect consumers via competitive markets wherever 
possible (Robinson, 2000). A price review is even more important to the companies 
concerned than elsewhere in the utility sector because the scope of regulation is so wide. 
On the other hand utility companies are becoming more entrepreneurial and more 
occupied with ways to match and, where possible, beat the actions of their competitors. 
In water, there is a preoccupation with comparative competition. Real competition is 
marginal: regulation, both "economic" and "social", is the big issue because it bears 
such weight.
Another symptom of the absence of competition in the water industry is the tendency 
for government intervention in the industry to continue. Politicians evidently feel the 
need to prompt the regulator into setting targets (e.g. for leakage) rather than using 
market incentives (The Financial Times, 1997).
Consolidation could provide significant opportunities for price reduction for the 
consumer. There are two reasons: firstly, the most efficient companies will prosper and 
less efficient companies will be taken over and have standards raised. Secondly, 
companies will share significant overheads (such as call centres and billing systems) 
and this will reduce the unit cost of serving individual customers. Consolidation will 
create companies of a size which can compete on a level playing field with the small 
number of international giants. For example, the combination of Thames Water (£3.9 
billion) and Severn Trent (£3.4 billion) would create a £7.3 billion company which 
could begin to take on the major US and French players on their own terms (Rider, 
1999).
7.2.2.3 The effect of privatisation on company performance
Prior to privatisation, the Water Authorities were already subject to Government 
imposed financial targets and performance aims on operating costs since 1981; they
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were strongly encouraged to improve their profitability and efficiency profiles to make 
their shares more attractive to buyers when flotation occurred (Ogden 1995).
After privatisation, The Director General of the Office of Water Service (OFWAT) had 
responsibility for ensuring that
(1) The water PLCS are able to finance the proper responsibilities of their functions
(2) Charges are regulated through a pricing formula based on the retail price index 
PRI+K; the K factor is assessed separately for each water company. The pricing 
formula is expected to promote efficiency and reduce costs as a means of enhancing 
profitability
(3) Developing competition through a review in “K” factor in the pricing formula. In the 
interim, OFWAT has published annually comparable information on issues such as 
comparisons of unit costs on water delivered and sewerage collected (OFWAT, 1993b), 
capital investment (OFWAT, 1992a) and levels of service (OFWAT, 1992b). The latter 
have been developed to assess company performance to customers and are measured by 
seven levels of service indicators: (DG1 and DG4); adequacy of Water Distribution 
System (DG2 and DG3); adequacy of the sewerage (DG5); and response to customers 
(DG6 and DG7).
In conclusion, the Director General is not the only person interested in efficiency. In 
their assessment of the water PLCS current and future profitability, the financial 
markets and city investment analysts are equally keen to scrutinise management 
performance in achieving cost savings and making other improvements in efficiency. 
While financial indicators of corporate performance are clearly the key indicator for city 
analysts, they also take careful account of management performance on levels of service 
to customers (Ogden, 1994).
To summarise, the UK water industry moved from the public to the private sector 
because the government believes that private sector provision of services is more
i inefficient than public sector provision. This move affected the role of accounting and 
this is the case of the water environment that transferred from the public to the private
130 For example, prior to privatisation, the water authorities were concerned with containing costs, but 
after privatisation, in pursuing profitability. In other words, vocabulary o f  profit replaced the previous 
vocabulary o f  costs.
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sector. The researcher's view is that it is of more value to look at other water 
environments before we look at the main case study of the thesis, the public water 
environment in Egypt. E.g. France, whose water industry has been mixed between 
public and private sector (see section 7.2.3).
7.2.2.4 Institutional Change and Privatisation
In numerous text and articles researches identify differences between public and private 
sectors in terms of their environments, resourcing and management practices (Alford, 
1993; Harrow and Willcocks, 1990; Ring and Perry, 1985). Gerry, (2000) argues that 
privatisation can be seen as coercive institutional change. Furthermore, he argues that 
during the transitional process of privatisation, two institutional templates coexist and 
compete for legitimacy . The public sector template may be deeply embedded, taken 
for granted and largely mindlessly enacted. However, as privatisation proceeds, the 
private sector institutional template and its implications are mindfully anticipated.
Institutional theory can, however, help us to understand processes of privatisation. Its 
proponents point to the importance of realising that privatisation constitutes institutional 
change and suggest mechanisms by which resulting archetypes of organisations will 
emerge, not only through coercive mechanisms but through normative and mimetic 
processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). There is also a growing body of literature on 
deinstitutionalisation and change from an institutional point of view, the conclusions of 
which can be extended to the context of privatisation.
Fligstein (1991) underscores the need of shocks to the organisational field while 
acknowledging the role of organisational elites. Oliver (1991) uses institutional and 
resources dependency theories to explain strategic responses to institutional processes in 
the context of differing institutional factors. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argue that 
radical change is more likely if there is loose coupling within institutions and less well- 
defined means for preserving dominant templates. Kondra and Hinings (1998) also 
predict that change is more likely to occur in institutional environments where there is 
more, rather than less, diversity or higher influence from other organisational fields.
131 In the actors' eyes.
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As mentioned in section 2.3, this research adopted a process approach and focused on 
the micro level. The discussion of this section aims to provide a better understanding of 
the role of actors in institutional change. Institutions are defined by their rules, this is so 
both in terms of what is meant by institutionalisation and in terms of how individuals 
identify with those institutions by "learning to act in a particular way" (March, 1994: 
42). Changes in institutional templates, as in privatisation, involve a period of flux 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). In such circumstances, both from an institutional and 
individual point of view there is a search for identity (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991), 
which may be strongest when external cohesion or constraints weaken (March, 1994), 
as in the context of privatisation.
In the context of institutional change in privatisation, actors are moving from a well- 
established, familiar institutionalised context to a less familiar and, therefore, uncertain 
private sector context. Thus, we would expect increased conscious information 
processing because some tasks will be familiar and some unfamiliar and inconsistent 
with prior experience (Lord and Smith, 1983). Gerry (2000) argues that processes of 
privatisation may be different in terms of sequencing and procedures, for example there 
could be a direct sale to a single private sector company, a break up and sale to a 
number of companies, or management buyout. This shift from public to private sector 
could be at a particular point in time, or there may be a period of transition.
Processes of privatisation also may affect the extent to which actors have opportunities 
to reflect on such experiences and are again important in promoting conscious 
processing (Lord and Smith, 1983). Furthermore, the involvement of actors in changing 
processes increases not only the likelihood of their acceptance but also their 
commitment to change (Coch and French, 1948; Nutt, 1998; Watson, 1976). Gerry 
(2000) argues that the greater the extent of actors' personal involvement in privatisation 
processes, the greater their direct experience of the private sector. The more actors 
identify personally with the outcome of privatisation, the more conscious their 
information processing.
Institutionalists have long understood the significance of organisational structures and 
systems (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), not only as functional entities but also as symbols 
"invested with socially shared meaning" (Tolbert and Zucker, 1986: 117). Gioia et al.,
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(1994: 365) show more broadly how "symbolic action is central to the institutional 
legitimacy" of change. In the context of privatisation, such symbolic reinforcement 
might include a structural form but also actors' experience and involvement regarding 
organisational rites (Trice and Beyer, 1984) and narratives (Barry and Elmes, 1997). 
The extent to which actors relate to such symbols as signifying public or private sector 
templates will be a likely influence on their preference with one or the other.
This section has argued that privatisation can be seen as a process of de- 
institutionalising public sector templates and institutionalising private sector templates. 
Viewing privatisation through an institutional lens highlights the inherent changing 
institutional templates. This section has conceptualised privatisation as institutional 
change.
7.2.3 The system of water in France
The aim of this section is to illustrate the management of water in France because in the 
researcher's view it has one of the ‘best’ water industries in the world in terms of 
management. It begins with a brief overview of who is responsible for water and expose 
two options for water management.
Water has become a major political point for local communities since the management 
of water resources has a direct effect on fundamental issues such as public health and 
economic development (Anonymous, 1994). Water supply and sanitation drainage is 
also receiving increased attention as a result, due to heightened concern for the 
environment. Water authorities are all too aware that the cost of improved water quality 
and uninterrupted service must remain affordable to the user. Full costs are almost 
always borne by consumers on the basis of their actual consumption.
In France, the national government is responsible for creating basic rules and specifying 
essential sanitary control measures. Local authorities are responsible for water services 
(i.e. drinking water supply, wastewater and rainwater drainage). For a total of 36,763 
communes (local authorities), there are 15,244 separate supply systems and 11,992 
drainage systems. Regional government authorities only step in on matters concerning 
investment scheduling and funding. France is divided into six-water catchment areas. 
Each catchment area has its own water authority, which receives taxes on all water
211
drawn and discharged in the catchment area in question. These taxes are re-distributed 
to regional authorities in the form of subsidies for investments aimed at bringing 
improvements in drinking water quality, supply lines, and wastewater treatment.
Local authorities have no actual legal obligations governing the supply of drinking 
water supply, but all of them do in practice. The main regulations governing the supply 
of drinking water are contained in the Public Health Regulations and the Water Act of 
1992. Local authority obligations also cover wastewater treatment, removal of residual 
sludge and supervision of non-collective treatment systems. The local water authorities 
are required to take responsibility for organising their own water services. French law 
on decentralisation also sets up an independent organisation to govern financial and 
budgetary aspects of local authority spending.
Local authorities can choose either to run their water services directly or to commission 
this task from a private sector. If the direct management option is chosen, the local 
authority takes on full responsibility for the water services. Staff working for the 
municipal water services will have public sector employment contracts with local 
authority status. About 40% of French communes choose the direct management option 
for drinking water supply systems. This option allows the local authority to develop in- 
house technical competence, which is useful when developing partnerships with private 
operators. Furthermore, direct management is also cheaper for the consumer, though 
this is gained only the expense of flexibility, especially with regard to staffing.
If the direct management option is chosen to commission all or some part of the tasks 
involved from a private operator, this sort of management is covered by long term 
contracts that also specify the cost of water supply and permissible range of variation. 
This system has been practised in France since the 20th. The system works in one of 
two ways: leasing and concession.
With a leasing arrangement, the local authority bears the initial investment costs and 
commissions management tasks from a private operator over a period of 5-20 years. The 
operator is paid for water supplied but must also pay the local authority rental on the 
plant it uses. The local authority uses this rental revenue to repay the technical and 
financial costs on the initial investment.
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With a concession arrangement, the private operator builds and runs the plant itself. 
Concession contracts are between 25-50 years and when the concession terminates, the 
plant becomes the property of the local authority. In France in 1994, concession 
arrangements represent 75% in water supply and 35% in wastewater treatment. To 
finance long term investments for concession contracts, private operators often sign 
“BOT” (build, operate, transfer) partnership agreements with local authorities. This 
enables private and public operators to share financial risks and mobilise substantial 
bank loans.
7.2.4 The water system in Egypt
The aim of this section is to expose the current situation in Egypt, to explain who is 
responsible for the management of water and to explain the history of water planning 
and to highlight some characteristics of water resource planning in Egypt.
Dr. Abu-Zeid, chairman of Egypt’s Water Research Centre points out that “satisfying 
future demands in Egypt depends on better utilisation and efficient use of present water 
resources. Optimal water management is an essential prerequisite for sustainable 
development of Egypt".
The future looks bleak if Egypt does not succeed in formulating and implementing a 
water policy, which can match the limited fresh supply with the increasing demand. Per 
capita water resources are expected to drop from a current value of about 922 m3 per 
year (1990) to about 337 w3 per year in 2025. If the present management practice and 
cropping patterns prevail, this could mean that up to 60 % of agricultural land will not 
be irrigated.
The system of irrigation in Egypt is tremendous in its size and complexity. It consists of 
the Aswan High Dam, eight main barrages, approximately 30,000 KM. of public canals,
17.000 KM. of public drains, 80000 KM. of private canals (mesqas) and farm drains,
450.000 private water-lifting devices (sakias or pumps), 22,000 public water-control 
structures, and 670 large public pumping stations for irrigation. Throughout this system, 
approximately 59 billionml of water is distributed annually, not only for cultivated
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land, but also for municipal and industrial use, for generation of hydro-electricity and 
for the navigation of freighters and tourist boats on the Nile (Hvidt, 1998).
The Ministry of Irrigation, formerly called the Ministry of Public Works and Water 
Resources (MPWWR), is responsible for national water resources and is the only body 
to authorise use of water from the Nile, canals, drains, and groundwater resources. The 
ministry also has control over works built to discharge water into canals, drain, and the 
Nile. MPWWR is authorised to impose penalties if its orders are not obeyed. A number 
of other ministries are involved in water management and use, including agriculture and 
land reclamation, health, tourism, power, transportation, industry, housing and 
reconstruction.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation has special responsibilities because 
agriculture consumes around 85% of water produced. Prior to 1992, when cropping 
patterns were liberalised, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation decided, in 
consultation with the Ministry of Industry, which crops were to be grown in which 
localities. Such planning was undertaken a year in advance. From this exercise, the 
Ministry requested specific volumes of water to deliver to each canal and each branch 
canal. Following the liberalisation of the cropping pattern, however, it is not known 
precisely how the water allocation takes place. The Ministry of Health, which also holds 
special responsibilities, is authorised to close portable water supply works if the water 
produced does not meet the required standards. The Ministry of Health is further 
responsible for drafting quality standards for various water uses and for discharges of 
waste water.
Three committees have been formed to ensure co-ordination among agencies involved 
in water resources. Two of them, the Supreme Committee of the Nile, headed by the 
minister of the MPWWR, and the Co-ordinating Committee for Land Reclamation meet 
monthly to direct and review different developments plans, as well as to resolve 
conflicts between ministries. The third committee is called the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee on Water Planning (ICWP) and was established in 1977 as a part of the 
Master Water Plan project. ICWP is, as the name indicates, a cross-ministerial 
committee with a strict focus on planning. It has been given the responsibility to set 
planning assumptions and review development plans.
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In Egypt, water planning is said to have started in 1933 when a policy was formulated to 
use the additional storage capacity made available by the second heightening of the old 
Aswan High Dam (AHD) and the Gabal El-Awlia Dam in Sudan. This plan introduced 
programmes for land-reclamation, conversion of some basin irrigation to perennial 
irrigation and increases in the areas under rice cultivation. This policy was first revised 
in 1974 and again in 1975 when a new plan was drafted to accommodate the extra 
volumes of water resulting from the erection of the Aswan High Dam (AHD).
In 1981, the first attempt was made to create a master plan for all water use in Egypt. It 
was carried out in the early 1980s under the auspices of UNDP and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The Minister of Irrigation at the 
time pointed out the objective to be achieved by this effort: “Because of this increasing 
competition for water and limited availability, it was imperative to introduce new 
scientific techniques, and to use mathematical models to design future plans for water 
development, and to ensure efficient use of this resource.” The resulting plan, the “Arab 
Republic of Egypt Master Plan for Water Resources Development and Use” is, 
however, not the plan as such, but a first step in a process which is intended to lead to 
improved planning capabilities within the sector. The main objective of the plan is to 
implement planning tools (i.e., to establish data bases and build flow models) which 
will make it possible to plan the development and use of water resources with greater 
precision in the future and, thus, to guide investment decisions.
The aims of this planning effort were: establishment of a data base; the setting-up of 
specific planning tools including six models which were built and implemented; 
establishment of three planning scenarios for new land development and determination 
of an economic rate of return and returns to water for ranking land-development 
projects. Hvidt (1998) points out that the results obtained from these planning tools are 
to be seen more as trials than final results since, due to a lack of data, the assumptions 
built into the models need to be replaced with real values when they are determined. 
The plan established three scenarios for future water demand and supply. Three main 
variables were analysed in detail: the supply, through implementation of water 
conservation projects, i.e., the Jonglei I and II project in Sudan, the demand for all user- 
groups; and the resulting potential expansion of agriculture on new land. The plan also
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established priorities for the satisfaction of water needs. Firstly, the plan stated that 
water demand for municipal, industrial, navigation and spills should be satisfied and 
secondly water use on the old agricultural land should be satisfied, and thirdly the 
remaining volumes of water could be used to satisfy water demand for land reclamation.
The latest update of Egyptian water policy dates from June 1990. It is a ten-year plan 
covering the period 1990 to 2000. This plan was made in response to several events 
which, in the late 1980s; altered previous assumptions and had a direct impact on water 
planning in Egypt. The main events are as follows:
(1) The 1979-88 drought period during which the Nile flows yielded 99 billion m3 less 
water than expected into Lake Nasser and reduced the reservoir to a critical minimum of 
6.8 billion m3 by July 1988
(2) Cessation in 1983 of construction works on the Jonglei Canal because of the civil 
war in southern Sudan, a project which would have provided Egypt with extra 2 billion 
m3 per year
(3) Revitalisation of the land-reclamation programme planned to reclaim 60700 hectares 
annually, requiring one million m3 of additional water each year. In other words, less 
water than anticipated would been available to satisfy needs.
The very critical water situation in 1988 opened the eyes of Egypt’s water planners. 
Despite the AHD, Egypt was still vulnerable to the Nile flows and thus the “need for 
rationalisation and reductions in water use emerged as common agreed possibilities to 
face the coming unknown” (Hvidt, 1998: 3).
Hvidt, (1998) in his research illustrates eight characteristics from his analysis of water 
resource planning in Egypt as follows:
(a) Shift from water abundance to water deficit
(b) Importance of international co-operation
(c) Supply bias
(d) Environmental concern
(e) Lack of data
(f) Established priority to non-agriculture uses of water
(g) Delayed implementation
(h) An uncertain administrative framework for water resource planning
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The general problems of the water industry in Egypt and the GOGCWS132 can be 
divided into three kinds: (a) compliance and management of demand for water, (b) the
1 o o
management and (c) the finance and financial resources . The problem of compliance 
and management of demand for water arose from different reasons such as:
(a) The population: the number of residents in Cairo is 13 million, and in addition, there 
will be three million visitors per day (16 million) by 2005. The following example 
should be enough to imagine the huge increase in demand for water. In 1968 the 
population in Giza was 610,000 and today it is one of the 50 biggest in the world, bigger 
than Paris and Berlin (the GOGCWS, no date source given, a: 17). The population in 
Shoubra El-Khama city was 185,000 in 1968, in 1986 was 700,000 and today it is the 
fourth biggest city in Egypt (Egyptian Geographic Association, no date source given: 
2). This will potentially change the focus from cost management of supply to cost 
management of demand
(b) Reinvestment for renewal and replacement of the old dragnets (which will eliminate 
of water losses valued at 250 million E. P., Ministry of Planning: 10) should be 
equivalent with establishing new stations
(c) Problems with water meters i.e. there are not meters enough due to breakdowns (The 
GOGCWS, no date source given, a: 42)
With regard to the problem of management, in 1968, 85% of the population (i.e. 
customers) were centralised alongside the east of the River Nile. Between 1976-1996 
the density of the population decreased in the centre of Cairo by 8%. In 1996 the 
customer percentage in the centre of Cairo decreased to 67%. This means the population 
who will be provided with water are a great distance from the River Nile. In the past, 
the GOGCWS faced technical problems relating to the connection of the services, 
however today the GOGCWS faces the planning of capital problems, finance problems 
and customer services. The question raised here is how can opportunity cost play a role 
in the water industry? (see section 10.1.2).
132 The case study o f  this research.
133 For the problem o f  finance and financial resources (see section 8.6.4).
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7.2.5 Water industry and institutional perspective
According to old institutional economic theory, there are three different types of change 
processes (Burns and Scapens, 2000) as follows:
(a) Formal versus informal change
(b) Revolutionary versus evolutionary change
(c) Regressive versus progressive change
(a) Formal change occurs by conscious design, usually through the introduction of new 
rules and/or through the actions of a powerful individual or group (Rutherford, 1994) as 
in the case of the UK water industry. In 1989, the ten Regional Water Authorities of 
England and Wales were privatised. The Regional Water Authorities were a product of 
a major re-organisation of the water industry in 1973.
Informal change occurs at a more tacit level; for example, as new routines adapt over 
time to changing operating conditions. Also, informal change has occurred in the UK 
water industry (Yorkshire Water Company). In 2000, after 11 years of privatisation in 
the UK water industry, the Finance and Commercial Manager of The Water Business 
Unit of the Yorkshire Water company stated that " we follow full absorption costing - 
we are not using activity based costing but we consider some ABC principles".
It would probably be reasonable to expect that formal cost management change (e.g. the 
implementation of new techniques such as ABC, ABM, etc) will be more straight 
forward than attempting to change the ways of thinking which are embedded in existing 
cost management routines. This expectation was confirmed when the Chief of 
Commitment (Engagement) Department (Balance Sheet) of the GOGCWS in Egypt 
stated th a t" There have been no significant changes in the cost method and if there were 
any small changes, these changes were built on the comments from The Accounting 
Central Institution. I think if there are any plans for change, it is necessary to get 
support for this plan from the state".
At a practical level, it seems reasonable to expect that hierarchical (i.e. imposed) cost 
management change will have its initial and most direct impact on the formal rules (i.e. 
the technical aspects) on cost management systems, but only an indirect impact on the 
informal processes which underpin cost management routines (for example, the
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changing of the of the economic forms and legal structure of the GOGCWS during their 
life, see section 8.2.1). Whereas, bottom-up change (initiated by organisational 
members who use cost management from one day to the next) is more likely to have an 
impact at a tacit level and to shape informal as well as formal cost management 
processes.
(b) Revolutionary change involves a fundamental disruption to existing routines and 
institutions (for example, the privatisation of the water industry in UK, - see sections
7.2.1 and 7.2.2). Evolutionary change is incremental with only minor disruption to 
existing routines and institutions (for example the GOGCWS in Egypt). It was clear 
from section 7.2.1, a brief history of the GOGCWS, that the economic forms and legal 
structure of the company were changed during their life starting as a "foreign company", 
changing to a general institution and then transferring to a stock company and finally an 
economic general organisation. The GOGCWS was an economic organisation but it 
aimed to achieve balance between expenditures and revenues and not to make capital 
profit like the private sector.
(c) Regressive and progressive. Tool (1993) distinguished between what he called 
"Ceremonial" behaviour and "instrumental" behaviour. Ceremonial behaviour emerges 
from a values system which discriminates between human beings and preserves an 
existing power structure; whereas instrumental behaviour emerges from a values system 
which applies the best available knowledge and technology to problems and seeks to 
enhance relationships.
Institutional change in the wider economy, especially deregulation and increased 
competition in the UK water industry set a series of changes in organisation and cost 
management practices that are still being used by worker. Privatisation of the UK water 
industry in 1989 and increased competition in the 1990s had forced UK water 
companies to become more explicitly profitable and cost conscious (Ogden, 1995).
The literature advocates that government agencies faced with market pressures and 
requirements to recover all expenditures with revenues will become more business like 
and cost conscious, and will make greater use of cost accounting data in order to control
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costs and prevent funding shortfalls and associated sanctions (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992; Gore, 1993).
The contingency literature provides considerable theoretical and empirical support for 
this claim. Zimmerman (1976), for example, develops an analytical model which 
suggests that non-profit organisations facing funding uncertainty will place greater 
emphasis on budgets and costs to avoid the sanctions associated with deficit spending. 
Cooper's (1995) theory of cost system choice argues that intensified competition 
increases the benefits from more complex cost accounting systems since competitors 
will be more likely to take advantage of poor decisions arising from inadequate cost 
information. Similarly, the contingency framework developed by Gordon and Miller 
(1976) maintains that organisations facing greater environmental uncertainty, due to 
factors such as competition, require more extensive, frequent and detailed financial and 
non-financial information and relatively sophisticated cost accounting and control 
systems.
Empirical studies provide support for the institutional theory and empirical theory. 
Khandwalla (1972), for example, found that the level of competition was positively 
associated with the use of more sophisticated cost accounting practices such as standard 
costing, incremental costing and flexible budgeting, while Gordon and Narayanan 
(1984) and others supported the hypothesis that greater environmental uncertainty 
increased the demand for decision-making information.
With an institutional realm134, it seems that a highly regulated set of institutions outside 
the water industry in Egypt were mirrored by institutions and routines within the 
industry that made these organisations bywords for stability and conservatism.
I Q C
According to neo-institutional economic theory (transaction cost) , there are three 
models of governance: (1) markets (2) hybrids and (3) hierarchies or internalisation
134 The Bums and Scapens (2000) model invites its users to identify three elements: (a) organisational 
routines and habits (b) an institutional realm and (c) a realm o f  action
135 The central aim o f  the studies o f  transaction costs is to explain why some transactions are more likely 
to be executed within one form o f organisation, whereas other transactions tend to be associated with 
different organisational models. The main thrust o f  transaction cost is that a specific institutional 
arrangement is chosen to govern a specific transaction because that arrangements offer some distinctive 
set o f  control devices to the control needs o f that transaction (Spekle1, 2001).
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(Williamson, 1975; 1979; 1985; 1996). These alternative governance structures differ in 
the control mechanisms they employ to safeguard contract execution and to achieve 
successful adaptation. Hierarchical governance attains control primarily by means of 
authority, internal incentive structures and monitoring, for example, the management of 
the water industry in Egypt (see section 7.2.4). Market governance derives control from 
free competition, for example the management of the water industry in the UK (see 
sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2). The hybrid form of governance is typically based on explicit, 
long-term contracts in conjunction with additional safeguards to assure compliance, for 
example, the management of the water industry in France (see section 7.2.3).
In conclusion, the researcher can see that there are differences between Egypt, the U.K. 
and France - from a neo-institutional economic theory (transaction cost) perspective - as 
shown in table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Key differences between Egypt, U.K and France
The key differences Egypt England (U.K.) France
Privatisation or 
regulation
is still public transferred from 
public to private136
a mix of privatisation and 
regulation
From institutional 
theory perspective
Egypt water is 
hierarchical
UK water is 
provided b y « highly 
regulated market
French water is hybrid
Furthermore, in institutional theory literature, in terms identified by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983), the researcher can relate Egypt to institutional isomorphism and the UK 
to competitive isomorphism. Isomorphism is a process that causes one unit in a 
population to resemble other units, in the population which face the same set of 
environmental conditions. Because of isomorphic pressures, organisations will become 
increasingly homogeneous within given domains and conform to expectations of the 
wider institutional environment (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify two types of isomorphism: competitive and 
institutional. Competitive isomorphism is not of interest for this study because it relates 
primarily to free and open market competition scenarios, and therefore, is not applicable
136 In the researcher's view, the UK water industry is mixed between privatisation and regulation in real 
terms. The researcher based this view on the role o f  the OFWAT (see the role o f  OFWAT in 1.2.2.3).
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to the analysis of public utility (sector) organisations. In this study, the focus on the 
concept of institutional isomorphism which relates to organisational competition for 
political power, social fitness, and institutional legitimacy. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 
150) state that the concept of institutional isomorphism is a useful tool for 
understanding the politics and ceremony that pervade modern organisations and contain 
a number of exogenous pressures that influence their structure and practices (this is the 
case of the GOGCWS in Egypt, see section 8.6).
Moreover, in terms identified by Brunsson (1994), the researcher observed that the 
water industry in Egypt relates to "political-ization" (see section 11.2.4) and the water 
industry in the UK to "company-ization". Company-ization means that an organisation 
which originally possessed a strong political element, assumes certain features deriving 
from the company's institution. For example, a state or local government authority 
begins to regard the people in its environment as customers, or these people begin to 
consider themselves as such (Brunsson, 1994).
7.3 Issues of costs in water industry
The aim of this section is to illustrate cost systems and some problems in water 
industry, e.g. how people pay for their water requirements, how the cost of water is 
calculated and whether this system is fair or a new system needed.
7.3.1 Cost system in water industry and some issues
In the U.K., the development of effective cost systems have been handicapped by the 
absence of suitable output measures for most of the industry’s activities. Very detailed 
analysis of expenditure is provided but comparison is normally with the expenditure 
budget rather than on a unit cost basis.
The industry has put a great deal of effort into attempting to overcome this problem and 
internally a number of comparisons are made between broadly similar areas of activities 
on the basis of the most suitable output measure available. Collectively, regional water 
authorities have commissioned a comparison of revenue collection costs, using for the 
most part the number of consumers as the “output measure”. Similar studies in other 
areas are under way.
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An alternative approach is to direct greater attention to budget preparation. The 
objectives of each area of activity are defined, the procedures determined and necessary 
resources identified on a “Zero based” approach. This type of exercise also provides a 
basis for determining priorities between different areas of activity.
It is likely that regional water authorities will continue to invest substantial resources in 
the improvement of this system. Apart from the obvious need to use resources as 
effectively as possible, regional water authorities are under pressure to open up more of 
their activities to competition, as local authorities have been required to do for their 
direct labour organisation. There is, therefore, a need to make proper comparison 
between external and internal provision.
In the U. K., in 1974, regional water.authorities faced the problem of changing from the 
local government type of accounting operated by their predecessors to a more 
commercial style. The main changes (Meredith, 1985) were:
(a) Accrual of both capital and revenue expenditure in annual accounts
(b) The use of a single pool of finance in place of separate capital and revenue finance
(c) The use of straight-line depreciation in place of loan redemption provisions
It was necessary to construct the accounting system in such a way as to enable 
appropriate charges to be levied to cover the costs incurred on each service, avoiding 
cross-subsidisation between services.
In 1974 costs of fixed assets were usually available only to the extent that loan debt was 
transferred and there was no complete information regarding assets financed from 
revenue or where loans had been fully repaid. This was not a problem of major 
significance - while depreciation .was calculated on historical costs only, some 
approximation to the normal straight-line depreciation charge could be calculated. With 
the introduction of current cost accounting in 1981, the matter became of far greater 
significance. Inventories of above ground assets could be prepared but the majority of 
water authorities’ expenditure is on below ground assets (water mains and sewers) and 
the best estimates of these had to be prepared according to whatever information was 
available. Valuations were generally on the basis of nationally agreed formulae. Work 
will be necessary for some years in order to improve the accuracy of fixed asset 
valuations.
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Regional water authority internal accounts, therefore, are mainly designed to measure 
performance against an annual expenditure budget. The budget is prepared on a basis of 
cost centres, each representing an area of activity for which an identifiable person is 
responsible, and will be broken down into accounting periods against which actual 
expenditure can be compared. The original budget is prepared on the basis of price 
rulings at a given date, and a separate estimate is made for price changes. There are also 
procedures for amending budgets during the year where necessary.
Authorities also carry out a substantial “contracting” business usually described as 
“rechargeable work”. Charges for regular work, for instance providing connections to 
new properties, are usually charged according to fixed price schedules, based on 
distance and other factors affecting costs, but other work is charged at actual cost. The 
accounting system must therefore include provision for “job costing” of these activities.
There are lots of issues in cost systems in the water industry such as, cost allocation. 
Cost allocation is used for many purposes, e.g. requirements in manufacturing for 
external reporting. Why? Because the allocation of depreciation cost is of major 
importance, cost allocation acts as a guide to decision taking within the firm, for 
example pricing decisions. Cost allocation is demanded
(a) To categorise the firm’s overall production control problems into more manageable 
chunks
(b) To sustain a system of incentives to encourage efficient production
(c) To co-ordinate the activities of separate units
(d) To provide information relevant to pricing
The cost allocation problem would be trivial in a world with the following properties:
(a) no joint or common cost (b) marginal and average cost equal (c) instantaneous 
adjustment of all inputs (d) complete information. In practice, however, none of these 
conditions applies. Most utilities are based upon substantial joint and common costs.
A firm freed from competitive pressure may be able or be required to choose other 
objectives than simple profit maximisation. These may include the setting of “fair” 
prices and attainment of aims such as universal service. Fairness can be defined in
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various ways, several of which may involve the sharing of some particular cost or 
benefit among competing products according to particular rules. Universal service will 
typically involve elements of cross-subsidy and an averaging of charges across 
consumers with different costs.
The questions which costing procedures are intended to answer include:
How should prices be related to costs, in order to attain aims not related to efficiency 
while achieving a target level of overall revenue or profitability?
What degree of cross-subsidy is present in the existing set of prices? But this assumes 
that the need for regulation is clearly established. For the regulator, the decision 
typically comes in two stages: (a) whether competition should be permitted (b) what 
price controls need to be imposed to ensure that it is conducted fairly. This situation 
raises a new set of issues;
Do the cost characteristics of particular products or subsets of products make them 
natural monopolies?
Will competition jeopardise universal services through “cream skimming”? If 
competition is fostered and emerges in markets for some products but not in others 
How can the incidence of cross-subsidisation of products be identified and prevented, in 
cases where a firm produces both types of outputs? (Cave and Mills, 1992).
In the context of cost allocation used for regulation, one of the main dimensions of 
competitive rivalry is the degree of joint supply, or bundling of services, which often 
occurs. There are many cost allocation procedures one of which is fully distributed
I 0 7
costs . Beyond this simple approach the four main candidates for establishing the cost 
share are in accordance with
(a) Relative output
(b) Gross revenue
(c) Net revenue
(d) Attributed costs
To determine fully the cost o f  each service. Each service takes attributes cost, which is assigned to it, 
and a share o f  the common costs. The fully distributed cost o f service I (FDCi) can be written as:
Fully distributed cost service o f I = Attribute cost o f  I + Share o f  common cost o f  service o f  I.
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Unfortunately, the various fully distributed cost methods give different results, so the 
economist’s criticisms of fully distributed cost have been strong; Kahn and Shew (1987: 
207) forcefully attack the use of conventional rather than a causal basis for cost 
allocation: “The only costs that have objective reality are ones that describe a causal 
relationship between the act of purchase and their incurrence. Cost allocations that are 
not grounded in causality have no basis in objective reality - they have no independent 
meaning to the prices they are suppose to justify, except in some ritualistic, incantation 
sense”.
There is no attempt to incorporate marginal cost or promote economic efficiency. As 
Baumol writes: “There is obviously not the slightest reason to expect that the prices 
emerging from a full-costing process will bear the slightest resemblance to those known 
to be necessary for efficiency in resource utilisation” (Baumol 1983: 181).
One of the regulatory purposes of cost allocation is to establish a fair set of charges 
which can be imposed upon customers in a way which is consistent with satisfactory 
incentives for the water industry.
The Director General of the UK's water service stated in a discussion paper entitled 
“Paying for water” (OFWAT, 1990) “If charges are to be broadly related to costs, in 
order to avoid under discrimination and provide proper incentives, the basis for the 
allocation of costs needs to be determined. In setting in their tariffs, companies will 
need to decide how to allocate cost between services and customers, and the proportion 
of costs should be recovered by means of capital contributions standing charges, where 
charges are related directly to use”.
In the same paper, the Director General talked about problems facing the water industry 
in England and Wales. The water industry has faced major difficulties because most 
domestic customers pay for their water on a tariff which is related to rateable value of 
their dwellings while the majority of business customers are metered. Cairo (the capital 
of Egypt) has a similar problem.
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OFWAT’s view on the accounting cost should be matched as far as possible to 
economic costs (for example, via current cost accounting), and suggests that the 
following structure might provide an appropriate balance (see table 7.2).
Table 7.2: Accounting and economic costs in the water industry
Capital cost of connection to system 
and enhancement of local network
Capital contributions connection plus 
charges plus requisitions
Average capital cost of enhancement 
of general infrastructure
Use- related charge
Capital cost of enhancement of general 
infrastructure is above average
Capital contributions 
(infrastructure charges)
Operating costs related to number of 
consumers (billing, meter reading)
Standing charge
Other operating costs of water supply 
and fuel drainage
Use- related charge
Other operating costs of surface 
drainage
Use- Related charge or (banded) standing 
charge
(O FW AT, 1990, Annexe 4, page 8).
In the case of water tariffs for metered domestic customers, OFWAT argued that the 
correct principle was to distinguish between costs which related to the number of 
customers connected, and those which related to the volume of water supplied. Costs 
such as billing and meter reading should be recovered through a service charge, while 
capital-related and operating costs of reservoirs, etc, which are generally related to the 
amount of water used, should be recovered through the volumetric charge.
7.3.2 How do the people pay for the water?
The basis on which water bills are estimated in England and Wales is “rateable value”. 
The growing minority who have had water meters installed pay on a very different
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basis. Their bills have two elements: a small and uniform fixed charge, plus a variable 
amount proportional to their water usage (the “volumetric” charge). Water metering can 
be justified on both economic and environmental grounds, as it introduces financial 
incentives for efficiency among customers and companies. This is illustrated in Figure 
7.3.
Figure 7.3: Current Payment Method
- Unmetered households (82% of total).
- Metered households (18% of total).
Total
Fixed chargeamount
household
pays for 
water.
,ow standing charge plus 
Volumetric charging
Amount of \feater a household uses.
Source: Kenway, (1999)- “New Stateman Privatised W ater: W ho paying the price?, p. vii
Objections of the currently favoured system of water charges based on rateable value 
(Kenway, 1999) include;
(a) Rateable values were last set in 1973, so are more than a quarter of a century out of 
date. As they are no longer used for local taxation, it would be prohibitively expensive 
to carry out a new valuation for water alone.
(b) A charging system that is completely independent of the amount of water used 
makes it impossible to encourage efficiency or economy via financial incentives;
(c) Bills based on rateable values are at odds with the way the water industry regulator 
has chosen to interpret “fairness” in water charging. The view of regulator is that
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fairness means “charges should broadly reflect the cost of providing water and sewerage 
services to different classes of customers”. From this point of view, two households 
using the same amount of water should pay the same for it. Under rateable value, the 
two households pay different amounts if they live in different-sized houses.
Cost reflectiveness has much to be said for it. It is the basis on which almost all prices 
are set, regardless of whether a customer is rich or poor. Yet it is not the basis on which 
we pay for our public services via taxation, and an attempt to introduce such a principle 
into local government ten years ago was decisively defeated. Most of us still 
automatically think of water as the public service it was until privatisation.
How much should be paid for each extra unit? The economist’s answer would be the 
“forward-looking long-run marginal cost” of providing that extra unit. Short-run 
marginal costs would be the cost of providing the extra unit on the assumption that the 
necessary physical infrastructure (reservoirs, pumping stations, the network of 
distribution pipes and so on) is already in place. Long-run marginal costs do not take 
this infrastructure as given but include an amount that reflects the cost of providing it. 
Forward-looking long-run marginal costs assume that providing additional water may 
be more costly than providing the current supply if, for example, new reservoirs have to 
be built in less advantageous locations. Long-run marginal cost is a financial incentive 
for the customer and the company. The customer, in deciding whether to consume more 
water, pays a price that reflects the additional costs of supplying it. The company, 
benefiting from the extra revenue generated by higher water usage, will make the right 
investment decisions.
It is not as easy to get agreement on what the numerical value should be. But while 
there is genuine room for disagreement, there is one reason why we should err on the 
side of caution when setting the unit price of water: if the price is too high, the water 
companies will make undue profits from each extra unit sold. It would no longer be in 
their interests to encourage the rest of us to be economical with water (for example, via 
promotions of new more water-efficient appliances such as washing machines), since 
this would cause their profits to fall. But such a switch would be politically difficult, 
chiefly because it would create many losers at all income levels, whose opposition 
might be weightier politically than the support of many winners.
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Hitherto the debate about how to price water intended to polarise the question of water 
metering, with the strongest opposition coming from those predominantly concerned 
about social welfare and justice. Their concerns are compelling: for reasons both of 
public health and private well-being people should not face financial incentives to 
economise on water for essential needs such as drinking, preparing and cooking foods, 
washing and bathing, and flushing the toilet.
Kenway (1999) suggests new system for charging for water. This new system focuses 
on metering, in the sense of measuring how much each household uses. But what really 
matters is the tariff, which is then built around the information that metering yields, to 
determine how much each household has to pay. The heart of objection to metering is 
that it creates a financial distinctive for people to use any amount of water, including the 
water they ought to be using for health and hygiene. Figure 7.4 shows the new proposed 
system.
Figure 7.4: A fairer alternative
J
Total 
Amount 
Household 
Pays for 
water
Tranche of “free” water. . 
for essential needs
/
Additional water charged 
According to usage
w
Amount of water a household uses
Source: Kenway, (1999)- “New Stateman Privatised W ater: W ho is paying the price?, p. vii
Here, the amount a household pays rises above the fixed charge once consumption 
exceeds a predetermined level (often, though inaccurately, called the “tranche of free 
water”). Only then would any financial disincentive to use water kick in. The volume of
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water covered by a fixed charge could vary between households, so those with more 
people would have a proportionally larger tranche of free water. And the amount 
payable in fixed charge could vary between households according to their liability for 
council tax, thereby preserving an important element of payment according to means. 
This certainly is a more complicated system, but it satisfies economic, social justice and 
environmental objectives.
7.3.3 How to calculate the cost of water?
In England, between 1990 and 1995 average prices rose in real terms by 5.5% a year 
and by 1.5% a year between 1995 and 2000. The main drivers were the need to improve 
drinking water quality and environmental protection in response to European 
legislation, and the need to eliminate capital maintenance backlogs that had built up 
before 1989.
The regulator fixes a price-increase cap (known as the K factor) separately for each of 
the 18 water companies and the ten combined water and sewerage companies ‘R PI +  
K 138’(Summerton, 1999; OFWAT, 1991). Initial K values were set for 10 years by the 
secretaries of State for the Environment and for Wales in 1989. The Licence requires Ks 
to be completely reset after 10 years at a “periodic review”. A review may also take 
place after only five years if either company or the Director feels it is necessary. The 
Director took the earliest opportunity available to him to reset K values in July 1994. 
The new price limits take effect for 10 years from 1 April 1995.
The question arising here is, does K cover all company charges? No. K is the price limit 
for a “basket of charges” (OFWAT, 1991). These are; charges for unmeasured water 
supply, charges for measured water supply, charges for unmeasured sewerage services, 
charges for measured sewerage services, charges for reception, the treatment and 
disposal of trade effluent. Charges for any of these particular items may be more or less 
than RPI + K. However, several charges are not covered by the K formula, for example
138 PRI “The Retail Price”: to be used in the formula is the PRI in the November prior to the start o f  the 
April 1 charging year.
K is a charging limit. It represents the amount by which average charges can rise in any one year. It is set 
individually for each company year. It reflects the provision services to customers, including financing its 
capital expenditure programme.
Example: if  K is 1 and the RPI increase in the 12 months to previous November is 1.5% then the average 
charges increase can be no more than 2.5%
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infrastructure charges. Limits on other charges, e.g. connection charges, are not laid 
down, but OFWAT would expect these charges to be reasonably related to costs.
The K factor indicates the percentage figures by which the water companies may raise 
their prices in each of the five years. For the customer, the K factor is modified by two 
other factors (Summerton, 1999): Firstly, inflation or deflation: for any given year the 
change in the retail price index is added. Secondly, there may be changes resulting from 
the rebalancing of charges between different types of customer.
OFWAT is responsible for ensuring that each company’s K continues to reflect the 
assumptions made when Ks were first set. Under certain limited circumstances the 
Director can adjust K without reference to the Secretary of State. Condition B of the 
Licence allows the Director to make, in any year, adjustments to a K factor for certain 
“relevant changes of circumstance” where they exceed, in total, 10% of turnover. For 
example: changes in the obligations placed on the companies; failure to achieve a legal 
obligation or a service standard; non-receipt of sale of surplus land assumed at the 
periodic review (OFWAT, 1991). Any interim reference notice must be issued by 1 
October and a determination made by OFWAT within three months. If a company is not 
happy with the outcome it can appeal to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
Individual K factors are related to what the Director considers companies would need to 
spend to fulfil their statutory obligation. They are ceilings on what companies can 
charge, and are based on the assumption that companies can achieve substantial 
increases in efficiency (OFWAT, 1992). There are some factors, which have a crucial 
effect on the K factor (Summerton, 1999):
(a) The cost of capital: the water regulator has become increasingly tough about the rate 
of return he will assume in making his decision, given the low-risk nature of the water 
business
(b) Efficiency: the water regulator believes improvements of 3 to 4 % a year are feasible 
between 2000 and 2005, with all the benefit enjoyed in the form of lower prices
(c) Maintenance and replacement of networks and equipment: the water regulator 
believes existing levels of expenditure are sufficient to preserve the status quo. Some 
companies’ assessments indicate that higher rates of capital maintenance and
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infrastructure renewals are needed to prevent a return to the deterioration of the 1970s 
and 1980s
(d) Comparative quality of service: the regulator proposes to reward the most effective 
companies by giving them more scope to increase their prices and, conversely, to 
penalise the least effective with less scope. The principle is to try to ape a competitive 
market in which profit gravitates to the companies that customers perceive to be 
offering the best value for money. The “least effective” companies argue that the 
regulator’s ways of measuring quality of service are too blunt for the job
(e) Efforts to establish customers’ views and to consult interest groups have been much 
more extensive. But there is a question of whether the regulator prefers the views of the 
OFWAT Customer Service Committees (which he appoints) to market-research 
evidence that customers would be content with a smaller price cut or more stable prices, 
as long as the extra income is spent on service and environmental improvements
(f) There is the interaction between metering and company income. The UK's 
government has decided to make water meters voluntary and prohibit disconnection as 
the ultimate deterrent against “won’t pays”
OFWAT ensures customers get a fair deal via the companies which have limited scope 
for increasing their dividends, unless they are able to increase their efficiency above 
what is allowed for in price limits (OFWAT, 1992). OFWAT (1994) divides the role of 
The Director of Water Services into two categories, primary duties and secondary duties 
as follows:
(a) The Director’s primary duties: He is required to act in a way he considers is best 
calculated to ensure that: the financial of a water and sewerage company, as specified in 
the Act, are properly carried out. Companies are able to finance their functions, in 
particular by securing a reasonable rate of return on their capital.
(b) The Director’s Secondary duties:
(i) Protecting customers: “customer’s bills should, in general terms, reflect the costs 
which the customer imposes on water and sewerage systems for a supply of clean water, 
disposal of dirty water and draining of surface water. Other aspects of customer’s 
interests are protected, including quality of service and benefits from the sale of land 
transferred to the companies at privatisation, or acquired since then”
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(ii) Promoting economy and efficiency: “the Director must encourage companies to 
operate efficiently. He monitors standards, compares performance between companies, 
against each company’s targets and with other sectors. The Director must give 
companies incentives to reduce operating costs and the cost of sustaining their assets, 
raise money cheaply, and complete environmental projects at low cost”
(iii) Competition: “the Director has a duty to facilitate competition between suppliers 
and potential suppliers, ensuring that a framework exists in which competitions can 
develop. He encouraged the Government to change the law, widening the scope for 
competition”
(iv) General Environmental duty: “the Director is required to exercise his power subject 
to achieve (among other things) “the future of conservation, enhancement of flora, fauna 
and geological or physiographical (landscape) features of special interest”
(v) Limiting charges: “the Director sets price caps, which allow the companies to 
finance their functions. This gives companies the incentive for greater efficiency. The 
Director does not control profits or dividends. The Director limits the annual price 
increase, or “K” factor, for each company to reflect what it needs to charge to finance 
the provision of services to customers”
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter highlights the importance of water as one of the most important public 
utilities. Furthermore, it ensures that the water industry is an extreme monopoly even if 
it is privatised. It raises the argument of privatisation or regulation in the water industry 
and it agrees that no one can give a clear answer on privatisation or regulation being the 
right decision for the water industry by looking to three countries having three different 
systems (England is a private "market", Egypt is a public "hierarchy" and France a 
mixture of privatisation and regulation "hybrids").
This chapter has given attention to the new tool of cost management in an indirect way,
1 3Qwhich is that of privatisation . This, is clear when the vocabulary of profit replaced the 
previous vocabulary of cost in the UK Water industry140. Furthermore, it has been 
stressed that management of water is a major political point. In addition, this chapter
139 See section 7.2.
140 When UK Water Authorities had to transform themselves from public sector to private sector.
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has raised the issue of centralisation vs. decentralisation and this become clear by 
comparison between the management of water in France141 and Egypt142.
This chapter raises some essential points about deficiencies in water utilities such as 
paying for water on a rateable value for domestic use and on metered value in the 
majority of business use in Egypt and England. The independence between price and 
cost prevents efficiency, in other words, there is a gap between accounting and 
economic theory and this leads the researcher to ask what is the role of accounting and 
why would accounting be useful in this situation? Furthermore, it highlights the 
dimension of social elements in the water industry, when explaining the objection to the 
new system which depends on meters. It exposes the dry future in Egypt and gives a 
brief history of water planning in Egypt (the case study of this research) which will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
141 In France, local authorities can choose either to run their water services directly or to com m ission this 
task from a private sector.
142 In Egypt, The Ministry o f Public Works and Water Resources is responsible for national water 
resources.
235
Chapter 8
Cost management in the GOGCWS
8.0 Introduction
As mentioned in sections 5.4 and 2.1, while technical (or contingent) explanations of 
cost management were not rejected, they were viewed as incomplete (Scott, 1987). This 
led the researcher to look at the institutional context within and outside the GOGCWS 
(see figure 5.1). The aim of this chapter is to describe the accounting system used in the 
"General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply" (GOGCWS), and its 
supervision and control body. It explores the question "which model of cost 
management was followed in the GOGCWS" and " what methods of cost accounting 
were used in the Egyptian water industry". The chapter examines the perceptions of the 
GOGCWS's managers of the organisation structure, cost accounting and cost 
management in the GOGCWS. The rationale for investigating the perceptions of the 
GOGCWS's managers is largely due to the argument in section 6.2.1.3. This argument 
is based on the premises that a single case study (such as the study of the GOGCWS) 
can yield valuable information about the topic under investigation by carrying out 
comparative study within the case organisation itself (e.g. the perceptions of employees 
in different departments). The chapter also explores the question “is there any difference 
or similarity between the rules and routines143 related to the cost accounting system that 
is followed by the GOGCWS”.
For this purpose, this chapter is divided into eight sections. The first section gives a 
brief discussion of the legal framework for public utilities in Egypt generally, with 
emphasis on the water industry. The second section describes the General Organisation 
for Greater Cairo Water Supply. It is opened by a brief history of the GOGCWS to 
highlight the change in the economic forms and the legal structure of the organisation. It 
also looks at the roles and the structure of the GOGCWS.
143 The term rules and routines used in the context as Burns and Scapens (2000) identified rules comprise 
the accounting systems as set out in the procedure manuals, whereas routines are the accounting practices 
in use.
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The third section examines the organisational structure of the GOGCWS in reality and 
identifies it with institutional theory. The fourth section gives a brief discussion of the 
supervision and control body of the "General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water 
Supply" whether internal (Department of the inspection, financial and managerial 
control, etc), external (the Cairo region and the Accounting Central Institution, etc).and 
financial or technical control.
The fifth section discusses the accounting system in the GOGCWS. It highlights the 
objectives, the notions and the contents of The Unified Accounting System144. It studies 
the general standard followed in preparing the Unified Accounting System and its 
accounting transactions. This section outlines the role of the cost accounting system in 
the GOGCWS.
The sixth section aims to explain the methods of cost accounting used in the Egyptian 
water industry. In other words, this section gives a brief summary of the cost accounting 
system's background in the GOGCWS; its description, cost recognition and 
measurement and reporting procedures. Furthermore, this section has looked at whether 
there are any differences or similarities between the rules (documentations) and routines 
(practices) in this cost accounting system.
The seventh section aims to explore the question "which model of cost management was 
followed by the GOGCWS". In other words, this section looks at "whether there was 
any use or potential use of throughput accounting, benchmarking, programme planning 
and budgetary systems, activity based costing, activity based management, strategic 
management accounting, etc in the GOGCWS. The section also discusses alternatives to 
cost management as suggested by consultants Black and Veatch International. It also 
discusses perceptions of the GOGCWS managers' towards the issue of cost 
management.
The final section (eight) highlights the conclusion of this chapter.
144 The accounting system which is followed in GOGCWS.
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8.1 The Legal framework for public utilities in Egypt
The water public utility in Egypt was centrally controlled145, but varies widely in 
institutional organisations. The largest city, Cairo, was designated through presidential 
decree as “General Organisation” with a corporate structure and regional responsibility. 
It was, however, subject to the control of both the governor and the Ministry of Housing 
and Public Utilities (MHPU). Most local utility organisations were administered 
through regions.
While public utilities in Egypt were managed, staffed and operated on a local or 
regional level, there was an excessive amount of central control (see section 8.4: the 
supervision and control body on the GOGCWS), lack of qualified technical support and 
inadequate budgeting by the GOE (Government of Egypt) ministries. Local utility 
organisations lack sufficient powers to make management, financial and personnel 
decisions (Cooper, 1992). Local authority and popular councils frequently complain 
about poor communication and poor service from the GOGCWS organisation and 
therefore often object to proposals for tariff increases or payment for central agency 
services (Cooper, 1992).
The water sector in Egypt was a nationalised programme. All policy making, planning, 
budgeting and administration for utilities in the country was carried out under the 
Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities. Each utility was required to use a centrally- 
mandated cost accounting method (see section 8.6) which was manual rather than 
computerised. The Ministry of Finance also seconded accountants to GOGCWS to 
ensure compliance with the government requirements.
Civil service rules prevented managers from discharging employees except for criminal 
acts. Wage and salary levels were too low146 to attract and keep good operators. No 
career development programmes had been developed. There was little incentive for 
operators to be productive or to work efficiently.
145 See section 8.4.
146 Comparing with the private sector.
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Public utilities in Egypt were generally established as public authorities. The President 
of the Republic issued the decisions necessary for creating, empowering and organising 
public utilities and public departments (Act 146 of the Constitution). Under Law 43 (the 
law of Local Government System) units of local administration establish and manage all 
utilities under their jurisdiction with the exception of national public utilities or those of 
a special nature as designated by the'President. Executive regulations of the Ministry of 
Local Administration defined local utilities which Governors might establish and 
operate. Governors had authority over all public utilities within their region. A 
Governor had the authority of a Minister regarding review and approval of all actions by 
a local utility and its board of directors. This was also a provision of article 1 of law 
43/1979 regarding juristic powers of local government.
A public utility, by definition, was an enterprise created by a government agency, for 
the implementation of a common interest/purpose such as satisfaction of the needs of 
the people in compliance with the principle of equality of users (Cooper Report, 
1992)'47.
Public authorities were established by Presidential decree under law No. 61/1963. The 
General Authority had the right to contract, undertake execution of work, and act in 
order to achieve the goals for which it was established. The authority was represented 
by the Chairman of its Board of Directors in all relationships with other entities and in 
court. A General Authority could be merged with other authorities or be cancelled by 
Presidential decree only.
A General Authority was usually established to manage a public utility. All their assets, 
monies and properties were considered to be public. All laws and regulations (see 
section Al.2.1) concerning public domain applied to them, unless stated otherwise in 
the enabling decree. A General Authority was permitted its own budget, based on any 
conditions in the Presidential decree. The budget was prepared by the Chairman and
147 The researcher does not have this resource but found two pages inside the GOGCWS discussing the 
organisations legal background and used information from the end o f these two pages (source: Cooper 
Report- 15 October 1992).
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approved by the Board of Directors. The central agency for accounting supervised all 
budget and accounting activities.
An authority could establish its own internal regulations without having to abide by 
government regulations, and could write regulations concerning the hiring of its staff, 
its workers, their promotion, dismissal, salaries, benefits and pensions. If delegation of 
these matters was not included in the presidential decree, the authority must abide by 
government regulations concerning employment. It should be noted that ministerial 
review and supervision was limited to general and decision-making affairs, and not to 
the daily workings of a General Authority.
The water utility in Cairo was created as a public authority under law No. 61/1963. It 
operated directly under the local authority and had autonomy to operate independently, 
except that tariffs were approved by the ministries. Annual funding was through the 
State budget and personnel policies were strictly regulated by the region (local 
authority).
8.2 The description of the GOGCWS
8.2.1 A brief history of the GOGCWS
• On 17 May 1865, the joint-stock company149 of Cairo Water was given a mandate 
for providing water to Cairo City for 99 years.
• On the first of July 1957 a law was introduced (No. 145/ 1957) to nationalise the 
joint-stock company of Cairo Water and establish Cairo Water Service which 
answered to the municipal council of Cairo City.
• In January 1958, Gizera water and Helwan joined the Cairo Water Service.
• In January 1964, Amada water was brought under the management of the Cairo 
Water Service.
• On 28/11/1965 the president of Egypt issued the order (No. 4417/ 1965) which 
transferred the management of the Cairo Water Service to an Egyptian stock 
company called "Greater Cairo Water" which answered to The General Egyptian 
Institution for Services Work.
148 The Accounting Central Institution was responsible for controlling and auditing the revenues and 
expenses (see section 8.4.2.6).
149 This company was managed by England (foreign company).
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• On 30/11/1968, the decision of the Egyptian president was issued (No. 1683) to 
establish " General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply" which answered 
to the Ministry of Housing.
• On 17/10/1971 the president of Egypt issued order (No. 2420) which declared that 
the General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply had to answer to the city's 
region.
• On 31/10/1991, the Prime Minister of Egypt issued an order (1655/ 1991) to include 
Maser Elgededa water in the General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply.
From the previous brief history, it was clear that the economic forms and legal structure 
of the GOGCWS were changed during their life starting as a foreign company, 
becoming a general institution, being transferred to a stock company and becoming 
finally an economic general organisation according to the order of the Prime Minister 
(No. 1039/ 1979). The GOGCWS was an economic organisation but it aimed to achieve 
a balance between expenditures and revenues, and not to make capital profit like the 
private sector.
8.2.2 The role (activities) of the GOGCWS
The General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply was responsible for 
managing water utilities in the cities of Cairo, Kalubia and Giza and its related 
organisations (and was also responsible for operation, and maintenance for utilities 
which were answerable to the organisation). The Presidential Decree No. 1938 of 1968; 
concerning establishing the General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply, 
stated that the organisation was responsible to establish, operate, and manage the water 
station in order to achieve its aims. Furthermore, the GOGCWS produced the following 
types of water:
(a) Fresh water150 (see section Al.2.2)
(b) Industrial water151
150 The GOGCWS established water stations which were necessary to provide fresh water for Greater 
Cairo (around 25% o f the population in Egypt) and any new areas in the scope o f  Greater Cairo whether 
for domestic use or service use. These included worship centres, charitable associations, bakeries, 
popularity squares, young peoples care centres, embassies, sports, clubs, unions and party centres. In 
addition it provided water to the governmental sector, public business sector, companies, commercial 
shops and different institutions and organisations.
151 The GOGCWS produced water which was not suitable for drinking and used it in industry. This water 
was less clean than fresh water and the production o f  it depended on the clarification method. There were 
several kinds o f  industrial water, which depended on the amount o f  chlorinate added.
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(c) Irrigation waters152
The main structure of the GOGCWS could be summarised in figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: The Structure of the GOGCWS
The main structure of the GOGCWS
Activating and maintaining 
water purification stations, 
establishing new stations and 
also developing some present 
stations.
Setting in operation and maintaining 
reservoirs for use in peak time and 
establishing and running the storage 
facilities to overcome high 
differences in water levels.
Running and maintmning the 
main and subsidiary water 
distribution dragnets and 
replacement and renewal of the 
present dragnets.
Establishing and developing the 
laboratories within the stations 
which control water quality, 
ensuring that the water has no 
pollutants according to 
international health standards.
Source: Based on the GOGCWS (no date source given, c), p. 7
8.3 The organisation structure of the GOGCWS
The organisation structure consisted of a Chairman and two Vice Chairmen. Each of 
these were answerable to their central and general administrations - and a group of 
department were answerable directly to the chairman (see the organisation structure of 
the GOGCWS153 in section A1.2.3).
The organisation had a hierarchical structure. The base of the organisation consisted of 
departments, then administrations, general administrations, central administrations (for 
the function of the board of directors and central administration of the GOGCWS, see 
section Al.2.3), etc.
152 The least clarified water was used in garden irrigation.
153 The organisation structure was taken from the administration o f  the organisation and management at 
the GOGCWS.
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The investigation of this research has focused on the perceptions of the GOGCWS 
managers154. The sample study included all managerial levels (high or senior managerial 
level "H", medium or middle managerial level "M" and low or junior managerial level 
"L"). The basis for this classification is the job of the respondents155. The Chairman, the 
two Vice Chairmen and each chief of administration are classified as high level 
managers. This represents 20% of the sample (10 respondents). Each chief of a 
department and member of staff working in administration are classified as middle level 
managers. This represents 26% of the sample (13 respondents). The staff who work at 
the operating levels are classified as low level managers. This represents 54% of the 
sample (27 respondents)
For an illustration of how the GOGCWS is organised: see table 8.1
Table 8.1: Perceived organisation of the GOGCWS (N =50)
Organisation of the GOGCWS
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
According to the nature of the production process 10% 12% 16% 38%
According to the nature of geographic areas — 2% 14% 16%
According to the nature of the market served — 2% - - - 2%
Others 10% 10% 24% 44%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis of questionnaire.
The researcher saw these different answers were due to the complexity of the water 
environment (see the GOGCWS's law and decrease in section A1.2.1.1 and figure 
A1.6), which created different perceptions between different managerial levels of the 
GOGCWS. For example, staff who work in the calculations of revenues and costs for 
each region of Cairo tended to choose "the nature of geographic areas" as the basis of 
the existing organisation structure of the GOGCWS. However, there is even a different 
perception among the same managerial level of the GOGCWS. For example, half of the 
high managerial level chose "according to the production process" and the other half 
chose "others" which is a combination of production process and geographic areas.
154 For the rationale for investigating the managers perceptions o f  the GOGCWS, see sections 6.2.13 and 
8 .0 .
155 For employee position (name and job o f  people who filled in the questionnaire) see table A2.1.
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Similarly, differences exist among the medium managerial level, 12% chose "nature of 
production process", while 10% chose "other" with 2% choosing "nature of geographic 
areas" and "nature of market served" respectively.
For a description of the control structure at the GOGCWS how do you describe the 
control structure at your company/division? see table 8.2
Table 8.2: Perceived control structure of the GOGCWS (N =50)
Control structure
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
Investment centre - - - 4% — 4%
Profit centre — 10% 10%
Contribution centre — 2% — 2%
Cost centre 16% 8% 30% 54%
Others 4% 12% 14% 30%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis of questionnaire.
This was not unexpected result - just over half of the respondents (54%) saw the control 
structure as the cost centre - because the Unified Accounting System divided the 
production into Production Centre, Productive Services Centres, Marketing Services 
Centres, and Administrative and Financial Services Centres. So this caused the control 
structure to be focused on cost. There were two kinds of control structure at the 
GOGCWS; external control (95% of respondents mentioned this control - observation 
from the interviews) and internal control156 (only 73% of respondents mentioned it - 
observation from the interviews). This came from high pressure for the GOGCWS to 
satisfy legislative requirements and led to the question "is the accounting system 
designed to achieve efficiency and optimisation for the company primarily or to satisfy 
legislative requirements primarily"? (see chapter 9). Furthermore, the researcher did not 
observe economic efficiency or 'pareto optimal' but there were efficiency controls or
• 157effective controls and pareto improvements in the organisation .
156 The role o f  internal control is too limited, it is checked only on signature, but this research would like 
the internal control to be able to discover the mistakes which the external control did not discover 
(Accountant in Central Accounts Department).
157 Accountant in Participating Accounts Administration said there was a procedure o f  control and no 
practice control at the same time.
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Regarding the question how does the control structure fit within the organisation 
structure? see table 8.3
Table 8.3: Perception of how control structure fits within the organisation
structure (N =50)
How Control structure fits within 
the Organisation structure
Managerial level Total
High Medium Low
A good fit 2% 4% 14% 20%
Reasonable fit 10% 12% 30% 52%
Problematic fit 8% 10% 10% 28%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
It can be observed from table 8.3 above, that 72% of respondents indicated that there 
was a "reasonable or good" fit between the control structure and organisation structure. 
However, just over half of the respondent's - observation from the interview - said it
1 58was not reasonable. This findings led the researcher to ask the interviewees why the 
control structure did not fit with the organisation structure of the GOGCWS. The 
interviewees stated that there were several explanations for the unsuitability of the 
control structure, such as; "the structure is built on favouritism"159, "is unchangeable"160, 
"executive command is bad"161, "the structure is bureaucratic"162, "is centralised"163 and 
"like a pyramid"164, "the problem is abuse of power"163.
Regarding "change in the organisation structure", the majority of respondents (90%) - 
observation from the interviews - stated there had been no substantial changes in the
158 The answer from the interviewees.
159 Accountant in participating Accountants Administration.
160 Accountant (Central Accounts Department).
161Chief o f  Bills Auditing and Stamp Department.
162 Accountant in Cost Department.
163 Accountant (Documentary Credit Department)
164 Chief o f  Documentary Credit Department.
165 Auditing (Maturities Department).
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organisation structure but there had been developments in the technical and legal aspect, 
although no developments regarding the financial and administration aspect except for 
very small changes such as; establishing new administrations and raising new managers.
There was a plan to change the organisation structure in the GOGCWS but nothing 
materialised166. The GOGCWS suggested a new organisation structure167 and sent it to 
the Accounting Central Institution but the Accounting Central Institution did not 
acknowledge it168. One accountant in the Central Department stated "if we want to 
change we should change the people not the structure". The researcher saw this answer 
as meaning it was extremely important to change the belief (attitude) of the worker as 
well as the structure. Furthermore, this raised the issue that organisation structural 
arrangements were as likely to be the outcomes of political processes as were 
organisational resource allocation decisions" (Pfeffer, 1978).
8.4 The supervision and control body on the GOGCWS
The General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply followed several control 
procedures. These procedures could be internal or external and also within these either 
technical or financial.
8.4.1 The internal control
8.4.1.1 The technical control (examination of production quality)
The general administration for laboratories and research of GOGCWS supervised the 
technical aspect of all the organisation and its workers. Each laboratory in the stations 
supervised and controlled the water at all stages of water purification; the subsidiary 
stations and also each laboratory controlled the dragnets, which were provided by the 
station.
On that basis, the laboratory's station was responsible for controlling water treatment 
operations to ensure that the water produced was suitable for drinking, and following it 
to dragnets until reached the customer, according to health standards.
166 Accountant (participating accounts Administration).
167 See the new organisation structure o f  the GOGCWS in figure A 1 .5.2.
168 C hief o f  Final Statement o f  Accounts and Follow-up.
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The control water treatment operations included chemical and biological examination of 
raw, filtered and treated water (every two hours). In addition, several searches and 
studies, which had no fixed system or programme, were carried out according to the 
circumstances of the work.
Regarding water quality control, each of the GOGCWS's stations had a laboratory 
which carried out examinations of water treatment. These examinations are represented 
in figure 8.2
Figure 8.2: Water Quality Control
Sterilisation of dragnets 
and reservoirs before 
operating
Filtration of water treated
every two hours
Carrying 
bacteriological, and biological 
examinations water from the 
Nile
out chemical,
Source: Based on the GOGCW S, (no date source given, c), p. 12
In addition, the GOGCWS had the biggest central laboratory in the Middle East - the 
capital cost of which was 250 million Egyptian pounds. The laboratory consisted of 
three sub-laboratories to measure all kinds of pollution and to provide immediate 
treatment.
Figure 8.3: Water quality control
to discover any pollution 
of^ie water whether
to determine
Bacteria and fungusinsecticidal or herbicidal The percentage of chlorinate.
The second laboratory 
(microbiology)
The first laboratory The third laboratory
Source: Based on the GOGCW S, (no date source given, c), p. 12
8.4.1.2 The financial control
The inspection of the financial and managerial administration was considered the main 
system for internal control of the GOGCWS. It gave direction and reduced the
variances . Its work included all the GOGCWS's activities (technical, financial and 
managerial). In general the functions of the inspection of financial and managerial 
administration were as follows (Accounting Central Institution, no date source given):
• Setting internal audit rules for financial and administrative research and follow up 
procedures to ensure the efficiency of workers' performance in production and 
services, follow up of achievements, discovery of mistakes and the difficulties 
which face the GOGCWS. Setting internal audit rules show incapabilities in 
carrying out the legal regulations, suggest solutions and show the different variance 
to reduce these immediately.
• Making random periodical inspections of activities and works' administrations of the 
GOGCWS and preparing the necessary reports (which include the results of 
research) to send to the chiefs of these administrations. After approval of these 
reports from the chief of the committee, the recommendations and suggestions in the 
reports will be carried out.
8.4.1.2.1 The performance of the inspection of financial and managerial 
administration's functions
Although the Department of the Inspection of Financial and Managerial Control was 
considered the fundamental control system inside the GOGCWS, and was responsible 
for ad-hoc inspection in all areas and administration of the GOGCWS, it had not 
received due recognition from the GOGCWS' administration (Accounting Central 
Institution, 1994: p. 61). This led to a lack of factors could have helped the 
administration to achieve its aims. In addition, there were some obstructions and 
difficulties which faced the inspection of financial and managerial administration to 
achieve effective internal control. These difficulties could be summarised as follows 
(Accounting Central Institution, 1994: 62):
- The lack of technical human ability in administrative areas (the inspection of financial 
and managerial administration).
- The absence of due care by the GOGCWS's administration.
- The lack of suitable means of transportation for administration workers.
169 In term o f  activity not the variance occurred from procedures.
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- The absence of collaboration between the GOGCWS administrations.
8.4.2 The external control
The GOGCWS followed technical supervision and control from the general 
administration for central laboratories within the Health Ministry, and it also followed 
financial control from several institutions. The style of external control may be 
illustrated as follows:
8.4.2.1 The technical control (examination of quality production)
The external control on water production in the GOGCWS was through the central 
administration within the Health Ministry which did chemical analysis and 
bacteriological analysis. The health supervisors took and analysed samples of treated 
water.
8.4.2.2 The financial control
There were several institutions which were responsible for financial control on the 
General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply namely:
- The Cairo region.
- Finance Ministry (treasury department).
- Ministry of planning.
- The Accounting Central Institution.
Every institution had its role and worked separately from the others. The role of each 
can be summarised as follows (Accounting Central Institution, no date source given):
8.4.2.2.1 The Cairo region
The General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply was one of many 
organisations which had to answer to the Cairo region in the administrative affairs and 
workers affairs of the organisation. In addition, the Governor of Cairo City determined 
the price170 of water sold by the GOGCWS.
170 The researcher made great effort to get an appointment with the Governor o f  Cairo City in order to 
obtain information o f  how the price o f  water was set. However, he was unable to gain access which 
limited the research.
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8.4.2.2.2 The Finance Ministry (before buying)
A Finance Ministry delegate171 was responsible for controlling purchasing before 
buying (allowing or not allowing to spend), control and supervision of the budget of 
GOGCWS, controlling all the accounting and calculation procedures and ensuring that 
it was identical to the laws, rules and procedures of the GOGCWS. The GOGCWS gave 
accounts to the Finance Ministry - within a time period determined by the Treasury 
Ministry, which was monthly, quarterly, and annually according to the rules, leaflets, 
and periodic publications which were issued by the Finance Ministry.
8.4.2.2.3 Ministry of Planning
The Ministry of Planning confirmed the medium term (five years) plan and the annual 
plan for the GOGCWS. In addition, it gave approval to the annual assignment of funds 
which the GOGCWS asked for in relation to all items in the budget.
8.4.2.2.4 The Accounting Central Institution
The Accounting Central Institution was responsible for controlling purchasing after 
buying supplies for the GOGCWS. It was responsible for controlling and auditing the 
revenues and expenses. The most important elements that were audited are as follows:
- The control of salaries, bonus and wages172.
1 7 ^- The control of general expenditures .
- The control of investment expenses174.
171 This person works for the GOGCWS but reports to the Finance Ministry.
172 The control o f  salaries, bonus and wages were controlled through seeing the balance sheet o f  the 
GOGCWS and also identifying the number and level o f  seniority by personnel records kept and compared 
between expenditure documents - salaries, bonus and wages - with personnel and salary records. Auditing 
o f  the internal control for wages and salaries was carried out. Employees files were checked and decisions 
made relating to appointment, bonus, leave without salaries and suggestions for avoiding mistakes in the 
future.
173 By seeing the projected budget and its distribution to the branches, different administrations examined 
the system used to distribute these funds. The internal system and rules which determined the expenditure 
were checked to ensure that all expenditure was according to the rules. Ensured that all expenditure 
documents relating to rents, travelling, petty expenses were correct.
174 Ensuring that the procedures relating to expenditures were correct and documentation relating to these 
was available by looking at the plan. Ensuring that expenditures were made according to the GOGCWS's 
plan and furthermore that expenditures were limited to the approved expenditure and not exceeded. 
Finding out why the limit was exceeded if  this did happen.
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- The control of the organisation's revenues1'3.
1 7 f \- The control of financial statements .
8.5 The Accounting system in the GOGCWS
The main development of accounting in Egypt can be divided into two stages: 
bookkeeping and accounting stages. In the bookkeeping stage, the double entry notion 
was followed in records, which were represented in an original "journal" connection 
with the subsidiary journal. Different kinds of business were recorded and carried over 
to the ledgers general and subsidiary which included classification for these entries to 
personal and named accounts. Thompson (1994: 51) argues that towards the end of the 
15th century, double-entry book-keeping was part of a "larger project to re-emphasise a 
belief in order sanctified by god". Then financial statements and the balance sheet was 
derived from the personal and named accounts.
The Unified Accounting System - the system which was followed in the GOGCWS - 
was established at this stage. In the accounting stage, the accounting information -
1 77which the economic organisation used to meet their aims - was connected with the 
requirements of external institutions.
8.5.1 Objectives, notion and contents of the Unified Accounting System
In spite of the Unified Accounting System meeting certain purposes within the
1 7Rorganisation, it was not conceivable that it could meet all the requirements of
175 Examining the internal auditing system, studying laws, ministerial decisions, rules relating to the 
revenues o f  the GOGCWS. Examining the collection system, evaluating it and suggesting any 
modifications. Comparing the actual collected revenues with the revenues which should be collected and 
studying the reasons for failure and suggesting solutions for that.
176 Ensuring that financial statements and balance sheets were prepared according to the rules issued by 
the Finance Ministry.
177 The Unified Accounting System was applied on
(1) The economic organisation within the public sector (with exception, by law, o f  banks, credit 
companies and insurance companies). The definition o f  the economic organisation, which had to apply 
the Unified Accounting System, was that "the unity which is practising industrial activity, business 
activity, agriculture activity, landed activity or any activity had economic characteristics"
(2) The general organisation or institution which had to, by law, prepare the balance sheet as a business 
balance sheet even if  it did not have any economic activity
The economic organisation in the public sector took different kinds o f  forms such as (a) general 
institution or organisation (b) public sector company (c) co-operative society or (d) subsidiary company
178 See section 8.6.
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planning and following up the execution of financial, economic and technical control 
(The GOGCWS, no date source given, b: 4). The objectives of the Unified Accounting 
System could be summarised as follows: (a) Providing the essential information and 
analytic tools which were a requirement for planning, execution, and controlling at 
different levels179 (b) It provided the link between the accounts of the economic 
organisation and the national accounts. The Unified Accounting System combined the 
terminology and concepts between the accountant of the economic organisation and the 
national accountant (c) It simplified the collection of accounting information and its 
classification and therefore recording it was easier.
The notion and contents of the Unified Accounting System are illustrated in figure 8.4.
179 The level o f organisation: The Unified Accounting System provided information, which helped in 
control, supervision and direction. In addition it participated in planning.
The level o f external institution: The Unified Accounting System helped the Ministry o f  planning to 
achieve integration between the budget in kind (the budget in kind contained the goods requirements, the 
service requirements and workers. It was called the budget in kind because it expressed by quantities 
before translating it to cash values), the financial budget, and the cash budget with the period horizons 
(short, medium, and long term) which were consistent with national plans.
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Figure 8.4: Contents of the Unified Accounting System 
Unified Accounting System
System Accounting Unified
i
It had "^ a sp ec ific It contained financial accounting, cost It united ' ' ( a )  the
arrangem ent to  record the accounting and m anagem ent accounting. finan cia l year (b) the
accounting inform ation * Financial accounting accoun ting  in dex  (c)
on  the lev e l o f  the T he U nified  A ccoun ting  System the fundam entals,
econ om ic organisation, contained -financial accounting- the rules, term in o logy
prepare the financial fundam entals, rules, term inology, and accounting
statem ents and the defin itions, accounts and financial d efin ition s (d ) the
planning budget statem ents that w ere com bined  on the accounts and
accord ing to fundam ental level o f  the econ om ic organisations. finan cia l statem ents
rules, term in ology  and * Cost accounting and (e )  the planning
defin ition to ach ieve The U nified  A ccoun ting  System budget
certain180 ob jectives included the basis, important rules,
term inology and defin itions.
* Management accounting
The U nified  A ccoun ting  System  had the
basis and rules o f  control w hich  w ere the
requirem ents o f  m anagem ent accounting
Source: Based on the GOGCW S, (no date source given, c), p. 10
The Unified Accounting System was built on general standards. These were:
(a) The simplicity181, clarity182 and flexibility183 standards
(b) Honouring of the accounting rules and principles standards184 (see section A l.2.4.1)
180 See section 8.6
181 Simplicity. It concentrated on financial accounting.
182 Clarity. It gave a detailed explanation o f  the Accounting index (see section A 1.2.4.2) which was 
considered as the main resource information.
183 Flexibility. It used special records to record any details which were work requirements.
184 These were considered the basis o f  records in the assets evaluation and goods inventory (the cost o f  
fixed assets were represented by all the capital expenditures for purchasing and preparing the fixed asset 
to work. There was a difference between the new fixed assets purchased and the old fixed assets 
purchased) and depreciation (the depreciation was calculated annually whether the result o f  the activity 
was loss or profit. The straight-line method was used in the cost accounting system in the GOGCWS with 
the exception that the usage related method was used for stationary, etc. in the end o f  each financial year). 
These principles and rules were approved by the convention. So, the preparation o f  the Unified  
Accounting System was built on existing rules and fundamentals.
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(c) The verified standards of implementation1 OJ
(d) Satisfied all the requirements which were created from inside or outside of the 
economic organisation.
The Unified Accounting System also gave freedom of choice regarding the manner in 
which documents were circulated within the organisation. It depended on several 
conditions such as the nature of activity, the size of the organisation and the kind of 
information required. In addition, the Unified Accounting System gave some examples 
of records or guidance which were not obligatory.
8.6 Cost accounting System
The aims of cost accounting in the GOGCWS could be summarised from the 
documentation of the organisation as follows (the GOGCWS, no date source given, c):
(1) Perfect control of production costs and the uses of production factors
(2) Providing the right basis to evaluate the finished production, uncompleted 
production and the work under implementation at the end of financial period
(3) Providing accounting information according to the planning budget (responsibility 
centres and cost centres)
(4) Helping to set policy and decision-making procedures at all levels (from the 
economic organisation to the national level)
(5) The cost accounting system recorded the actual cost186 relating to production and 
costs according to the centres and stages.
The aims of cost accounting in the GOGCWS were compared with the aims of cost 
accounting which were mentioned in section 5.1.2. It was observed that the aims of cost 
accounting (from a theoretical viewpoint) could be summarised in three ways: (a) stock 
valuation (b) planning control and (c) decision-making (Clark, 1923; Drury and
185 It gave a chance for the economic organisation to study the system project before it was issued. All 
economic organisations were obliged to apply the Unified Accounting System from the beginning o f  year 
67/68 with the possibility o f  a one year delay for any economic organisation that requested it, but on 
condition it had the permission o f  The Accounting Central Institution.
186 Actual cost means in this context historical cost. The calculation o f  the cost o f  water per cubic meter 
was as follows: costs were calculated for each centres separately - The Unified Accounting System in the 
GOGCWS divided the production into: (a) Production Centres (b) Productive Services Centres (c) 
Marketing Services Centres (d) Administrative and Financial Services Centres - which depended on the 
actual (historical) cost. The cost o f  each centre was added together in order to get the total cost and finally 
the total cost on the water production was divided in order to obtain the cost per cubic meter.
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Dugdale, 1992; Coward, 1944; Frank, 1990; Cooper and Kaplan 1991; 1992). These 
were similar to the aims of cost accounting in the GOGCWS. For example, the heart of 
the first, third and fifth aims of cost accounting in the GOGCWS were planning and 
control. The focal point of the second and fifth aims were stock valuation and the core 
idea of the fourth aim was decision-making. On the other hand, it was observed there 
was a limitation in the aims of cost accounting in the GOGCWS because it depended on 
historical costs relating to traditional management accounting (for further explanation of 
this point, see section 9.2.1.1). Furthermore, this suggested that cost information had no 
role or a very limited role in shaping the strategy of the GOGCWS (see section 9.2.1.3).
Although the records of cost accounting systems in the GOGCWS depended on 
historical costs, which were useful for knowing the direct and indirect actual costs for 
the production unit and controlling and monitoring of performance. Furthermore, the 
record of GOGCWS was divided into four main groups as follows: (1) Records for 
financial accounts (2) Records data for financial accounts (3) Records value group 
relating to inventory control (4) Records related to costs. This research concentrated on 
the records related to cost (a brief summary of its contents as given in section A l.2.4.3). 
This section is divided into seven sub-sections as follows:
8.6.1 Cost accounting development and the needs
For an illustration of the development of cost accounting - how was the cost accounting 
system developed? - see table 8.4
Table 8.4: Development methods of the cost accounting system (N =50)
Development of cost 
accounting system
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
In-house 14% 22% 22% 58%
Contractor • 6% 2% 26% 34%
Software package — — — —
Customer prepared — — — —
Borrowed from another agency — — — —
Others — 2% 6% 8%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis o f  questionnaire.
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From table 8.4 above, it could be observed that 58% of the respondents chose "in- 
house" as a method of development of the cost accounting system. This result is 
consistent with the analysis of the documentation of the GOGCWS. The UAS (which 
includes the cost accounting system, see figure 8.4) was imposed on the GOGCWS by 
government regulation (see section 8.5).
On the topic of what standards are used for your cost accounting activity?, see table 8.5 
Table 8.5: Standards used for cost accounting system (N =50)
Standards of cost accounting
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
Agency standards 2% 2% 8% 12%
Government cost accounting standards 12% 8% 26% 46%
Generally accepted accounting principles — — — —
Others 6% 16% 20% 42%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
These answers highlighted the effect of legislation on cost practice (see section 9.2.2.3). 
They also raised the question of why the respondents answered differently. In order to
1 &7explore this question, the percentage (42%) of others was analysed, due to it being 
the second highest percentage, following the 46% which stated government cost 
accounting standards.
The question is this cost system adequate for your needs? is illustrated in table 8.6
Effect o f legislation on cost practice in the GOGCW S (N =21)
A verage o f previous 
years.
Technical Comm ittees within 
GOGCW S.
There is no 
standard
I do not know
26% 8% 4% 4%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
These answers - (26%) stated that the standards used for the GOGCWS were the average o f  previous 
years - and did not conflict with the answers o f  - 46%, which stated government cost accounting 
standards. It could have been that the standards used for cost accounting in the GOGCWS related to 
government cost accounting standards based on the average for the previous year.
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Table 8.6: Adequacy of the cost accounting system (N =50)
Adequacy of the cost 
accounting system
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
No needs — - — 4% 4%
Few needs 12% 4% 14% 30%
Most needs 8% 18% 22% 48%
All needs - - - 4% 12% 16%
I do not know — — 2% 2%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
The analysis of adequacy of the cost accounting system above shows that the majority 
of respondents (48%) viewed the cost accounting system within the GOGCWS as 
adequate for most of their needs. It was noted that at senior managerial level 60% (12% 
/ 20%) perceive the cost accounting system as adequate only for few needs. The senior 
managerial levels have more an overview of the GOGCWS and this could account for 
this result.
8.6.2 Changes in cost management
On the topic of the cost method being revised in the GOGCWS "Has there been a major 
revision to the method used in the GOGCWS for estimating and measuring product 
cost?", see table 8.7
Table 8.7: Any revision of methods used for estimating and measuring product
cost (N =50)
Yes 10%
No 86%
I do not know 4%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
This result was confirmed by the analysis of the documentation of the GOGCWS which 
showed that although the economic forms and legal structure organisation changed 
during the organisation's life (see section 8.2.1), there was no change in the cost
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method . This respondent’s answer raised the question “why was there no change?” 
(For more detail, see section 11.2.4). Unintentional changes to cost management in the 
GOGCWS "may occur in the absence of systems to monitor the execution of the 
routines where the rules and routines are not sufficiently understood or accepted by the 
actors" (Burns and Scapens, 2000: 10).
Regarding the question whether changes should be made in the cost department - 
observation from the interviews, 45% of interviewees could not comment or give any 
suggestions or advise about the cost department. Of the remaining interviewees, 55% 
highlighted some suggestions for the cost department such as:
(a) "Introduce computers"189 ("technology"190)191 and "excellent use of it"192
(b) "Design accurate planning before taking decisions"193 and "make the connection and 
integration between administrations in order to decrease the cost"194
(c) "Evaluate the booking value"195, "choose skilled workers"196 and "train them"197
(d) "Establish cost centres"198 and "control of the cost element"199, "look for the fairest 
way in cost distribution"200 and "give higher authority for the cost department"201, "it
909should be seen at the same level as the central administration"
188 The GOGCWS had followed the Unified Accounting System since the 1960s.
189 Accountant in the Cost Department, Accountant in the Participating Accounts Administration, and 
Accountant o f  the Statistics Department
190 Chief o f  Central Accounts Department and Chief o f  Balance Sheet Administration.
191 Observation from questionnaire, regarding the computer based configuration o f  the cost accounting 
system in the GOGCWS, 66% o f respondents chose a non automated system. On the topic o f  the principal 
method o f  data entry, the majority o f  respondents 92% chose manual.
192 Accountant in the Participating Accounts Department, Chief o f  the Bills Auditing and Stamp 
Department, Accountant in the Cost Department, Auditing and Accountant in the Cost Department.
193 The chief o f  the Balance Sheet Administration.
194 The chief o f  the Documentary Credit Department
195 Accountant in the deduction and Modifications Department
196 Accountant in the Participating Accounts Administration.
197 The chief o f  the Balance Sheet Administration.
198 Accountant in the Central Accounts Department. This was a very surprising result because it 
contradicted the analysis o f  the description o f  the control structure at the GOGCWS as mentioned 
previously. But the reason could be that, although the cost centre included in the rules (procedures) o f  the 
GOGCWS it disappeared from the routines (activities) o f  the organisation, and this goes back to the 
argument regarding the differences between rules and routines highlighted by Burns and Scapens (2000).
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There were two observations from this result. Firstly, half of the interviewees (50%) 
realised that the cost method was not appropriate for the GOGCWS and this was the 
first step to change. So the question raised again was “why was there no change?” (See 
the answer in section 11.2.4). Secondly, the interviewees were very fearful of talking 
against the policy of the government (the policy of the GOGCWS).
8.6.3 Measuring and estimating product cost
For the present method of measuring product cost How do you consider the present 
method o f  measuring product cost and practice?, see table 8.8
Table 8.8: Perception of measuring product cost (N =50)
Measuring product cost
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
Straightforward and simple 6% 12% 28% 46%
seems a reasonable compromise 2% — 6% 8%
Needs significant change 6% 4% 2% 12%
Need simplifying 6% 10% 16% 32%
Others — — 2% 2%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
Just under half of respondents 46%, chose straightforward and simple. Maybe the 
reason for this answer was that the cost accounting system depended on historical costs. 
Furthermore, the documentation of the GOGCWS (organisational rules of the 
GOGCWS) confirmed that the measuring of product costs depended on the actual 
(historical) costs. Moreover, the result showed that 44% of respondents stated that the
In addition to that the interviewees or the respondents sometimes gave their own opinion and other times 
gave the view o f the organisation and this could have created confusion.
199 Accountant in the Central Accounts Department
200 The vice chairman for Technical Affairs.
201 Accountant in the Cost Department.
202 Accountant in the Cost Department.
203 Most o f  the interviewees before they started the interview asked the researcher to keep the interview 
very confidential otherwise they were concerned they might be dismissed from their jobs.
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present method of measuring the product costs needed to change (whether simple or 
significant) and this answer achieved reliability when the researcher asked the 
respondents whether a cost system was adequate for their needs (see section 8.6.1). 
Regarding depreciation methods used in cost accounting system of the GOGCWS, what 
depreciation methods are used in your cost accounting system? The majority of 
respondents (98%) chose straight line. The perception of depreciation methods used in 
cost accounting systems of the GOGCWS were consistent with the actual method used.
On the topic of "measuring the cost of resources consumed", how do you measure the 
cost o f  resources consumed?, the majority of respondents (92%) stated according to 
actual cost. This answer was similar to the fifth aim of the cost accounting system of the 
rules (documentation) of the GOGCWS. So, this meant there was no difference between 
the rules (documentation) of the GOGCWS and the (routines) practices related to 
measuring the cost of resources based on historical cost.
8.6.4 Water Funding
The perception of competitive intensity of capital and financing for water in the 
GOGCWS is illustration in table 8.9.
Table 8.9: Perception of competitive intensity of capital and financing in the
GOGCWS (N =50)
Market Conditions
Competitive Intensity
1 2 3 4 5
1 Availability of 
funds
Easy to obtain 
funds
36% 34% 10% 10% 10% Hard to obtain 
funds
2 Source of funds Many sources 14% 56%
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10% 8% 12% One major 
source
Source: Analysis of questionnaire.
204 Although there was only one major source (the government) for funding (subsidisation) o f  water in the 
GOGCWS, it could have been answered this way because there were many institutions and organisations 
- e.g. the National Investment Bank, The Finance Ministry, Ministry o f  Planning, The Cairo region, etc, - 
represented the government. Also, there were a variety o f  customers such as: domestic, business, public, 
etc.
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This result showed the respondents' perception was that there was no difficulty in 
funding for water in the GOGCWS (observation from the questionnaire). Comparing 
this observation with the documentation of the GOGCWS, if the price of filtered water 
did not increase, the governmental subsidisation would be 73 7205 million E.P. annually 
(during 1999- 2003) (The GOGCWS, no date source given, a: 17). The GOGCWS 
would borrow this amount of money from The National Investment Bank (at 14% 
interest) and the result being that subsidisation will be 840 million E.P. The question 
here is "can the government provide subsidisation for the new investments and 
replacement, and renew the present system at the same time?” If the answer to the 
question was no, this meant the government should look at different methods for 
managing the water industry in the GOGCWS (opportunity cost).
The residents of Cairo had the lowest priced water (The GOGCWS, no date source 
given, a: 17). This may seem to have been a wise policy but it had some effects. The 
low price did not provide the GOGCWS with the financial resources to run, maintain 
and renew the system in order to provide the quantities of good quality water demanded 
by customers.
In conclusion, it was noted that there was a big problem in the finance and financial 
resources in the GOGCWS. Furthermore, there was a big difference between what the 
managers thought about the funding of the water in the GOGCWS and in reality.
8.6.5 Cost information, reporting and decision-making
8.6.5.1 Use of cost information
The question what statements describe how data from this cost accounting system are 
primarily used?, is illustrated in table 8.10
205 This means the government subsidised the GOGCWS by more than four and a quarter times their total 
revenue for 1999/2000 = 172,593,108.01 Egyptian pounds).
Table 8.10: Using data from cost accounting (N =50)
Using data from cost accounting
Managerial Level Total
%Yes % No % I do not know %
H M L H M L H M L
T o m anage an activ ity  or a program m e 14 12 20 6 14 32 — — 2 100
T o m easure program m e perform ance 10 12 22 10 14 26 — -- 6 100
T o determ ine se llin g  price -- . . . 6 20 26 48 -- -- . . . 100
T o va lu e inventory 20 10 42 . . . 14 8 — 2 4 100
T o valu e cost sa les 20 10 42 . . . 14 8 — 2 4 100
T o sa tisfy  leg is la tive  requirem ents 20 24 52 2 2 ---- — — 100
Source: Analysis of questionnaire.
This was not unexpected result for the researcher - 72% of respondents stated the data 
was used to value inventory and the same percentage stated the data was used to value 
cost of sales. This was because it was similar to the second aim of the cost accounting 
system which was providing the right basis to evaluate the finished production, 
uncompleted production and the work under implementation at the end of financial 
period. The majority of respondents 96% stated the data was used to satisfy legislative 
requirements (see section 9.2.2.3).
The researcher took the result of the analysis of the questionnaire, which highlighted 
that the data created from cost accounting was not used to determine the selling price. 
Further, by asking the interviewees "who determines the price of the water", they stated 
the selling price was determined outside of the organisation. Furthermore, it was noted 
that Cairo's governor determined the price of water in Cairo City and every governor 
determined the selling price of water in his/her city. The question raised here was "why 
does the governor determine the selling price?" The reason might be the effect of 
legislation which stated that water utilities in Egypt were subject to the control of both 
the governor and the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities (see section 8.1).
On the topic of to what extent is cost accounting data used in budget formulation?, see 
table 8.11
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Table 8.11: Using data from cost accounting in budget formulation (N =50)
Using data from cost 
accounting in budget
Managerial level Total
High Medium Low
Usually the basis of estimation 20% 24% 46% 90%
Rarely used 2% 8% 10%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
This answer was no different to the information in the documentation of the company, 
which said that the aim of cost accounting system was to provide accounting 
information according to the planning budget.
8.6.5.2 Reporting of cost accounting
The question for what purposes are reports generated from this cost accounting 
system?, is illustrated in table 8.12
Table 8.12: Reporting purposes of cost accounting data (N =50)
Managerial Level Total
%Yes % No % I do not know %
H M L H M L H M L
Financial reporting 20 22 52 —- 2 2 --- 2 — 100
Developing prices 4 2 16 16 24 38 — — — 100
Inventory control 10 14 30 10 10 24 — 2 — 100
Managerial control 2 18 26 18 8 28 — — — 100
Budget preparation 18 26 50 2 — 4 — --- — 100
Budget execution 6 10 16 14 16 38 — — — 100
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire, H =High level, M =M edium level, L =Low level.
This result (94% respondents stated yes for financial reporting) raised the question of 
whether the accounting system in the GOGCWS was designed to help financial 
accounting, management accounting or both. In addition, the majority of respondents 
(78%) stated no in developing prices. By asking the respondents what they meant by 
developing prices, they explained that costs should be considered when pricing and not 
necessarily for price to be based on cost.
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On the topic of who uses the reports generated from the cost accounting system ?, see 
table 8.13
Table 8.13: Users of cost accounting reports (N =50)
Users of cost accounting 
reporting
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
Financial managers 8% 22% 42% 72%
Budget analysts 6% — 4% 10%
Others 6% 4% 8% 18%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
This result indicated that the accounting system served financial accounting.
Regarding the level at which cost information flowed within the GOGCWS 
(observation from the interviews), the majority of interviewees (94%) said that the cost 
information goes to a high level of command. This result was the outcome of the 
professional hierarchical bureaucracy with which the GOGCWS was consistent.
8.6.5.3 Decision-making and cost management
On the topic of using cost information in decision-making in the GOGCWS 
(observation from the company's documentation) cost accounting helps to set the policy 
and decision making at all levels (see table 8.14).
Table 8.14: Use of cost accounting reports in decision-making (N =50)
Cost information %
Plays a part in decision making 55
Does not play any part in decision making 32
I do not know 13
Source: Analysis o f interviews
By analysing the percentage who answered that cost information plays a part in
0C\f\ •decision-making, 62% of them answered "I think". This means they were not actually
206 62% out o f  55% which has shown in table 8.14
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sure whether cost information played a part in decision-making, and they stated their 
answers on the opinion that senior management takes no decisions without looking at 
cost information.
8.6.6 Financial management system and cost accounting system
The question what financial management systems/functions are integrated with this cost 
accounting system?, is illustration in table 8.15
Table 8.15: Integration between financial management system and cost accounting
system (N =50)
Managerial Level Tot
a l
%
Yes % No % I do not know %
H M L H M L H M L
General ledger 20 22 44 4 8 — — 2 100
Programme accounting 18 26 46 2 8 — — — 100
Payroll 18 20 46 2 6 8 — — — 100
Inventory control 6 14 20 14 12 34 — — — 100
Property, plant and equipment 16 16 38 4 10 16 — — — 100
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire, H =High level, M =M edium level, L =Low  level.
Table 8.15 shows that the majority of respondents stated that the financial management 
systems were integrated with the cost accounting system of the GOGCWS. The reason 
for this answer may be that the GOGCWS followed the Unified Accounting System, 
which did not distinguish between financial, and cost accounting systems.
From the analysis of the interviews, in answer to the question are the elements o f  cost in 
your cost accounting system reconciled with your general ledger control accounts (e.g. 
labour to accrued payroll account)? Just under 44% of respondents answered monthly. 
Of the remaining respondents 20% answered others, 18% answered quarterly, 16% 
answered annually and 2% answered no.
8.6.7 Distinguishing between direct and indirect costs
From the analysis of the interviews, the majority of interviewees (84%) could not 
answer the question regarding how overhead costs were managed and allocated within 
the GOGCWS. Even the interviewees (16%) who answered the question, said they
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calculated the total cost for each centre each year and added these costs to the 
production centres. So, the researcher concluded that no one in the GOGCWS, 
including staff in the cost department, understood the procedures used in cost 
management.
In conclusion, the accounting system in the GOGCWS was linked to the financial 
accounting function and not the management accounting function. There were no 
substantial changes in the cost methods of the GOGCWS; furthermore, there were no 
differences between the rules (documentations) and the routines (practices) related to 
measuring the cost of resources. Cairo's governor determined the price of water in Cairo 
City (and every governor determines the selling price of water in his/her city). 
Essentially, the cost system reflects the organisational structure of the GOGCWS. The 
emphasis across the whole company had been limited to conventional budgetary control 
with full allocation of overheads.
Cost information went to senior management. Furthermore, cost information served 
several purposes, perhaps the most important was to satisfy legislative requirements. It 
can be argued that cost information was not the first element to be taken into 
consideration to determining the water's price as there was an effect of legislation on 
cost practice.
8.7 Cost management in the GOGCWS
In cost management literature, (evidence of renewed interest could be seen from the 
publication and reaction to Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). A great deal of recent cost 
management literature centred on activity-based costing (Banker and Hughes, 1994; 
Cooper and Kaplan, 1992; Datar and Gupta, 1994). However, other modem cost 
management tools such as benchmarking (Elnathan and Kim, 1995), and just-in-time 
inventory systems (Alles, et al., 1995) have also recently been examined. In order to 
achieve the aim of this section, it is divided into seven sub-sections.
8.7.1 Throughput accounting model
The use of throughput accounting in the General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water 
Supply (the biggest water organisation in Egypt can be seen in table 8.16).
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Table 8.16: Use of throughput accounting in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Planning
and
control
process
Managerial level
Use now % Plan to use 
in the 
future %
Used in the 
past, but 
not now %
Not used or 
planned to 
use at all %
I do not 
know % Total
%
H M L H M L H M L H M L H M L
Throughput
accounting
10 6 2 8 20 54 100
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire, H =High level, M =M edium level, L =Low  level.
Table 8.16 shows that the throughput accounting model was not used in the GOGCWS. 
Throughput accounting costs focus on the short term with overheads attributed from 
product accounting to usage of existing manufacturing bottlenecks. The result of 
questionnaires relating to throughput accounting was consistent with Dugdale, et al. 
(1996) who argued that the idea of building up product costs on the throughput 
accounting principle is probably impracticable (for the principle of throughput 
accounting, see section 4.1).
8.7.2 Benchmarking
Regarding the use of benchmarking in the GOGCWS is illustrated in table 8.17. 
Table 8.17: Use of benchmarking in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Planning
and
control
process
Managerial level
Use now % Plan to use 
in the 
future %
Used in the 
past, but 
not now %
N ot used or 
planned to 
use at all %
I do not 
know %
Total
%
H M L H M L H M L H M L H M L
Benchmark
-ing
2 4 10 6 12 2 12 20 20 2 10 100
Source: Analysis o f  questionnaire, H =High level, M  =M edium level, L =Low level.
The findings of this research (non-uses of benchmarking in the GOGCWS) was 
consistent with Clark and Merton (1997). They see benchmarking as a tool for 
management change. There was no change in the management process in the General 
Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply as observed from the interviews.
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The core idea of benchmarking was that performance should include three performance 
measures: (a) cost minimisation (b) cycle time minimisation (c) improvement of quality 
(see section 4.1). These three concepts were similar to the mission of the GOGCWS 
which was "To earn the trust and satisfaction of our customers and stakeholders by 
providing Greater Cairo with sufficient quantity of high quality water at fair price which 
contributes to the development of society" (Black and Veatch International, 1997: 4).
From the above results of the questionnaires related to benchmarking, its core idea, and 
the mission of the GOGCWS, a gap was observed between theory and practice. The 
model of cost management observed at the GOGCWS (or the design of the accounting 
system) did not give priority to cost management whereas the theory did give priority. 
The reason for this could have been the effect of the Government on cost accounting. 
This supported the argument of Geiger and Ittner (1996) which was that mandated 
government cost accounting systems were positively associated with cost system 
elaborateness, but were not associated with greater internal use of cost accounting data.
8.7.3 Budgeting
Budgeting played a crucial role in the water industry in Egypt, and particularly in the 
case of the GOGCWS, concerning the use of operational budgeting procedures in the 
GOGCWS (see table 8.18).
Table 8.18: Use of Operational and Capital budgeting in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Managerial level
Planning 
and control 
process
Use now % Plan to use 
in the 
future %
Used in the 
past, but 
not now %
Not used or 
planned to 
use at all %
I do not 
know %
Total
H M L H M L H M L H M L H M L
%
Operational
budgeting
procedures
20 24 46 2 2 2 4 100
Capital budgeting 
procedures
20 22 42 2 4 10 100
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire, H =High level, M =M edium level, L =Low  level.
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This result showed that the majority of respondents (90%) stated that they used 
operational budgeting procedures207 . 84% of respondents stated they utilised capital 
budgeting procedures208. These answers indicated that GOGCWS was highly controlled 
internally and externally because views were that the budget was an internal and 
external regulative model and a critical reflection about what the staff were doing (see 
figures 8.5 and 8.6).
It was valuable to look at whether there was any difference or similarity between rules 
(documentations), routines (practice) and theory related to the meaning of the budget, 
preparation and principles preparation.
The budget was a sub-system of the accounting information system and contained the 
estimation of the financial activities in a comprehensive financial plan. This considered 
the co-ordination between the objectives, facilities, and probability circumstances (The 
GOGCWS, no date source given, c: 2). So, in theory it is an effective tool for planning, 
control and performance evaluation. Furthermore, the budget process helped in making 
crucial decisions regarding resources209, that created goods and services, and supplied 
data to enable the product managers to manage the planning and control loops around 
their particular responsibility. So, the researcher observed no difference in the role of 
the budget between the rules (documentations) of the GOGCWS and the normative 
theory.
With regard to the description of the annual budgeting process at the GOGCWS, there 
were stages of budget preparation which are illustrated in figure 8.5.
207 2% o f  respondents (one respondent) answered that there were plans to use this in the future. The 
reason maybe that she had spent all 25 years o f  her employment recording in one book (the service 
requirement) and yet got no a qualification to understand where the information would be used. Another 
2% o f  respondents (one respondent) answered that it has not been used in the past and there are no plans 
to use it at all. The reason could be that he worked in the Bills Auditing and Stamp department and had no 
idea about the budget. O f the remaining respondents 6% answered that we do not know.
208 One respondent answered that there are plans to use this in the future and maybe the reason w hy is that 
his experience in work is very limited (4 years only), the nature o f  his work was only to record some 
expenses and he had not enough qualifications. Two respondents answered that there are no plans for use 
at all. One o f  them worked as the chief o f the Bills Auditing Department and the other was the ch ief o f  
the Bills Auditing and Stamp Department and the nature o f  work for both o f  them had no connection with 
formal planning and control procedures. Five respondents answered that we do not know.
209 The argument o f  normative theory.
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Figure 8.5: Organisational model of stages of budget preparation
The objectives of the GOGCWS should be determined
9 1 nbefore the detailed programmes are set .
Each administration determined their requirement and 
sent it to the budget administration. The budget 
administration categorised these requirements to the 
financial sectors according to The Unified Accounting 
System (see section A l.2.4.2).
y
To achieve integration and quasi-resolve the 
conflict211.
To be a guide for implementation and performance 
standard, 
date source given, b), pp. 2-4
The perception of the interviewees regarding budget preparation was considered. For 
example, the Chief of Balance Sheet Administration in the GOGCWS said there were 
some steps in preparing the operational budget, which were explained as follows:
210 (Source: The GOGCWS, no date source given, b: 2).
211 For example, the purchasing plan o f  chlorinate was affected by the program o f  water production, credit 
facilities, etc. From another aspect, the purchasing plan affected the program o f  water production, amount 
owing to others, the financial position o f  the organisation and the size o f  the inventory o f  chlorinate. So if  
there was no co-ordination between detailed plans the result might be incorrect. From another aspect, co­
ordination between detailed plans might need simplification, because all aspects needed to be carefully 
considered as each affected the other e.g. the purchasing plan was not compatible with the space available 
within the organisation.
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3- Co-ordination between 
detailed plans
4- Approbation of the budget 
and declaration
Source: Based on the GOGCWS, (no
objectives
Determination
2- Setting detailed plans and 
preparing the financial 
statements
Figure 8.6: Stages of operational budget preparation
From the two elements above we could prepare
and then
Receiving at the expenses of the 
last year
Send the operational budget to the Financial Ministry
The operational budget for the next year
Sending of a letter to all stations, dragnets, different 
administrations to determine their requirements such 
as (raw materials, new employees, etc)
The Financial Ministry gave subsidisation which was usually less than requested in the 
budget
Source: C hief o f Fixed Assets Departm ent interview.
Regarding the question how do you describe the annual budgeting process at your 
company?, is illustrated in table 8.19
Table 8.19: Description of the budgeting process in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Budgeting process
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
Top-down procedures. 8% 10% 10% 28%
Top management set parameters: organisation units 
prepare budgets: top management adjust/decide.
10% 6% 16% 32%
Bottom-up procedures. 2% 8% 22% 32%
Discussion and participation procedures. — 2% 6% 8%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
This means the budget process at the GOGCWS had extremely hierarchical in its' 
procedure.
Based on the analysis of the questionnaires and interviews, there was no substantial 
difference between rules (documentations) of the GOGCWS and the routines (practices)
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related to budget preparation. All of them agreed that each administration determined 
their requirement and sent it to the budget administration.
The final point to highlight were the general principles for preparing the budget. From 
the documentation of the GOGCWS, questionnaires and the personal interviews, there 
were five points in the principles for preparing the budget as follows:
(a) The budget relied on prediction of water based on the historical data of the 
GOGCWS such as the amount of production and sales of water
(b) Comprehensive budget
(c) Division of budget time-scale
(d) Expression of the budget in financial terms
919(e) The budget was considered as a tool of control 
A brief discussion for each principle is given below:
  'ji'i
(a) The budget relied on prediction of water. The prediction was not guessed. It 
was dependant on rules and fundamentals such as scientific development, economic 
elements, the political actions, governmental actions, intentional actions, different 
legislators and the historical data of the organisation such as the amount of production 
and sales of water.
The study of prediction could be divided into three stages: the prediction for the 
immediate term such as the cash budget, the prediction for the short term such as the 
operation budget and the prediction for the long term such as the capital budget. For 
instance, the Chief of Commitment (Engagement) Department (Balance Sheet) stated 
"there are three factors which determine the capital budget (replacement and renewal214, 
completion215, new expansions216)".
212 By the Accounting Central Institution.
213 Such as the prediction o f sales, production, supply, etc.
214 The replacement and renewal projects related to the existent/current stations.
215 The completion projects related to the projects needing completion.
216 The new expansions were those that should consider future financial needs.
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(b) Comprehensive budget. The budget should contain several aspects such as: sales 
plan, production plan, investment plan and the finance plan. The Unified Accounting
0 1 7  •System ensured that the budget should have three aspects (budget in kind , financial 
budget218, and cash budget219).
(c) Division of budget's time. The budget would be divided into periods (quarterly or 
monthly) in order to overcome the obstacles which can affect the organisation, such as 
changes in the economic environment that were not considered in the budget 
preparation. This required flexibility220, which allowed the evaluation of actual 
performance, enabled the discovery of variance before it increased and action to be 
taken to prevent future repetition of these obstacles.
In practice, the GOGCWS did not divide the budget into periods. This meant the 
GOGCWS did not take into consideration any changes that had occurred during the 
year. This meant there was a gap between the GOGCWS's rules and general principles 
for preparing the budget and its practical application.
(d) Express the budget in financial terms. The aim of this role was to co-ordinate 
between the sub-budgets as they had difficult measurement units, for instance: the raw 
material budget was expressed by quantities or weights and the staff budget could be 
expressed by hours of work. In order to arrive at the final budget form, all these budgets 
had to be calculated and presented financially.
(e) The budget was considered a tool of control. This principle relied on two rules: 
(1) linking budget estimations by the responsibilities centres (this meant distributing the 
budget's estimation to the responsible departments and administrations, to find their
217 The budget in kind contained the goods requirements, the service requirements and staff. It was called 
the budget in kind because it expressed by quantities before translating it to cash values.
218 The financial budget translated the budget in kind to cash frame and it explained the financial plan o f  
the organisation.
219 The cash budget contained the expected cash payments and payments received during the period o f  the 
budget. It helped to study the financial structure o f  the organisation.
220 The division o f  the budget's time helped, due to its flexibility, to review the estimation o f  the budget 
each period by less effort and less time in order to meet any changes that were not considered before.
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weak and strong points, and then identifying the necessary corrective measures (2) 
Participation by the responsibility centres in preparing the budget. These two rules 
worked in practice and that was clear when one of the accountants in Participating 
Accounts Department stated "each administration determines their requirements and 
sends it to the responsible administration for preparing the budget and then the 
estimations of budget are prepared according to this basis".
The budget plan served two main aims (planning and control). There was no benefit 
from planning if it was not followed by control (The GOGCWS, no date source given, 
b: 22). Control should pass through three steps
(a) Comparison between actual and planning performance and determining the 
variances: This was achieved through the budget estimate record. It contained a column 
for the actual expenditure and a column for the estimated budget so that The Financial 
Ministry could determine the variance.
(b) Variance analysis: The variances were usually divided into two elements. The 
quantity element (the difference between the actual sales and the sales plan according to 
the planned price) and the valorem element (the difference between the planned price 
and the actual price according to the actual quantities).
(c) Taking actions221 which were necessary to correct the variances.
The reasons for the variances were:
(a) The amount of activity did not suit the staff (quantity and skills)
(b) Random decrease of the required funds from The Financial Ministry without 
knowing the needs of the organisation
(c) The lack of standard to measure the efficiency of the use of resources (post 
estimation)
In conclusion, The GOGCWS was ruled by bureaucracy from both internal and external 
influences and there was no substantial difference between the rules (documentation) of 
the GOGCWS and the normative theory related to the role and preparation of the
221 After the variances were determined, analysed and responsibility confirmed, then managerial reports 
were prepared (including suggestions on how to correct the variances) and sent to the responsible levels 
in order to correct the variances.
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budget. On the other hand, there was a gap between the normative theory and the 
practice of the GOGCWS related to the role of budgets.
The accounting system in the GOGCWS tended to focus wholly on financial accounting 
and its institutional setting and chose to neglect management accounting. Several 
studies informed by institutional theory show that the financial controls devised to 
discipline resource utilisation in public-sector organisations (for example, external 
financing limits) are little used further down the organisational hierarchy (e.g. Ansari 
and Euske, 1987; Pettersen, 1995) or assume the relatively symbolic role of legitimising 
the organisation to funding bodies (e.g. Brunsson, 1989; Czarniawska-Joerges and 
Jacobsson, 1989).
8.7.4 Activity based costing
ABC was not used in the water industry in Egypt. Regarding the question asked of 37 
interviewees in the General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply could you 
please tell me about the methods used in your company for measuring product cost?, 
see table 8.20
Table 8.20: Methods used for measuring product cost (N =37)
73% stated Full Absorption Costing
22% stated Activity Based Costing
5% stated that they did not know
Source: Analysis o f interviews
The researcher also checked the validity of the answer of the interviewees by asking in 
the questionnaire what is the product/service cost measurement practice in use at your 
company?, see table 8.21
Table 8.21: Methods used for measuring product cost (N =50)
Methods of cost 
measurement
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
Full absorption costing model. 12% 18% 40% 70%
Activity-based costing 8% 8% 12% 28%
Others — — 2% 2%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
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This result raised the question of why 22% of interviewees and 28% of respondents 
answered activity based costing, when the method used in the GOGCWS for measuring 
product cost was the full absorption costing model (based on the analysis of the 
documentation of the GOGCWS). In order to answer this question, the researcher 
discovered that the 22% of interviewees who answered Activity Based Costing 
misunderstood what this was. The reason for this misunderstanding could have been the 
Unified Accounting System which the GOGCWS followed (see section 8.5). This 
divided production into production Centres (5), Productive Services Centres (6), 
Marketing Services Centres (7), and Administrative and Financial Services Centres (8). 
So, it could have been that the reason for these results was that respondents or 
interviewees thought that when they calculated the cost for each centre alone and then 
calculated all together, this was Activity Based Costing.
There was no empirical evidence of ABC use in the water company in Egypt. Research 
was concentrated on one case study however, all water organisations in Egypt are 
governed by the same law (see section 8.1).
8.7.5 Activity based management
ABM is not used in the GOGCWS in Egypt. The researcher discovered this from the 
documentation of the GOGCWS and observations from the questionnaire, see table 8.22
Table 8.22: Use of ABM in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Planning 
and control 
process
Managerial level
Use now % Plan to use 
in the 
future %
Used in the 
past, but 
not now %
Not used or 
planned to 
use at all %
I do not 
know %
Total
%
H M L H M L H M L H M L H M L
Activity Based 
Management
2 2 6 2 10 2 2 2 22 50 100
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire, H =High level, M =M edium  level, L =Lo\v level.
This answer was expected because the GOGCWS followed the full absorption cost
model. Furthermore, activity based management is extension of activity based costing
(see section 4.4) and the result of analysis of the above point (activity based costing)
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concluded that there was no empirical evidence of A B C  in the U U U C W S . S o , the 
researcher suspected that ABM was not used in the GOGCWS.
8.7.6 Strategic Management Accounting (SMA)
Planning and decision-making are a reasonable basis in a stable or semi-stable 
environment but are more difficult in a dynamic environment. The present environment 
in Egypt was characterised by dynamic political, economic, social and legal elements. 
Egypt was transferring from the central national system to the economic market and it 
was necessary that the organisation should be proficient both managerially and 
economically. The lack of opposition to these changes and new indicators leads to high 
risks such as: losing control of the direction of the organisation; the loss of GOGCWS's 
leadership position because it was considered the biggest water organisation in the 
developing countries222; re-organisation of the organisation by other external influences 
or making management alternations to achieve change (The GOGCWS, 1996: 7).
Regarding the question how do you describe the strategy o f your company?, see table
8.23
Table 8.23: Description of the GOGCWS's strategy
Description of the GOGCWS's 
strategy
Managerial level
TotalHigh Medium Low
As a unitary organisation. 8% 14% 18% 40%
As a multidivisional organisation. 12% 8% 34% 54%
Others. — 4% 2% 6%
Total 20% 26% 54% 100%
Source: Analysis of questionnaire
Perhaps the reason for these different answers is that the chief of the fixed asset 
department and the chief of the cost department said "the GOGCWS has one strategy 
and this strategy is divided into sub-strategies for each department". Furthermore, Loft 
(1991) argued that large companies' strategies were trying to dominate the market by 
driving competitors out (this was not the case for the GOGCWS) or lead to monopoly
222 Egypt was one o f  the developing countries. The term "developing countries" has been used not to 
suggest that such countries can or should be seen as a homogeneous whole, but simply to broadly 
describe countries which were characterised by relatively low levels o f  per capita income, possess limited 
industrialisation and exhibit a constrained infrastructure (Vullimary et al., 1990).
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and in turn to bureaucracy and wastefulness. The GOGCWS had a bureaucratic system 
(see section 8.3)
The strategic planning in the GOGCWS had a process which could be illustrated as 
follows:
(a) Planning: the approval of the strategic planning process of the GOGCWS
(b) Clarifying the formal and informal responsibilities issued for GOGCWS
(c) Clarifying the mission of GOGCWS and the value's owner benefit
(d) Evaluating the external environment (power and directions, owners' benefit, 
competition and co-operating)
(e) Evaluating the internal environment (resources, performance, and present strategy)
(f) Determining the strategic subjects which face the organisation such as service level, 
costs, finance, and management
(g) Formulating the required strategy to manage all main subjects such as: determining 
the scientific alternative, obstacles in achieving these alternatives, the main suggestion 
to overcome these obstacles, planning work for the suggestions and working out a 
program for the plan
(h) Setting effective organising strategy for the future
There were different levels for strategic planning such as; high command, medium and 
executive command.
So far, this analysis has shown that there was no change in cost management model of 
the GOGCWS. The following sub-section provides evidence of resistance to change of 
cost management model within the GOGCWS. This resistance to change has been 
created by the external institutional pressures (the Egyptian government policy).
8.7.7 The Consultants
Black and Veatch International and its associated sub-contractors carried out a 
Management, and a Training and Systems Strengthening (MTSS) project under the 
Institutional Development Component, Cairo Water II. The project covered the period
223 There are several institutions which were involved in the approval o f  the strategic planning process o f  
the GOGCWS such as; Cairo governorate, Finance Ministry (treasury department),Ministry o f  planning, 
The Accounting Central Institution, etc.
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25 January 1993 through to 31 December 1997. The project was funded by USAID"". 
The aim of the Cairo Water Supply II (the Institutional Development Component), was 
to provide an organisational and technical support system to the authority. After a 
project start-up workshop in May 1993, the project was re-focused to prioritise 
managerial autonomy and financial viability.
The project concluded with several recommendations. Perhaps the most appropriate to 
this research are as follows: (a) cost would be recovered by a fair, economic price for 
water, (taking into accounts social concerns and realities) (b) The organisational 
structure for delivering these economic, high quality services would be decentralised, 
performance-based and committed to excellence. This value-oriented vision, 
strategically aligned the GOGCWS with the Egyptian Government’s private-sector-led 
economic development framework. This would enable the utility to direct the water 
sector away from one funded exclusively by private sector participation.
The consultants (Black and Veatch International) therefore suggested a public 
ownership of the source of water and private ownership for its distribution. They 
challenged the cost system of the GOGCWS and offered an alternative mode of cost 
management for the water industry. This alternative of cost management was based on 
re-organisation structure of the GOGCWS (see figures A 1.5, A 1.5.1 and Al.5.2).
What happened to all these recommendations? It was found that they were not put into 
practice. Why? It may be that it was against government policy for the management of 
the GOGCWS (For more explanation of the above, see section 11.2.4, which focus on 
the lack of change at the GOGCWS). Recommendations of the consultants (Black and 
Veatch International) were withheld by the chief-of-legal-affairs of the organisation.
224 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent government agency that 
controls foreign assistance and humanitarian aid in order to advance the political and econom ic interests 
o f  the United States. Since 1975, the United States has given over $2.8 billion to urban water and 
wastewater infrastructure projects. The United States has co-operated with the Egyptian government in 
programmes to expand water and wastewater infrastructures, to improve the delivery o f  services, and to 
ensure that adequate policies are in place to support further development in this area. 
USAID is currently implementing a water and sanitation programme which is valued at approximately $1 
billion in eleven cities. This funding is for the construction o f  major new water and wastewater treatment, 
and conveyance facilities. Water and wastewater activities are implemented in close co-operation with 
several Egyptian agencies, (including nine economic utility organisations, the Ministry o f  Housing, Public 
Utilities, and New Communities).
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8.8 Conclusion
From the analysis presented so far, it could be argued that GOGCWS contains features 
of an institutional political perspective discussed earlier in chapter 2. These were as 
follows: Firstly, it was preoccupied with formal structures and legal systems (see 
sections 8.1 and 8.2). Secondly, the approach emphasised detailed accounts of particular 
political systems, resulting in "configurative description", or, in other words, interactive, 
descriptive accounts of inter linked rules, rights, and procedures (see section 8.3). 
Thirdly, the approach was conservative in the sense that it emphasised the "permanent 
and unchanging" (see section 8.6.2). Finally, the work was largely non-theoretical, (i.e. 
more attention was given to historical re-constructions of specific institutional forms, 
see section 8.7.3).
This chapter has revealed the complexity of the environment of the Egyptian water 
industry and the GOGCWS in particular (see section 8.2). In addition, Diab (1999) 
argued that there are many deficiencies in Egyptian water utilities that can be traced to 
institutional issues and constraints, largely due to a cumbersome, hierarchical 
organisation without regulatory oversight. This lack of local autonomy prevents 
effective and efficient operation of the water or wastewater system (The GOGCWS, no 
date source given, a: 44). This chapter has highlighted the changes of the economic 
forms and legal structure of the GOGCWS (see section 8.2.1). From the neo- 
institutional economic theory perspective, the chapter points out that the GOGCWS has 
hierarchical structure (see section 8.3). Furthermore, it has illustrated that the 
GOGCWS is highly controlled (see section 8.4).
This chapter points up the limitation of the aims of the cost accounting system in the 
GOGCWS (see section 8.6). Moreover, it has highlighted the use of cost information in 
general and the use of cost information for decision-making in particular, which 
concluded that cost information has a very limited role in decision-making. The chapter 
has also illustrated the cost method used in the GOGCWS (full absorption costing) and 
stressed that the method of cost accounting in the GOGCWS is similar to traditional 
management accounting not contemporary management accounting (see section 8.7).
The chapter showed that the GOGCWS followed the traditional view which was that 
costs were best controlled by the department responsible for minimising the variance
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between budgeted and actual cost by cost element. The chapter has also suggested 
alternative modes to cost management to those suggested by consultants, Black and 
Veatch International, who suggested a public ownership of the source of water, and 
private ownership for its distribution, but this was not put into practice at the 
GOGCWS. From the neo-institutional economic theory perspective, the Black and 
Veatch International recommended that the GOGCWS should move from a hierarchical 
structure to adopt a hybrid approach.
In conclusion, the GOGCWS lead to monopoly and in turn to bureaucracy and waste. 
The researcher concludes that the GOGCWS did not have strategic cost management or 
an economic optimisation cost management policy but might have accounting and 
control cost management policy. Institutional theorists have tended to view the 
emergence of organisational control practices as a process of relatively passive 
adaptation (DiMaggio, 1988; Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995; Czarniawska and Sevon, 
1996). More recent research shows that organisations may, under certain 
circumstances, pro-actively influence their relations to different constituencies.
225 Abemethy and Chua (1996) found that the scope for managerial choices and which controls to 
implement can be significant even where certain constituencies exercise considerable power.
Chapter 9
Cost management and external environment
9.0 Introduction
Figure 5.1 had shown the importance of external environment for cost management. 
This chapter is going to explore the question "Was there a relationship between cost 
management226 and P (Cl)227 and P (Un)228 which relates to the three areas of the 
external environment (product market, factor market and legislation)? As illustrated in 
figure 9.1, the first three elements (efficiency, optimisation and strategy) were seen to 
derive from the interplay of forces in the external environment.
Identifying the factors that drive costs is central to effective cost management (Porter, 
1985; Shank, 1989; Shank and Govindarajan, 1992; 1993). "Understanding cost 
behaviour means understanding the complex interplay of "Cost drivers" at work in any 
given situation" (Shank and Govindarajan, 1992: 29). ‘Cost drivers’ research to model 
cost variability has sparked off an emergence of research literature into the relationships 
between overhead costs and their hypothesised underlying causes. Several factors are 
identified, (e.g. complexity and efficiency, Foster and Gupta, 1990); capacity, product 
and process variables, (Banker and Johnson, 1993; Data et al., 1993); and product mix 
heterogeneity (Anderson, 1995). Rouse and Putterill (2000) argue that while the above 
factors are relevant, this list of cost drivers is incomplete. In particular, environmental 
factors229 are component explanations of cost variability. They argue that not only has 
cost management research paid little attention to the impact on costs by environmental 
factors, it has also been slow to recognise and incorporate theories which underpin other 
disciplines.
226 The objectives o f  cost management are efficiency (see section 4.1), optimisation (see section 4.4) and 
strategy (see section 5.2).
227 P (Cl) refers to the perception o f competitive intensity, (i.e. the general level o f  market conditions 
which make profitability difficult).
228 P (Un) refers to the perception o f unpredictability, (The overall degree o f  variability from period to 
period, which make forecasting and planning difficult).
229 Environmental factors have been incorporated into analyses in research literature (Jesson, et al., 1987; 
Cook, et al., 1994; Lovell, et al., 1994).
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Figure 9.1: The relationship between cost management and the external
environment
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Figure 9.1 builds on Institutional theory (a theory which views organisations as 
operating within a social framework of norms, values, and assumptions about what 
constitutes ‘appropriate’ economic behaviour, Oliver, 1997). According to Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978: 3) "a good deal of organisational behaviour can be understood by 
knowing something about the organisation's environment and the problems it faces 
for obtaining resources. What happens in an organisation, is not only a function of its 
internal structure, leadership, procedures, or goals. It is also a consequence of the 
environment, and the particular contingencies and constraints from that environment".
Powell and DiMaggio (1991: 13) argue that it is important not to see the environment as 
separate from the company and its organisational processes. The environment can 
penetrate the organisation, creating ways in which actors view the world and make 
sense of their organisational activity. The environment creates categories through which 
organisational activity is constructed. Institutional theory according to Scott (1995) is a
230 This research argues that the environment o f  the GOGCWS could explain three main factors: product 
market, factor market and legislation.
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continuation and extension of the intellectual revolution that introduced open systems^1 
into the study of organisations.
Scott (1987a) identifies the diversity of institutional sources, (i.e. regulatory structures, 
governmental requirements, laws, ideologies, educational systems and professions). 
Hence, the institutional environment is of “a complex and multiple character” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Scott, 1983a). Oliver (1991) argues that in 
dealing with institutions, organisations may use a variety of strategies. These may range 
from passive conformity, compromise and avoidance, to defiance and proactive 
manipulation. In other words, organisations invariably conform to their institutional 
environment. Organisations respond in a variety of ways to the normative, regulatory 
structure, depending on the situation and its possible consequences (Bergevam, et al., 
1995)
Scott and Meyer (1991: 117) propose the idea of "societal sectors", to describe the way 
in which organisational environments are specific and variable, rather than general and 
uniform. Scott and Meyer (1991) claim that the technical and institutional perspectives 
are independent dimensions, rather than polarised extremes. Some organisations are 
subject to both kinds of pressures. Scott and Meyer cite public utilities as an example.
Carruthers (1995) notes that the distinction between the technical and the institutional 
perspective is frequently overdrawn. He claims that non-profit organisations (such as 
the GOGCWS and other less competitive environments), have sufficient ‘slack’ to 
allow institutional effects to come into play. Similarly, Powell (1991: 185, 188) 
contends that institutional effects are visible even in technical environments, and it can 
be difficult to separate the two.
Neo-institutionalists would prefer to keep the technical and institutional perspectives as 
analytically separate dimensions, but the two are often confused. For instance, 
institutional processes are routinely disguised as technical ones. De-coupling plays an 
important role in this process. Its institutionally prescribed appearance (via a formal 
structure), does not compromise actual operations. Researchers such as Brignall and
231 Open systems theory modified existing approaches by focusing on the wider environment as it 
constrains, shapes and penetrates the organisation (Scott, 1992).
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Modell, 2000; Abemethy and Chua, 1996; Pettersen, 1995; Ansari and Euske, 1987; 
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983, all argue that a way of dealing with conflicting 
institutional pressures in public sector organisations, is to de-couple232 the control 
systems used at different levels of the organisation.
Cost drivers have been categorised by Shank and Govindarajan (1993) into: (a) 
structural (scale, scope, technology and complexity) and (b) executional (workforce 
involvement, plant layout, product configuration and capacity utilisation). Rouse and 
Putterill (2000) classified cost drivers into: (a) policy environment233 (b) physical 
environment234 and (c) market environment. This classification of cost drivers includes 
three areas of the external environment - (the product market, the factor market and 
legislation). The factor market includes raw materials and supply, labour, management, 
capital and financing, and technology).
In order to understand the complex processes of the Egyptian Water Industry, it was 
.necessary to focus on micro-processes. However, it was impossible to ignore the 
broader (macro-institutional) dimension. To understand micro-processes it was 
necessary to recognise the institutional context both within the organisation itself, (i.e. 
the organisation's rules, routines and institutions) and outside, (i.e. the broader social, 
economic and political institutions of the organisational field and the society in which 
the organisation operates) (Burns and Scapens, 2000). This chapter has focused on the 
micro level (use of cost information at the GOGCW) and the macro level P (Cl) and P 
(Un). These are related to three areas of the external environment: (product market, 
factor market and legislation).
232 De-coupling can be identified as a process o f  breaking down the structural elements o f  different parts 
o f  the organisation in response to institutional pressures, (in order to comply with prescribed norms, 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Brignall and Modell, 2000).
233 This includes factors, highlighted by Shank and Govindarajan (1993). Rouse and Putterill (2000) argue 
that these cost drivers relate closely to the fixed factors or constraints faced by an organisation. Changes 
to these drivers were not usually a short-run operation-arising as they do from internal choices affecting 
organisational structure and process (p. 369).
234 The Physical environment, in which the organisation operates, has an "external flavour" and provides 
difficult challenges for management to improve performance.
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This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section one describes how the data was 
presented and highlights the variables which measure cost management (efficiency, 
optimisation and strategy). Cost management is seen in relation to Cl and Un that is 
related to the product market, factor market and legislation. Section two gives a 
descriptive analysis of the data. Section three examines the reliability and validity of the 
data, by using alpha coefficient and factor analysis. Section four examines the 
restructured data. Section five addresses the question "Was there a relationship between 
cost management and P (Cl) and P (Un) which relates to the three areas of the external 
environment (product market, factor market and legislation).
Section six offers a brief discussion of the results. The final section outlines the main 
conclusions of the chapter.
9.1 Data
On the use of cost information, Al-Hazami (1995) identified the three objectives of cost 
management: efficiency, optimisation and strategy. Cost management practices were 
measured by using forty-seven items (questions ). Fifteen items measured the use of 
cost information for system maintenance and efficiency. Eighteen items measured the 
use of cost information for system optimisation. Fourteen items measured the use of
916cost information for system strategy. A Likert scale was utilised, (ranging from 1 = 
extremely important to 5 = not important).
The perception of ‘intensive competition’ and ‘unpredictability’ relate to the three areas 
of the external environment (product market, factor market and legislation). The 
GOGCWS perception of the external environment for (Cl) and (Un) were measured 
using eighty-six items, (forty-three items for P (Cl) and forty-three items for P (Un)). 
Fourteen items measured the product market (seven for P (Cl) and seven for P (Un)). 
Sixty-four items measured the factor market (thirty-two for P (Cl) and thirty-two for P 
(Un)). The factor market is divided into five sub-sectors: raw materials and supply 
(seven items for P (Cl) and seven items for P (Un)). Labour (seven items for P (Cl) and
235 See section A2.1 (Question 8 in section 3.4).
236 The range o f  Likert scale was 1 = extremely important 2 = very important 3 = important 4 =  not so 
important 5 = Not important and 6 = I do not know.
237 See section A2.1 (Question 1 - the company environment).
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seven items for P (Un)). Management (four items for P (Cl) and four items for P (Un)). 
Capital and financing (four items for p (Cl) and four items for P (Un)). Technology (ten 
items for P (Cl) and ten items for P (Un)). Eight items measured legislation (four items 
for P (Cl) and four for P (Un)). Respondents were asked to assess various sectors of the 
company's environment, on the dimensions of P (Cl) and P (Un) by using a Likert 
scale238.
There were two questions relating to the GOGCWS environment. In one question 
respondents were asked to prioritise the significance of environmental sectors (product 
market, factor market or legislation) by percentage. The second question asked 
respondents to rank the sub-sectors of the factor market, (including raw materials and 
supply, labour, management, capital and financing, and technology).
This chapter has focused on the perceptions of the GOGCWS managers. The sample 
study included all managerial levels. Functional levels were also included in the sample, 
(i.e. financial, technical and distribution).
238 For competitive intensity, the Likert scale ranged from 1 = low to 5 = high. For Unpredictability, the 
Likert scale was 1 = very predictable 2 = predictable 3 = average 4 = unpredictable and 5 = very 
unpredictability 6 = I do not know.
239 See section A2.1 (Questions 2 and 3 - the company environment).
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9.2 Data analysis one
9.2.1 Cost information
9.2.1.1 Use of cost information for efficiency
On the use of cost information for system efficiency, see table 9.1
Table 9.1: Descriptive analysis of the use of cost information for system efficiency
(N =50)
Cost information role
Significance of cost information use at 
company
Extremely
im portant
Very
im portant
Im portant N ot so 
im portant
Not
im portan t
I do not 
know
To comply with procedures of reporting 16% 40% 38% 4% ------- 2%
Basis for audit 12% 38% 34% 2% 10% 4%
Planning of period costs (budgeting) 28% 48% 16% 2% 4% 2%
Management and control of period costs 26% 34% 20% 14% 6% —
Role of standard costing in assessing 
performance
10% 40% 18% 14% 18%
Identification of corrective measures 14% 20% 26% 20% 20% —
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire
The researcher observed that this result emerged as ‘normative’ perspective (Bjomenak 
and Olson, 1999: 332). The normative view is related to traditional (technical) 
management accounting, not contemporary management accounting. For example, in 
standard costing or budgeting, the normative perspective is invariably based on ex post 
benchmarks, not on forward-looking market prices. The normative pressure is therefore 
based on historical observations and data, not expectations for future forward planning.
Brignall and Modell (2000) argue that an institutional and political process is associated 
with budgeting (Wildavsky, 1975; Jonsson, 1982; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983; 1986). 
These researchers focus on the bargaining process inherent in public sector budgeting. 
They differentiate between ‘advocates’ (e.g. lower-level managers, or representatives of 
certain professional groups), and ‘guardians’ (e.g. senior level staff, and politically- 
elected officials representing funding-bodies).
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Regarding the use of cost information for system efficiency, see table 9.1a
Table 9.1a: Descriptive analysis of the use of cost information for system efficiency
(N =50)
Cost information role
Significance of cost information use at 
company
Extrem ely
im portant
Very
im portant
Im portant N ot so 
im portant
N ot
im portant
I do not 
know
To achieve targets of production 4% 8% 6% 20% 60% 2%
To achieve large profits 4% 10% 2% 14% 70% —
To achieve certain financial 
measurements
10% 6% 6% 22% 52% 4%
Source: Analysis o f  questionnaire
This result found that the economic perspective does not play an important role in 
shaping the policy of the GOGCWS. However, the political and social element does 
play an important role in shaping the GOGCWS policy.
For a summary of the significance of cost information for system efficiency (at the 
GOGCWS), see table 9.1b
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Table 9.1b: Reported significance of cost information for system efficiency used at
the GOGCWS (N =50)
Cost information role Overall meaifi4U 
score241
Planning of period costs (budgeting) 2.1
Compliance with procedures of reporting 2.4
Management and control of period costs 2.4
Basis for audit 2.7
Role of standard cost in assessing performance 2.9
Identification of necessary corrective measures 3.1
Perceived importance for meeting budgets 3.3
Inventory Evaluation 3.4
To provide a means of communication 3.5
Measuring efficiency of production performance 3.6
To enhance cost reduction programs 3.6
Performance evaluation of management 3.8
To achieve certain financial measurement 4.1
To achieve target of production 4.3
To achieve a large profit 4.4
Source: Analysis of questionnaire
240 One o f  the most important ways o f  summarising a distribution o f values for a variable, is to establish 
its central tendency - (the typical value in a distribution). Where do values in a distribution tend to 
concentrate? Statisticians are referring to a number o f  different measures when they talk about averages 
(such as mean, median, mode, Bryman and Cramer, 1990: 82).
Gould (1991), (a palaeontologist who is well known for his popular writings on science), illustrates the 
first two o f  these measures o f  average when he writes: "A politician in power might say with pride, "The 
mean income o f  our citizens is $15000 per year". The leader o f the opposition might retort, "But h alf our 
citizens make less than $10000 per year". Both are right, but neither cites a statistic impassive objectivity. 
The first invokes a mean, the second a median" (1991: 473).
The Mean is the value closest to all the other values. In order to calculate the mean: Total all the cases 
divided by the number o f cases. Residual from the mean: the difference between each case in a 
distribution and the mean: if  this value is positive, the value is above the mean; if  it is negative, it is below  
the mean (Bryman and Cramer, 1999).
241 The range o f  the Likert scale was 1 = extremely important 2 = very important 3 = important 4 =  not so 
important 5 = not important.
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9.2.1.2 Use of cost information for system optimisation
On the use of cost information for system optimisation, see table 9.2.
Table 9.2: Descriptive analysis of the use of cost information for system
optimisation (N =50)
Cost information role
Significance of cost information use at 
company
Extrem ely
im portant
Very
im portant
Im portant Not so 
im portant
Not
im portan t
I do not 
know
Planned and actual product costs 46% 34% 10% 6% 2% 2%
Importance of a flexible budget for 
manufacturing cost control
6% 30% 40% 8% 12% 4%
Variance analysis and exception 
reporting
34% 24% 18% 14% 6% 4%
To stimulate control of conversion cost 26% 38% 14% 4% 14% 4%
Importance of marketing cost analysis 14% 16% 32% 8% 28% 2%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire
From the perspective theory, respondents saw management accounting from a 
hierarchical view (institutional hierarchy) (see section 5.2.2). Management accounting 
was seen as an instrument for calculation, implementation, and control that belonged to 
the tactical and administrative level. Management accounting was only one out of 
several functional disciplines within the organisation (Ansoff, 1965 and Anthony, 
1965).
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Table 9.2a: Descriptive analysis of the use of cost information for system
optimisation (N =50)
Cost information role
Significance of cost information use at 
company
Extremely
Important
Very
im portant
Im portant N ot so 
im portant
Not
im portant
I do not 
know
To maintain certain profit margins 6% 2% 4% 10% 74% 4%
Product mix decision 4% 8% 8% 22% 58% —
Development of better manufacturing 
methods
6% 8% 6% 20% 60%
Importance of product cost as an input 
to pricing decision
12% 4% 12% 70% 2%
Transfer prices for internal services 2% 2% 8% 14% 68% 6%
To enhance equipment productivity 6% 8% 24% 24% 36% 2%
To motivate people to do better 2% 10% 8% 16% 56% 8%
To emphasis throughput rate 10% 10% 2% 28% 46% 4%
Measuring of efficiency and capacity 
utilisation
4% 16% 10% 26% 40% 4%
To determine economic production 6% 8% 10% 26% 42% 8%
Make or buy decisions 6% 10% 22% 26% 36% —
Personal development and workforce 
improvement
2% 16% 12% 10% 60%
Source: Analysis of questionnaire
The initial analysis shows that management accounting in the GOGCWS had no new 
techniques242. The GOGCWS followed a ‘traditional’ management accounting system, 
not contemporary management accounting. It was clear that the social or political 
element was more important than the economic element, (if cost information was 
unimportant to determine economic production or enhance productivity). Analysis from 
the interviews showed that most interviewees recommended that the price of water be 
determined ‘outside’ of the GOGCWS itself.
242 The new techniques in this thesis, were based on their importance in current management accounting 
literature (e.g. activity-based costing, activity-based management, target costing, strategic management 
accounting, transfer prices).
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For a summary of the significance of cost information for system optimisation used at 
the GOGCWS, see table 9.2b below:
Table 9.2b: Reported significance of cost information for system optimisation used
at the GOGCWS (N =50)
Cost information role Overall mean score'4'0
Planned and actual product cost 1.9
Variance analysis and exception reporting 2.5
To stimulate control of conversion cost 2.5
Importance of flexible budget for manufacturing cost control 3
Importance of marketing cost analysis 3.3
Motivating efficiency improvement 3.7
To enhance equipment productivity 3.8
Make or buy decisions 3.8
Measuring of efficiency and capacity utilisation 3.9
To emphasise throughput rate 4
To determine the economic production amount 4.1
Personal development and workforce improvement 4.1
Product mix decisions 4.2
Development of better manufacturing methods 4.2
Importance of product cost as an input to pricing decision 4.3
To motivate people to do better 4.4
To maintain certain profit margins 4.6
Transfer prices for internal services 4.6
Source: Analysis of questionnaire
243 The range o f  Likert scale was 1 = extremely important 2 = very important 3 = important 4 =  not so 
important 5 = not important.
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9.2.1.3 Use of cost information for system strategy
Regarding the use of cost information for system strategy, see table 9.3
Table 9.3: Descriptive analysis of the use of cost information for system strategy (N
=50)
Cost information role
Significance of cost information use at 
company
E xtrem ely
im portant
Very
im portant
Im portant Not so 
im portant
N ot
im portant
I do  not 
know
To forecast the future 14% 34% 28% 6% 14% 4%
Evaluation of investment projects 10% 30% 20% 18% 20% 2%
Improvement of product characteristics 6% 10% 4% 22% 58% —
Planned and actual customer 2% 10% 4% 8% 76% —
Importance of competitor cost analysis — 4% 2% 2% 92% —
Market share analysis 4% 6% — 6% 84% —
New product development 2% — — 6% 92% —
Market development 6% 2% 2% 4% 86% —
Importance of product configuration — 6% - - - 4% 90% —
New product development 2% — — 6% 92% —
Decisions of company strategy 6% 16% 14% 26% 38% —
Product quality analysis 8% 8% 6% 30% 48% —
Importance of product configuration 6% — — 4% 90% —
Source: Analysis o f  questionnaire
The result showed that cost information had no role or a very limited role in shaping the 
strategy of the GOGCWS. This meant cost management in the GOGCWS was clearly 
absent. Comparing this result with the rules (documentation) of the GOGCWS 
(mentioned in section 8.7.6), it showed that the role of accounting was extremely 
important in supporting the development of strategy. The researcher concluded that 
there was a ‘gap’ between the theory and practice of cost management in the 
GOGCWS.
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If cost information was not important for deciding the strategy and competitor cost 
analysis244 of the GOGCWS, what factor did affect the shaping of strategy policy of the 
GOGCWS? The researcher observed that political and social elements had more effect 
than the economic element (see section 10.1.1).
For a summary of the significance of cost information use for system strategy at the 
GOGCWS, see table 9.3a below:
Table 9.3a: Reported significance of cost information for system strategy used at
the GOGCWS (N =50)
Cost information role Overall mean score"54
To forecast the future 2.8
Evaluation of investment projects 3.1
Decisions of company strategy 3.7
Product quality analysis 4
Importance of technology configuration 4
Improvement of product characteristics 4.2
Planned and actual customer profitability 4.5
Market growth analysis 4.5
Market development 4.6
Importance of product improvement 4.6
Market share analysis 4.7
Importance of competitor cost analysis 4.8
Importance of product configuration 4.8
New product development 4.9
Source: Analysis of questionnaire
The result showed that cost management had a very limited role in strategy at the 
GOGCWS. This may have resulted from the policy of managing the water in the 
GOGCWS (for the public sector, see section 7.2.4).
244 Because Control o f  the Egyptian water industry was under a monopoly.
245 The range o f  the Likert scale was 1 = extremely important 2 = very important 3 = important 4 = not so 
important 5 = not important.
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9.2.2 Company environment
As mentioned in section 9.1, this research concentrated on managers perceptions of 
competitive intensity and unpredictability (related to three areas of the external 
environment: product market, factor market and legislation, Al-Hazami, 1995). This 
research adopted institutional theory (as opposed to contingency theory, see section 
2.1). However, it is necessary to examine the core idea of each of them. Institutional 
theory suggests that organisations gain legitimacy by conforming to external 
expectations of cost management practice, whilst separating their internal activities 
from externally-focused symbolic systems. Conversely, contingency theory suggests 
that organisational practices are driven by both the task environment, and the technical 
nature of the work. The closer the "fit" between technical features of the environment 
and cost management practice, leads to an increase in efficiency and effectiveness.
9.2.2.1 Product market
Managers' perception of competitive intensity (Cl) and unpredictability (Un) of product 
market was measured by using 14 items (7 for P (Cl) and 7 for P (Un)). Regarding the P 
(Cl) of product market in the GOGCWS, see table 9.4
Table 9.4: P (Cl) of the product market in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Competitive Intensity
Market Conditions
1 2 3 4 5
I d
o 
no
t 
kn
ow
1 Market Change (sales) Declining 8% 2% 32% 48% 8% Expanding
market
2%
2 Competition intensity Low 100% ------- — — High — ■
3 Customer variety One major 
customer
2% 4% 6% 26% 62% Large variety — -  ■:
4 Profit margins Narrow 82% 6% 6% 4% 2% High
5 Product innovation Well established 38% 18% 10% 18% 16% A lw ays new  
products
™  .
6 Nature of competition Well established 
competitors
98% 2% Always new  
competitors
7 Price o f products Stable 28% 30% 16% 14% 12% Fluctuate
prices.
•
Source: Analysis of questionnaire
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Concerning the P (Un) of product market in the GOGCWS, see table 9.4a
Table 9.4a: P (Un) of the product market in the GOGCWS (N =50)
M arket Conditions
Unpredictability
Very
predictable
Predictable Average Unpredictable Very
Unpredictable
I do not 
know
1 Market Change (sales) 48% 34% 12% 4% — 2%
2 Competition intensity 96% 4% — — —
3 Customer variety 80% 20% — — — ' —  ■
4 Profit margins 92% 6% 2% — — —
5 Product innovation 52% 34% 10% 4% — — .
6 Nature of competition 96% 4% — —
7 Prices o f product 78% 18% 4% “““ ------- ■:™
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
9.2.2.2 Factor market
The perception of (Cl) and (Un) of Factor market was measured by using 64 items (32 
for P (Cl) and 32 for P (Un)) (as illustrated in table 9.5). The factor market was divided 
into five sub-sectors.
Table 9.5: Measure of factor market
Sub-sectors of factor market P (Cl) measured by P (Un) measured by
Raw materials and supply 7 items 7 items
Labour 7 items 7 items
Management 4 items 4 items
Capital and financing 4 items 4 items
Technology 10 items 10 items
A brief descriptive analysis of each sub-sector is given in turn.
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9.2.2.2.1 Raw material and supply
Regarding the P (Cl) of raw materials and supply, see table 9.6
Table 9.6: P (Cl) of raw materials and supply in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Competitive Intensity
Market Conditions
1 2 3 4 5
I d
o 
no
t 
kn
ow
1 Supply Shortage o f  supply ------- 2 % 8% 2 2 % 68% O ver supply —
2 Source of supply One m ajor source 10 % 8% 8% 40% 30% Plenty o f 
sources
4%
3 Competition between 
suppliers
No competition 18% 6% 32% 2 0 % 2 2 % Intensive
com petition
2%
4 Cost of raw material Low 2 % 2 % 16% 52% 2 0 % High 8%
5 Delivery time Short 40% 18% 14% 4% 2 % Long 22%
6 Nature o f suppliers Well established 30% 38% 6% 12% 10 % A lw ays new  
suppliers
4%
7 Prices of raw material Stable prices 4% 6% 14% 50% 24% Fluctuate
prices
2%
Source: Analysis o f  questionnaire
Regarding the P (Un) of raw materials and supply, see table 9.6a
Table 9.6a: P (Un) of raw materials and supply in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Market Conditions
Unpredictability
Very
predictable
Predictable Average Unpredictable Very
Unpredictable
1 do not 
know
1 Supply 74% 22% 4% — — —  "
2 Source of supply 56% 32% 8% — — 4%
3 Competition between 
suppliers
52% 30% 10% 6% — .. 2%
4 Cost of raw material 38% 34% 16% 4% — 8 %
5 Delivery time 44% 24% 8% 2% —  ' 22%
6 Nature of supplier 56% 28% 8% 2% — 6%
7 Prices or raw material 62% 26% 8% 2% — 2%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire
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The reason for the above result could have been because water in Egypt was under 
monopoly control, which prevented competition and achieved predictability for raw 
materials and supply.
9.2.2.2.2 Labour
For the P (Cl) related to labour, the result was as shown in table 9.7
Table 9.7: P (Cl) of the labour in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Competitive Intensity
Market Conditions
1 2 3 4 5
I d
o 
no
t 
kn
ow
1 Availability o f skilled 
labour
Shortage 24% 14% 1 0% 24% 28% Stable - - -
2 Competing employers Few 72% 16% 8% — 4% M any —  ■
3 Wage rates Low 6% 8% 74% 1 2 % — High
4 Trade union Not militant 28% 1 0 % 24% 28% 10 % M ilitant
5 Labour turnover Low 74% 16% 8% 2 % — High —
6 Labour dependency Low 4% 8% 2 % 1 2 % 74% High ----------------
7 Industrial relation Poor 4% 4% 36% 2 2 % 28% G ood 6%
Source: Analysis o f  questionnaire
For the result of P (Un) related to labour, see table 9.7a
Table 9.7a: P (Un) of the labour in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Market Conditions
Unpredictability
Very
predictable
Predictable Average Unpredictable Very
Unpredictable
I do not 
know
1 Availability of skilled 
labour
64% • 28% 8% -- — ; ■ ■ —  ■
2 Competing employers 72% 22% 4% 2% ----
3 Wage rates 72% 26% 2% —
4 Trade unions 46% 50% 4% — —
5 Labour turnover 68% 26% 6% — - - - —
6 Labour dependency 80% 16% 2% 2% — —
7 Industrial relations 62% 24% 8% — — 6%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire
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It was observed that the way of managing labour in the GOGCWS created obstacles for 
efficiency, optimisation or strategy because every worker knew that they would get their 
salary at the end of each month, and therefore would not change their job.
9.2.2.2.3 Management
Regarding the P (Cl) related to management, see table 9.8
Table 9.8: P (Cl) of the management in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Competitive Intensity
Market Conditions 1 2 3 4 5
I d
o 
no
t 
kn
ow
l Availability o f qualified 
managers
Shortage 48% 14% 16% 10% 12 % Stable
2 Salary of management Low 48% 26% 26% — — High —
3 Competition for good 
managers
Low 48% 6% 12% 8% 26% H igh
4 Staff turnover Low 4% — 14% 10% 72% High
Source: Analysis of questionnaire
When asked about competition for "good" managers, the majority of interviewees 
objected to the word "good", but 52% of interviewees stated that competition was 
low246. This result may have two explanations. One explanation was that while 
managers did their best, there were regulations which prevented them from achieving 
what they wanted (institutional theory-regulative structure). The second explanation was 
that the GOGCWS managers were working in their own interests and not those of the 
company. The organisation itself gave them no motivation or incentive to work hard. 
Salaries were high and both managers and workers knew they would get paid regardless 
of whether they worked or not. This was true of most public sector organisations in 
Egypt.
246 34% o f  respondents claimed that competition among managers was high. Respondents stated that 
managers compete with each other in order to gain a high position (but not through their actual work).
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Regarding the P (Un) of management, see table 9.8a
Table 9.8a: P (Un) of the management in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Market Conditions
Unpredictability
Very
predictable
Predictable Average Unpredictable Very
Unpredictable
I do not 
know
l Availability o f qualified 
managers
66% 32% 2% ■ ' “““ “““ . . ..
2 Salary of management 66% 26% 8% — —
3 Competition for good 
managers
66% 26% 8% . . . -
4 Staff turnover 72% 24% 4% — —
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire
A possible reason for these answers was that the method of choosing a manager was 
dependent on how many years they had worked in the organisation (not on their
• 747qualifications or work). This was made clear when interviewees , suggested that an 
alternative to privatisation would be "choosing effective workers for leadership".
9.2.2.2.4 Capital and financing
For the P (Cl) of capital and financing, see table 9.9
Table 9.9: P (Cl) of Capital and financing in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Competitive Intensity
Market Conditions
1 2 3 4 5
I d
o 
no
t 
kn
ow
l Availability o f funds Easy to 
obtain funds
36% 34% 10% 10% 10% Hard to 
obtain fund
—
2 Sources of funds One major 
source
12% 8% 10% 56% 14% M any
sources
—  .
3 Cost of finance Low 8% 6% 16% 28% 36% High 6%
4 Staff turnover Low 70% 16% 8% 6% — High —
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
247 Accountants in the Participating Accounts Department.
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There were influences on the source of funding of Government cost accounting 
practices. Geiger and Ittner (1996) argue that units relying on ‘revolving’ funds were 
more likely to use cost system data (managing activities or programs) than units 
receiving all of their funding through reimbursement. This could have been true of the 
GOGCWS. From the initial analysis, it appeared that there was very little focus on 
using cost information for strategy. There was also a validity between the answers of 
respondents (who stated that the cost of finance was high) and the actual documentation 
of the GOGCWS (see section 8.6.4) which showed that governmental subsidisation was 
737 million E. P. annually for the GOGCWS. This amount of money would invariably 
be borrowed from The National Investment Bank at 14% interest, and the result of this 
would be a subsidisation of 840 million of E.P.
For the P (Un) of capital and financing, see table 9.9a
Table 9.9a: P (Un) of capital and finance in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Market Conditions
Unpredictability
Very
predictable*
Predictable Average Unpredictable Very
Unpredictable
I do not 
know
l Availability o f funds 60% 32% 8% — —
2 Sources of funding 58% 38% 4% — — - —
3 Cost o f finance 50% 34% 10% — ■. Y 6%
4 Staff turnover 66% 32% 2% — ---- :
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
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9.2.2.2.5 Technology
For the P (Cl) of technology, see table 9.10
Table 9.10: P (Cl) of Technology in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Competitive Intensity
Market Conditions
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
I d
o 
no
t 
kn
ow
l Availability of equipment Shortage — 2% 2% 26% 66% Stable 4%
2 Equipment suppliers One major 
suppliers
2% 4% 18% 28% 38% Many 10%
3 Competition for 
equipment.
No
competition
72% 10% 8% 4% 2% Keen
com petition
4%
4 Delivery of equipment Short 16% 14% 26% 10% 10% Long 24%
5 Equipment failure Usual failure 20% 26% 18% 4% 4% Frequent
failure
28%
6 Nature o f manufacturing 
technology
Simple 28% 28% 24% 6% Complex 14%
7 Nature of system 
technology
Simple 54% 14% 20% 2% 4% Complex 6%
8 Technology development Negligible
change
32% 32% 8% 18% 8% Common
change
2%
9 Equipment obsolescence Short life 2% 4% 12% 16% 60% Long life 6%
10 Capital labour 
substitution
Slow 48% 24% 12% 10% 4% Fast 2%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
It was clear from the above result that there was face validity of the data. For example, 
on the topic of obsolete equipment, 76% of respondents stated that the organisation's 
‘equipment’ was unchanged, and in their view was likely to remain that way. It was 
therefore unsurprising when 72% of respondents stated that capital/ labour substitution 
was slow.
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For the P (Un) of technology, see table 9.10a
Table 9.10a: P (Un) of technology in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Market Conditions
Unpredictability
Very
predictable-
Predictable Average Unpredictable Very
Unpredictable
I do not 
know
l Availability of equipment 58% 32% 6% — — 4%
2 Equipment suppliers 52% 28% 10% 2% — 8%
3 Competition for equipment. 50% 34% 8% 4% """ 4%
4 Delivery of equipment 40% 20% 14% 2% — 24% '
5 Equipment failure 38% 22% 8% 4% . . . 28%
6 Nature o f manufacturing 
technology
42% 32% 12% 2% 12%
7 Nature o f system technology 48% 32% 14% 2% 4%
8 Technology development 54% 32% 12% 2% —
9 Equipment obsolescence 60% 28% 4% 4% — 4%
10 Capital labour substitution 56% 32% 8% — — 4%
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
Although 56% of respondents stated that the technology element was the least 
significant248 aspect of the factor market, the researcher observed that the technical 
aspect was much more important than the financial or management aspect (especially in 
the water industry). This is because the water industry serves fundamental human 
requirements (see section 8.4).
9.2.2.3 Legislation
Legislation represented a third of the external environment. The perception of (Cl) and 
(Un) of legislation was measured by using 8 items (4 items for P (Cl) and 4 for P (Un)).
248 For the rank priority significance o f  the factor market, 64% respondents stated that capital and 
financing was the first element. 42% respondents stated that raw materials and supply was the second 
element. 44% respondents chose labour as the third element. 36% respondents saw management as the 
fourth elem ent, while 56% respondents stated that technology was the least important element.
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On the topic of the P (Cl), see table 9.11
Table 9.11: P (Cl) of the legislation in the GOGCWS
Market Conditions Intensive Competition
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
I d
o 
no
t 
kn
ow
l Regulators in the industry One major 
regulator
20% 12% — 16% 52% M any
regulator
: - - -
2 A mount o f legislation Small 22% 18% 2% 18% 36% Large 4%
3 Nature of legislation Well
established
32% 30% 18% 14% 6% Frequent
change
- - -  ^
4 Effect o f legislation Negligible — — — 12% 88% Heavy ■ ■ .
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
These results showed the validity of the data. For example, 68% of respondents stated 
that there were too many regulators in the water industry, and this answer was 
consistent with the results from the analysis of documentation (see section 8.4). There 
were many regulators (both technical and financial). Furthermore, 54% of respondents 
stated that there was too much legislation and this was clear from section Al.2.1.1 
(which included general laws and decrees, laws related to management development, 
etc). In addition all respondents (100%) stated that legislation exerted a strong 
influence.
For the P (Un) of legislation, see table 9.1 la
Table 9.11a: P (Un) of the legislation in the GOGCWS (N =50)
Market Conditions
Unpredictability
Very
predictable
Predictable Average Unpredictable Very
Unpredictable
I do not 
know
l Regulators in the industry 68% 20% 8% 2% --- 2%
2 Amount of legislation 62% 22% 6% 4% — 6%
3 Nature o f legislation 44% 42% 14% — — —
4 Effect o f legislation 76% 24% — — — . . .  — ■
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
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There has been much institutional accounting research Covaleski, et al., 1993; 1996; 
Mezias, 1990; Geiger and Ittner, 1996 all focused on external legitimisation in the 
shaping of accounting practice. Covaleski, et al., (1993) claimed that pressures exerted 
by the US Federal Government were crucial in the development of a case-mix 
accounting system in the health industry. Mezias (1990) described how various 
institutional factors (laws, expectations and professionalism) influenced the formulation 
of US accounting policies. Geiger and Ittner (1996) studied the influence of sources of 
funding and legislative requirements on government cost accounting practices. Their 
hypothesis was that "mandated government cost accounting systems are not associated 
with greater internal use of cost accounting data". This is particularly relevant to the 
GOGCWS research study.
The researcher previously held the view that legislation in Egypt played an important 
role in cost management. This view was confirmed by the respondents ranking of the 
significance of various sectors of the external environment, (product market, factor 
market and legislation). The results were as follows:
Seventy two percent of respondents stated that legislation was the most important 
element. 28% stated that the factor market was the most important element, whilst no 
respondents considered the product market as the most important element in the 
environment sector.
"Was there a relationship between cost management and P (Cl) and P (Un) which 
relates to the three areas of the external environment (product market, factor market and 
legislation)? A difficulty facing the researcher here was how do we know each scale 
measures a single idea? For example, how does the researcher know that the set 15 
items do actually measure efficiency, etc. In other words, how can we assess the 
reliability and validity of a construct? In order to answer these questions, the reliability 
and factor analysis (using SPSS) was conducted as follows
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9.3 Reliability and validity of construct
9.3.1 Reliability
The reliability of a measure refers to its consistency249 (Bryman and Cramer, 1999: 
P.64). Internal reliability was important in relation to multiple-item scales. It raised the 
question of whether each scale was measuring a single idea and whether the items that 
make up the scale were internally consistent (p.65). Cronbach's alpha250 is computed in
251terms of the average inter-correlation among items measuring the concept. Alpha 
coefficient was used to examine reliability and validity of the constructs. Alpha 
coefficient provided general support for the constructs and instruments used in this 
research and also indicated that some refinement may be necessary. Measures of 
reliability are shown in table 9.12
Table 9.12: Alpha coefficients of Reliability for the items of cost management (N
=50)
Indicator Alpha
coefficients
Cost practice (reporting)- Different uses of cost information
Uses of cost information for system maintenance and efficiency 0.82
Uses of cost information for system optimisation 0.89
Uses of cost information for system adaptation 0.91
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
249 This entailed two separate aspects - external reliability and internal reliability. External reliability 
referred to the degree o f  consistency o f  a measure over several times (Bryman and Cramer, 1999: 64). 
This was not applicable to the GOGCWS research study.
250 There were two procedures. Split-half and cronbach's alpha could be readily computed in SPSS for 
estimating internal reliability.
251 The closer Cronbach's alpha is to 1, the higher the internal consistency reliability. Therefore, 
reliabilities less than 0.6 are generally considered to be poor, those in the 0.7 range to be acceptable, and 
those over 0.8 to be good.
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Table 9.12a: Alpha coefficients of Reliability for factor analysis of P (Cl) and P 
(Un) of the GOGCWS environment (N =50)
External environment
Competitive
Intensity
Unpredictability
Product market -.6405 .3741
Factor market:
Raw material .2374 .7753
Labour -.0612 .6580
Management .2360 .7074
Capital and financing .0607 .6151
Technology .6130 .7732
Legislation .5221 .7876
Source: Analysis of questionnaire.
Values which were nearer to one indicated greater reliability than values nearer to zero. 
The measures suggest that respondents answered in a similar way to each indicator of 
cost management, but in different way to company environment. The next step was to 
use factor analysis, this was used to examine the reliability and validity of the construct.
9.3.2 Factor analysis
9.3.2.1 Use of accounting for Cost management
9.3.2.1.1 Use of cost information for system efficiency
By carrying out a factor analysis of use of cost information for efficiency, the initial 
step was to compute a correlation matrix for 15 items (see table A2.12). The aim of this
252 Factor analysis enables us to assess the factorial validity o f  the questions which made up the scales (by 
telling us the extent to which they seemed to be measuring the same concepts or variables). Factor 
analysis was used for three main purposes: (a) to assess the degree to which items were tapping the same 
concept (b) To determine the degree to which they could reduce to a smaller set (c) To try to make sense 
o f  the bewildering complexity o f  social behaviour by reducing it to a more limited number o f  factors. 
Bryman and Cramer (1999) argue that two uses o f  factor analysis can be distinguished as (a) Exploratory 
- in which the relationships between various variables were examined without determining the extent to 
which the results fit a particular model (b) Confirmatory factor analysis - comparing the solution found, 
against a hypothetical one.
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step was to decide whether to carry out factor analysisZJJ. According to the result of a 
correlation matrix254, the researcher thought it worthwhile to conduct a factor analysis.
There were several kinds of methods available on SPSS, such as alpha, image, 
maximum likelihood factoring, principal components and factor analysis (called 
principal-axis factoring in SPSS). Bryman and Cramer (1999) claim that the two widely 
used forms for factor analysis are ‘principal component’ and ‘principal-axis factoring’. 
The researcher chose the principal component method . The rationale for choosing 
principal-components analysis, was that it analysed all the variance of a score or 
variable, including its unique256 variance.
Table 9.13 illustrates the SPSS output showing the initial factors produced by a 
principal component analysis (for using cost information for efficiency) and the amount 
of variance they account for (their 'eigenvalue').
253 If there is no significant correlation between these items, they are unrelated and we would not expect
them to form one or more factor analysis (Bryman and Cramer, 1999: 273).
254 Most o f  the items were significantly correlated at over the 0.05 level (either positively or negatively, 
with one another, see table A2.12a). They suggested that they might constitute one or more factors.
255The difference between ‘principle-components’ analysis and 'principal-axis' factoring is how they 
handle unique variance.
256 Unique variance is a combination o f  both specific variance and Error variance (for more details on
‘variance’ see Bryman and Cramer, 1999: 274).
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Table 9.13: Total variance explained for Using Cost Information for Efficiency
Compone
nt
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings
Rotation
Total % of 
Variance
Cumulati
ve
Total % of 
Variance
Cumulati
ve
Total
1 4.608 30.718 30.718 4.608 30.718 30.718 3.238
2 1.777 11.845 42.563 1.777 11.845 42.563 2.238
3 1.597 10.649 53.212 1.597 10.649 53.212 2.474
4 1.368 9.120 62.332 1.368 9.120 62.332 2.671
5 1.169 7.796 70.129 1.169 7.796 70.129 1.823
6 .770 5.136 75.265
7 .733 4.886 80.151
8 .692 4.615 84.766
9 .489 3.318 88.084
10 .468 3.118 91.202
11 .406 2.710 93.912
12 .295 1.969 95.881
13 .278 1.856 97.736
14 .191 1.275 99.011
15 .148 .989 100.000
Source: Analysis of questionnaire.
The next step was to reduce the number of variables. There were two main criteria used 
for deciding which factors to exclude, - ‘Kaiser's Criterion’ and the ‘Scree’ test. This
? r o
research study followed Kaiser's criterion , which was to select those factors which 
had an eigenvalue of greater than one (this meant the first five factors were selected for
257 The Scree test was introduced by Cattell in 1966. In the Scree test, a graph was drawn o f  the 
descending variance accounted for by the factors initially extracted (Bryman and Cramer, 1999: 282). The 
term "Scree", in fact, was a geological one for describing the debris found at the bottom o f  a rocky slope 
and implied that these factors were not very important.
258 The rationale for choosing a Scree test was that the choice o f  criterion might depend on the size o f  the 
average communalities and the number o f variables (Bryman and Cramer, 1999: 277). Furthermore, the 
Kaiser criterion had been recommended for situations where the number o f  variables was less than 30. 
The number o f  using cost information for efficiency was 15 variables, and the average communality was 
greater than 0.07 (the average communality for using cost information for efficiency was just over 0.07).
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using cost information for efficiency. The principal components produced a 
‘Component matrix’ (see table A2.2), which showed the relationship between each item 
and a factor was expressed as a correlation or loading.
The first factors extracted from the analysis were those which accounted for the 
maximum amount of variance. As a consequence, what they present might not be easy 
to interpret, (since items would not correlate as highly with them as they might). In fact, 
most of the items would fall on the first factor, although their correlation within it may 
not be that high.
In order to increase the interpretability of factors, they were rotated to maximise the 
loading of some of the items. A number of ways were developed to rotate factors, 
Bryman and Cramer (1999) argue that the two most commonly used methods are
• • 9^Q • •orthogonal rotation and oblique rotation. Oblique rotation was used. Oblique rotation 
produced by the oblimin method in SPSS gave three matrixes; - a pattern matrix , the 
structure matrix261, and the component matrix262 (see tables A2.2, A2.2a and A2.2b). 
The structure matrix was made up of weights which reflected the unique variance each 
factor contributed to a variable. This was a matrix generally used to interpret the factors. 
According to the structure matrix of using cost information for efficiency, the researcher 
ended up with five factors. For the illustration of these five factors and the items 
included in each factor, see table 9.13a
259 The advantage o f  orthogonal rotation was that the information the factor provided was not redundant, 
(since a person's score on one factor is unrelated to their score on another). The disadvantage o f  
orthogonal rotation was that the factors may have been forced to be unrelated, whereas in real life they 
might be related. This might be less likely with oblique rotation (Bryman and Cramer, 1999: 279).
260 A pattern matrix consisted o f  calculations between the variables and the factors (see table A2.2a).
261 See table A2.2b.
262 The component matrix showed the correlations between the factors. It was difficult to estimate the 
amount o f  variance accounted for oblique factors since the variance was shared between the correlated 
factors (see table A2.2).
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Table 9.13a: Factors of Use of Cost Information for Efficiency (N =50)
Purposes of cost information for efficiency Mean score 
of efficiency
Factor
1- To achieve certain financial measurements
2- To enhance cost reduction programs
3- Identification of necessary correctives
4- Compliance with procedures of reporting
5- Perceived importance for meeting budgets
3.3 Measurement.
1- Inventory valuation
2- Basis for audit
3.1 Evaluation.
1- To provide a means of communication
2- Measuring efficiency of production 
performance
3- To achieve large profits
3.8 Accidental variable.
1- Management and control for period costs
2- Role of standard cost in assessing 
performance
3- Planning of period costs (budgeting)
2.5 Cost efficiency.
1- Performance evaluation for management
2- To achieve production target
4.1 Performance.
Source: Analysis of questionnaire
9.3.2.1.2 Use of cost information for system optimisation
By carrying out a factor analysis using the same steps as followed in the use of cost 
information for system maintenance and efficiency, the system failed to create a pattern 
matrix and a structure matrix. The researcher looked for the reason for failure and 
concluded that it might be that the average of communality was less than 0.70. Hence, 
Scree test and Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisation were used (see table A2.3).
263 According to Varimax rotation, it may not be appropriate to use the significance level o f  the factor 
loading since it depends on the size o f  the sample. There are two ways: Firstly, items or variables which 
correlate less than 0.3 with a factor, are omitted from consideration. An alternative criterion to use is the 
correlation above which no item correlates highly, with more than one factor. The advantage o f  this rule 
is that factors are interpreted in terms o f  items unique to them.
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The researcher ended up with five factors for use of cost information for system 
optimisation. An illustration of these five factors and items included in each factor are
detailed in table 9.14 below.
Table 9.14: Factors of Use of Cost Information for Optimisation (N =50)
Purposes of cost information for 
optimisation
Mean score of 
optimisation
Factor
1- Development of better manufacturing
2- Personal development and workforce 
improvement
3- To motivate people to do better
4- To enhance equipment productivity
5- Importance of marketing cost analysis
6- Transfer prices for internal services
4.1 Human resources 
and productivity 
development.
1- Determine the economic production 
amount
2- To maintain certain profit margins
3- Measuring of efficiency and capability 
utilisation
4- Importance of product cost as input to 
pricing decision
4.2 Economic evaluation
1- Variance analysis and exception reporting
2- Planned and actual product cost
3- Importance of flexible budget
4- To stimulate control of conversion cost
2.5 Cost optimisation
1- Motivating efficiency improvement
2- To emphasise throughput rate
3.5 Motivation
1- product mix decision
2- Make or buy decision
4 Decision processes
Source: Analysis of questionnaire
9.3.2.1.3 Use of cost information for strategic objectives
By carrying out factor analysis using the same steps as followed in uses of cost 
information for system maintenance and efficiency, the researcher ended up with three 
factors for use of cost information for system strategy (see table A2.4). An illustration
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of these three factors (and items included in each factor), are detailed in table 9.15 
below.
Table 9.15: Factors of Use of Cost Information for Strategy (N =50)
Purposes of cost information for Strategic 
objective
Mean score of 
strategy
Factor
1- Importance of technology configuration
2- Improvement of product characteristics
3- Product quality analysis
4- Decisions of company strategy
5- Market growth analysis
6- To forecast the future
7- Market development
4 Market evaluation.
1- Importance of competitor cost analysis
2- Evaluation of investment projects
4 Investment/competit 
or cost.
1- Importance of product configuration
2- Importance of product improvement
3- New product development
4- Planned and actual customer profitability
5- Market share analysis
4.6 Product
development.
Source: Analysis of questionnaire.
9.3.2.2 Company (The GOGCWS Environment)
9.3.2.2.1 Product market 
P(CI)
By carrying out factor analysis using the same steps as followed in uses of cost 
information for system maintenance and efficiency, the SPSS gave this computer 
message. "There are fewer than two cases. At least one of the variables has zero 
variance, or there is only one variable in the analysis. No further statistics will be 
computed".
Hence the researcher considered all items, which included one factor in the product 
market (see table 9.16).
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Table 9.16: Factor of P (Cl) in the product market (N =50)
Factor Raw material and supply (Competition).
1 Product market 1- Market change (sales)
2- Competition intensity
3- Customer variety
4- Profit margins
5- Product innovation
6- Nature of competition
7- Price of products
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
P (Un)
Factor analysis produced three factors for the product market - unpredictability (see 
table A2.5). For an illustration of these three factors and items included in each factor,
see table 9.16a below.
Table 9.16a: Factors of P (Un) of the product market (N =50)
Factor Mean Unpredictability Mean score
1 Price change 1.5 1 - Product innovation 1.7
2- Price of product 1.3
2 Customer/competition 1.1 1 - Customer variety 1.2
2- Nature of competition 1
3 Growth 1.5 1- Market change (sales) 1.8
2- Profit margin 1.1
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
9.3.2.2.2 Factor market
9.3.2.2.2.1 Raw materials and supply
P(CI)
Factor analysis produced three factors for raw materials and supply - competition (see 
table A2.6). For an illustration of these three factors and items included in each factor, 
see table 9.17.
315
Table 9.17: Factors of P (Cl) of raw materials and supply (N =50)
Factor Raw material and supply (Competition)
1 Suppliers 1- Sources of supply
2- Competition between suppliers
3- Nature of suppliers
2 Raw materials 1- Cost of raw material
2- Price of raw material
3 Time 1- Supply
2- Delivery time
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
P (Un)
Factor analysis produced two factors for raw materials and supply - P (Un) (see table 
A2.6a). For an illustration of these two factors and items included in each of them, see
table 9.17a. below.
Table 9.17a: Factors of P (Un) of raw materials and supply (N =50)
Factor Mean Raw material and supply 
(unpredictability)
Mean score
1 1.8 1 - Sources of supply 1.7
2- Competition between suppliers 1.8
3- Cost of raw material 2.2
4- Nature of suppliers 1.8
5- Price of raw material 1.6
2 1.9 1- Supply 1.3
2- Delivery time 2.6
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
9.3.2.2.2.2 Labour 
P(CI)
Factor analysis produced two factors for labour - P (Cl) (see table A2.7). For an 
illustration of these two factors and items included in each of them, see table 9.18.
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Table 9.18: Factors of P (Cl) of labour (N =50)
Factor Labour (Competition)
1 1-Availability of skilled labour
2- Wage rate
3- Labour turnover
4- Relations between water organisations.
2 1- Competing employers
2- Trade union
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
P (Un)
Factor analysis produced two factors for labour - P (Un) (see table A2.7a). For an 
illustration of these two factors and items included in each of them, see table 9.18a
below.
Table 9.18a: Factors market of P (Un) of labour (N =50)
Factor Mean Labour (Unpredictability). Mean score
1 1.5 1 - Availability of skilled labour 1.4
2- Wage rate 1.3
3- Trade union 1.6
4- Labour turnover 1.4
5- Relations between water 1.7
organisations
2 1.3 1- Competing employers 1.4
2- Labour dependency 1.3
Source: analysis o f questionnaire.
9.3.2.2.2.3 Management 
P (Cl)
Factor analysis produced two factors for management - P (Cl) (see table A2.8). For an 
illustration of these two factors and items included in each of them, see table 9.19.
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Table 9.19: Factors of P (Cl) of management (N =50)
Factor Management (Competition).
1 1- Availability of qualified managers
2- Staff turnover
2 1- Salary of management
2- Competition for good managers
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
P (Un)
A factor analysis produced all items related to only one factor (see table A2.8a). For an 
illustration of the items (see table 9.19a).
Table 9.19a: Factor of P (Un) of management (N =50)
Factor Mean Management (Unpredictability). Mean score
1 1.38 1 - Availability of qualified managers 1.4
2- Salary of management 1.4
3- Competition for good managers 1.4
4- Staff turnover 1.3
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
9.3.2.2.2.4 Capital and financing 
P (CI)
Factor analysis produced two factors for capital and financing - P (CI) (see table A2.9). 
For an illustration of these two factors and items included in each of them, see table
9.20.
Table 9.20: Factors of P (CI) of capital and financing (N =50)
Factor Capital and financing (Competition)
1 1- Cost of finance
2- Staff turnover
2 1- Availability of funds
2- Sources of funding
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
318
P (Un)
Factor analysis showed that all items were related to only one factor (see table A2.9a). 
For illustration of the items see table 9.20a.
Table 9.20a: Factor of P (Un) of capital and financing (N =50)
Factor Mean Capital and financing 
(Unpredictability)
Mean score
1 1.5 1- Availability of funding 1.5
2- Source of funds 1.5
3- Cost of finance 1.8
4- Staff turnover 1.4
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
9.3.2.2.2.5 Technology 
P(CI)
Factor analysis produced three factors for technology - P (CI) (see table A2.10). For an 
illustration of these three factors and items included in each factor, see table 9.21.
Table 9.21: Factors of P (CI) of technology (N =50)
Factor Technology (Competition)
1 1 - Availability of equipment
2- Equipment suppliers
3- Delivery of equipment
4- Equipment failure
5- Nature of manufacturing technology
2 1- Obsolete equipment
2- Capital labour substitution
3 1- Competition for equipment
2- Nature of system technology
3- Technology development
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
P (Un)
Factor analysis produced three factors for technology - P (Un) (see table A2.10a). For 
an illustration of these three factors and items included in each factor, see table 9.21a.
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Table 9.21a: Factors of P (Un) of technology (N =50)
Factor Mean Technology (Unpredictability) Mean score
1 1.7 1- Competition for equipment 1.8
2- Nature of system technology 1.9
3- Technology development 1.6
4- Capital labour substitution 1.7
2 2.45 1- Equipment suppliers 1.9
2- Delivery equipment 2.7
3- Equipment failure 2.9
4- Nature of manufacturing 2.2
technology
3 1.66 1- Availability of equipment 1.6
2- Obsolete equipment 1.7
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
9.3.2.2.3 Legislation 
P(CI)
Factor analysis produced two factors for legislation - P (CI) (see table A 2.ll). For an 
illustration of these items, see table 9.22.
Table 9.22: Factors of P (CI) of legislation (N =50)
Factor Legislation (Competition)
1 1- Regulators in the industry
2- Number of legislation
3- Effect of legislation
2 1- Nature of legislation
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
P (Un)
Factor analysis showed that all items related to only one factor (see table A2.11a). For 
an illustration of the items, see table 9.22a
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Table 9.22a: Factor of P (Un) of legislation (N =50)
Factor Mean Legislation (Unpredictability). Mean score
1 1.6 1- Regulators in the industry 1.5
2- A mount of legislation 1.8
3- Nature of legislation 1.7
4- Effect of legislation 1.2
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
According to the reliabilities and factor analysis, the researcher ended up with the 
following factors (see table 9.23).
Table 9.23: Factors of cost management and P (CI) and P (Un) of the product 
market, factor market and legislation
Subject matter Number of
Main Branch Sub-branch factors
Cost management Efficiency Five
Optimisation Five
Strategy Three
Competitive Product market One
Intensity Factor market Raw material and supply Three
Labour Two
Management Two
Capital and financing Two
Technology Three
Legislation Two
Unpredictability Product market Three
Factor market Raw material and supply Three
Labour Two
Management One
Capital and financing One
Technology Three
Legislation One
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
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These numerous factors hindered the researcher in his attempt to address the question 
"Was there a relationship between cost management and perception of competitive 
intensity and unpredictability. It was therefore important to restructure the data as 
outlined in the next section.
9.4 Restructured data
9.4.1 Cost management
Three factors represented cost management. The first factor represented efficiency, 
which resulted from the aggregate of 5 factors of efficiency (see table 9.13a). The 
second factor represented optimisation, which resulted from the aggregate of 5 factors 
of optimisation (see table 9.14). The third factor represented strategy which resulted 
from the aggregate of 3 factors of strategy (see table 9.15). The rationale for choosing 
the aggregate factor for efficiency, optimisation and strategy was because, although 
factor analysis divided efficiency into 5 factors, optimisation into 5 factors and strategy 
into 3 factors, - the alpha coefficients of reliability and validity construct (see table 9.12) 
were very good. Furthermore, the correlation and the significance level were very good 
between the original items of efficiency (see table A2.12a), and the same was noted for 
optimisation (see table A2.13a) and strategy (see table A2.14a).
9.4.2 The GOGCWS environment
9.4.2.1 Product market
One factor for P (Cl) of the product market was acceptable (-0.64). This resulted from 
the aggregate of 7 items (see table 9.16) according to the computer message of the SPSS 
and the alpha coefficient of these items. Three factors emerged for the P (Un) of the 
product market as a result from factor analysis (see table 9.16a), because the alpha 
coefficients were poor and there was no strong correlation between them (see tables 
A2.15 and A2.15a).
9.4.2.2 Factor market
9.4.2.2.1 Raw material and supply
Three factors for the P (Cl) of raw material and supply resulted from factor analysis (see 
table 9.17), because the alpha coefficient was poor (0.24) and there was no strong 
correlation between them (see table A2.16). One factor for P (Un) of raw material which 
resulted from the aggregate of two factors came from SPSS (see table 9.17a), because
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the alpha coefficients and the level of significance between the items formulating the 
two factors was acceptable (see tables 9.12a, A2.17 and A2.17a).
9.4.2.2.2 Labour
Two factors for the P (Cl) of labour resulted from factor analysis (see table 9.18) 
because the alpha coefficient was very poor between the two factors (-0.16), and 
between the original items (-0.0612). There was also no strong correlation found 
between them (see table A2.18). One factor for P (Un) of labour resulted from the 
aggregate between the two factors which resulted from factor analysis (see table 9.18a). 
The reason for the combination between the two factors was because (although the 
alpha coefficient was poor between the two factors “0.40”), the alpha coefficient 
between the original items was acceptable (0.658). There was also a strong correlation 
and significance between the items formulating these two factors (see tables A2.19 and 
A2.19a).
9.4.2.2.3 Management
Two factors for P (Cl) of management resulted from factor analysis (see table 9.19) 
because the alpha coefficient was very poor between the two factors (0.0004) and 
between the original items (.2360). In addition, there was no strong correlation found 
between them (see table A2.20). One factor for P (Un) of management resulted from 
factor analysis (see table A9.19a), because the items had strong correlation and the 
significance between them (tables A2.21 and A2.21a) and the alpha coefficients 
between items, were acceptable (0.7074).
9.4.2.2.4 Capital and financing
Two factors for P (Cl) of capital and financing resulted from factor analysis (see table 
9.20) because the alpha coefficient was very poor between the two factors (0.0605) and 
also between the original items (.0607). In addition, there was no strong correlation 
between them (see table A2.22). One factor for P (Un) of capital and financing resulted 
from factor analysis (see table 9.20a), because the items had strong correlation and the 
significance between each of them (tables A2.23 and A2.23a) and the alpha coefficients 
between the items, were acceptable (0.6151).
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9.4.2.2.5 Technology
Three factors for P (Cl) of technology resulted from factor analysis (see table 9.21) 
because the alpha coefficient was very poor between the three factors (0.2461), and 
there was no strong correlation or significance between these original items (see tables 
A2.24 and A2.24a). Three factors for the P (Un) of technology resulted from factor 
analysis (see table 9.21a), because the alpha coefficient was not acceptable between 
these three factors (0.5505), and there was no strong correlation or significance between 
these three factors (see tables A2.25 and A2.25a).
9.4.2.3 Legislation
Two factors for P (Cl) of legislation resulted from factor analysis (see table 9.22), 
because the alpha coefficient was very poor between the two factors (0.0586) and there 
was no strong correlation or significance found between the original items (see tables 
A2.26 and A2.26a). One factor for P (Un) of legislation resulted from SPSS (see table 
9.22a) because the alpha coefficient was acceptable between the items (0.7876), and 
there was a strong correlation and significance between the items which formulate the 
factor (see tables A2.27 and A2.27a).
9.4.3 New factors of cost management and external environment
In conclusion, the researcher ended up with several factors. Some of them represented 
cost management while others represented the P (Cl) and P (Un) in the external 
environment. These related to three areas: the product market, the factor market (raw 
material and supply, labour, management, capital and financing, and technology) and 
legislation. The number of these factors was illustrated in table 9.24.
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Table 9.24: New factors of cost management and P (Cl) and P (Un) of product 
market, factor market and legislation
Subject matter Number of 
factors/ Mean 
score
Main Branch Sub-branch
Cost Efficiency One (3.3)
management Optimisation One (3.7)
Strategy One (3.96)
P(CI) Product market One
Factor market Raw material and supply Three
Labour Two
Management Two
Capital and financing Two
Technology Three
Legislation Two
P (Un) Product market Three (1.3)
Factor market Raw material and supply One (1.8)
Labour One (1.4)
Management One (1.4)
Capital and financing One (1.5)
Technology Three (1.95)
Legislation One (1.5)
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire.
9.5 Data analysis two
Was there any relationship between cost management and the P (Cl) that related to the 
product market, factor market and legislation? The results were as shown in tables 9.25 
and 9.25a.
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Table 9.25: Pearson correlations between Cost practice and perception of the 
GOGCWS environment related to P (Cl) (N= 50).
Factor market
Cost Product Raw material & Labour Managemc Capital & Technology Legislation
management market supply nt financing
FI F2 F3 FI F2 FI F2 FI F2 FI F2 F3 FI F2
Efficiency - .276* . 265* .246* .290* .266* .310*
Optimisation - .328* .299* .247* .314* .357**
Strategy - .356** .269* - .256* .242*
Table 9.25a: The significance levels of the Pearson correlations between Cost 
practice and perception of the GOGCWS environment related to P (Cl) (N= 50).
Factor market
Cost Product Raw material & Labour Manageme Capital & Technology Legislation
management market supply nt financing
FI F2 F3 FI F2 FI F2 FI F2 FI F2 F3 FI F2
Efficiency .026 .032 .042 .021 .031 .014
Optimisation .010 .018 .042 .013 .006
Strategy .006 .029 .036 .045
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
The result showed that there was a negative correlation between the product market and 
cost management (efficiency, optimisation and strategy). There was a positive 
correlation between legislation and efficiency, but there was no correlation between 
legislation and optimisation or strategy. Regarding the factor market, raw material and 
supply had a positive correlation with cost management (efficiency, optimisation and 
strategy). Labour had a positive correlation with efficiency and optimisation, but had a 
negative correlation with strategy. Management had a negative correlation with 
efficiency, a positive correlation with strategy and no correlation with optimisation. 
Capital and financing had a negative correlation with efficiency but a positive 
correlation with optimisation and no correlation with strategy. Finally, technology had a 
positive correlation with efficiency and optimisation, and had no correlation with 
strategy.
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Was there any relationship between cost management and P (Un) related to the product 
market, factor market and legislation? The results were as shown in tables 9.26 and 
9.26a.
Table 9.26: Pearson correlations between Cost practice and perception of the 
GOGCWS environment related to P (Un) (N= 50).
Cost
management
Product market Factor market Legisla
tionRaw 
materia! 
and supply
Labour Manage
ment
Capital and 
financing
Technology
FI F2 F3 FI F2 F3
Efficiency
Optimisation .272* .318*
Strategy .242*
Table 9.26a: The significance levels of the Pearson correlations between Cost 
practice and perception of the GOGCWS environment related to P (Cl) (N= 50).
Cost
management
Product market Factor market Legisla
tionRaw 
material 
and supply
Labour Manage
ment
Capital and 
financing
Technology
FI F2 F3 FI F2 F3
Efficiency
Optimisation .028 .012
Strategy .045
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
The result showed that there was no correlation between the product market and cost 
management (efficiency, optimisation and strategy), and none between legislation and 
cost management. Regarding the factor market, labour and management, and capital and 
financing had no correlation with cost management (efficiency, optimisation and 
strategy). Raw material and supply had a positive correlation only with optimisation and 
no correlation with efficiency or strategy. Technology had a positive correlation with 
optimisation and strategy, but had no correlation with efficiency.
9.6 Discussion
In conclusion, the researcher found that there was a correlation between the cost 
practice and perception of the GOGCWS environment (illustrated in tables 9.27 and 
9.27a).
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There was a negative relationship between efficiency and the P (Cl) related to the 
product market. There was a positive relationship with the P (Cl) related to legislation, 
raw material and supply, labour, and technology and efficiency. The researcher referred 
to this as ‘technical’ rather than ‘economic’ efficiency (see section 4.1). Furthermore, 
the P (Cl) in relation to legislation, appeared to play a more important role than both the 
product market and factor market.
There was a negative relationship between optimisation and the P (Cl) related to 
product market. There was a positive relationship with the P (Cl) related to raw material 
and supply, labour, technology, capital investment and optimisation. In addition, there 
was a positive relationship between optimisation and the P (Un) related to raw material 
and supply and technology. The researcher observed that the managers tried to achieve 
results in the organisation, but there were certain rules and controls which hindered 
them.
There was a negative relationship between strategy and the P (Cl) related to product 
market and labour. There was a positive relationship between raw material and supply, 
management and strategy. There was a positive relationship between strategy and the P 
(Un) related to technology. It was clear that technology was the most important aspect 
because the water service deals with fundamental human requirements.
In short, legislation and the factor market had positive pressure of cost management, 
while the product market had negative pressure of cost management. It was important to 
examine the relationship between cost management and the P (Cl) and P (Un) that are 
related to the external environment (from all three managerial levels - senior ‘high’ 
level, medium level and junior ‘low’ level), see tables 9.28, 9.28a, 9.29, 9.29a, 9.30 and 
9.30a).
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The perception of the senior level GOGCWS managers was that "legislation, raw 
material, management and product market, technology, capital investment and labour" 
all had negative pressure of cost management. The perception of senior managers in the 
GOGCWS was similar to that of the GOGCWS264 itself (except that technology, capital 
investment and labour had positive pressure of cost management).
264 Legislation and factor market have positive pressure o f  cost management. Product market has negative 
pressure o f  cost management.
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The perception of the GOGCWS managers (medium level) was that technology had 
negative pressure of efficiency, and positive pressure of optimisation and strategy (see 
table 9.29). However, they did not comment on the product market or legislation, or the 
remaining elements of the factor market. Comparing this result to the result from the 
perception of the GOGCWS itself, it did not fully represent the perception of the 
GOGCWS.
The only response from the junior managers level to perceptions of the impact of the 
external environment on cost practices, was capital investment had positive pressure of 
optimisation, and legislation had negative pressure of optimisation, (as illustrated in 
table 9.30).
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It was necessary to examine the relationship between cost management and the P (Cl) 
and P (Un) (which are related to the external environment), from a functional viewpoint 
(accounting, technical and administrative (see tables 9.31. 9.32 and 9.33).
335
Ta
bl
e 
9.3
1:
 P
ea
rs
on
 
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
 b
et
we
en
 
Co
st 
pr
ac
tic
e 
an
d 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of 
the
 
Ch
ief
 o
f 
Co
st 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
of 
G
O
G
CW
S 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
(p
ro
du
ct
 m
ar
ke
t, 
fa
cto
r 
m
ar
ke
t 
an
d 
le
gi
sla
tio
n)
 r
ela
ted
 
to 
P 
(C
l) 
an
d 
P 
(U
n)
/ 
M
ea
n 
sc
or
e 
- F
un
ct
io
na
l 
lev
el 
(a
cc
ou
nt
in
g)
l/l
TT
vn
©
Vo>_>
%-«cd
bO<uc
+-Taao
£c
La
bo
u
r
2.
14
1.
14
2.
14
1.
14
2.
14
1.
14
M
an
ag
e
m
en
t
3.
75 1
3.
75 1
3.
75 1
Ca
pi
ta
l
in
ve
stm
e
nt 2.
5 1 2.
5 1
Te
ch
n
ol
og
y
2.
7
2.
5
2.
7
2.
5
2.
7
2.
5
R
aw
m
at
er
i
al 2.
86
1.
14 2 1.
14
2.
86 1.
14
P(
C
I)
P (U
n)
P 
(C
l)
P (U
n)
P(
C
I)
P (U
n)
oD.
cC3O
£c
bO
vo
CO
CO
m
£  _CJ o>
o  t  
o  z
o  g
© .2«3 'S
. f a  B s
s &
•3  *
. f i  TSw s« J i
.Si HH
>  u
. s *
C 3
°  T3b ©
.2 2 ^
ft g « « h *2 
«  <-—s B  J- B pB a o © 
c l  • — «  '■*" ^  -3
. —  ' — ^ B 5/5
*  ‘3dV <U 
w*3 *0 u Bg 3 
a  t>
£ 5-r2 «
« !« fa « 3
£ J
-*-»5/5 VB ^
O  *M
*-C g
C8 S  
i- w
fa 3
« o
§ i .c« s—^S- -*pc$ 3 v <u
*  B
5  «-5 ■*T3 J-
©  03£ s
<Nro
a\
p22«
H
VO
00
ri
53 fa
<  ^  
«
*S °B w
BO
*PP
*P3
p
(U
n) fH rH
pB « C«w B v fa • ppbD SHHr_, b5H O 
Cl
a>
fa U
fa
(N (N fN
IT) min r fO tH
f aOau
B
#o
Ph *-+33
'M
GO
B
0
GA
• pp« S 2
O
u
’3
B
•pp
-LP
a
0)
u
O
4-*
c «
La
bo
u
r
2.
41 1 I
prz I
PVZ
M
an
ag
e
m
en
t
2.
5 1 2.
5 1 M
Ca
pi
ta
l
in
ve
stm
e
nt (S 1—1 <S H
Te
ch
n
ol
og
y
2.
4 1 I
rz 1 2.4
Ra
w
m
at
er
i
al (N (N tH (N 1—1
(id
) a p (U
n)
P(
C
I)
p (U
n)
P(
C
I)
p (U
n)
un
o
V
a
_ >
+->abDos
+scaos'£tUD
O
CL
-4-Te
C3O
s'5bO
c-~mm
Ta
bl
e 
9.3
3:
 P
ea
rs
on
 
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
 b
et
we
en
 
Co
st 
pr
ac
tic
e 
an
d 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of 
the
 
Ch
ief
 o
f 
G
en
er
al
 C
hi
ef
 o
f 
M
et
er
s 
A
dm
in
ist
ra
tio
n 
of
 
G
O
G
CW
S 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
(p
ro
du
ct
 m
ar
ke
t, 
fa
cto
r 
m
ar
ke
t 
an
d 
le
gi
sla
tio
n)
 r
ela
ted
 
to 
P 
(C
l) 
an
d 
P 
(U
n)
/ 
(M
ea
n 
sc
or
ed
) 
- F
un
ct
io
na
l
lev
el 
(a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e)
sso
Jg
on
*3do
hJ
A S3*  P ©
Vo_>
cd
00
CD
Ca
CD
s*5toO
00
oomm
La
bo
u
r 1.
9 1 1.
86 1 1.
86 1
M
an
ag
e
m
en
t
4 1.
25 4 1.
25 4 1.
25
Ca
pi
ta
l
in
ve
stm
e
nt i-l (N tH l-H
Te
ch
n
ol
og
y
1.
4
2.
1
2.
1 1.
4
2.
1 1.
4
Ra
w
m
at
er
i
al 2.
6 1.
4 2 1.
43
2.
57
1.
43
P(
C
I)
P (U
n)
P(
C
I)
P (U
n)
P(
C
I)
P (U
n)
o
a,
4-Tc
03O
sc-1oo
The results showed (the analysis of managerial and functional levels), that legislation is 
the most important factor affecting cost management. This result could be explained by 
institutional theory. Institutional theorists argue that pressures to conform to accepted 
practices, can be particularly powerful in government organisations (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Gupta et al., 1994; Geiger and Ittner, 1996). Since 
the survival of government units depend primarily on the support of external 
constituents, (and only secondarily on actual, performance, Gupta et al., 1994), 
conforming to accepted social norms and external requirements is necessary to maintain 
organisational legitimacy (thereby strengthening support and ensuring continued 
funding). Scott (1987) argued that in institutional environments (such as government 
organisations), environmental agents have the authority to impose organisational 
practices on subordinate units, or specify conditions for remaining eligible for the 
continuation of funding. Consequently, subordinate organisations are likely to show 
little resistance to the implementation of mandated practices, but the changes will tend 
to be superficial and loosely coupled to participant action.
This result could be explained by neo-institutional theory which is a theory "based on 
the premise that organisations respond to pressures from their institutional 
environment and adopt structures and/or procedures that are socially accepted as 
being the appropriate organisational choice" (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). This shows 
that the GOGCWS relates to political organisation. This means the GOGCWS's 
legitimacy is threatened by monopoly. Procedures and management play no direct part 
in generating resources for the GOGCWS, it is assumed that the customer is not 
interested in such things but only in the GOGCWS product.
9.7 Conclusion
This chapter identified the perceptions of managers in the GOGCWS regarding 
legislation, product market and factor market which affect accounting work in the 
GOGCWS generally, and cost management especially. From a strategic cost 
management perspective, this chapter elevated environmental factors in importance as
265 For a definition o f  the term "institutional environment" (see section 7.2.5).
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major drivers of cost and in particular, highlighted their related interaction with 
management strategy and policy.
This chapter observed that management accounting in the GOGCWS was based on ex 
post benchmarks (historical observations), not on forward-looking market prices 
(expectations for the future). The result was, that management accounting had no new 
techniques operating in the GOGCWS. Furthermore, management accounting in the 
GOGCWS was based on a hierarchical perspective (institutional hierarchy). Cost 
information had no role (or a very limited) role in shaping the strategy of the 
GOGCWS. In addition, government funds for the GOGCWS had an effect on the use of 
cost information.
The economic element did not play an important role in shaping the policy of the 
GOGCWS. The political or social element did play an important role in shaping the 
policy of the GOGCWS. In other words, the GOGCWS represents a specific 
embodiment of the role "political and legal structures play, in shaping the institutional 
frameworks within which various organisations operate" (Scott, 1987: 409; March and 
Olsen, 1989; Bealing, et al., 1996). The analysis also suggests that the GOGCWS 
adopted institutionalised structures in order to gain legitimacy and social support. This 
suggestion is not new to institutional theory. It has been suggested by several authors 
(e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991). Furthermore, the 
political, social and cultural elements had strong influence on the decision to privatise 
and regulate the water industry in Egypt.
Social context shaped economic theory, and accounting was both independent of, and 
connected to economic theory. The way of managing labour in the GOGCWS created 
obstacles for efficiency, optimisation and strategy. Furthermore, managers of the 
GOGCWS tried to achieve results, but there were enforced regulations which prevented 
them from achieving what they wanted (institutional theory- regulative structure). The 
researcher noted that the most important element affecting the strategy of the GOGCWS 
was legislation, the factor market and the product market.
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Chapter 10
External and Internal Environments of the GOGCWS
10.0 Introduction
The objective of this research was to understand, describe and explain the role of cost 
management within the water industry. Institutional theory was adopted as a framework 
for explaining the role of cost management in the Egyptian Water Industry via a case 
study of the GOGCWS. Institutional theory focuses on both the external (Covaleski, et 
al., 1993; 1996; Mezias, 1990) and internal environment (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the external and internal environment of the 
General Organisation for the Greater Cairo Water Supply. The chapter is divided into 
three sections.
Section one examines research evidence from the external environment. It discusses 
Egyptian government policy in its management of the water industry. It also examines 
the perceptions of the GOGCWS managers on the issue of privatisation in the water 
industry. It looks at the supply and demand of water in the Egyptian water services 
industry.
Section two examines evidence from the internal environment. It outlines the current 
cost practice used in the GOGCWS. The final section sums up the main conclusions and 
implications of the previous sections.
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10.1 The External environment
10.1.1 Government policy
The Egyptian Prime Minister has said Egypt is committed to economic reform despite 
the economic slowdown it has suffered over the past two years (XINHUA, 05/02/2002). 
He confirmed that privatisation would continue. He argued that it helps improve 
competitiveness. The new Egyptian government signalled that the privatisation process 
will broaden to include not only state enterprises but also the public utilities and public- 
sector authorities (Business Middle East, 16/03/2000). However, Egypt's privatisation 
programme is in no way straightforward and an array of obstacles must be negotiated, 
many of which are not immediately clear.
The partial privatisation of Egypt's state electricity companies began with a law, passed 
by parliament and ratified by the president. It allowed the country's eight regional 
distribution companies to be transferred to a joint stock company. The Egyptian cabinet 
determined how much capital in the joint stock company would be offered to stock 
market investors (Modern Power Systems, 98). However, investors were not allowed to 
exceed 49 percent of the shares in each of the eight companies. The new company was 
responsible for power generation and buying-power from private projects. It also 
controlled interconnection between Egypt and its neighbouring countries.
This research does not aim to compare the water industry in Egypt with that of France 
and England. Rather it aims to offer alternative governance structures for the water 
industry in different countries (such as the UK where water is provided by a highly 
regulated market and France where water services is hybrid structure). By holding up 
other structures as alternatives, the Egyptian water industry may now consider other 
control mechanisms (such as market or hybrid).
The focus of this research was the water industry in Egypt. As mentioned in section 
7.2.5, by Williamson, 1985; 1996; Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Colbert and Spicer, 1995; 
Dietrich, 2001), the management of the water industry in Egypt was hierarchical. The 
aim of this section is to examine the perceptions of the GOGCWS managers on the 
issue of privatisation (a governance structure in the water industry). The results were as 
shown in table 10.1
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Table 10.1: Perception of privatisation or regulation of the water industry in the
GOGCWS. (N =37)
Privatisation or regulation
Managerial level Total
High Medium Low
Object to privatisation — 10% 32% 42%
Supportive of privatisation — 10.5% 10.5% 21%
Did not object or agree about 
privatisation.
3% 3% 5% 11%
Refused to talk about privatisation 3% 5% 18% 26%
Total 6% 28.5% 65.5% 100%
Source: Analysis o f  interviews.
The interviewees who were opposed to privatisation gave reasons for their objections. 
Interviewee response has been divided into four categories: Cost, price, control and 
water requirements. Typical responses included the following:
• Privatisation will lead to a decrease in both salaries and workers266.
• Privatisation will lead to price increases and go against public interest .
• Price increases will affect the indigent 269.
• A price increase would affect the social element .
• It would affect the political position271.
779• The most important element is the political element .
• • 973 • 974• Water is an essential life element- and life's artery .
266 Accountant in the Participating Accounts Department.
267 Accountant in the Cost Department, Accountant in the Cost Department, Accountant in the Cost 
Department, Accountant in the Central Department and Accountant in the Participating Accounts 
Administration.
268 Auditing in the maturities Department.
269 Chief o f  Loans Accounts and Documentary Credit Department.
270 Chief o f  the Bills Auditing and Stamp Department and Accountant in the Deduction and Modifications 
Department.
271 Chief o f  the Commitment Department.
272 Accountant in the Cost Department.
273 Accountant in the Bills Auditing and Stamp Department.
274 Accountant in the Cost Department.
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• The General Organisation for the Greater Cairo Water Supply provides water to 
25% of the population in Egypt, so how can we let 25% of the population be under
97^the control of the private sector ?
• We cannot have water under anyone's control276.
Results from the interviews show that 42% of respondents were opposed to 
privatisation. This is consistent with the basic premise of institutional theory which 
posits that "an organisation's tendency is to conform to established norms, traditions and 
social influences in both their internal and external environments. This conformity 
extends to their structures and practices (as in the case of the GOGCWS). Institutional 
theory claims that successful governments are those that gain support and legitimacy by 
conforming to social pressures" (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001).
It is further argued that these results could be explained in terms of the religious beliefs 
of the Egyptian people who follow the faith of Islam. In Islam, water laws prohibit the 
monopoly of water by those nearest the source (International El-Aharam, 2000). Islamic 
laws forbid those with a plentiful supply of water to keep it as surplus. These laws also 
prohibit the sale of water (even if it is surplus to requirements). Islamic law forbids the 
wasting and excessive use of water, and advocates water-cleaning or anti-pollution 
programmes.
It was noted that at senior managerial level, no one objected to privatisation. Half of the 
junior managerial levels objected (32%). The senior managerial levels have more of an 
overview of the management of the organisation and this could account for this result. 
Senior managers realised the GOGCWS needs to change from a hierarchically-based 
organisation to one market-based (or a mix between the two). Consultants Black and 
Veatch International had made similar suggestions (see section 8.7.7).
None of the senior managerial staff were in favour of privatisation. This may be a fear 
of the consequences of going against government policy. Douglas (1986) argues that 
individuals see answers as being "right" only if they fit in with institutional thinking.
275 Chief o f  commitment.
276 Accountant in the Cost Department.
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This pressure to conform, prevents employees from giving their own opinions, out of 
fear that they may conflict with the institution's ethos.
A possible reason for the high percentage of interviewees (26%) who refused to talk 
about privatisation at all, may have been born out of fear of talking against the policy of 
the government. It is clear from sections 8.1 and 8.4 that the GOGCWS had a regulative 
pillar (the third pillar in institutional theory, Scott, 1995; see section 2.3). Fear is central 
to the regulative pillar (North, 1990 and Scott, 1995). Hence institutional pressures may 
work in constraining the activities of the GOGCWS managers.
21% of respondents who agreed with privatisation in the water industry did not approve 
of selling the water companies to the private sector. Interviewees wanted to see the 
Egyptian water industry run on a basis of both privatisation and regulation. In other 
words, they wanted to adopt a hybrid approach similar to that of France, see section
7.2.3). This was observed when The Chief of Statistics Department stated that 
"Privatisation will increase quality but will also increase price. In order to solve this 
problem, the ownership of the organisation should be between the private sector and the 
state, but the greater percentage of ownership should be with the state (over 50%)".
The interviewees, who did not oppose or agree with privatisation (11%), stressed the 
importance of the social element. This was clear when an accountant in the Costs 
department stated "It is impossible to privatise the water industry because investors 
want a profit margin and this means an increase in price". This statement showed there 
was a very negative view of privatisation in the GOGCWS.
Some interviewees suggested alternatives to privatisation of the water industry. These 
suggestions were classified into five categories: leadership, regulation and control, cost
977and price, loss and consumption and privatisation. Typical suggestions were "Leaders 
chosen should be both judicious and competent"278. With regard to regulation and 
control, respondents suggested restrictions and the calling to account of management at
• 770every level, (even the chairman of the organisation ). They advocate exercising stricter
277 Accountant in the Participating Accounts Department.
278 Accountant in the participating Accounts Administration.
279 Chief o f  the Bills Auditing Department (Collection).
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controls on senior management. These should be put into effect rather than merely exist
280on paper .
On the subject of cost and price, the interviewees suggested a price increase. They 
recommended obtaining a subsidy from the state to make up the difference between 
price and cost281, (thereby reducing costs through continuous maintenance of equipment 
and a reduction in water consumption) . The focus of this category was clearly 
important. This was apparent when the Chief of the Balance Sheet Administration 
stated, "The only solution is to look at methods which can reduce costs and raise 
prices".
Regarding loss and consumption of water, respondents suggested reducing the loss of
9RTwater by following new technology , and putting a meter in each flat would lead to
984less consumer consumption of water . On the issue of privatisation, respondents 
suggested privatising distribution, management and collection, but without transferring 
ownership of the organisation . Conversely, they were against the privatisation of 
production ,
Although this research is based on a single company, the company itself provides water 
for 25% of the population in Egypt. This research argued that "the social context shaped 
economic theory, and accounting was both independent of and related to economic 
theory". Carpenter and Feroz (2001) claim that isomorphic pressures will cause 
organisations to become increasingly homogenous (within given domains), and lead 
them to conform to expectations of the wider institutional environment.
280 Accountant in the Deduction and Modifications Department.
281 Accountant in the Planned Budget Department.
282 Accountant in the Cost Department and another accountant in the Cost Department.
283 Chief o f  Loans and Grants Department.
284 Accountant in the Bills Auditing and Stamp Department
285 Accountant in the Planned Budget Department.
286 Chief o f  the Central Accounts Department.
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The Chief of the Documentary Credit Department supported this argument when he 
stated that "privatisation in the water industry leads to a higher quality and decreases 
cost by about 50%, but he adds, we should consider the social element". He believes 
that if management of the water industry in Egypt was privatised (market based), it 
would be more beneficial. He emphasised the social element which opposed 
privatisation in the Egyptian water industry.
The importance of the social element is made clear by the argument put forward by 
Young (1996) and Douglas (1986). Young (1996) contended that individuals draw upon 
their institutional commitments when recognising problems which require decision­
making, (and in suggesting specific proposals as feasible and correct "solutions" to such 
problems). A social element underlies all thinking and problem-solving. In recognising 
the social element, Douglas (1986) argues that individuals see answers as being "right" 
only if they fit in with institutional thinking. This pressure to conform therefore 
prevents employees from giving their own opinion out of fear that they may conflict 
with the institution's ethos.
10.1.2 Supply and Demand of water in Egypt
Demand for water is growing in the 21st century. The most important factor affecting 
demand of water is the rise in population. For example, the population of Egypt rose 
from 55 million in 1994 to 63 million in the year 2000. It is expected to increase to 86 
million by the year 2025. The demand for water will inevitably increase. The future 
looks bleak if Egypt does not succeed in formulating and implementing a water policy 
which can match the limited fresh water supply with increasing demand. The per capita 
water resources are expected to drop from 922 m3 per year (1990) to 337 m3 in the year 
2025. This will potentially change the focus from cost management of supply, to cost 
management of demand. The Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources 
(MPWWR) in Egypt had highlighted several cases - (especially in the distant regions of 
the Nile) - where the cost of the desalination of seawater was less than the cost of 
transferred Nile water. They concluded that the desalination of seawater should be 
increased. De-salinated water in Egypt was approximately 30 million w3/year 
(International El-Aharam, 4/3/2000). If the present management practice and cropping 
patterns continue, it could mean that up to 60 % of agricultural land would not be 
irrigated.
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The main problems facing the water industry of Egypt (see section 7.2.4) and the 
GOGCWS, is management of water demand. This problem has arisen for several 
reasons. The increase in population is one such reason. For example, the population of 
Cairo is 13 million. By 2025, three millions tourists are expected to visit the city per 
day. This poses a potential problem for the demand on water supplies.
The following example illustrates the potential problems an increased demand for water 
is likely to produce. In 1968, the population of Giza was 610,000. Today it is one of the 
largest cities in the world (the GOGCWS, no date source given, a: 17). The population 
of Shoubra El-Khama was 185,000 in 1968. In 1986 it was 700,000. Today it is the 
fourth largest city in Egypt (Egyptian Geographic Association, no date source given: 2).
Regarding price, the GOGCWS charges different prices (i.e. business sector rates differ 
from those of domestic houses). Table 10.2 presents an outline of (1) the purpose of 
water (2) the rate of each purpose (3) quantities of water and (4) the value of water sold 
in 1999/2000.
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Table 10.2: Purposes of water and the quantities for the year 1999/2000
Purpose Rate Quantity m3 Value E .P /8/
Houses .12, .16 900,091,063 115,006,510.72
Fixed rate .12 5,063,982 607,676.27
Places of Worship .08 2,639,883 211,190.64
Society clubs .10 4,654,748 465,474.8
Charitable associations .15 3,684,640 552,696.00
Health insurance hospitals .23 1,379,018 317,174.14
Unions .25 323,970 80,992.50
Bakeries and garages .28 3,912,553 1,095,514.84
Government factories .30 1,097,853 329,355.90
Building order .34 5,055,170 1,718,757.80
Commercial shops .36 44,158,915 15,897,209.40
Clubs .50 511,982 255,991.00
Large factories .60 31,665,959 18,999,575.40
Embassies .75 977,885 733,413.75
Tourist investment 1.25 12,835,303 16,044,128.75
Water treatment .10 1,037,487 103,748.70
Investment treatment .15 1,037,202 155,580.30
Annual fixed rate 181,177 18,117.70
Total 1,020,308,790 172,593,108.61
Source: This inform ation was obtained during fieldwork from the accounts departm ent o f  the
GOGCW S.
The cost of water supply outweighs the revenue of water supply. Taking the cost and 
average revenue of water houses as an example. The cost per m3 = 0.46 pence (see 
section 1.5). By contrast, average revenue per m3 for houses = 0.16 pence. This meant 
the uncover cost of supply of water houses = 0.30 * 900,091,063 = 270,027,318 E. P.
287 E. P. means Egyptian pound.
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10.2 Internal environment
10.2.1 Current cost practice in the GOGCWS
The management accounting procedure used in the GOGCWS (see tables 9.1 - 9.3a) 
was consistent with the development of literature in management accounting up until 
1970 (see table 3.2). The GOGCWS used budgets (see section 8.7.3) and full absorption 
costing (see section 8.7.4). Its budget was governed by functional bureaucracy (and 
contributed to the pursuit of the rationale in the allocation of resources). Furthermore, 
the emphasis on budgeting and standard costing (see section 9.2.1.1) resulted in 
increased control within the GOGCWS. Brignall and Modell, 2000; Wildavsky, 1975; 
Jonsson, 1982; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983; 1986 all found that budgeting was 
associated with institutional and political processes (see section 9.2.1.1)
The budget of the GOGCWS can be described in terms of DiMaggio and Powell's 
(1983: 563) definition: "Budgeting is one specific form of coercive isomorphism that 
governments often require for funding". Covaleski and Dirsmith (1989: 585) adopted an 
institutional perspective to examine the role of power in the budgetary process. They 
found that the state's budget, (which is the end product of many processes of 
institutionalisation), is controlled by issues of power and by individuals working in their 
own self-interests.
Was there dissatisfaction with the conventional costing system at the GOGCWS? 
Conventional costing systems allocated overhead costs on simplistic measures (such as 
direct labour, etc). These systems within the GOGCWS ignored overhead costs for 
calculating the costs of products (Innes and Mitchell, 1995 and Kaplan 1994, see section
4.3). Why was activity-based costing not practised in spite of its many advantages? - (as 
outlined in section 4.3). It was observed that the main reason that the GOGCWS had no 
authority or choice in its accounting system was because it was a public sector 
economic organisation. The Unified Accounting System was applied on an economic 
organisation within the public sector by law, (incremental model). This goes back to the 
argument of Carpenter and Feroz (2001), who found that previous governmental 
accounting research (based on economic theory) ignored how institutional and 
organisational pressures constrain accounting choice in the public sector.
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On the topic of activity-based management (mentioned in section 8.7.5) it was noted 
that ABM was not used in the GOGCWS because the organisation took the functional 
view rather than the process view. The functional view sees costs as best controlled by 
department managers (see section 8.3). Managers were responsible for minimising the 
variance between budget and actual costs by cost element (see sections 8.7.3 and 8.8). 
Cost variance analysis in the GOGCWS seemed to be designed in a way which meant 
managers were responsible for the variances under their control. This meant that the 
emphasis of the cost model used in the GOGCWS was on efficient use of resources. 
This is what Harmmer and Champy, 1993; Cooper et al., 1992 and Trussel and Bitner, 
1998 call a ‘traditional’ view of cost management (see section 4.4). In contrast the 
ABM view sees costs as best controlled by managing the workload, eliminating non­
value-added activities and continuously improving value-added activities. This would 
then be an effective use of resources (Brimson, 1996).
Which methods of cost management were best suited to the GOGCWS? Berry, et al., 
(1995: 55) found that "the structures of traditional cost accounting (e.g. full absorption 
costing) fit beautifully with the notion of functional bureaucracy. These structures are a 
classic case of dis-aggregation of hierarchic elements to lower-order activities”.
As illustrated in table 8.30, the GOGCWS focuses on operational and capital budgets. A 
budget was more than a financial statement. It was a record of how real sources 
(expressed in monetary terms) allocated different activities. It was observed that the 
budget process at the GOGCWS followed the incremental model of budgeting. (This 
observation was based on analysis of documentation288 and staff perception at the 
GOGCWS ). Tncrementalism’ refers to a particular view of the budget decision­
making process (Jonsson, 1982). What occurred during a given period determined what 
would happen in the future at the GOGCWS. It was expressed as "This year's budget is 
estimated 290 by the amount spent last year".
288 See figure 8.5
289 See figure 8.6 (analysis o f  interviews) and table 8.30 (analysis o f  questionnaires).
290 This was the case o f  the GOGCWS (see figure 8.6).
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10.2.2 Managers’ perceptions of cost management
Cost management was defined in this thesis as has three elements, - efficiency, 
optimisation and strategy. Table 10.3 shows when managers of the GOGCWS were 
asked, "Do you have cost management for efficiency?" The answer across the board 
was yes (92%). However, when actual use of cost information for efficiency was 
analysed, the mean score shows that there is use of cost information for efficiency. 
However, it was very low for optimisation and almost disappeared for strategy.
Table 10.3: Managers Perception of Cost Information in the GOGCWS
Cost management Do you have cost 
management? (Yes)
The use of cost 
information for (Mean 
score291)
Efficiency 92% 3.3
Optimisation 76% 3.7
Strategy 70% 3.96
Source: Analysis o f questionnaire
The mean scores in the three Likert categories (in table 10.3) appear similar, however, a 
big difference can be detected between them. It should be noted that this is the average 
mean score and respondents of the questionnaire numbered only fifty. The average 
mean score appears to show a difference (i.e. less than 3.5 is ‘important’ whereas higher 
than 3.5 is ‘not important’).
As mentioned in section 9.2.1.1, the use of cost information for efficiency was 
measured by fifteen items (eight of which had an overall mean score of less than 3.5. six 
items showed an overall mean score higher than 3.5, see table 9.1b). The use of cost 
information optimisation was measured by eighteen items. Five items had an overall 
mean score of less than 3.5, while thirteen items had an overall mean score of higher 
than 3.5 (see table 9.2b). The use of cost information for strategy was measured by 
fourteen items. Two items had an overall mean score of less than 3.5 and twelve items 
had mean score of higher than 3.5 (see table 9.3 a).
291 The range o f  the Likert scale was 1= extremely important, 2 = very important, 3 = important, 4 =  not 
so important, 5 = Not important and 6 = I do not know.
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Managers’ perception of legislation is the most important factor in cost management for 
the GOGCWS followed by the factor market. Perception of the product market had no 
impact on cost management at the GOGCWS (see chapter 9). This was unsurprising 
given that the hypothesis working in this research was: "If managers perceive a 
competitive, uncertain environment, then cost management will inevitably increase". As 
it is, the GOGCWS runs efficiently (see section 9.2.1.1). However the company 
suffered from a lack of change and focus in the organisation itself. The managers had no 
strategic orientation.
The results (see tables 10.3) show that managers of the GOGCWS realised the 
accounting system used in the organisation was inadequate. It was observed that many
9Q9of the suggestions put forward by academics (regarding improvement in management 
accounting) were similar to those advocated by interviewees within the GOGCWS. For 
example, Coates and Longden (1989) were among the first to note that computer 
technology would obviate the need for standard costing systems and make it possible to 
work entirely on-line with actual costs. Similarly interviewees293 of the GOGCWS felt 
"it would be beneficial to introduce computers into the company and make use of 
them".
10.3 Conclusion
This chapter shows how institutional pressure was worked in shaping management 
policy of the Egyptian water companies. It was noted the GOGCWS was 'boxed-in' and 
was not receptive to new ideas.
This chapter highlighted the method of cost management was used in the GOGCWS 
which was based on budget, full absorption costing and standard costing. It also 
illustrated there was no change of cost management in the GOGCWS that had been 
further explained in the following chapter.
The chapter showed that the GOGCWS's managers were not stupid, or ignorant. It also 
highlighted the managers of the GOGCWS realised the method of cost management
292 (Coates and Longden, 1989; Littler and Sweeting, 1989; Hope and Hope, 1995; Cooper, 1996).
293 Accountant in the Cost Department, Accountant in the Cost Department, Accountant in the 
Participating Accounts Administration, Accountant o f  the Statistics Department.
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was not relevant and there was a need for change (see section 10.2.2). This chapter 
illustrated that the GOGCWS focused on the first element of cost management 
(efficiency) while the two elements of optimisation and strategy were given less 
attention. This argument will be further developed in chapter eleven.
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Chapter 11 
Discussion
11.0 Introduction
Chapter ten showed how the GOGCWS focused on the element of cost management 
(efficiency). The two elements of optimisation and strategy had not previously been 
addressed by the GOGCWS. It was also highlighted in chapter ten that there was no 
change of cost management within the GOGCWS. This chapter aims to explain why 
there was no change in cost management by adopting two propositions. The first 
suggested that government policy (coercive isomorphism) shaped the limited use of cost 
management for efficiency, optimisation and strategy. The second proposition assumed 
that organisations are the ‘theatre’ in .which institutions are visible.
The objective of this research was to understand, describe and explain the role of cost 
management within the water industry. Institutional theory adds the social and political 
elements that are typically absent or de-emphasised in the rational instrumental 
approach, (which guides most of the recent research on cost management, see section 
2.1). The aim of this chapter is to discuss the GOGCWS research findings in the light of 
the theoretical framework that has been adopted. It also relates the findings back to the 
literature review. The chapter is divided into three sections.
Section one evaluates the theories used to explain cost management. It relates the 
different theories to the three elements of cost management (efficiency, optimisation 
and strategy). It finds the existing theories of cost management are inadequate and 
incomplete (Scott, 1987).
Section two explains the findings of this research. It focuses on the role of accounting 
within the GOGCWS and the relationship between accounting and GOGCWS decision­
making. It examines the accounting system of the GOGCWS294 from an institutional 
perspective. The section offers an explanation for the lack of change in the GOGCWS 
(institutional imprinting) through neo-institutional theory. It examines the effect of the 
macro environment on the GOGCWS from an institutional perspective. It also links the
294 The Unified Accounting System.
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GOGCWS to both institutional isomorphism (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001), and the 
political organisation (Brunsson, 1994).
The final section sums up the main conclusions and implications of the previous 
sections. It also looks at how this study relates to other studies and the similarities and 
the differences found therein.
11.1 Cost Management
Cost management is a major theme in management accounting. It acts both as a 
guideline for the allocation of costs to different cost objects, and as a base for the design 
of accounting systems (Shillinglaw, 1989). Shank and Govindarajan (1989) defined 
strategic cost management (SCM) as "the managerial use of accounting information 
explicitly directed at one of the four stages of the strategic management cycle (Shank, 
1989: 50). Cooper and Slagmulder (1998b; 1998c) claimed that enterprise-wide 
strategic cost management systems require two distinct models. The first model needs to 
address operational improvement and efficiency, while the second needs to identify the 
firm's source of profitability. It was observed the two models highlighted by Cooper and 
Slagmulder had three elements of cost management, namely: efficiency, optimisation 
and strategy.
Cost management for efficiency has its roots in transaction theory and absorption 
costing (see section 4.1). As mentioned in section 4.1, there are three ways of utilising 
cost management to increase efficiency, (i.e. throughput costing, benchmarking and 
target costing). Some researchers claim that ABC focused on efficiency (Bjornenak and 
Olson 1999).
It was observed that the control of efficiency in the GOGCWS (via budgeting296, the
• 9Q7 • 9QRreporting process , standard costing (as part of the design and planning process) led 
to an emphasis placed on calculation and analysis of variance. These findings support
295 These are formulation, communication, implementation and action.
296 See section 8.7.3.
297 Reports generated from the cost accounting system, found that the majority o f  respondents (94%) 
agreed for introducing financial reporting (for further analysis see section 8.6.5.2).
298 See section 9.2.1.1.
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the argument of Ezzamel, et al., (1994). They found that companies were focusing on 
improving the technical capabilities of their management accounting system, in order to 
improve their costs calculation and enhance their efficiency. However, control of 
efficiency and standard-costing may have become obscured by the attention given to 
observation and analysis of variance.
Cost management for optimisation has been written from a managerial economic-theory 
perspective. There are certain models of cost management which can be utilised to 
achieve optimisation (such as the ABM, see section 4.4). Cost management 
optimisation research is underpinned by contingency theory (Simons, 1987; 1990; 
Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Shank, 1989, see section 5.2.2).
Optimisation was not a central concern to the GOGCWS (see tables 9.2, 9.2a, 9.2b and 
9.27). It was observed that there was a similarity between the cost management method 
at the GOGCWS (budget and absorption costs), and Anglo-American literature (see 
section 5.1.2). In Anglo-American literature, costs include quantity components and a 
value component. Value components can be measured in two ways. The first involves 
the assignment of payments (in the form of actual or past market prices) to the 
consumed input factor. (This was how299 cost was calculated in the GOGCWS). The 
second approach adds opportunity costs to pagatory costs300.
Is there any room for Opportunity costs in the Egyptian Water Industry? Several
n a  i
respondents suggested using water technology (i.e. using technology to provide water 
resources). This could be achieved by re-cycling drainage water (i.e. making multiple
299 For the measurement o f  cost o f  resources in the GOGCWS, the majority o f  respondents (92%) chose 
actual cost as apposed to other forms o f  costing (see section 8.6.3).
300 “Pagatory” costs refer to ‘cash payments’.
301 Egypt was one o f  the first countries to recycle water. River water has multiple use. It was used in 
generating power from the High dam, and subsequently for water navigation, tourism, agriculture, 
drinking and re-use o f  drainage water. This meant that water was being used several times to achieve 
utmost utilisation (International El-Aharam, 04/03/2000).
There were two ways to overcome decrease o f  water resources in future. Firstly, using water technology  
in agriculture would consume around 85% o f  water resources (such as irrigation pumps). This would lead 
to a decreased water consumption o f over 50%. This would mean increasing water resources by over 
40%. The second way involves the removal o f  salt from seawater and hard water. The technology
developed in this field could bring the cost o f  de-salination to 2 E.B./ m3 . This poses the question "Is the 
conveyance o f  distant Nile water for drinking, economical or not?"
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use of it) and using technology for irrigation). The Ministry of Public Works and Water 
Resources (MPWWR) in Egypt explained how opportunity costs could play a crucial 
role in the water industry (see section 10.1.2).
Much of cost management strategy research has been written from an industrial- 
economic perspective. Beilis, et al., (1999) claimed that strategic cost management and 
strategic management accounting have previously been the focus of researcher interest. 
Wong (1996) used a case study to illustrate how an activity-based approach to strategic 
cost management can give management a ‘richer’ and ‘robust’ understanding of cost 
dynamics. Cooper and Slagmulder (1998a) asked, "What is strategic cost management?" 
They found it to be the application of cost management techniques, which improves the 
strategic position of the firm thereby reducing costs. Simmonds (1981; 1982; 1985;
1986) suggested adding more relevant market data to management records and a regular 
reporting system. He emphasised the. need for the relative competitive data on levels and 
tends on prices, costs, profit and volume changes for the firm and its competitors (see 
section 5.2.1).
Porter (1985) defined ten structural cost drives which may have originated the cost 
driver concept (see sections 5.1.3 and 5.5). This set of cost drivers was further 
developed in strategic management accounting literature (see sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3) 
(Riley, 1987; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993a). Here cost drivers were divided into two 
groups: structure cost drivers and executional cost drivers. Most of strategic 
management accounting research was based on the assumption that behaviour was 
governed by ‘rational economic sense’. However this did not explain the strategy of the 
GOGCWS (which itself was based on economic, political and social elements).
As mentioned in chapter ten, the focus of the GOGCWS was on efficiency and there 
was no change in cost management within the organisation. In order to explain why 
there was no change in cost management in the GOGCWS, two propositions were 
required. Firstly, government policy (coercive isomorphism) shaped the limited use of 
cost management for efficiency, optimisation and strategy. Second proposition assumed 
organisations are the 'theatre' in which institutions are visible.
358
11.2 Explanation of the findings
Proposition One: Government policy (coercive isomorphism) shaped the limited use o f  
cost management
11.2.1 Role of accounting in the GOGCWS
Dietrich (2001) outlined four different roles of accounting (see section 3.2.1). These 
were as (a) passive optimiser (b) passive co-ordinator (c) active co-ordinator and (d) 
active regulator (Dietrich, 2001). It was argued that the role of accounting within the 
GOGCWS worked as a passive optimiser , because authority in the GOGCWS 
seemed to be created for constraint purposes, not co-ordination purposes (see section
3.2.1).
Burchell, et al., (1980) outlined their four roles of accounting. These were (a) answer 
machines (b) assistance through decision-support systems (c) ammunition machines and 
(d) organisational rationalisation machines. While the four roles outlined above were 
not necessarily all applicable to the role of accounting within the GOGCWS, 
nevertheless point (a) answering machines304 did relate to the role of accounting at the 
GOGCWS. For example, the accounting system of the company provides a stock 
control system and credit control routines.
The role of accounting within the GOGCWS could be seen as "a passive optimiser" and 
"answering machines". There was a similarity between the two. The contract in the 
GOGCWS was based on a universal "knowledge that", rather than a "learning based" 
"knowledge how" (passive optimiser). Therefore uncertainty over the objectives at the 
GOGCWS (and their cause and effect) was very low (answering machine).
11.2.2 The Unified Accounting System and Institutional theory
It was observed that the Unified Accounting System contained cognitive, normative and 
regulative structures (Scott, 1995). The system involved activities that provided stability
302 In this instance, information-use at the GOGCWS was described in a "knowledge that" manner 
(Dietrich, 2001, see section 9.2.1).
303 An accountant in the Cost Department o f  the GOGCWS stated that "there has not been any change in 
the organisational structure o f the GOGCWS for 25 years. This does not give any opportunity for the 
skilled worker to introduce anything new". Similarly, another accountant in the Central Accounts 
Department claimed that "The organisational structure does not fit with the organisation's mission".
304 Simon (1960) called this ‘structured decision-making’.
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and meaning to social behaviour (see section 8.5). On the whole, the Unified 
Accounting System was essentially a normative structure. It was also observed that the 
different elements of institutional theory (culture, social structure and routines, see 
section 2.3) were apparent within the Unified Accounting System. As mentioned in 
section 2.3, there is no universal definition of "institutional". However, according to 
Scott (1995) an ‘institution’ has three pillars: cognitive, normative and regulative,
The Cognitive pillar
The Unified Accounting System had an accounting index based on three elements: 
(a) classification of accounts (b) code of accounting and (c) explaining the core idea of 
each. This shows that the Unified Accounting System contained a cognitive element 
(which included constitutive rules). These rules involved the creation of categories and 
the construction of typifications (see section 2.3).
The Unified Accounting System required records at the GOGCWS to be divided into 
four groups (see section 8.6). The Unified Accounting System took the number code 
and divided the production into: Production Centre, Productive Services Centre, 
Marketing Services Centre and Administrative, and Financial Services Centres. This 
ensured accuracy and ease in the collection of accounting information and its 
classification (see section A l.2.4.2).
The Normative pillar
It was observed that the accounting system in the GOGCWS had a core of functional 
claims (see section 8.5). This was clear from the first objective of the Unified 
Accounting System (outlined in section 8.5.1). This objective provides the information 
and analytical tools which are a requirement of planning, execution and control at 
different levels. The role of accounting in the GOGCWS is a normative structure, 
because the state enforces the Unified Accounting System onto economic organisations 
within the public sector (see section '8.5). Therefore, state agencies (i.e. the Accounting 
Central Institution and the Finance Ministry) exert influence over choice of accounting 
practice (see section 8.4).
305 See section A 1.2.4.2.
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It was argued that the Unified Accounting System was a normative system (see section 
2.3). It defined the objectives (see section 8.5.1) and also designated a way to pursue 
them (see section A l.2.4.2). The Unified Accounting System could be seen as the 
source of accounting rules and procedures (routines) operating at the GOGCWS . 
Although there were changes implemented in the economic forms and legal structure of 
the GOGCWS (see section 8.2.1), the researcher observed that these changes are what 
Nelson and Winter (1982) call "evolutionary307 change".
The Regulative pillar
It was noted that the Unified Accounting System was a regulative process. This was 
apparent from analysing documentation of the GOGCWS (see section 8.1). Analysis of 
the interviews revealed that most of the interviewees felt they had to satisfy 
requirements of both the Accounting Central Institution, and the Finance Ministry. As 
mentioned in section 2.3, fear, force and experience were central factors of the 
regulative process. Fear was a major factor (see section 8.6.2).
It is argued that the Unified Accounting System had a large number of routines. This 
supports the argument of Nelson and Winter, 1982 (see section 2.3). It was argued that 
the only way to change the management accounting system at the GOGCWS was by 
implementing formal rules. In other words, in order to change management accounting 
system at the GOGCWS, the Accounting Central Institution has to implement formal 
rules for change.
As mentioned in (section 8.5), the GOGCWS was required to and did follow the 
Unified Accounting System. Institutional theory was adopted to explain accounting 
choice in organisations, where actors working in their own interests cannot exert 
influence over choice of accounting practice (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). At the 
GOGCWS, this was because the Accounting Central Institution forced the GOGCWS to 
follow the Unified Accounting System.
306 See the relationship between rules and routines in section 2.3.
307 A similar point was made by Burns and Scapens (2000). They differentiated between ‘revolutionary’ 
and ‘evolutionary’ change. Revolutionary change is a fundamental distribution to existing routines and 
institutions. Evolutionary change is incremental, with only minor distribution to existing routines and 
institutions.
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11.2.3 Institutional imprinting
The focus of management accounting in the GOGCWS was on the scope dimension. 
This supported the argument of Bjornenak and Olson (1999) (see section 3.2.2). This 
was evident from analysis of documentation of the budget system (see section 8.7.3). 
The Unified Accounting System in the GOGCWS had longevity (see section 8.6.2); 
what Bjornenak and Olson (1999) called ‘a continuous view of the system itself.
In institutional theory literature, this was often referred to as organisational imprinting 
(Kimberly, 1975; Mezias, 1990; Scott, 1987; Stinchcombe, 1965). Organisational 
imprinting referred to the process whereby organisations maintain certain practices 
adopted at the time that the organisation was founded. Hence, these organisational 
practices became accepted as an effective means to account for public monies (see 
section 8.5). This also applied to the GOGCWS. When state governments dictated 
accounting practices in their constitutions and statutes in this way, they were offering 
only one choice of accounting method, (thereby excluding alternative methods). 
‘Organisational imprinting’ for state governments established a social reality of correct 
procedures to account for public monies. This was apparent in the regulations and 
statues of the UAS.
Proposition Two: Organisations are the 'theatre' in which institutions are visible.
Government statues dictated choice of accounting method in Egyptian water companies. 
This research argued that accounting bureaucrats working within the Egyptian Water 
Industry carry political influence/power (see sections 8.1 and 8.5). It also argued that 
Government statues (decision-makers) had been influenced by their institutionalisation. 
They exert this power in order to retain outmoded accounting practices.
It was noted that the accounting system of the GOGCWS was consistent with
O A O  * # • •
historical institutional theory (see section 2.2). This was confirmed through 
interviewee feedback309 where the following responses were common:
308 Historical-based analysis was useful for relating what they were trying to maximise and why they 
emphasised certain goals over others (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).
309 See section 8.7.3.
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• “The most important indicators for the operational budget are the expenses and 
revenues of last year”310
• “The budget of the last three years is taken as a guide in order to prepare the
0 1 1
operational budget”
• “There are certain steps taken in preparing the operational budget, firstly, we look at
O 1 o
the expenses of last year”
• "In order to prepare the operational budget and capital budgeting, we look at the 
balance sheet of the last three years”313
• “In order to prepare the budget we look at the expenses and the revenues of last year 
and add 10%”.
11.2.4 The lack of change at the GOGCWS
Why was there no change at the GOGCWS? Government policy played an important 
role here. This was apparent from an analysis of the interviews and questionnaires. 
Analysis of questionnaire data showed that legislation had a greater effect than the 
product market and the factor market on cost practice (see table 9.27). The Chief of 
Commitment314 stated "I think if there are any plans for changes in cost measurement
o i c
practice, it would be necessary to get support from the state". Another interviewee 
added, "If we want to change the cost method in the GOGCWS, we have to change the 
regulations".
Managers of the GOGCWS were aware of the limitations of the Unified Accounting 
System. Why did they not change it? It was found that managers had no choice of 
accounting system, and fear made them reluctant to change it. This altered the focus 
from a micro-process view of the GOGCWS to a macro-process one of the government 
policy. In other words, it highlighted the effect of the macro on the GOGCWS.
310 Chief o f  Bills Auditing Department (collection).
311 Chief o f  Commitment (Engagement) Department (Balance Sheet).
312 Chief o f  Fixed Assets Department.
313 Chief o f  Balance Sheet Administration.
314 (Engagement) Department (Balance Sheet).
315 Auditing (Maturities Department).
363
Institutional theorists claim that because an organisation (like the GOGCWS) depends 
on its survival for support of external constituents, it must conform to accept social 
norms. This reasoning applies to government organisations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Meyer et al., 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, Scott, 1987). These institutionalised 
expectations were expressed in a broad class of elements. They include rules, blueprints 
for action, standard operating procedures and impersonal prescription (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977, Scott, 1987). Meyer and Rowan (1977) claimed that the formalised co­
ordination and control systems of organisational structure, served as "rationalised and 
impersonal prescriptions which identify various social purposed. This demonstrates 
institutional conformity as technical, (affecting control) and specifying appropriate 
means to pursue technical purposes of rationality".
Scott and Meyer (1994) stated that there were two schools of thought on the relationship 
of environments to organisations. The first saw the environment as a structure of power, 
(posing problems which the organisations must rectify (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, 
Zald, 1970; 1984). Accounts were thus likely to arise in response to demands made by 
powerful elements in the environment. The second theory concentrated less on the 
power of environmental demands for particular products or exchanges, than on the 
power of the environment as a supplier of cultural material for the organisation. Both 
views should be taken into consideration.
It has been shown (see section 8.5) that the environment of the GOGCWS constrained 
managers in their choice of accounting system. Similarly the organisation failed to put 
into practice any recommendations (i.e. alternatives to the method of cost management, 
as outlined by consultants). Moreover, there was a tendency to not even disclose such 
recommendations ‘coercive isomorphism’. The second view highlights government 
policy, (arguing that the water industry in Egypt can be explained in terms of the 
religious beliefs of the Egyptian people-culture).
This argument offered only a partial insight into water organisations. This argument 
failed to take into account the inadequate accounting practices of water organisations in 
Egypt. Previous research had led theorists to shift from a technology-focus (as the 
primary determinant of structure) to one emphasising the role played by the 
environment (Meyer and Scott, 1983a). Organisational environments vary in complexity
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of resource and power arrangements (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). They also differed in 
the configuration of their wider structures and legitimating rules (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
Institutional theorists argued that pressures to conform to accepted practices can be 
particularly powerful in government organisations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Gupta et al., 1994; Geiger and Ittner, 1996). The survival of 
government units depended primarily on the support of external constituents, and only 
secondarily on actual performance (Gupta et al., 1994). Conforming to accepted social 
norms and external requirements was required to maintain organisational legitimacy. 
This strengthens support and ensures continued funding.
Scott (1987) claimed that (institutional environments such as) government organisations 
and environmental agents316 had the authority to impose their own organisational 
practices. The GOGCWS for example was required to follow the Unified Accounting 
System. The government can therefore dictate subordinate units to comply, or even 
specify conditions for their remaining eligibility for continuation of funding. As a result, 
subordinate organisations were likely to show little resistance to the implementation of 
mandated practices. Changes will tend to be superficial and only arise a result of 
participant action.
The fact that (there was no change in cost management at the GOGCWS) may be 
explained by through neo-institutional theory. "Institutional theory was based on the
• -2 1 7
premise that organisations respond to pressures from their institutional environments . 
They adopted structures or procedures which were socially-accepted as being the 
appropriate organisational choice" (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). It was assumed that the 
customer was only interested in the GOGCWS product. Institutional theory proposed 
that many elements of formal organisational structure, policies and procedures, arose as 
a result of societal expectation of what constitutes acceptable organisational practice 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991; Scott, 1987; Bealing et 
al., 1996).
316 (E.g. the Accounting Central Institution in Egypt).
317 For the term institutional environment (see section 7.2.5).
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It was observed that the GOGCWS was what Brunsson (1994) calls a "political 
organisation"318. This observation was built from both an understanding of the term 
"political organisation" (Brunsson, 1994), and from an analysis of the GOGCWS 
(outlined in chapters 8, 9 and 10). The political organisation contained a hierarchy in 
which citizens were the clients or ‘principals’ (see section 8.3). The political 
organisation was ‘a public utility’ (see sections 7.1 and 8.3). An organisation did the 
task assigned to it but had no intrinsic value if this role disappears (see section 8.2.2). A 
political organisation claimed its services were useful for everyone in its consistency 
and was under democratic control. Typically "control" in political organisations was 
concerned with rules. In political organisations, the (publically-appointed) leadership 
prescribes the procedures and methods used (see section 8.4).
The GOGCWS was what Brunsson (1994) calls "political-isation". ‘Political-isation’ 
occurs when an individual organisation takes on some the characteristics of a political 
organisation. This included attempts to anchor the organisation in a hierarchy of super­
ordinate and comprehensive ideas and values, whilst also addressing the wider public 
(not merely its own customers). The GOGCWS was essentially a highly political
3 1 9organisation
The "water environment"320 in Egypt was very complex (see section 8.1). There was 
pressure for the water companies in Egypt to satisfy legislative requirements (see 
sections 8.4 and 9.6). The water environment in Egypt was a structure of power, (posing 
problems which organisations need to rectify, see section 7.2.4). Accounting arose in 
response to demands made by powerful elements in the environment.
11.2.5 Rationale for choosing the Budget incremental model
As mentioned in section 10.2.1.1, the GOGCWS had adopted an incremental budget 
model. Why did decision-makers of the GOGCWS follow an incremental model? Why
318 A political organisation is "an institution on which most state and municipal organisations are based" 
(Brunsson, 1994: 324).
319 A highly political organisation may be attracted by management techniques which focus on results and 
action (Brunsson, 1994).
320 See sections A 1.2.1.1 and 8.4.
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do decision-makers in the GOGCWS follow the budget process as a method of cost 
management? Institutional theory offers an explanation. The institutional theoretical 
explanation can be divided into two levels: (a) the macro level (b) the individual level.
At the macro level, the Accounting Central Institution in Egypt exerted a constant 
institutional pressure for the GOGCWS to use the Unified Accounting System. An 
incremental budget was one of its tools (see section 8.5). Scott (1987) argued that in 
institutional environment such as government organisations (like the GOGCWS), 
environmental ‘agents’ have the authority to impose organisational practices on 
subordinates. They can also specify conditions for eligibility of funding. Consequently, 
subordinate organisations were likely to show little resistance to the implementation of 
mandated practices (For more discussion of the macro level, see section 8.6).
Regarding the individual level, Douglas (1986) argued that institutions provide 
conceptual schemas (or analogies) that can be used in the decision-making. In the 
decision-making process, individuals were faced with the choice of expanding time and 
energy on difficult problems, or employing existing methods. Institutions often opt to 
save time and effort in resolving problems. Institutions can thus be seen as ‘machines’ 
of decision-making and thought, which are “in danger of turning individual thought 
over to automatic pilot" (Douglas, 1986: 63). As mentioned in section 11.2.1, the role of 
accounting within the GOGCWS can therefore be seen as answering machine and 
passive optimiser.
Attempts to save time and effort should be made by institutions, however our reliance 
upon them to provide analogies and conceptual schemas is not without its costs (Young, 
1996). Institutions can systematically direct individual memory, and channel our 
perceptions into forms compatible with the relations they authorise. They fix processes 
that are essentially dynamic, they hide their influence, and they arouse our emotions an 
important issue. They essentially endow themselves with ‘rightness’. Any problems are 
automatically transformed into organisational problems. The solutions they suggest 
come only from a limited range of experience. If the institution is one that depends on 
participation, (e.g. the GOGCWS), it should answer the call for "more participation". 
Institutions are shown to have the megalomania of a computer, “where the whole vision 
of the world is its own program” (Douglas, 1986: 92).
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Institutional thinking may standardise and generalise our framing of particular 
problems, and limit our ways of conceptualising particular issues. This was apparent 
with the junior managers at the GOGCWS who objected to the issue of privatisation 
(see section 10.1.1). In this way, institutions create "shadowed places" (in which 
nothing can be seen nor any questions asked, Douglas, 1986: 69). While institutions 
save us time and effort in the decision-making process, they also limit the types of 
solutions, which are "appropriate". Government policy did not allow the method of cost 
management suggested by consultants (Black and Veatch International) to be adopted 
within the GOGCWS. They may stifle our creativity in developing novel approaches to 
issues. They may also inhibit our ability to recognise particular issues as ‘problems’ to 
be resolved.
The "shadowed places" created by institutions emerge in part because individuals draw 
upon institutions to classify "things" into categories. In categorising and classifying, we 
draw boundaries around those things that will be influenced, and those that will be 
excluded from consideration within a particular context (i.e. the UAS). For example, we 
draw upon our institutions to recognise and classify certain things of an “economic” 
nature. If institutional commitments suggest that economic things are to be valued more 
than non-economic things (or vice versa), then the assignment of things as either 
‘economic’ or ‘non-economic’ imbues them with a particular moral and political 
content (Douglas, 1986: 63).
11.3 Conclusion
The explanations of the findings of this research centred around two proposition: (a) 
Government policy (coercive isomorphism) shaped the limited use of cost management 
for efficiency, optimisation and strategy (b) Organisations are the 'theatre' in which 
institutions are visible. In other words, the explanation of the findings had moved from 
an institutional functionalist view (first proposition) to an institutional interpretative 
view (second proposition)
Cost management (optimisation and strategy) was not a central concern at the
GOGCWS (see tables 9.2 - 9.3a and table 10.3). However, technical efficiency was a
major concern (see tables 9.1, 9.1a and 9.1b). Although managers of the GOGCWS
were aware the accounting system used in the organisation was not ideal, there had been
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no change in its system since the 1960s. Managers had no choice of accounting system 
and fear made them reluctant to change it. Professionalisation of the government 
accounting community in Egypt (the Accounting Central Institution), creates a constant 
institutional pressure for the GOGCWS (and other water companies in Egypt, see 
section 8.5), to use the Unified Accounting System.
The role of accounting within the GOGCWS can be seen as a "passive optimiser" and 
"answering machines". The focus of management accounting in the organisation is on 
the scope dimension, and the accounting system employed has longevity (institutional 
imprinting). This chapter has shown that the accounting system in the GOGCWS 
adopted an incremental budgeting model, standard costing and absorption costs.
•  9^1The Unified Accounting System can be seen as an outcome of coercive isomorphism . 
"Coercive isomorphism" is the way in which organisations (such as the GOGCWS), 
may be subject to external pressures from general cultural expectations (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983), (e.g. the GOGCWS, or organisations upon which they are dependent, 
Carruthers, 1995). Similarly, Egyptian government regulations coerce the GOGCWS 
into adopting the Unified Accounting System.
As mentioned in section 11.2.2, the Unified Accounting System contained cognitive, 
normative and regulative pillars (Scott, 1995). It was clear from chapters 8, 9 and 10, 
that the external environment inhibited cognitive learning within the GOGCWS. The 
effect of the external environment at the GOGCWS, shaped its accounting system. In 
other words, the institutional pressures dominated the use of accounting in the 
GOGCWS.
The findings of the research were consistent with the argument advanced by DiMaggio 
and Powell (1991, 1983) who argue that ‘coercive isomorphism’ is the way 
organisations (such as the GOGCWS) may be subject to external pressures as a result of 
cultural expectations. This also applied to organisations upon which other organisations 
are dependent (Carruthers, 1995). Similarly, Egyptian government regulations coerced
321 DiM aggio and Powell (1991) distinguish between "competitive" and "institutional" isomorphism. 
Within ‘institutional isomorphism’, they distinguish between coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphism.
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the GOGCWS into adopting the Unified Accounting System. These conclusions (drawn 
from analysis of the documentation), showed that there were several institutions 
responsible for financial control in the GOGCWS (such as the Cairo region, the Finance 
Ministry, the Ministry of Planning and the Accounting Central Institution, see section
8.4.2).
The findings of the research were consistent with (see section 7.2.2.1) the argument put 
forward by Ogden (1995) who claimed that before privatisation of the UK water 
industry, accounting emphasised cost-reduction in order to meet Government- 
determined performance aims (and thereby improve organisational efficiency). 
Management control in the GOGCWS relates to programmed controls (see section
5.2.2). Data was communicated through formal reporting procedures.
Results of this research concur with the argument of Scapens (1991). Management 
accounting texts suggested that in many situations, absorption costing cannot provide 
relevant costs decision-making and control (Scapens, 1991; see section 5.1.1). In 
practice, absorption costing seems to be the dominating technique in most Western 
countries (e.g. the U.S.A. Howell, et al., 1987; the U.K. Drury and Tayels, 1994; 2000; 
Sweden: Ask and Ax, 1992) and socialist countries (e.g. Egypt, see section 8.7.4). It 
was argued that the methods of management accounting used in the GOGCWS were 
compatible with the techniques of management accounting adopted in Germany (see 
table 5.1). For example, the cost method used in the GOGCWS is based on absorption 
costing, which represented costing practice (a major characteristic of the German 
tradition).
The findings of this research also support the argument of Hope and Hope (1995: 213) 
who claim that most organisations remain "tied" to archaic accounting systems and 
management structures. They stress the need for ‘horizontal information systems’ and 
even interviewees323 in this study called for "a connection and integration between 
administrations in order to decrease costs" (p. 213).
322 Horizontal systems provide managers with a new framework for measuring the ‘real’ performance o f  
their business. As such, the horizontal information system can bring new methods o f  cost management 
into existence (i.e. activity based management).
323 The ch ief o f  Balance Sheet Administration and Chief o f  the Documentary Credit Department.
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Cost accounting in the GOGCWS was similar to what Shark (1943) and Coward (1944) 
called "konstnadssted"324. Coward (1944: 49) argued that "if a manufacturing company 
follows the conversion of materials in different steps throughout the factory, then it is 
natural to divide the production process into sub-processes". This was apparent in the 
GOGCWS (see section 8.4.1.1). It was observed that the cost accounting system in the 
GOGCWS was not made clear to staff (see section 8.6.7). This relates back to the 
argument of Brignall, et al., (1991) (see section 5.1.3) who found that cost traceability 
varies systematically, (being greatest in professional services and least in mass services, 
such as the water industry, see section 5.1.3).
It was observed that there was a similarity between the method of cost management in 
the GOGCWS and methods found in Anglo-American literature (see section 5.1.2). In 
Anglo-American literature, costs always include quantity components and value 
components. Value components can be measured in two ways. The first involves the 
assignment of payments in the form of actual or past market prices, to the consumed 
input factor. (This was similar to how cost was calculated in the GOGCWS). The 
second approach added opportunity costs to ‘pagatory’ costs. "Pagatory" costs refer to 
"cash" payments.
This chapter highlighted the similarities and differences between this study and other 
studies. However, it did not focus on the contribution to knowledge which is addressed 
in the following chapter.
324 Konstnaddsted is an alternative classification o f  cost pools. ‘Department’ is the natural choice for 
Konstnaddsted.
325 On the topic o f  measuring cost o f resources in the GOGCWS, the majority o f  respondents (92%) chose 
‘actual cost’ as opposed to other forms o f  costing (see section 8.6.3).
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Chapter 12 
Conclusion
12.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to summarise the results of the research and identify its 
contribution to knowledge. This research has reported on the findings of one case study 
- conducted in an Egyptian public sector organisation (the GOGCWS). The results and 
contributions of the research have been presented, analysed and developed in chapters 
eight, nine, ten and eleven.
This chapter summarises the research and the research findings. It has four sections. 
Section one presents an overview of the thesis and gives a brief background to the 
‘knowledge problem’ of cost management.
Section two identifies the contributions to knowledge this thesis makes to cost 
management and management accounting. Some contributions relate to institutional 
theory and the case study approach.
Section three discusses limitations of this research and offers suggestions for future 
research.
The final section concludes with comments on the research process and learning 
experience.
12.1 An overview
Objectives and research questions
This research endeavoured to understand and explain the role of cost management in the 
service water industry in Egypt via a case study of the GOGCWS. Cost management 
was examined from different viewpoints, including (a) accounting (the managerial and 
economic perspective) and (b) Government policy (social and political perspective).
With this objective in mind, empirical questions to be addressed in this research were:
372
• What was the cost structure for the provision of an Egyptian water service? (see 
section 8.6).
• What was the rationale of the water companies for their cost management? (see 
sections 8.5 and 11.2).
• What methods of cost management were used in the Egyptian water industry? (see 
sections 8.6 and 8.7).
• What was the role of accounting (its nature and function) in controlling the Egyptian 
water companies? (see sections 3,1, 8.5 and 11.2.1).
This thesis developed an explanation of an Egyptian water company. The provision of 
water is an important public sector service, world-wide, with significant economic and 
• social impact (see section 7.1). The motivation to conduct this study arose from both 
theoretical and practical reasons (see section 1.3).
Cost Management
Largely rational economic theory and neo-classical theory (the normative view) has 
been the basis of most cost management research. A major criticism of rational 
economic theory is that it failed to consider the behaviour of the firm, neglected the 
social and political context, assumed the imperfect market does not exist and neglected 
the monopoly market, uncertainty and unpredictability.
There are different approaches in cost management (e.g. the economic approach and the 
strategic approach, see section 11.1). Much of the empirical research on cost 
management, (especially in activity-based costing and strategic management 
accounting), has been based on studies of private sector implementation. This study 
focused on a public utility (see section 7.1) and not the private sector, and hence this 
made the research difficult. As mentioned in section 6.2.1.3, certain projects seem to 
have universal sensitivity in developing countries: political power structures and 
government decision-making processes, social problems that reflect national image. 
Water is an emotive subject in all of them. Therefore, access to data was difficult given 
the constraints exerted by Egyptian Government policy.
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Theoretical framework
Institutional theory was adopted as a framework for explaining the observed practice of 
cost management in the GOGCWS, because it adds the social and political elements 
that were typically absent or de-emphasised in the rational instrumental approach 
(which guides most of the recent research on cost management, see section 2.1). 
Institutional theory focuses on both the external (Covaleski, et al., 1993; 1996; Mezias, 
1990) and internal environment (Burns and Scapens, 2000).
As mentioned in sections 2.1 and 3.'3.2, three institutional theoretical frameworks had 
been used in the accounting literature, - namely old institutional economic theory 
(Scapens, 1994; Bums and Scapens, 1998; 2000), neo-institutional economic theory 
(transaction cost) (Williamson, 1975; 1985; 1991; 1996) and neo-institutional 
sociological theory (Miller, 1994). This research adopted neo-institutional economic 
theory and utilises new empirical data. This research therefore focused on the regulative 
pillar and adopted a micro focus (see figure 2.2). The study took a process approach 
(see section 2.3).
Methodology and method
This research adopted a hybrid approach (i.e. between inductive and deductive), but 
mainly an inductive approach. The rationale for choosing a hybrid approach was 
because the aims of this research were to describe what is going on (i.e. to describe the 
current cost structure for the provision of water in Egypt); and to understand and 
explain why it has been put into effect (i.e. the companies' rationale for their choice of 
cost structure). The research also took a nomalist view (ontology - the rationale for 
which can be found in section 6.1.2). It also takes a ‘voluntaristic’326 view of human 
behaviour than which guides contingency research (Child, 1972; Schreyogg, 1980). The 
voluntaristic view was noticeably absent in early neo-institutional research (DiMaggio, 
1988 and Oliver, 1991). This approach followed from more recent advances in 
institutional theory which call for more-in-depth, interpretative analyses of the dialectic 
between stability and change (Czarniawska and Servon, 1996).
326 ‘Voluntaristic’ view assumes that human beings are free-willed, act independently o f  external stimuli 
and exercise freedom o f  choice (Burrel and Morgan, 1979).
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A case study approach was adopted in this research (see section 6.2.1). It entailed 
collecting data for an examination of the GOGCWS327 (see chapters 8, 9, 10 and 
appendix). A case study is both a process of induction and deduction (see section 6.1.1). 
The case study is mainly explanatory (theoretical framework), and exploratory in 
practice. A case study approach is a useful research strategy for both generating and 
developing the theoretical arguments put forward in this thesis (see section 6.2.1.1).
This methodological position led the researcher to use multiple sources for collecting 
data (including interviews, questionnaires and company documents of the GOGCWS). 
Multiple sources of evidence (triangulation, see section 6.2.1.3), were used in order to 
examine the context of the GOGCWS (Yin, 1984). Semi-structured interviews were 
carried out. Archival documents were reviewed and press articles, state statutes, and 
official documents were assessed. A questionnaire was used as the basis for the 
questioning in interviews, (which were held with all managerial levels). The rationale 
behind this integration (a method known as 'triangulation'), is that limitations of one 
method can be counter-balanced by the strength of another (Hoque and Hopper, 1994).
12.2 Contribution to knowledge
This thesis gave an insight into the role of cost management and management 
accounting practice in the Egyptian water industry.
12.2.1 The role of Cost management and Management accounting
This research was based upon a model of cost management which had three elements of 
cost management: efficiency, optimisation and strategy. These three elements are found 
in different theories (Incremental theory, Accounting theory, Economic theory 
(efficiency), Marginal and Opportunity cost (optimisation) and Strategic Management 
Accounting (strategy). Few studies have discussed these three objectives. Even these 
few studies (which focus on these three objectives), use a different theoretical 
framework, (for example Al-Hazami, 1995 used contingency theory to explain cost 
policy and practice in UK manufacturing industries).
327 Although, Yorkshire Water Company had been stood as an example o f  UK water system and also the 
French water but the focus o f  this research on the Egyptian water industry (the GOGCWS).
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This thesis has contributed to our understanding of the role of cost management in the 
Egyptian water industry, by providing empirical evidence of cost management practice 
in one organisation. There were no other empirical studies cited in academic literature 
of Egyptian companies. This research was conducted in a Third world "socialist" 
country whose environment is different from those of Western developed economies, 
(on which previous reported research is based). Chapters eight and ten provided an 
overview of the environment where this research was conducted.
Much of the empirical literature on cost management (especially activity-based costing 
and strategic management accounting) is based on studies of private sector organisation 
implementation. This study focused on public utilities rather than the private sector (see 
section 7.1). It is hoped that it will contribute to knowledge development in this field.
The explanations of the findings of this research centred around two proposition: (a) 
Government policy (coercive isomorphism) shaped the limited use of cost management 
for efficiency, optimisation and strategy (b) Organisations are the ‘theatre’ in which 
institutions are visible. In other words, the explanation of the findings had moved from 
an institutional functionalist view (first proposition) to an institutional interpretative 
view (second proposition)
The research findings of this study support the work of Berry, et al., 1985; Covaleski et 
ah, 1985; Ansari and Euske, 1987; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991; Lapsley, 1994; 
Geiger and Ittner, 1996. They all concluded that a public sector cost accounting system 
is generally implemented to satisfy government mandates, and is rarely used for internal 
decision-making and control purposes. The findings of the GOGCWS research are 
consistent with the argument put forward by Jones and Dugdale (2001) who claimed 
that management accounting appeared more significant in the UK than in some other 
countries, (e.g. Japan or Germany, Jones et ah, 1993; Jones, 1995). Nevertheless in 
Egypt, the information constructed through the application of accounting measurements, 
techniques and criteria does not seem to dominate in decision-making and control. The 
reason for that is government policy or coercive isomorphism shaped the limited use of 
cost management for efficiency, optimisation and strategy.
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This research argued that the role of management accounting in the GOGCWS relates to 
technical management accounting (which does not provide useful information for 
optimisation and strategy ‘see table 9.27’). The prescribed roles of management 
accounting in the GOGCWS emphasised the reporting and control functions within a 
bureaucratic hierarchy. In order to change the role of management accounting within the 
GOGCWS, the focus should be on organisational processes (the accounting process), 
not on organisational units (the accounting department). In other words, the GOGCWS 
needs to improve performance measurement (see section 4.1 and Beretta, et al., 1998).
12.2.2 Institutional theoiy and case study
Institutional theory was particularly useful for understanding public sector government 
(Bealing, et al. 1997). This research found that institutional theory was a theoretical lens 
with which to view the role of cost management in the GOGCWS. This thesis used 
institutional theory to explain the rationale of the cost management in the GOGCWS 
(see section 11.2). Previously, there had been very little empirical evidence of cost 
management in the Egyptian water industry (e.g. the study of "Black and Veatch 
International", 1997).
The study examined whether government policy (a coercive institutional) pressure had a 
greater influence for the choice of accounting system in the GOGCWS. Previous 
research has utilised institutional theory in order to explain change in an organisation. 
This research adopted institutional theory in order to explain the unchanging and 
relatively static environment of the GOGCWS. ‘Organisational imprinting328’ which has 
been used by researchers (Stinchcombe, 1965; Kimberly, 1975; Scott, 1987 and Mezias, 
1990). ‘Organisational imprinting’ for state governments (i.e. the UAS' regulations and 
statues), establish a ‘social reality’ of correct procedures to account for public monies 
(see section 11.2.3).
This thesis found evidence that the Egyptian government directly influenced methods 
and systems of cost management at the GOGCWS. Consultants (Black and Veatch 
International) were only indirectly influential in that they could inform government
328 ‘Organisational imprinting’ refers to the process whereby organisations (such as GOGCWS) tend to 
maintain certain practices. For example the Unified Accounting System had been in effect since the 
GOGCWS was founded.
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policy, and advise which accounting methods and systems should be employed in the 
organisation.
It was observed at the GOGCWS, that culture, government policy, structure, 
institutional pressures, fear and force influenced participant perception and situational 
and organisational objectives. (These factors are all part of the third pillar which is 
Regulative in institutional theory, see section 11.2.2). These observations led to the 
conclusion that cost management practices at the case organisation (the GOGCWS) was 
influenced by institutional pressures.
Institutional thinking of the Egyptian government policy "standardised" managers 
perceptions of the GOGCWS' framing of problems. It also limited their ways of 
conceptualising particular issues. In this way institutions create "shadowed places" 
(Douglas, 1986; see section 11.2.5). The ‘shadowed places’ created by institutions 
emerge in part because managers draw upon institutions to classify things into 
categories. In categorising, they draw boundaries around those things which will be 
influenced, and those that will be excluded from consideration. The institutional 
commitments of the GOGCWS managers, mean that water was valued more (as a 
commodity) than non-economic things.
Analysis of this research differed from contingency theory (which guides most recent 
research in cost management). While technical (or contingent) explanations of cost 
management were not rejected, they were clearly viewed as incomplete (Scott, 1987). 
Institutional theory adds the social and political elements, which were typically absent 
or de-emphasised in the rationally instrumental approach. One difference between 
contingency and institutional theory is that institutional theorists believe organisations 
respond to external pressures by adopting externally-driven accounting system 
practices. They do this without evidence that efficiency will increase as a result 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Gupta et al., 1994; Abernathy and Chua, 1995). 
Furthermore, institutional theory had been seen in this research as interpretative theory 
(not functional theory, i.e. contingency theory).
Institutional theory adds a broader (extra-organisational) institutional dimension to the 
analysis and discussion of this thesis. The framework also led to a clear understanding 
of intra-organisational processes of cost management. Through such research, it is
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hoped that researchers and managers will better able to anticipate the issues and 
difficulties involved in cost management.
Bums and Scapens (2000) adopted Old institutional economic theory and used old data 
(1990, 1993). They focused their attention on the cognitive pillar (see figure 2.2). This 
research utilises neo-institutional economic theory and uses new empirical data (unlike 
the studies of Geiger and Ittner, 1996; Burns and Scapens, 2000). This research 
therefore focuses on the regulative pillar and adopts a micro focus (see figure 2.2). 
Previous management accounting research (utilising institutional theory) neglected 
empirical data somewhat (e.g. Scapens, 1994; Brunsson, 1994; Carruthers, 1995; 
Walker, 1998; Spekle, 2001).
The case study method was used for studying complex social processes within a single 
organisation (Scapens, 1990). The case itself was both exploratory and explanatory 
(Spicer, 1992). This thesis has demonstrated how a case study approach has helped 
improve knowledge of cost management and management accounting.
12.3 Limitations and future research
12.3.1 Limitations
This study had several limitations, (some related to theory, - others to empirical work. I 
Much of this research was written from an economic perspective. Other research exists 
which examines the different models of cost management (e.g. the ABC, ABM and 
SMA), but limited research exists regarding the development or constraints of cost 
management. Values and beliefs are two factors which illustrate the emotional aspect of 
accounting. This is a neglected feature of the social analysis of accounting. Jones and 
Dugdale (2001) suggest that emotions are important in understanding accounting.
There were several limitations to the empirical work. For example the research was 
based on the GOGCWS, - a single complex case study. Had a different case study been 
selected (e.g. the General Organisation for the Greater Alexandria Water Supply), this 
may have resulted in a different outcome. However, the legal framework and accounting 
system of all Egyptian water companies are similar to each other. There are also 
limitations to using case studies as a research method (see section 6.2.1.3)
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There was limited access to the organisation itself, which meant that the investigation 
focused solely on staff working in the GOGCWS. This limited the research to the 
perception of only the GOGCWS managers. The policy decision-makers and staff who 
actually controlled the GOGCWS (such as the Central Accounting Institution) were 
therefore excluded.
Other problems arose from limited access to data. The problem arose from sensitivity of 
certain data (as mentioned in section 6.2.1.3). These include the political power 
structure, government decision-making processes, religious and social problems (which 
reflect the national image) and the water industry itself. This is not a unique problem 
when gathering research data. Hvidt (1998) in his research (an analysis of water 
resource planning in Egypt), found a distinct lack of data available. More data could 
have been obtained for this research had more information from the GOGCWS had 
been available. A different case study could have been examined had more time been 
available for fieldwork, (e.g. the General Organisation for the Greater Alexandria Water 
Supply329 ‘GOGAWS’ could have been cited as an example).
The case material presented in chapters seven, eight, nine and ten represented the 
researcher's own observations and understanding. Much effort was made to ensure the 
reliability and validity of the study (see sections 6.2.1.3 and 9.3). There was no attempt 
to portray the accounts as absolute reflections of events. There is always the possibility 
that a different researcher, using different methodology and method could arrive at 
different conclusions.
12.3.2 Future research
The main objective of this research was to develop a theoretical explanation of 
observations of an organisational setting. The primary focus of this research was mainly 
intra-organisational, and to a lesser degree, extra-organisational. This requires further 
research.
Government policy exerted much power and influence on cost management systems in 
the GOGCWS, and this was clear from the analysis (see chapters seven, eight, nine and
329 The researcher had interviewed very few of the staff in the GOGAWS by informal way. He failed to 
get the access to the GOGAWS.
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ten). For example, the recommendations of consultants (Black and Veatch International) 
which aim to set the market-base rationality for the GOGCWS were rejected by the 
organisation. This can be explored further in order to understand the reasoning of the 
policy decision-makers who rejected market-based rationality.
It was argued that there was a lack of change in management and cost management at 
the GOGCWS (see section 11.2.4). It was found that the environment of the GOGCWS 
constrained managers in their choice of accounting system. The organisation failed to 
put into practice recommendations as outlined by the consultants. Moreover, there was 
even a tendency not to disclose such recommendations (coercive isomorphism). It was 
noted that government policy of the water industry can be explained in terms of the 
religious beliefs of the Egyptian people (culture). This latter area needs to be developed 
through future research.
The study raised essential points about problems in the Egyptian water industry (see 
chapter 7). Further research can focus on alternative ways of paying for water (such as a 
rateable value for domestic use and metered value for business use). Future research 
should address the issue of how price systems can be based on cost in order to focus on 
cost management (efficiency , optimisation and strategy in the GOGCWS). The 
research showed clearly how the water system operates in Egypt and the GOGCWS (see 
section 7.2.4 and chapters 8, 9 and 10). However, the research did not devote enough 
time to the issue of which changes could have been implemented in the Egyptian water 
system, (see section 7.2). One external factor which could motivate the GOGCWS 
managers in the acquisition and use of cost management systems, is competition and 
uncertainty of funding. This area would need further investigation.
12.4 Reflections on the learning process
The research process was a learning exercise for the researcher. Valuable practical 
research experience was gained in the process. There were problems however with the 
environment in which the research was conducted. Unlike Western environments 
(where most research methods literature is based), case-based organisational research by 
doctoral students and other researchers is noticeably absent in Egypt. ‘Secrecy’ and lack
330 This refers to economic efficiency, not technical efficiency.
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of confidentiality was also a problem. The biggest problem however was with 
participant understanding of what the term ‘research’ actually meant. Hence they were 
unsure of the type of information that the researcher required. Many participants were 
initially reluctant to express their perceptions and experiences, and limited themselves 
to such information as number of employees, etc. This was perhaps attributable to the 
researcher’s inexperience. Could this been anticipated, interviews and discussions could 
have begun with clear explanations of the type of information required.
There were also problems with participant understanding of some the expressions and 
terms used. This was particularly a problem with lower level staff. Measures had been 
taken to ensure that the data collection instrument did not contain commercial, 
economic or accounting jargon. However in follow-up questions, comments and 
discussions the researcher did tend.to use jargon. The researcher had to explain the 
meaning of many terms (mainly through examples). This naturally took a considerable 
amount of time. Some participants also responded in unfamiliar slang, some of which 
was industry-specific. This problem could have been avoided had the researcher 
familiarised himself with such terms, before embarking on the fieldwork.
Participation and access were secured through the Egyptian government and the 
GOGCWS itself. Initially the researcher intended to study two organisations (the 
GOGCWS and the General Organisation for the Greater Alexandria Water Supply), but 
this did not prove possible. Many of the organisations, approached could not afford the 
time or were afraid to talk against government policy. During data and interpretative 
analysis it was difficult to concentrate on one case at a time. There was interplay 
between the GOGCWS and Yorkshire Water Company. This interplay, though 
sometimes cumbersome, was helpful. This illustrates the value of looking at more than 
one case study, (case studies, which are not necessarily case-comparative).
The research makes a significant contribution to cost management and management 
accounting literature in Egypt. Previously, there has been little research of this kind. 
With more studies like this, organisations in Egypt may now become more ‘research- 
friendly’.
331 (As reported in Appendix two).
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Appendix One 
A l.l  Letters of the access for the GOGCWS
Sheffield Hallam University 
Pond St.
Sheffield SI 1WB
March 13th 2000
To. Professor El-Sharkawy.
Embassy of Arab Republic of Egypt.
London
Dear Professor El-Sharkawy,
I write with respect to Mr. Yasser Abd-El-Naby; MM 8048
Mr. Abd-El-Naby began his studies at the university in February 1999. The school has 
recommended that Mr. Abd-El-Naby transfer from M.Phil. to Ph.D. and this will be 
going to the next university research degree committee (16/2/2000); this follows a 
presentation and examination of the proposal (Accounting Information System in the 
water Industry: The case of Cost Management). He is currently undergoing the second 
and final semester of his research training programme having successfully completed 
the first semester.
Mr. Abd-El-Naby has managed to build his theoretical framework and his empirical 
work will be on "The General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply". I wonder 
if you can help him to get access to this company by no later than the beginning of May 
2000 in order to finish his thesis on time (no later than the beginning of September 
2001).
Yours sincerely,
Professor Anthony J. Berry.
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Sheffield Hallam University 
Pond St.
Sheffield SI 1WB
April 20th 2000
To. Professor El-Sharkawy.
Embassy of Arab Republic of Egypt.
London
Dear Professor El-Sharkawy,
I write with respect to Mr. Yasser Abd-El-Naby; MM 8048
I have pleasure in enclosing the fieldwork plan for Mr. Abd-El-Naby's study of 
"Accounting Information Systems in the Water Industry: The Case of Cost 
Management".
I estimate that he will need up to .four months (at least three months) in Egypt. A 
considerable amount of preparation has been taken from published sources.
This will be an original and useful contribution to the management of the water Industry 
in Egypt and the world.
Yours sincerely,
Professor Anthony J. Berry.
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Arab Republic of Egypt
The Central institution for General Statistical
Decision of the chief of Central institution for General Statistical by empowerment
No. 652 (Year 2000)
Relating to the researcher/ Yasser Kamal El-Sayed Abd-El-Naby - who works as 
assistant researcher in the Institute of National Planning and is a university student in 
England- to do his field work to obtain a Ph.D. on "Accounting Information System in 
The Water Industry: The Case of Cost Management"
The chief of secretariat-general sector
* After seeing the presidential of Egypt issued order (No. 2915 / Year 1964) relating to 
establishing and organising the Institution
* And the decision of the Chief of the Institution (No. 231/ Year 1968) related to 
statistics, consultations and explorations.
* And the acceptance of the chairman of the Institution (07/07/1998) for the 
empowerment to the chief of secretariat-general sector to approve the decisions relating 
to security of data.
* And the letters of general administration of mission (No. 1186, 60/05/2000), 
(unnumbered, 60/05/2000)
Decision
(1) The researcher/ Yasser Kamal El-Sayed Abd-El-Naby -who works as assistant 
researcher in the Institute of National Planning and the member of foreign mission in 
England- to do his fieldwork which is mentioned above.
(2) This research involves the Chairman of the Board of directors, financial manager, 
cost department manager, accountants, auditors, marketing managers, production 
managers, some production engineers, consultants of the General Organisation for 
Greater Cairo Water Supply and the organisations which are involved in setting the 
pricing policy for water in Egypt. It also involves the people responsible for the control 
of water organisations in the Accounting Central Institution, the general manager of
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public relations in the Ministry of public works and water resources and the ministry of 
Agriculture. It is conditional that this research is approved by their administration 
security and the data collected will be used for academic purposes only.
(3) The data will be collected according to the statement which is prepared for this 
purpose and stamped by the Central Institution for General Statistical (being a 23 page 
questionnaire), taking up to three months only (from the issue of this decision).
(4) The process of this fieldwork is not allowed to start until this decision is issued.
(5) The researcher should submit two copies of the primary results of this fieldwork to 
the Central Institution for General Statistical and submit two copies of the final results 
on completion.
(6) This decision comes into action on the date of issue.
Issued in 
20/06/2000
Sami Hussan Fauat
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Arab Republic of Egypt
The Central institution for General Statistical
Record: R/ AM/ A 674 Subject:......................
Date: 21/60/2000 ....................................
Attached:..............
F. A. O the general manager of the general administration of mission within 
Ministry of Higher Education.
Goodness greeting and following
Referring to the letters (No. 1186, 60/05/2000) and (unnumbered, 13/60/2000) and its 
attachments concerning the application for the acceptance for the researcher/ Yasser 
Kamal El-Sayed Abd-El-Naby - who works as assistant researcher in the Institute of 
National Planning and is a university student in England- to do his fieldwork for his 
Ph.D. on "Accounting Information System in the Water Industry: The Case of Cost 
Management". Also referring to the proposal for above, stamped by the security stamp 
of the Central Institution for General Statistical, and our letter to you (No. 535, 
16/05/2000).
We would like to inform that the Central Institution for General Statistical approves that 
the researcher can do the fieldwork mentioned above. Attached to the decision of the 
chief of Central institution for General Statistical empowerment No. 652 (Year 2000) 
which is a requirement for this role. The researcher should submit two copies of the 
primary results of this fieldwork to the Central Institution for General Statistical and 
submit two copies of the final results on completion according to No.5 of the decision.
Many thanks
The general manager for general administration of security.
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Arab Republic of Egypt 
Ministry of Higher Education 
Mission Department
Financial supervision and emissary care 
The Administration of emissary cares 
Department of Scientific Communication
Dear Sir, Chairman of General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply
Goodness greeting and following
I would like to inform you that Mr. Yasser Kamal El-Sayed Abd-El-Naby -who works 
as assistant researcher in the Institute of National Planning and is a university student in 
England studying for a Ph.D. in "Accounting Information System in the Water Industry: 
The Case of Cost Management"- came to Egypt to do his fieldwork which will involve:
The chairman of the Board of Directors, Financial Manager, Cost Department Manager, 
accountants, auditors, marketing managers, production managers, some production 
engineers, consultants of General Organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply and the 
organisations which are involved in setting the pricing policy for the water in Egypt.
I would like to inform you that the Central Institution for General Statistical agreed that 
-in the letter to us No. 535 (19/05/2000) and the decision issued at 20/60/2000 - Mr. 
Yasser Abd-El-Naby may do his fieldwork by condition which is that this research is 
approved by your administration security. The individual data is by law confidential and 
the use of this data will be for academic purposes only. The questionnaire consists of 23 
pages and stamps from the Central Institution for General Statistical.
There is also permission to give him the following information: -
- Profit and loss accounts, balance sheet and the planning budget.
- Cost accounts.
- The standards of internal and external control.
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- A general view of each department, its roles and aims and knowledge of the 
communication between each department and others for 30 years.
We hope to facilitate his role and give him the data needed.
Many thanks for your contribution.
24/60/2000
Ehab
The general manager
Abo-El-Wafa El-Tiab Abo-El-Wafa
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A1.2 The GOGCWS
Al.2.1 The GOGCWS' law and decrees
Al.2.1.1 General laws and decrees
1- Law No. 47 of 1978 and its amendments; concerning the State Civil Servants 
System.
2- The executive regulation of Law No. 47 of 1978; issued by Decree No. 2 of 1978 
and its amendments of the Civil Service Affairs Committee of the Central Agency 
for organisation and administration.
3- Law No. 43 of 1979 and its amendments concerning the Local Administration 
System.
4- Prime Minister’s Decree No. 707 of 1979; promulgating the executive regulations of 
the local administration system law.
5- Law No. 53 of 1979; regarding imposing upon government units and public sector 
to provide basic data for planning of manpower and vocational training in 
accordance with employment information forms.
6- Prime Minister’s Decree No. 1309 of 1979; regarding economic general 
organisations and financing funds of economic nature.
7- Law No. 49 of 1977 and its amendments; regarding leasing and selling places and 
organising relationship between the lessor and the lessee.
8- The executive regulations for the law of organising the relationship between the 
lessor and the lessee.
9- Law No. 106 of 1976 and its amendments; regarding directing and organising 
construction works.
10-Law No. 143 of 1981; regarding desert lands.
11- State Minister’s Decree No. 198 of 1982; issuing the executive regulations of desert 
lands law.
12- Law No. 26 of 1983; regarding sewers and sanitary drainage systems.
13- Law No. 16 of 1985; amending provisions for workers in sewers and sanitary 
drainage.
14-Law No. 12 of 1984; regarding Irrigation and drainage.
15- Law No. 48 of 1882; regarding the protection of the River Nile and water ways 
from pollution.
16-Law No. 3 of 1982; regarding developmental planning.
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17- Law No. 59 of 1979; regarding establishment of new developmental communities.
18-Development and Housing Minister’s Decree No. 600 of 1982; promulgating the 
executive regulations for law No. 3 of 1982 re-developmental planning
19-Law No. 25 of 1992; amending some provisions of law of directing and organising 
construction works, law of establishing fund to finance economic housing projects 
and law of developmental planning.
20-Circular letter No. 30 of 1987; regarding authorities and responsibilities included in 
law 47 of 1978.
21- Prime Minister’s Decree No. 615 of 1986; regarding maximum wages and in-kind in 
government units, local administrative units, general organisations and authorities.
22- Law No. 27 of 1994, regarding arbitration in civil and trade articles.
23-Presidential Decree No. 399 of 1987; regarding agreement of regional Cairo centre 
for international trade arbitration.
24-Law No. 144 of 1988; amending law of the central agency for accounting.
25- Presidential Decree No. 129 of 1964; promulgating the law of the central agency for 
accounting.
26-Presidential Decree No. 796 of 1972; regarding formation and responsibilities of the 
Training High Council.
27-Law No. 118 of 1964 and its amendments; regarding establishing the central agency 
for organisation and administration.
28-Presidential decree No. 1085 of 1964; concerning organising and determining 
responsibilities of the Central Departments of the Central Agency for Organisation 
and Administration.
29-Presidential Decree No. 2915 of 1964; concerning establishing the Central Agency 
for Mobilisation and Statistics.
30-Law No. 54 of 1964; concerning the administrative control organisation.
31-Presidential Decree of law No. 35 of 1960; concerning statistics and census.
32-Presidential Decree No. 1115 of 1974; concerning the Organisation of the Ministry 
of Finance.
33-Presidential Decree No. 1100 of 1974; determining responsibilities of the State 
Minister of Local Administration and Public Organisations.
Al.2.1.2 Laws Related to management development program
1- Law No. 47 of 1987 and amendments; concerning the state civil servants system.
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2- The executive regulations of law No. 47 of 1978; issued by decree No. 2 of 1978 of 
the civil service affairs committee of the central agency for organisation and 
administration; and amended by decree No. 75 of 1992 of the State Minister for 
Administrative Development.
3- Decree No. 1 of 1979 of the Minister of Administrative Development; concerning 
employing experts.
4- Decree No. 2 of 1979 of the Minister of Administrative Development; concerning 
employing foreign experts.
5- Decree No. 3 of 1979 of the Minister of Administrative Development; concerning 
employing workers who carry out temporary works.
6- Decree No. 4 of 1979 of the Minister of Administrative Development; concerning 
employing graduated apprentices.
7- Law No. 39 of 1975 amended by Law No. 49 of 1982; concerning qualifying the 
handicapped.
8- Law No. 46 of 1972; concerning the state council.
9- Decree for laws No. 19 of 1959; concerning validity of provisions of the 
administrative prosecution on the general organisations.
10-Law No. 145 of 1957; concerning liquidation of Cairo Water Company.
11-Presidential Decree No. 577 of 1957; concerning Cairo Water utility Department.
12-Law No. 61 of 1963; promulgating the general organisations law.
13-Presidential Decree No. 4417 of 1965; concerning transfer of Cairo Water Utility 
Department to Arab stock Company.
14-Presidential Decree No. 1938- of 1968; concerning establishing the general 
organisation for Greater Cairo Water Supply.
15-Presidential Decree No. 33 of 1977; concerning re-organisation of units of 
organisation and administration in the various agencies.
16-Presidential Decree No. 70 of 1981; concerning organising public service 
departments.
17-Presidential Decree No. 625 of 1981; concerning establishing follow-up offices in 
the state administrative units and the public sector units.
18-Law No. 53 of 1979; concerning obliging the governmental and public sectors to 
provide basic data for planning manpower and vocational training.
19-Presidential Decree No. 118 of 1964; concerning establishing the central agency for 
organisation and administration.
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20-Presidential Decree for law No. 42 of 1967; concerning delegation of authorities.
21-Law No. 115 of 1983; amending some provisions of state civil servants law No. 47 
of 1978.
22-Decree No. 75 of 1992 of the Minister of Administrative development; amending 
some provisions of the executive regulations of state civil servants law.
23-Law No. 34 of 1992; amending some provisions of state civil servants law No. 47 of 
1978.
24-Decree No. 337 of 1992 of the head of the central agency for organisation and 
administrative; concerning re-approval of the comprehensive assessment of the 
organisation’s job with related remarks.
25-Law No. 5 of 1991; concerning leadership civil positions in the state administrative 
units and the public sector units.
26-Prime Minister’s Decree No. 1596 of 1991; promulgating the executive regulation 
of law No. 5 of 1991.
27-Presidential Decree No. 796 of 1972; concerning formation and authorities of the 
training high council.
28-Law No. 39 of 1975; concerning qualifying the handicapped.
29-Presidential Decree No. 2420 of 1971; concerning organising the governmental 
system.
30-Presidential Decree No. 72 of 1975; concerning organising the Ministry of Housing 
and Construction.
Al.2.1.3 Laws Related to financial viability
1- Presidential Decree for promulgating the central agency for accounting law No. 129 
of 1964.
2- Law No. 127 of 1981; concerning governmental accounting.
3- Law No. 105 of 1992, amending provisions of law No. 127 of 1981 concerning 
governmental accounting.
4- Law No. 308 of 1958 and its amendments; concerning administrative 
sequestegation.
5- Law No. 66 of 1963 and its amendments; promulgating the customs law.
6- Minister of Finance Decree No. 101 of 1985; concerning customs release procedures 
for goods imported for ministers, governmental authorities, general organisations 
and Public sector companies.
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7- Minister of Finance Decree No. 316 of 1983; concerning the temporary release 
system on private riding cars.
8- Prime Minister’s decree No. 615 of 1986; regarding maximum wages and in-kind in 
government units, local administrative units, general organisations and authorities, 
banks and public sector companies.
9- Minister of Finance Decree No. 228 of 1985; concerning arbitration system in 
disputes between good’s owners and the customs authority.
10-Minister of Finance Decree No. 274 of 1986; amending the principles of the 
temporary release system.
11 - Presidential Decree No. 186 of 1986; promulgating organising customs exemptions 
law.
12-Presidential Decree for Law No. 1987 of 1986; concerning nullification of taxes and 
fees annexed with the customs taxes.
13- GOGCWS Chairman’s Decree No. 101 of 1976; issuing the financial regulations for 
the budget and accounts.
14- Law No. 35 of 1972; concerning protecting of public money.
15-Law No. 105 of 1985; concerning the maximum of wages.
16-Prime Minister’s Decree No. 615 of 1986; concerning the maximum of wages.
Al.2.1.4 Laws related to TSOM program
1- Law No. 140 of 1956; amended by law No. 56 of 1957; amended by law No. 174 of 
1960; and Presidential Decree No. 1356 of 1961; and law No. 209 of 1980; and law 
No. 187 of 1981; and law No. 129 of 1982; concerning occupying public roads.
2- Law No. 84 of 1986; concerning public roads.
3- Minister of Manpower Decree No. 53 of 1982; identifying enterprises, safety and 
vocational health agencies and training authorities.
4- Minister of Manpower Decree No. 36 of 1982; concerning forms for statistics of 
injuries serious accidents and diseases.
5- Presidential Decree No. 114 of 1984; concerning formation of consulting agencies 
for safety and vocational health.
6- Minister of Manpower Decree No. 2 of 1985; concerning organising work of the 
high consulting council for safety and vocational health.
7- Law No. 57 of 1978; concerning getting rid of pools and swamps; and preventing 
excavation works.
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8- Law No. 38 of 1967; amended by law No. 129 of 1982 concerning public 
cleanliness.
9- Law No. 48 of 1982; concerning protection of the River Nile and waterways from 
pollution.
10-Minister of Irrigation Decree No. 8 of 1983; promulgating the executive regulations 
for law No. 48 of 1982 concerning protection of the River and waterways from 
pollution.
11-Presidential Decree No. 93 of 1962; amended by law No. 48 of 1982 concerning 
drainage of liquid waste.
12- Law No. 10 of 1990; concerning expropriation of real property for public utility.
13-Presidential Decree No. 392 of 1979; organising the Egyptian General Organisation 
for Standardisation and Production Quality.
14-Law No. 106 of 1976; concerning directing and organising construction works.
15-Law No. 25 of 1992; amending provisions of law of direction and organising 
construction works, and law of establishing fund for financing economic housing 
projects, and law of development planning.
16-Presidential Decree No. 431 of 1979; concerning organising the Egyptian 
Committee for Hydraulics and Water Sources and Enterprises for Irrigation and 
Drainage.
17-Presidential Decree No. of 1986; concerning organising the general organisation for 
geological survey and mining projects.
18-Decree No. 48 of 1968; concerning organising necessary precautions to protect the 
workers during work from health detriments, work and machines hazards.
Al.2.1.5 Laws related to materials management and procurement
1- Law No. 9 of 1983 and its amendments; promulgating the law on organisation of 
adjudications and bidding.
2- GOGCWS Decree published in the official journal on 7/7/1986 edition 153; 
promulgating GOGCWS adjudication and bidding regulations.
3- Law No. 31 of 1984; concerning some principles for disposal of specific state 
property.
4- Law No. 7 of 1991; concerning some provisions related to the specific state 
property.
5- Administrative Decree No. 84 of 1981; establishing a unit for inventory control.
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6- Prime Minister’s decree No. 137 of 1978; concerning establishing units for 
Inventory Control.
7- GOGCWS stores regulations; issued in accordance with GOGCWS board of 
directors approval in meeting on 18 October 1975.
8- Government stores regulations.
9- Legal opinion by the general assembly of the state council in its meeting on 6 May 
1985; obliging applying the provisions of the agreement of the American grant 
(USAID) in matters related to choice of contracting parties and contracting 
procedures in contrary to provisions of law No. 9 of 1983 and its executive 
regulations.
Al.2.1.6 Laws and Decrees related to project management and administration
1- USAID Regulations.
2- Law No. 9 or 1988 and its amendments; concerning adjudications and auctions law.
3- GOGCWS adjudications and auctions regulations.
4- Presidential Decree No. 627 of 1981 concerning establishing Information and 
Documentation Centres in the State Administrative Agencies and Public 
Organisations and identifying their responsibilities.
5- Presidential Decree No. 4720 of 1979 concerning the system of maintaining state 
official Documents and method of their publishing.
6- Presidential Decree No. 2915 of 1964 and its amendments; Concerning establishing 
and organising the central Agency for Mobilisation and Statistics.
Al.2.2 Stages of production of fresh water
The production of fresh water should pass through five main stages. Figure A l.l  shows
the stages of production of fresh water.
Figure A l.l: Stages of production of fresh water
Filtration Refining.Precipitation. Pumping to the 
city dragnets.
Pulling water from 
the Nile and 
pumping it.
Source: Based on the GOGCWS (no date source given, c), p. 10-11.
The following section will give a brief explanation of each stage.
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Al.2.2.1 Pulling water from the Nile and pumping it
There are some conditions regarding pulled water.
1- The pulling should be from flowing (streaming) water not stagnant water by the 
extension of pipes for the appropriate distance and deep inside the waterway of the Nile.
2- The pulling of water should be far away from pollution sources (industrial pollution) 
or any human crowd on the Nile beach.
3- Setting up protective measures on the pulled pipes to prevent any pollutants from the 
entrance with the pulled water.
4- The pulling should be by suitable pump of irrigation water with the designated water 
quantity of station to produce it.
Al.2.2.2 Precipitation
In this stage the clarification chemical and preliminary purification (chlorinate) are 
added and then filtration and finally this goes to the precipitation tank.
A l.2.2.3 Filtration
This stage can be illustrated in figure A1.2.
Figure A1.2: Filtration stage
Input Process Output
Water from the stage Water is filtrated through the sand layer Filtration water.
of precipitation.
—►
(filtration sand) from top to bottom. ->
Source: Based on the GOGCWS (no date source given, c), p. 11.
Al.2.2.4 Refining
Figure A1.3. will illustrate this stage.
Figure A1.3: Refining stage
Filtration water.
Input
filtration water.
Clarification
Output
Filtration water is transferred through 
dragnets from the pipes while the water is 
injected finally by chlorinate.
Process
Source: Based on the GOGCWS (without date, c), P. 11.
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Al.2.2.5 Pumping to the city dragnet
Pumping to the city dragnet is through earth filtration pumps and is pumped to the 
customer by appropriate pressure which ranges between 60-100 m.
Al.2.3 Organisation structure of the GOGCWS
According to the organisation structure (see figure A 1.4), there are 6 central 
administrations. The following section will illustrate the function of board of directors 
of the GOGCWS and these 6 central administrations.
Al.2.3.1 The function of the board of directors of the GOGCWS
The board of directors of the GOGCWS represents the top of the organisation structure 
and the important functions of it are as follows:
1- To suggest the general policy of the institution which the organisation manages 
according to the scope of the general policy of the state.
2- To suggest project development plans and programs for carrying them out.
3- To set the internal rules and the decisions related to finance and administration of the 
GOGCWS and its workers.
4- To suggest the tariff of water sold.
5- To approve the annual budget plan of the GOGCWS and financial statement.
6- To look at the periodic reports which are introduced for following up the work and its 
financial position.
Al.2.3.2 The functions of the chief of the central administration for projects
The chief of the central administration for projects is responsible for the supervision of 
preparation for designs for new projects and vertical or horizontal expansion for present 
projects.
Al.2.3.3 The functions of the chief of the central administration for stations
The chief of the central administration for station is responsible for the supervision of 
the work of the main stations, which is responsible for treatment to clean and filter 
water. He is also responsible for the supervision of all the requirements to run the 
station, and maintenance.
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Al.2.3.4 The functions of the chief of the central administration for dragnets
The chief of the central administration for dragnets is responsible for the supervision of 
the work of the stations, projects for pressure development, operational programs and 
the maintenance of the dragnets.
Al.2.3.5 The functions of the chief of the central administration for financial 
affairs
The chief of the central administration for financial affairs is responsible for the 
supervision of preparing the financial plan for the GOGCWS and following up the 
carrying out of it. He is also responsible for preparing the organisation's budget and 
financial statements.
A l.2.3.6 The functions of the chief of the central administration of managerial 
affairs
The chief of the central administration of managerial affairs is responsible for the 
supervision of workers affairs such as; salaries, wages, general secretaries, all 
administrative aspects and preparing the workers plan for the GOGCWS.
Al.2.3.7 The functions of the chief of the central administration for legal affairs
The chief of the central administration for legal affairs is responsible for liaising with 
legal authorities and gives formal (legal) opinions in all subjects that the board of 
directors enquires about
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Al.2.4 The Unified Accounting System
Al.2.4.1: The general rules for recording the economic organisation’s transactions 
according to the Unified Accounting System
1- All records of the economic organisation's transactions are recorded according to the 
Accounting index to integrate between the accounts of the economic organisation and 
the national accounts.
2- Separate between the maturity and payment or collection to prepare the cash 
budget336. According to this rule the transaction should be recorded as on credit even if 
cash and then one of the cash accounts is used when recording the payment or collection 
as shown in figure A1.7.
Figure A1.7: The rules of transactions of the Unified Accounting System
Maturity
Then
PaymentCollection
Cash
Current account bank Current account bank
Credit current facing documentary credit.
Cash
Commissions agent. 
Varieties debtors.
Different debtors.
Others debt balances.
Suppliers.
Varieties creditors.
Different creditors.
Others credit balances.
Current expenses.
Source: Based on the GOGCW S, (no date source given, b), p. 19.
Al.2.4.2 The Accounting index 
The aim of the accounting index
The aim of the accounting index is to help the accounting system to achieve its aim.
335 Cash budget is one o f  the statements, which GOGCWS has to prepare.
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The basis o f the establishment o f the accounting index
There are three bases on which the accounting index is based and these three bases are 
as follows: (a) classification of accounts, (b) code of accounting and (c) explaining the 
core idea of each of them.
A. Classification o f accounts
All accounts which have a connection with the activity of the economic organisation are 
enumerated and then these accounts are classified into homogeneous groups in order to 
satisfy the traditional requirements of financial accounting and prepare the national 
accounts.
Balance sheet accounts are classified to enable the preparation of the financial position 
and the statement of resources and uses, so we can know the contents of the capital and 
the financial sources of it.
The result accounts are classified into two groups: uses (expenses) and resources 
(revenues). The uses are classified as wages, general expenditures and transfers, and the 
revenues are divided into the current activity revenues and financial investments' 
interests of transfers. According to this classification the result of the economic 
organisation can be known (profit or loss).
In addition to the classification of the uses, classification of the accounts depends on the 
nature of them. It is divided into groups such as: production centres, production services 
centres, distribution services centres, administrative and financial services centres and 
capital process centres. This division shows the connection between financial 
accounting and cost accounting.
B. Accounts code
The Unified Accounting System takes the number code to ensure accuracy, ease of 
accounting direction, collection of accounting information and classification of it. The 
number code takes six levels as follows (see table A 1.1);
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Table A l.l: Accounts code of the level of general accounts
The code Accounts
1 Assets.
2 Liabilities.
3 Uses.
4 Resources.
5 Production centres control.
6 Production services centres control.
7 Distribution services centres control.
8 Administration and financial services control.
9 Capital process services control.
Source: the GOG CW S (no date source given, b), P. 15
The first level is the level of general accounting and this level is coded from 1 to 9 
The second level - This level represents the general account and is coded by two 
numbers (starting from 11 to 99).
The third level - This is the subsidiary account and three numbers (111: 999) code it.
The fourth level - This is the branch account and is coded by four numbers (1111: 
9999).
The fifth level - This is the minor account and is coded by five numbers (11111: 99999). 
The sixth level - This is the analysis account level and is coded by 6 numbers (111111: 
999999).
C. Explanation of the core idea of the (1) assets and their classification and (2) uses 
and their classification.
Assets and their classification 
Assets 1
Fixed assets 11. These are transferred property or not transferred and tangible or 
acquisition or produced by the organisation for sales or transferred. Fixed assets include 
lands, buildings, constructions, installation, roads, machines and equipment.
Projects on execution 12. These include the fixed asset in preparation stage.
Inventory 13. This has all tangible or non-tangible goods, which the organisation buys 
for the production process to make complete products, or if the financial period is
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finished and they are not completed (uncompleted products). Also it has all goods which 
the organisation buys to re-sell without any production process.
Long period lending 14. These are loans, which the organisation gives to other 
companies to be repaid over one year.
Financial investments 15. These are the investments of the economic organisation in 
governmental stock and national or international stocks.
Debtors 16. This represents the organisation's rights against other organisations 
resulting from the business activity of the organisation. It includes agent's commissions, 
receiving payable and varieties debtors.
Different debts accounts 17. This represents the organisation's rights against other 
organisations resulting the non-normal activity of the organisation. It includes different 
debtors, other debt balances and payable allocation operational revenues.
Cash in the treasury and banks 18. It includes two accounts: (a) cash in the treasury. 
The Unified Accounting System distinguishes between the cash in treasury of the unit 
and the cash in the subsidiary' treasury of it. And (b) current account bank. The Unified 
Accounting System distinguishes between money, which is the result of the process, 
and money, which is the result of capital process.
Al.2.4.3 The book group related to cost
This represents the records and books, which are used in the administration of financial 
statistics and cost. These records and books are illustrated as follows
The records and books related to the fixed assets. These include (a) Statistical book 
which records in it the direct bounds (bills) which comes in daybooks (journal) and the 
excluded assets from the goods requirements which come from the financial control on 
inventory administration, (b) Detailed book for the cost of fixed assets and its 
depreciation, (c) Special book for the distribution of fixed asset on the different stations 
and production centre for each asset alone.
The records and books related to wages. These are represented by the following 
records (a) Analytical records for wages to show the detailed wages according to 
production centres and stations, (b) Social insurance book, (c) Book for individual 
items, (d) Total wages book.
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The records and books related to goods requirement. These are represented by the 
following: (a) Records for recording the excluded goods requirements and relating to 
the fixed assets, (b) Book recording within it all items of goods requirements.
The records and books related to service requirements. This includes as follows: (a) 
Service requirement book, which has, recorded within it, all items of service 
requirements . (b) Current transferred expenses book, (c) Apportionment current 
transferred book, (d) Total book which includes the calculation of cost centres for 
current transferred expenses apportionment current transferred as total.
The archives book. This represents the following books: (a) Cash book daily entry, 
which has, recorded within it, all cash day-enter, which come from the central accounts 
administration, (b) A daily entry book which has, recorded within it, all the banks' 
journals which come from the central accounts administration.
Other records. Represented as follows: (a) Statistical records which have recorded 
within all data related to the cost of m3 of the water, (b) Record which has, recorded 
within it, all data sent to different external organisation.
Comments o f the Central Accounting Institution regarding the book groups
The cost system lacks some forms and data such as; operation order and cards, average 
burdening for wages and expenses.
337 Service requirements represent the given services from others which are a requirement for the 
production process, such as expenses o f  maintenance, expenses o f  publicity and advertising, hiring out 
equipment and means o f  transportation, etc.
Appendix Two 
A2.1 The Questionnaire and Interview guide
Introduction
This is an investigation for the Ph.D. research which I am currently preparing at 
Sheffield Hallam University (U.K.). The research examines the role of cost management 
in the Egyptian Water Industry. The Study aims to discover and describe the 
relationship between cost management and cost structure; the current cost structure for 
the provision of Egyptian Water Services and the rationale of it; methods of cost 
accounting that were and are used; and finally, the role of accounting in controlling the 
Egyptian Water Industry.
The data will be collected through:
1. Reading and analysing relevant documents: annual reports, financial plans and 
budgets, progress reports, description of and instruction for cost accounting systems, 
policy documents- the guide informing managers what they should do when certain 
things happen-, policies and rules procedures, government rules, 5 years financial 
statements and other suitable available documents.
2. Personal interviews and questionnaires: this will divide into three phases (steps):
A- The first step: conversation interview will be conducted with planner's/policy 
decision makers within such as; Ministry of Irrigation (Ministry of Public Works and 
Water Resources); Ministry of Agriculture; Government advisor; the people who set the 
price of the water Industry; and finally, conversation interview with the accountants 
responsible for controlling all the companies of the Water Industry. The aim of this step 
is to build knowledge basis of the Egyptian Water Industry.
B-The second step: Personal interviews and questionnaires- please see the 
questionnaires and the interview guide which is attached to this introduction- will be 
conducted on-site during one or two visits with senior managers, financial directors and 
managers of cost department of all the Water companies in Egypt.
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C- The third step: personal interviews and questionnaires will be conducted during an 
on-site visit in Great Cairo Water Public Enterprise- A major case study of this 
research- with relevant persons at various levels of management (senior manager, cost 
directors, financial directors/ controllers, accounting staff, general marketing manager 
and general production managers); consultants and engineering's Great Cairo Water 
Public Enterprise.
Interviewing will be supported by tape-recording which will capture much more than 
the researcher's memory. Tape-recording will be used where possible provided the 
interviewee agrees. It is anticipated that the use of a tape-recorder will increase rapport 
between the interviewer and interviewee.
I should emphasise that the data will be used for academic purposes only and will not be 
released-under any circumstances- for any other use. Confidentiality will be assured. I 
appreciate that there are many demands on your time, but the more complete response 
will ensure a high quality of research.
Structure of the questionnaire
1- General background.
2- Cost practice
A. Control structure and responsibility accounting.
B- Planning and control procedures.
C- Product costing (System background - system description - cost recognition and 
measurement - reporting).
D- Reporting.
3- Cost management policies.
4- Company environment.
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Confidential 
General Background
Section 1: About The Respondent.
(1) Name of person filling the questionnaire:
(2) Job Title:...................................................
(3) Job Description:........................................
(4) Length of time with company:.....................................
(5) Length of time with company at the present jo b :.......
Section 2: About The Company.
(1) Name of the company:.................................................
(2) Established date of the company:................................
(3) Business activities in your company:..........................
(4) For the last financial year, would you please indicate:
Total sales.
Total assets.
No. of employees.
(5) Who are your customers? Please, describe the company sales to each customer:
Category Of Customer
Company Sales
Less
than
10%
10-
20%
20-
40%
40-
60%
60-
80%
80-
100%
Domestic
Public (schools, hospitals,...)
Business (agriculture, industry,...)
Others, Please specify:..................
465
Cost Practice
Section 1: Control structure and responsibility accounting.
Q1: How do you describe the strategy of your company? (Please tick the appropriate 
box)
j j A s a un ita ry  o rgan isation  J j A s a  m ulti-d iv isional j j A s a ho ld ing  com pany j j O ther, p lease  specify
o rgan isation  ...........................................
Q2: How is the company organised? Please tick the appropriate box)
j j A cco rd ing  to  the  j j A ccord ing  to  the |~ ~ j A ccord ing  to  the  j J A cco rd ing  to  the j j O ther, p lease
natu re  o f  p roducts  nature  o f  nature o f  the  nature  o f  the  s p e c i f y ............
p roduced  geograph ic  areas p roduction  process m arkets served  ............................
Q3: How do you describe the control structure at your company/division? (Please tick 
the appropriate box)
j j Investm en t centre j J P ro fit centre j ~ |  C ontribu tion  centre j j C ost cen tre  j j O ther, p lease
s p e c i f y ...............
Q4: How does the control structure fit within the organisation structure? (Please tick the 
appropriate box)
j j A  good  fit | j R easonable fit j j P rob lem atic  fit
Section 2: Planning and control procedures.
Ql: Which one of the following formal planning and control approaches are used in 
your company? (Please tick the most appropriate answer for each process, in the table 
below:
Planning and control process
is in use 
now
is
planned 
to be 
used in 
the future
was used 
in the 
past, but 
not now
is not 
used or 
planned 
to be 
used at 
all
I do not 
know
Operational budgeting procedures
Capital budgeting procedures
Zero based budgeting approach
Linear programming model
Transfer pricing model
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Planning and control process
is in  use 
now
is
p la n n ed  
to  be 
u sed  in 
th e  fu tu re
w as used  
in  th e  
p a s t ,  b u t 
n o t now
is n o t 
u sed  o r  
p la n n e d  
to  be  
u sed  a t  
a ll
I  d o  n o t 
k n o w
Focus on short run marginal cost model.
Focus on medium run marginal cost model.
Focus on long run marginal cost model.
Product costing (Full absorption costing).
Product costing (Activity based costing).
Activity-based management (ABM).
Throughput accounting.
Life-cycle costing.
Value-chain approach to strategic cost 
management.
The accounting assessment of competitive 
position.
Qualitative performance measures.
The balanced scorecard.
Benchmarking of costs against other 
companies.
Target costing.
"Kaizen" cost management (formal, regular 
cost reduction programmes).
If you have any comment, please write these comments below:
Q2: Could you tell me about any other existing formal planning and control process 
used in your division/business unit not mentioned above?
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Q3: How do you describe the annual budgeting process at your company? (Please tick 
the appropriate box)
| | T op -dow n  j j T op  m anagem ent set param eters: organ isation  j j B o ttom -up j j D iscussion  and  partic ipa tion
procedures units prepare  budgets: top  m anagem ent procedures p rocedures
ad just/decide
Section 3: Product costing.
3.1 System background.
Ql: How was the cost accounting system developed? (Please tick the appropriate box)
In -house  j j C on trac to r j j Softw are j j C ustom er j j B orrow ed  from  j j O thers, please
package p repared  an o th e r agency  s p e c i fy ...............
Q2: Is this cost system adequate for your needs? (Please tick the appropriate box)
N o  needs j j Few  needs j j A bou t h a lf  ou r needs | j M ost needs j j A ll needs
Q3: Has there been a major revision to the method used in your company for estimating 
and measuring product cost? For example a shift from FAC to ABC. (Please tick the 
appropriate box)
Yes j j No j | I do not know
Is a major revision planned?
Yes j j No j j I do not know
Is a major revision in process?
Yes j j No j j I do not know
• Has the introduction of the new product costing method led to any of the following 
changes:
j j N o  changes j j C hanges to  j j C hanges to  j j C hanges in the struc tu re  o f  j j O ther, p lease  
p roduction  p roduct m ix  responsib ility  and sp ec ify
process accountability
468
Q4: In your view, do you consider the present method of estimating and measuring the 
product cost and practice as; (Please tick the most appropriate answer)
Estimation Measurement
Straightforward and simple
Seems a reasonable compromise
Needs significant change
Needs simplifying
Other, please specify............................................
If you have any comment, please write these comments below:
Q5: What is the estimated number of accounting/finance personnel directly involved in 
operating the cost system?
Q6: What is the computer based configuration of the cost accounting system in your 
company?
j j T erm inals  tied  to  the  j j M ostly  PC  applications j j System  no t au tom ated  | j O ther, p lease  specify
m ainfram e ...............................................
Q7: What are the principal methods of data entry?
j j M anual j j B atch  interface j j O n-line- j j Personal com puter- j j Personal com pu ter- j j O ther, please
m ainfram e stand alone connected  to large  PC . s p e c i f y ...........
Q8: What are the sources of funding for the services/operations to which the cost 
accounting system relates?
A pprop ria ted  j j N on-appropriated  j j R eim bursable  R evo lv ing  j j O ther, p lease  spec ify
3.2 System description.
Q l: Of what type is this cost accounting system?
j j Jo b /w o rk er o rder | | Process cost j j A c tiv ity  cost j j O ther, p lease  spec ify
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Q2: How do you measure the cost of resources consumed? (Please tick the appropriate 
box)
j j A ctual cost | ~ j  S tandard  cost j ~ j  O ther, please  s p e c ify .............................
Q3: What standards are used for your cost accounting activity? (Please tick the 
appropriate box)
j j A gency  s tandards | | governm ent cost | j G enerally  accepted  j j O ther, p lease  s p e c i f y ...
accoun ting  standards accounting  p rincip les ...............................................
Q4: What statements describe how data from this cost accounting system are primarily 
used?
Describe
Yes No I do not 
know
To manage an activity or a program
To measure program performance
To determine selling price/ user fee or inter/intra agency 
service charge
To value inventory or cost sales
To satisfy legislative requirements
Other, please specify ......................................................
Q5: To what extent is cost accounting data used in budget formulation? (Please tick the 
appropriate box)
□  Not used at all j j Rarely used j j Usually the basis o f  estimation
Q6: What financial management systems/functions are integrated with this cost 
accounting system? (Please check all that apply)
General ledger
Program accounting
Payroll
Inventory control
Property, plant and equipment
Other,.............................................................................................................
Not applicable
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Q7: Are the elements of cost in your cost accounting system reconciled with your 
general ledger control accounts (e.g., labour to accrued payroll accounts)?
j | N o  j j M onth ly  j j Q uarterly  j j Sem i-annually  j j A nnually  j j O ther, p lease  specify
Q8: If you consider that changes is needed with the method of product costing utilised 
in your company, Please indicate your reasons:
3.3 Cost recognition and measurement.
Ql: What is the product/service cost measurement practices in use at your company? 
(Please tick the appropriate box)
j j Full absorp tion  j j A ctiv ity -based  j j D irect costing  j j M arginal costing  j j O ther, p lease
costing  m odel costing  m odel m odel (D C ) m odel (M C ) s p e c i f y .......................
(FA C ) (A B C )
Q2: What depreciation methods are used in your cost accounting system?
□  S traigh t line □  A ccelerated  □  U sage related j j N one j j O ther, p lease  s p e c ify .........
Q3: How does the system treat gains/losses upon disposal of assets?
□  Add to  basis o f  □  A djustm en t to j j T reated  as j j T reated  as j j O ther, p lease  j j N o t app licab le  
new  asse t depreciation  m iscellaneous general and s p e c i fy .................
incom e o r adm in istra tive  ................................
expense expense
Q4: Does your overall cost accounting system have a formalised method of 
distinguishing between direct and indirect costs?
| | Yes “ j No □  I do not know
If yes, how are they distinguished and measured?
Q5: Does your system have any Service Centres or other intermediate cost pools? 
j j Yes j j No j j I do not know
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If yes, how are these cost allocated to overhead cost pools or final cost objects?
Q6: Do you have operational overhead cost pools in your cost accounting system? 
j j Yes j j No j j I do not know
If yes, how are these costs allocated?
Q7: Do you have General and Administrative cost pools in your cost accounting 
system?
Yes j j No j j I do not know
If yes, how are these costs allocated?
Q8: Do you receive allocations of general and administrative expenses from other 
organisational units? 
j j Yes j j No j j I do not know
3.4 Reporting
Q l: For what purposes are reports generated from this cost accounting system (Please 
check all that apply).
Financial reporting
Developing prices
Inventory control
Managerial control
Budget preparation
Budget execution
Other, please specify...................................................................................
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Q2: Who uses the reports that are generated from the cost accounting system? (Please 
check all that apply).
Q  P rogram  m anagers □  financial m anagers □  B udget analysts j j O perating  m anagers j j O ther, p lease  specify
Q3: How many different reports are generated from this system?
Q4: How often do the recipients of these reports give you feedback on management 
decisions made based on data in the reports? (Please tick the appropriate box)
j j A lw ays j j o ften  j j usually  j J rarely  j j N ev er
Q5: To what extent does the present product costing model help you to manage cost 
within the company/division? (Please tick the appropriate box)
j | T o  a  very  g reat j j T o  a  great ex ten t j j T o  a  m oderate j j T o  som e ex ten t j j T o  no  ex ten t
ex ten t ex ten t
Q6: Could you please indicate the extent to which you rely on the information provided 
under the present product costing model for managerial decision making? (Please tick 
the appropriate box)
j j T o tally  re liab le  (no  j j R eliab le  J j R eliab le to som e to  | j U nreliab le  j j T o ta lly  un re liab le  N o t
error) ex ten t a t all
Q7: To what extent, if any, do you fell your cost accounting system provides all the 
information that users of these reports need? (Please tick the appropriate box)
□  T o  a  very  g rea t j j T o  a  g reat ex tent j j T o  a  m oderate j j To som e ex ten t j j T o  n o t ex ten t
ex ten t ex ten t
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Q8: The reporting system provides .a series of data relating to cost information. The 
following statements describe different uses of cost information. In your opinion, please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the statements as 
indication of the importance of the role of cost information play in your company. 
(Please tick the most appropriate answer for each statements, in the table below).
Cost information role
Significance of cost information use at your 
company
extrem
ely
import
ant
very
import
ant
Import
ant
Not so 
import 
ant
Not
import
ant
I do
not
know
Uses for system maintenance and efficiency.
To comply with procedures of reporting
Basis for audit
Inventory Evaluation
Planning of period costs (budgeting)
Perceived importance for meeting 
budgets
To provide a means of communication
To achieve target of production
To achieve large profit
Management and control of period costs
Role of standard cost in assessing 
performance
Measuring efficiency of production 
performance
Performance evaluation of management
Identification of necessary corrective 
measures
To achieve certain financial 
measurement
To enhance cost reduction programmes
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Cost information role
Significance of cost information use at your 
company
extrem
ely
import
ant
very
import
ant
Import
ant
Not so 
import 
ant
Not
import
ant
I do
not
know
Uses for system optimisation.
Importance of flexible budget for 
manufacturing cost control
Variance analysis and exception 
reporting
Planned and actual product cost
Motivating efficiency improvement
To enhance equipment productivity
To enhance labour productivity
To motivate people to do better
To stimulate control of conversion cost
To emphasis throughput rate
To maintain certain profit margins
Measuring of efficiency and capacity 
utilisation
Make or buy decisions
Product mix decisions
Personal development and workforce 
improvement
Development of better manufacturing 
methods
Importance of product cost as an input 
to pricing decision
Transfer prices for internal services •
Importance of marketing cost analysis
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Cost information role
Significance of cost information use at your 
company
extrem
ely
import
ant
very
import
ant
Import
ant
Not so 
import 
ant
Not
import
ant
I do
not
know
Uses for system adaptation
To forecast the future
Evaluation of investment projects
Decisions of company strategy
Improvement of product characteristics
Product quality analysis
Planned and actual customer 
profitability.
Importance of competitor cost analysis
Market share analysis
Market growth analysis
New product development
Market development
Market and competition details
Importance of product configuration
Importance of technology configuration
Any comment:
Q9: In your view, How would you evaluate the cost practices' orientation at your 
company? (Please tick the most appropriate answer for each statement, in the table 
below:
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Cost information Orientation
Significance of cost information use at your 
company
extrem
ely
import
ant
very
import
ant
Import
ant
Not so 
import 
ant
Not
import
ant
I do
not
know
Long run concern with cost and revenue 
information
Long run concern with little 
consideration for cost information
Long run corporate plan guidelines
Short run concern with target costing
Short run concern with flexible costing
Short run concern and efficiency 
information
Short run concern and conversion cost
If you have any comment, please write these comments be ow:
Q10: What types of information generated by the formal reporting system in your 
company helps in making decisions? (Please tick the most appropriate box in this table)
Degree of 
Importance
Extremely
important
Very
important
Important Not so 
important
Not
important
I do not 
know
Quantitative Data
Qualitative Data
Q11: Do you have any additional comments about the existing cost practices in your 
company?
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Cost management policies
Section 1:
The followings are three perspectives of cost management policies which are based 
upon time horizons, long, medium and short run. First, please read the definition of each 
model and then answer the related questions if that model of cost management is used in 
your company.
Section A: The strategic cost management policy (SCMP).
Definition
"The long term is focused through the notion 
of strategic cost management policy (SCMP) is 
a systemic view that refers to the way in which 
the enterprise "cost structure" is positioned in 
terms o f markets and competition ".
T his is partly explored in term s o f  cost 
structure, and partly in term s o f  estim ates o f  
lon g  run m arginal cost and w hether long-run  
m arginal cost can be affected  by the log istic  
system , organisational, tech n olog ica l and 
m arket arrangem ents; e .g ., understanding o f  
m arginal costs im posed  by particular strategic 
m o v es.
Q l:  D o es  your com p an y  have a SC M P m odel?  
P lease tick  the appropriate b ox  
j j Yes | j N o j j I do not know
I f  your com pany has a SC M P m od el. P lease  
answ er the fo llo w in g  questions, o th erw ise  g o  to  
section  B.
Q2: P lease sp ec ify  the period h orizons w h ich  are 
used in the SCM P m odel.
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Q3: In w hat w ays d oes your SC M P m od el d iffer  
from  above defin ition .
Not at all. There are differences.
If yes. What are they?
478
Section B: The Economic optimisation cost management policy (ECMP).
Definition
" The medium term is approached from a view 
of an economic optimisation cost management 
policy (ECMP): assuming that technology, 
logistic system, raw material, production and 
distribution arrangements, organisational and 
market arrangements are given then 
EC M P refers to the w a y  o f  op tim ising  the 
activ ity  or product m ix  to ensure an optim al 
short term  perform ance o f  the enterprise. This 
w ou ld  be based upon attention to m arginal 
revenues and m arginal costs over the relevant 
tim e period.
Q 1 : D o es your com p any have a E C M P m odel?  
P lease tick  the appropriate box  
j j Yes j j N o j j I do not know 
I f  your com pany has a EC M P m od el. P lease  
answ er the fo llo w in g  questions, o th erw ise  go  to  
section  C.
Q2: P lease sp ec ify  the period h orizons w h ich  are 
used in the ECM P m odel
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10
Q3: In w hat w ays d oes your E C M P m od el d iffer  
from  above definition .
Not at all There are differences
If yes, what are they?
Section C: The Accounting and control cost management policy (ACMP).
Definition
"The short term is approached via the control 
of efficiency and accounting cost management 
policy (ACMP). ACMP is the loop of 
accounting control, process of budgeting and 
reporting. The cost here would probably be 
either full absorption costing (FAC), based on 
tradition methods or based on activity-based 
costing (ABC)
Q 1 : D o es your com p any have a A C M P  m od el?  
P lease tick  the appropriate b ox  
j j Yes | j N o j j I do not know  
I f  your com pany has a A C M P  m od el. P lease  
answ er the fo llo w in g  questions, o th erw ise  g o  to  
section  2
Q2: P lease sp ec ify  the period h orizon s w h ich  are 
used in the A C M P m odel
Years 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10
Q3: In w hat w ays d oes your A C M P  m o d e l d iffer  
from  above defin ition .
Not at all There are differences
If yes, what are they?
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Section 2:
I am interested in the amount of capital investment expenditure (CIE) that was spent by 
your company over the last 5 years. Firstly, please write down in the table below the 
figure (amount) of capital investment expenditure that has been during the last 5 years. 
Secondly, please indicate how important (significant) relative to your company, under 
the current situation, is each item of the CIE by making the most appropriate answer in 
the table below.
Classification Of Capital 
Investment Expenditure (CIE)
The amount 
of capital 
expenditure 
during the 
last 5 years
Perceived Relevant Importance to Your 
Company Under Current Conditions
Extrem
ely
import
ant
Very
import
ant
Import
ant
Not so
import
ant
Not
import
ant
I do not 
know
System maintenance Capital Expenditure.
Major maintenance and 
replacement of facilities
Improvement required to carry 
on the existing business
Improvement in operational 
efficiency
Rationalisation and cost 
reduction programmes
Product improvements
System Optimisation Capital Expenditure.
Introduction or expansion of 
new market
Expansion of the existing 
process
Research and development 
investment
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Classification Of Capital 
Investment Expenditure (CIE)
The amount 
o f capital 
expenditure 
during the 
last 5 years
Perceived Relevant Importance to Your 
Company Under Current Conditions
Extrem
ely
import
ant
Very
import
ant
Import
ant
Not so
import
ant
Not
im port
ant
I do not 
know
Management and development 
training
Marketing expenditure
System adaptation capital expenditure
Changes in manufacturing 
process and products
Changes in manufacturing 
process and market
Changes in manufacturing 
process, market and products
Changes in market and products
Changes in organisation 
(reorganisation)
Concentration of production in a 
single site •
Changes in distribution 
arrangements
Changes in raw material 
arrangements
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Company Environment
The researcher is interested in your company’s relationship with various sectors of the 
external environment. Specially he would like to elicit the degree of "Intensive 
Competition" and "Unpredictability" facing your company that are related to three areas 
of external environment: product market, factor market and legislation.
The following is a brief definition of intensive competition and unpredictability: 
Intensive Competition: The general level of market conditions that makes profitability 
difficult.
Unpredictability: The overall degree of variability from period to period that makes 
forecasting and planning difficult.
Ql: Please tick the most appropriate answers, in the provided shaded areas of the table 
below, to indicate the degree of "Intensive Competition" and "Unpredictability" facing 
your company over the last 5 years. In the case if you do not know, please tick the 
appropriate box of the table below.
Market Conditions
Intensive Competition Unpredictability
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
I d
o 
no
t 
kn
ow
Very
predicta
ble
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e
A
ve
ra
ge
U
np
re
di
ct
ab
il Very
unpredi
ctability
I 
dO 
no
t 
kn
ow
Product Market
1 M a rk et C h a n g es  
(sa les).
Expandi
ng
market
Declinin
g
2 C o m p etitio n
in te n sity
Low High
3 C u sto m ers v a r ie ty . large
variety
One
major
custom er
4 P r o fit  m arg in s High Narrow
5 P r o d u c t  in n ovation Well
establish
ed
Always
new
products
6 N a tu re  o f  
co m p etitio n
Well
establish
ed
competit
ors
Always
new
competit
ors
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Market Conditions
Intensive Competition Unpredictability
Low 1 2 3 4 5 High
I d
o 
no
t 
kn
ow
Very
predicta
ble
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e
A
ve
ra
ge
U
np
re
di
ct
ab
il Very
unpredi
ctability
I d
O 
no
t 
kn
ow
7 P rices o f  p ro d u cts Stable Fluctuate
prices.
Factor Market.
a Raw Material 
and Supply.
1 S u p p ly oversupp
ly
shortage 
o f  supply
2 S o u rces o f  su p p ly plenty o f 
sources
One
major
source
3 C o m p etit io n  b etw een  
su p p liers
No
competiti
on
Intensive
competiti
on
4 C o st o f  ra w  m ater ia l Low High
5 D eliv e r y  tim e Short Long
6 N a tu re  o f  su p p liers Always
new
suppliers
Well
establish
ed
7 P rices or ra w  
m ater ia l
Stable
prices
Fluctuate
prices
b Labour
1 A v a ila b ility  o f  sk illed  
la b o u r
stable Shortage
2 C o m p etin g
em p lo y ers
Few Many
3 W a g e  rates Low High
4 T r a d e  un ion Not
militant
Militant
5 L a b o u r  tu r n o v e r Low High
6 L a b o u r  d ep en d en cy High Low
7 In d u str ia l re la tion Good Poor
c Management
l A v a ila b ility  o f  
q u a lified  m anagers
Stable Shortage
2 S a la ry  o f  
m a n a g e m en t
Low High
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Market Conditions
Intensive Competition Unpredictability
Low 1 2 3 4 5 H igh
I 
do 
no
t 
kn
ow
V ery
p red ic ta
ble
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e
A
ve
ra
ge
U
np
re
di
ct
ab
il
V ery
unpred i
ctab ility
I 
dO 
no
t 
kn
ow
3 C o m p etit io n  for  
good  m an a g ers
Low High
4 S ta f f  tu r n o v e r Low High
d Capital and 
Financing
l A v a ila b ility  o f  fund Easy to
obtain
fund
hard to 
obtain 
fund
2 S o u rces  o f  fund many
sources
One
major
source
3 C o st o f  fin a n ce Low High
4 S ta f f  tu r n o v e r Low High
e Technology
l A v a ila b ility  o f  
eq u ip m en t
Stable Shortage
2 E q u ip m e n t su p p liers Many One
major
suppliers
3 C o m p etit io n  for  
eq u ip m en t.
No
competiti
on
Keen
competiti
on
4 D e liv e r y  o f  
eq u ip m en t
Short Long
5 E q u ip m e n t fa ilu re usual
failure
Frequent
failure
6 N a tu re  o f
m a n u fa c tu r in g
tech n o lo g y
Simple Complex
7 N a tu r e  o f  system  
te ch n o lo g y
Simple Complex
8 T e ch n o lo g y
d ev e lo p m en t
Negligibl 
e change
Common
change
9 E q u ip m e n t
o b so lescen ce
Long life Short life
10 C a p ita l lab ou r  
su b stitu tio n
slow Fast
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Market Conditions Intensive Competition Unpredictability
Low 1 2 3 4 5 H igh
I 
do 
no
t 
kn
ow
V ery
p red ic ta
ble
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e
A
ve
ra
ge
U
np
re
di
ct
ab
il
V ery
unpred i
ctab ility
I 
dO 
no
t 
kn
ow
Legislation
1 R eg u la to rs  in the  
in d u stry
One
m ajor
regulator
Many
regulator
2 N u m b e r  o f Small Large
leg isla tio n
3 N a tu re  o f  leg isla tion Well Frequent
establish change
ed
4 E ffect o f  leg isla tio n Negligibl
e
Heavy
Overall Assessment
Q2: How do you rank the significance of these three sectors of external environment 
relative to your company in order to express their importance? Then please attach 
percentage weights to each sector.
Environment sectors
Rank o f priority o f significance
Percentage Weighting (%)1 2 3
1- Product Market
2- Factor Market
3- Legislation
100%
Q3: Given the market factor sub-sectors, how would you rank the 5 sub-sectors within 
the factor product in order to express their priority and significance?
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Factor product
Rank
1 2 3 4 5
1- Raw Material and Supply
2- Labour
3- Management
4- Capital and Financing
5- Technology
Thank you fo r  completing this questionnaire.
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The Interview Guide 
Cost practice
Section 1: Control structure and responsibility accounting.
Ql: Could you please describe the organisation structure of the company?
Q2: How did the existing organisation structure develop?
Q3: Could you please describe the control structure at the company?
Q4: How many responsibility centre do your primary products have to sequentially go 
through, from purchases to customers?
Section 2: Planning and control procedures.
Ql: Could you tell me how the operational business budget is constructed in your 
division/business unit?
Q2: Could you please tell me how the capital budgeting is constructed in your division 
business unit?
Section 3: Cost accounting.
3.1 System background.
Q l: Could you please tell me about-the methods used in your company for measuring 
product cost? For example: Full Absorption Costing Model, Activity based Costing 
Model, Direct Costing Model, Variable Costing Model, Marginal Costing Model, 
Target Costing, Throughput Costing,...)
Q2: Were there any significant changes in the cost measurement practice system used in 
your company over the last five years?
I f  yes, Please tell me about; When did it happen? What was each change? Who was its 
champion? What is your opinion about each change? And where are others' opinion 
about it?
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I f  no, Are there any plans to change the cost measurement practice? Please describe 
them.
3.2 System description.
Q l: How many steps (levels) through which these cost information flow within your 
company?
Q2: Is there any role for consultants who designed your cost management in: -
- maintaining it by reviewing over a specific period of time?
- the day to day managing it? .
- proposing changes on it which may be: simple changes; significant changes; complete 
changes of it.
3.3 Cost recognition and measurement.
Ql: Could you tell me how the overhead cost is (1) managed within your company 
and/or (2) allocated within your company?
3.4 Reporting.
Ql: What are the types of cost information generated by the formal reporting system in 
your company? For example, Daily plant book reports; Regular management reports; 
Ad hoc reports; Combination; Other?
Q2: The reporting system provides a series of data relating to cost information, How do 
your company take action on the basis of these reports?
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A2.2 Analysis of the Questionnaire
Table A2.1: The respondents of the questionnaire
Name Job title
1 Shapan Ramadan Mohammed Accountant (Participating Accounts Department).
2 Ali Sadek Mohammed Ali Accountant (Participating Accounts Department).
3 Gamalat Mustafah Naseer Accountant (Participating Accounts Department).
4 Momena Tah Mohammed Abd- 
El-Salam
Accountant (Bills Auditing and Stamp 
Department).
5 Saeed Ahamed Ahamed Accountant (Financial Affairs) in participating 
Accounts Administration.
6 Mustafah Husseen El-Kasbani Chief of Bills Auditing Department (collection).
7 S ameer Ragab Ahamed Chief of Bills Auditing and Stamp Department.
8 Nagwa Ahamed Abd-El-Hadi Chief of Statistics Department.
9 Mohammed Mohammed Ahamed 
Deyab
Accountant (Deduction and Modifications 
Department).
10 Adel Taha El-Hadi Chief of Commitment (Engagement) Department 
(Balance Sheet).
11 Mohammed Abd-El-Rasheed 
Abd-El-Al
Chief of Loans Accounts and Documentary Credit 
Department).
12 Emad Hesen Ebrahem Accountant (Cost Department).
13 Batah Salah Abd-El-Mawgood Accountant (Cost Department).
14 Mervat Abd-El-Hameed Chief of Fixed Assets Department.
15 Zenab El-Sayed Ali Tantawy Accountant (Cost Department).
16 Fauzia Abdo Marzouk Accountant (Cost Department).
17 Mohammed Sayed Hassan Chief of Central Accounts Department.
18 Magda Fareed Sad Accountant (Cost Department).
19 Maher Ahamed Sayed Accountant (Cost Department).
20 Mohammed Sayed Hassan Chief of Cost Department.
21 Bader Abd-El-Shafy Abd-El- 
Shafy
Accountant (Documentary credit Department).
22 Yasser Mahammoud Ahamed Chief of Documentary Credit Department.
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Name Job title
23 Adel El-Bagdadi Vice Chairman for Technical Affairs.
24 Asem Mohammed Abd-El-Aziz Auditing (Maturities Department).
25 Samir Mohammed Hassan Accountant (Planned Budget Department).
26 Marsel William Yakob Chief of Balance Sheet Administration.
27 Mohammed Mustafah Amin Chief of loans and Grants Department.
28 Hamadi Abd-El-Hakeem Sharawi Accountant (Cost Department).
29 Azzam Mohammed Ramdan Chief of Final Statement of Accounts and Follow- 
up
30 Ekram Mohammed Hassanen Accountant (Cost Department).
31 Sadi Flah Sad Accountant (Central Accounts Department).
32 Mosad Abd-El-Wahed Showra Accountant (Central Accounts Department).
33 Amal Habeeb Abd-El-Gani Accountant (Cost Department).
34 Abd-El-Halim Attia Abd-El- 
Halim
Accountant (Cost Department).
35 Reda Abd-El-Menam Ahamed Accountant (Cost Department).
36 Khyeria Ahamed Faried Accountant (Central Department).
37 Medhat Abd-El-Hamid Basywni accountant (Participating accounts Administration.
38 Magdi Abd-Allah Zaki Accountant of Statistics Department.
39 Mahasen Ahamed Refaee Accountant (Participating Accounts Department).
40 Abd-El-Aziz Zaki Abd-El-Aziz Accountant of Participating Accounts Department 
(Deduction Department).
41 Ahamed Mosad Mohammed General Chief Administration of Government and 
Organisations Accounts.
42 El-Sayed Ramadan Kamal General Chief of Inventory Administration.
43 Rada Abd-El-Hameed Shatah General Chief of Purchases and Contracts 
Administration.
44 Hamdy Mustafah Abd-El-Hameed General Chief of Revenues Auditing 
Administration.
45 Hussam Hassan Abd-El-Aal General Chief of Meters Administration.
46 Emad Abd-El-Halim Ali Senior Accountant (Cost Department).
47 Ahamed Anwer Researcher of Planning for Investment Projects.
48 Aesha Ahamed Chief of Budget and Follow-up Administration.
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Name Job title
49 Mohammed El-Demardash Chief of the central administration for managerial 
affairs.
50 Hassan El-Shasfy Chief of the central administration for stations.
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Table A2.2: Component Matrix51 for Uses of Cost Information for Efficiency
Component
1 2 3 4 5
To comply with procedures of 
reporting.
.705 -8.225E-02 -.229 8.351E-02 -.142
Perceived importance for 
meeting budgets.
.668 .242 -.134 -.122 6.349E-02
Planning of period costs 
(budgeting).
.667 -6.567E-02 -.208 .452 -6.288E-02
Identification of necessary 
measures.
.633 -.245 -.283 -.308 2.977E-02
To achieve certain financial 
measurement.
.625 -8.903E-02 -.448 -.274 -.290
To enhance cost reduction 
programmes.
.596 -.296 2.017E-02 -.108 -.423
To achieve target of production. .587 .360 -1.092E-02 -.197 .363
Measuring efficiency of 
production performance.
.547 -9.638E-02 .545 -6.974E-02 -.269
To achieve large profit. .514 .435 .291 -.276 -.298
Basis for audit. .511 .447 .273 .250 .271
Inventory evaluation. .242 .772 -.260 .311 -9.951E-02
Role of standard cost in 
assessing performance.
.425 -.541 .349 .321 4.392E-02
To provide means of 
communication.
• .391 2.81 IE-02 .685 -.310 .223
Management and control of 
period costs.
.583 -.229 4.059E-02 .618 .198
Performance evaluation of 
management.
.414 -.286 -.293 -.316 .641
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a 5 components extracted
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Table A2.2a: Pattern Matrix” for Uses of Cost Information for Efficiency
Component
1 2 3 4 5
To achieve certain financial 
measurement.
.863 6.278E-02 -9.695E-02 -8.508E-02 .120
To enhance cost reduction 
programmes.
.680 -.179 .222 .167 -.168
Identification of necessary 
measures.
.630 -.106 3.471E-02 3.135E-02 .388
To comply with procedures of 
reporting.
.561 .164 -2.184E-02 .312 7.096E-02
Inventory evaluation. 2.571E-02 .910 -.168 9.880E-03 -.167
Basis for audit. -.239 .574 .359 .325 .135
Perceived importance for 
meeting budgets.
.370 .379 .172 4.428E-02 .261
To provide means of 
communication.
-.165 -9.526E-02 .856 -8.369E-04 .217
Measuring efficiency of 
production performance.
.234 -9.090E-02 .684 .204 -.220
To achieve large profit. .322 .373 .603 -.233 -.164
Management and control of 
period costs.
-2.677E-02 .127 -6.251E-02 .890 7.991E-02
Role of standard cost in 
assessing performance.
1.886E-02 -.357 .242 .704 -2.385E-02
Planning of period costs 
(budgeting).
.334 .283 -.161 .631 -1.793E-02
Performance evaluation of 
management.
.145 -.173 -6.672E-02 7.170E-02 .883
To achieve target of production. 7.760E-02 .433 .292 -2.393E-02 .488
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
a Rotation converged in 14 iterations.
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Table A2.2b: Structure Matrix3 for Uses of Cost Information for Efficiency
Component
1 2 3 4 5
To achieve certain financial 
measurement.
.852 .190 7.077E-02 .138 .250
To enhance cost reduction 
programmes.
.710 -5.386E-02 .347 .354 -2.870E-02
Identification of necessary 
measures.
.693 3.609E-02 .189 .243 .490
To comply with procedures of 
reporting.
.675 .276 .175 .473 .219
Perceived importance for 
meeting budgets.
.516 .486 .324 .233 .385
Inventory evaluation. .108 .878 -6.958E-02 2.325E-02 -8.647E-02
Basis for audit. 2.517E-02 .616 .462 .392 .231
To provide means of 
communication.
1.983E-02 3.649E-03 .835 .150 .267
Measuring efficiency of 
production performance.
. .367 1.830E-02 .736 .369 -9.451e-02
To achieve large profit. .406 .462 .645 -2.409E-02 -3.989E-02
Management and control of 
period costs.
.224 .184 .135 .889 .194
Role of standard cost in 
assessing performance.
.188 -.280 .342 .731 5.639E-02
Planning of period costs 
(budgeting).
.507 .356 6.197E-02 .702 .130
Performance evaluation of 
management.
.272 -6.421E-02 4.523E-02 .195 .892
To achieve target of production. .276 .528 .404 .146 .572
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
a Rotation converged in 14 iterations.
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Table A2.3: Rotated Component Matrix'1 for Uses of Cost Information for
Optimisation
Component
1 2 3 4 5
Development of better manufacturing 
methods.
.770 -1 .926E -02 .201 .186 .367
Personal development and workforce 
improvement
.742 .502 9 .451E -02 -.119 6 .727E -02
To motivate people to do better .618 .225 4 .571E -02 .495 .146
To enhance equipment productivity .556 .363 -8 .440E -02 .203 .309
Importance of marketing cost analysis .507 .264 .387 .118 .195
Transfer prices for internal services .420 -.129 .333 .266 -.188
Determine the economic production 
amount
.372 .762 7 .213E -02 8 .225E -02 3 .263E -02
To maintain certain profit margins 9 .662E -02 .671 .225 .556 .154
To measure of efficiency and capacity 
utilisation
.159 .635 -1 .066E -02 4 .9 5 5 E -0 2 .426
Importance of product cost an input to 
pricing decision
-3 .151E -02 .596 .438 .244 .232
Variance analysis and exception 
reporting
9 .926E -02 -2 .174E -02 .844 9 .2 3 7 E -0 2 7 .500E -02
Planned and actual product cost 2.281E -02 .200 .745 7 .031E -02 -2 .369E -02
Importance of flexible budget .154 -.127 .547 .363 .427
To stimulate control of conversion cost .247 .196 .496 .271 -5 .716E -03
Motivating efficiency improvement 9.044E -02 2.886E -02 .162 .826 .103
To emphasis throughput rate .221 .274 .241 .771 3 .3 7 8 E -0 2
Product mix decision .1 3 0 .231 .199 -8 .9 8 1 E -0 2 .790
Make or buy decision .243 .198 -.127 .270 .767
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
a Rotation converged in 11 iterations.
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Table A2.4: Structure Matrix for Uses of Cost Information for Strategy
Component
1 2 3
Importance o f technology configuration. .861 -.110 .529
Improvement o f product characteristics. .874 -.349 .532
Product quality analysis. .822 -6.088E-02 .628
Decisions o f company strategy. .808 4.481E-02 .398
M arket growth analysis. .747 -8.667E-02 .566
To forecast analysis. .718 -2.435E-02 .132
M arket development. .715 .230 .558
Importance o f  competitors cost analysis. .540 -.657 .498
Evaluation o f investment projects. .531 .606 .341
Importance o f  product configuration. .434 4.864E-02 .862
Importance o f  product improvement. .463 -.146 .838
New  product development. .325 -.259 .791
Planned and actual customer profitability. .597 -.505 .690
Market share analysis. .470 -.585 .623
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Table A2.5: Structure Matrix for the P (Un) of Product market
Component
1 2 3 4
M arket changes (sales) .486 -.156 -.516 -.338
Competition intensity 5.729E-02 -5.122E-02 -6.143E-02 .913
Customer variety .136 -.839 8.325E-02 .203
Profit margins 8.032E-02 2.029E-02 .870 -.105
product innovation .776 -.228 .208 -.116
Nature o f competition 9.488E-02 -.829 -.153 -.172
Prices o f product .790 -2.310E-02 -.135 .132
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
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Table A2.6: Structure Matrix for the P (Cl) of Raw Material and Supply
Component
1 2 3
Supply -.141 .133 -.861
Sources of supply -.805 -4.801E-02 .121
Competition between suppliers .648 .430 -2.903E-02
Cost of raw material .215 .787 -2.505E-02
Delivery time .181 -1.319E-03 -.822
Nature of suppliers -.705 .247 -9.529E-02
Prices of raw material -.292 .795 -.133
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Table A2.6a: Structure Matrix for the P (Un) of Raw Material and Supply
Component
1 2
Supply 8.756E-02 .817
Sources of supply .720 .176
Competition between suppliers .907 .242
Cost of raw material .585 .360
Delivery time .417 .721
Nature of suppliers .832 .199
Prices of raw material .886 .140
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
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Table A2.7: Structure Matrix for P (Cl) of Labour
Component
1 2 3
Availability o f skilled labour .663 .254 .190
Competing employers 7.429E-02 .176 .785
Wages rate .477 .379 .223
Trade union -.365 -.422 .566
Labour turnover -.750 .108 .246
Labour dependency 7.977E-02 -.830 -8.372E-02
The relationship between water 
organisations
.655 -.275 . -.203
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Table A2.7a: Structure Matrix for P (Un) of Labour
Component
1 2
Availability o f  skilled labour .706 .197
Competing employers .129 -.882
Wages rate .733 -.398
Trade union .618 -.514
Labour turnover .666 -.272
Labour dependency .417 -.754
The relationship between water organisations .541 -.144
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
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Table A2.8: Structure Matrix for P (Cl) of Management
Component
1 2
Availability of qualified managers .822 -4.500E-02
Salary of management -.592 .624
Competition for good managers .225 .852
Staff turnover .692 .264
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Table A2.8a: Structure Matrix for P (Un) of Management
Component
1
Availability of qualified managers .803
Salary of management .769
Competition for good managers .613
Staff turnover .748
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
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Table A2.9: Structure Matrix for P (Cl) of Capital and Financing
Component
1 2
Availability of fund -.275 .814
Sources of fund .486 .641
Cost of finance .696 5.394E-02
Staff turnover -.625 .116
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Table A2.9a: Structure Matrix for P (Un) of Capital and Financing
Component
1
Availability of fund .867
Sources of fund .876
Cost of finance .431
Staff turnover .781
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
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Table A2.10: Structure Matrix for P (Cl) of Technology
Component
1 2 3
Availability o f equipment .480 .338 .143
Equipment suppliers .603 -.151 .134
Competition for equipment 6.089E-02 -6.547E-02 .694
Delivery o f equipment .734 -141 -.194
Equipment failure .675 .303 .163
Nature o f  manufacturing technology .712 -.118 .201
Nature o f  system technology .474 6.228E-02 .646
Technology development 8.079E-03 .184 .676
Equipment obsolescence -4.624E-02 .884 1.296E-02
capital labour substitution -4.290E-02 .882 .118
Extraction Method: Principal Com ponent Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Norm alization.
Table A2.10a: Structure Matrix for P (Un) of Technology
Component
1 2 3
Availability o f equipment -4.082E-03 .467 .724
Equipment suppliers .172 .691 .268
Competition for equipment .782 .383 3.438E-02
Delivery o f equipment .291 .832 2.885E-02
Equipment failure .364 .514 -4.703E-02
Nature o f manufacturing technology .443 .782 2.165E-02
Nature o f system technology .857 .392 8.110E-02
Technology development .681 .254 .335
Equipment obsolescence .281 -2.804E-02 .881
capital labour substitution .828 .225 6.204E-03
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
R otation Method: Oblim in with Kaiser Norm alization.
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Table A 2.ll: Structure Matrix for P (Cl) of Legislation
Component
1 2
Regulators in the industry .886 -.195
Num ber o f legislation .852 -.220
Nature o f legislation .158 .912
Effect o f legislation .598 .355
Extraction M ethod: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with K aiser Norm alization.
Table A2.1 la:Structure Matrix for P (Un) of legislation
Component
1
Regulators in the industry .878
Number o f legislation .899
Nature o f legislation .630
Effect o f  legislation .854
Extraction Method: Principal Com ponent Analysis. 
Rotation M ethod: Oblim in with Kaiser Norm alizatio
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